G R E A T E R 

A M E R I C A 

ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN 



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GREATER AMERICA 



BY 

ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN 

M.I.C.K., F.R.G.S., GOLD MKDALLIST ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY 
AUTHOR OF 

"OVERLAND TO CHINA" " RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA" 
"CHINA IN transformation" ETC. 



WITH MAPS 




HARPER dr- BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 

NEW YORK AND LONDON 

1904 



LIBRARV ni CONGRESS 
Two Copies Received 

APR 7 1904 

Copyright S^itry 

CUSS .ii XXc. No. 
g- 1. p 3 -| 



COF 



P7I3 



'7P 



Copyright, 1904, by Archibald R. Colquhoun. 

All rights resirved. 

Published April, 1904. 



PREFACE 

In calling this book Greater America, the author 
is aware that he challenges comparison with a far 
more important, studied, and weighty work. No 
other title, however, conveys so successfully the 
main idea of this book. 

It is not only the territorial magnitude of 
Greater America, her innumerable problems of 
race and policy, and her resources, wealth, and 
progressive theories which are the motive of this 
book — it is rather Greater America as a world- 
power, the American peoples, and the American 
ideal in the cosmogony of the world. 

An attempt is here made — it is believed for the 
first time — to present American evolution as a 
whole, to treat her history from the stand-point 
of its wide national significance, to show to what 
point she has progressed, to indicate what her 
future may be. To do this in one comparatively 
short volume involved an amount of compression 
and elision which must, perforce, lead to a certain 
abruptness; it was impossible, in many cases, to 
do more than indicate a line of thought or suggest 
a train of ideas. 

What does Greater America mean? 

iii 



P R E FA C E 

If we could answer that question succinctly, if 
we could estimate the direction in which this 
huge dynamic force will be exercised, we should 
be able to take a long look into the future. But 
America — so it seems to the author — is at a 
critical period in her history. Very much de- 
pends on the spirit infused into her national life, 
both at home and abroad, during the next few 
years. 

As these lines are written comes the news of 
the final burst of the war cloud in the Pacific, 
and although long expected, we are not yet able 
to estimate what it may mean to the rest of the 
world. Nearly twenty years ago the writer of 
these lines predicted the shifting of the centre of 
gravity* of world affairs from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific Ocean. ^ Ten years later he embodied the 
same idea in a book which urged the cutting of an 
isthmian canal under American auspices.^ Final- 
ly, in his last book, published two years ago, he 
was able from personal knowledge to describe the 
principal features in that change which already 
had come over the Pacific' 

The three great factors in the transformation 
of the Pacific are the advance, overland and over- 
sea, of the two great expansive powers, Russia and 
America, and the regeneration of Japan. We see 
the embroilment of two of these in a struggle 

* R. U. S. Institution, 1885. 

^ The Key of the Pacific, 1895. 

* The Mastery of the Pacific, 1902. 

iv 



PREFACE 

which may have far-reaching consequences, not 
merely for either or both, but for the whole 
world. 

What part will Greater America play in the 
drama? 

It is with intention that the writer has to a 
certain extent ignored domestic politics in this 
study of Greater America, and has dealt chiefly 
with problems of imperial importance, which 
affect not the United States alone but Greater 
America as a whole. The questions of foreign 
relations, of alien peoples, of national defence, 
of government of dependencies — these are the 
matters which are of vital importance to the 
future of a great expansive nation, but on one 
domestic question — that of efficiency and purity 
in the administration — so many of these wide 
questions ultimately depend that it must be 
given a foremost place. The character of such 
a work as this is rather critical than descriptive. 
It is less of a travel-book than any yet attempted 
by the author, although he has visited, and in 
some cases revisited, almost every part of Greater 
America. If he seems, at times, to be bent on 
picking out weak spots, he asks his reader to 
believe that it is in no unfriendly spirit. A nation 
imbued with so many elements of greatness as 
the Americans, and with so large a measure of 
success behind them, needs criticism far more 
than lesser peoples. 

In writing both for the British and American 



PREFACE 

publics, the author was met by a difficulty in 
avoiding what might, at times, seem unnecessary 
explanation, since matters which are simple to 
the one are often cryptic to the other. The 
American reader must, therefore, exercise indul- 
gence in reading such chapters as that on "How 
Greater America Is Governed," while the Briton 
will perhaps forgive the dissertations on our 
Civil Service and the government of India, when 
he reflects that these are frequently the subjects 
of misconception on the part of even enlightened 
Americans. 

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that, in 
using the term " America " to the exclusion of the 
qualifying prefix "United States of," the author 
is not only avoiding circumlocution but is techni- 
cally correct. The citizens of the United States 
of America must be called Americans, since they 
have no other word to express their nationality, 
whereas the Canadians, Brazilians, or Mexicans, 
geographically Americans, have a distinct na- 
tional name. The term United States, so fre- 
quently used, might be with equal correctness 
applied to other than the North American States, 
but there is no other people who claim the name 
Americans, and no other country which could be 
spoken of as America. It may not be out of 
place to mention here that, although some of the 
subjects raised in this book are not new to the 
author, they are all studied afresh in the light 
of the most recent developments, and that no 

vi 



PREFACE 

part of the book has appeared previously in any 
form on either side of the Atlantic. 

In conclusion, the author wishes to thank the 
many friends, British and American, who have 
assisted him in his task in various ways, and more 
particularly the courteous officials at Washington, 
who gave him every assistance in their power in 
obtaining information. 



CONTENTS 

PACB 

CHAPTBE 

Preface • *^^ 

I. The American People i »-^ 

II. America and Colonization 38- 

III. Pacific Expansion: Theory and Practice . 62 

IV. Pacific Expansion: The Philippines — Three 

Years After ^5 

V. Caribbean Expansion: Cubans and Their 

American Friends 112 

VI. Caribbean Expansion — Cuba and the United 

States '3^ 

VII. The New American Sphere i47 

VIII. The Control of the Caribbean 171 

IX. Pan-Americanism in the Southern Continent 199 

X. Canada and Pan-Americanism 226 

XI. How Greater America Is Governed ... 253 

XII. Americans in the Tropics 284 

XIII. Problems of Expansion — Civil Service Re- 

form 302 ,_ 

XIV. Problems of Expansion— The Employment of 

Natives 3^7 

XV. Problems of Expansion— Army and Navy . 345 - 

XVI. Asia in Transformation 3^6 

XVII. Foreign Relations 394 

Appendix 4i9 

Index 42i 

ix 



LIST OF MAPS 

POLITICAL SKETCH MAP OF THE WORLD .... Facing p. I 

RACE DIAGRAM " 24 

DIAGRAM SHOWING ACCESSIONS OF TERRITORY. . " 48 

DIAGRAM SHOWING ALASKA TERRITORY .... " 58 
PANAMA AS A STARTING-POINT FOR THE PACIFIC 

AND FAR EAST " 162 

PANAMA AS A SHORT ROUTE FROM NEW YORK AND 

NEW ORLEANS TO THE PACIFIC SLOPE ... " 164 

THE CONTROL OF THE CARIBBEAN SEA .... " IQO 
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AMERICA, SHOWING 

TRANSPORTATION ROUTES " 200 

DIAGRAM SHOWING DENSITY OF POPULATION IN 

SOUTH AMERICA " 204 

MAP SHOWING EXISTING AND PROJECTED TRANS- 
CANADA RAILWAYS " 250 

RAILWAY MAP OF ASIA, SHOWING RUSSIAN EX- 
PANSION " 368 



GREATER AMERICA 

CHAPTER I 
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 

While it is impossible, in the scope of this book, 
to deal adequately with a subject so vast and so 
complex as that of the American people, it is 
essential, in order to appreciate what "Greater 
America" means, to glance briefly at the com- 
position and tendencies of the nation. 

It is a well-known fact that even the Early 
English were hardly so mixed in race as the modern 
Americans, and although the different elements 
may be politically fused, physically, morally, and 
socially they are still, to a great extent, distinguish- 
able. This is inevitable when we consider the 
steady stream of immigration which since 1830 
has been pouring into the country. Before that 
date it was not considerable, nor did it reach its 
greatest volume for some years. The Irish famine 
and political conditions in Germany provided a 
stimulus in the forties, and simultaneously ' came 
the discovery of gold in California and the be- 



GREATER AMERICA 

ginnings of steam communication. The main 
stream of immigration until 1880 was from north- 
em Europe, which had suppHed so many of the 
pre - Revolution colonists, and from the first the 
bulk of immigrants naturally avoided the South 
and settled in the Eastern and Northern States. 
The tendency from that date was to increase the 
urban population.^ 

The growth of cities in the last quarter-century 
has, of course, been infinitely more rapid than in 
the preceding era. In 1880 only one city — New 
York — had a population of over one million; in 
1900 there were three, and three others had more 
than half a million each. New York had a popu- 
lation of nearly three and a half millions; Chica- 
go one and three - quarter millions ; Philadelphia 
one and a quarter millions. After 1880 a fresh 
element in immigration was introduced. Hun- 
garians, Italians, Armenians, Roumanians, Rus- 
sians, and Poles began to flock in, until, in 1902, 
they formed seven- tenths of the total immigration. 
In 1903 the great bulk of European aliens came 
from the three countries of Austria-Hungary, Italy, 
and Russia. The aggregate immigration was 
105,000 in excess of that reported for any pre- 

* Tn the century between 1790 and 1890 the urban population 
rose from one-thirty-third of the total to one-third ; and while 
the total population increased sixteen times, the urban popu- 
lation increased one hundred and thirty - nine times. These 
figures include the preponderance of the rural population in 
the South, where agricultural interests still claim 87 per cent, 
of the population. 



GREATER AMERICA 

vious year. In New York over one-third of the 
population is foreign-bom. There are over 300,000 
Germans, 275,000 Irish, 155,000 Russians, 145,000 
ItaHans, 150,000 Austro-Hungarians ; the balance 
from the other countries of Europe, Asia, Canada, 
and South America. A great number of these 
are, of course, Jews expelled from their adopted 
countries. Others, like the Italians, are Latin 
people; while the Hungarians, Roumanians, Rus- 
sians, and Armenians bring a strain of Eastern 
blood. Hitherto the United States has had no 
real difficulty in combining all the immigrants into 
a coherent whole. The admiration with which 
we view this achievement should not blind us to 
some of its features. While the bulk of the immi- 
grants belonged to stocks kindred to that of the 
original Americans, the process of race fusion was 
in reality little more remarkable than that ac- 
complished in the early history of Britain. With 
the introduction of Latin and Slavonic elements, 
however, a serious problem arises. They are not 
brought in contact with a pure, homogeneous peo- 
ple, but with a nation, one, perhaps, in political 
principles, but heterogeneous in many other re- 
spects. It is usual to speak of American national 
character as if it were some outside influence 
which envelops and subdues the immigrant as 
soon as he becomes an American citizen. The 
fact is, of course, that immigration has mould- 
ed the national character and will continue to 
do so. 

3 



GREATER AMERICA 

It was recognized from early times that the 
native-born would have a difficulty in holding his 
own, not only racially but poHtically. The 
attempt to found a national party was met with 
ridicule and the title of "Know-nothings," but it 
was a sign of a very general desire to perpetuate 
the influence of the old colonial stock, and finds 
an echo in the writings of a modern American 
statesman, Mr. Roosevelt, when he speaks of 
"communities where the native - American ele^ 
ments are largest" as most promising from the 
point of view of social evolution. 

It is natural that Americans should be proud 
of their colonial ancestors. Early colonization 
provided the United States with a sturdy, steady, 
and yet enterprising stock, wedded to the prin- 
ciples of hard work and civic liberty. In this 
element we fail to find the seeds of the social 
problems of modem America, which chiefly centre 
round the worship of the golden calf. It is prob- 
ably true that a purely native^that is, colonial — 
American community would be free from the most 
objectionable features of American democracy. 
But such a community is hard to find after nearly 
a century of unrestricted immigration, and it is 
impossible that a country whose resources have 
made it the rendezvous for the speculators and 
adventurers of Europe should have failed to show 
their influence in its pohtical and social develop- 
ment. 

If a vague uneasiness was felt concerning peo- 

4 



GREATER AMERICA 

pie of kindred stock, it was certainly justifiable 
as regards aliens; but as to one class of immi- 
grants, the peculiar circumstances of their com- 
ing and their English speech have blinded most 
people to the fact that they are essentially an 
alien race. The Irish immigration was a factor 
in national life which the United States was far 
from wishing to reject; but as introducing a Celtic 
people into the midst of a nation largely Teutonic 
it has been a fateful experiment. The quickness 
of the Celt, his natural eloquence, vivacity, and 
love of politics have enabled him to usurp on the 
American continent a position of much power. 
The " Irish vote " is more influential in Amer- 
ican than in British affairs, and has had fre- 
quently a baneful influence on the welfare of 
the nation. In municipal life especially the Irish 
element has made for corruption and intrigue, 
the natural weapons of a people who have never 
won for themselves, or enjoyed as their birthright, 
the exercise of national rights. They have also 
used their influence on many occasions for the 
redress of their private grievances rather than for 
the true welfare of the community at large. Alto- 
gether, this Celtic element has been fraught with 
serious consequences, and it has retained its 
essential peculiarities while developing nominally 
on the lines of democracy. 

But if the less desirable class of Teutonic immi- 
grants from northern Europe and the Irish Celts 
have proved not unmixed blessings to the land of 

5 



GREATER AMERICA 

their adoption, what shall we say of a later stream ? 
Although it is generally assumed in America that 
the national digestion is strong enough to enable 
her to assimilate anything, there are already signs 
of uneasiness in some quarters, and laws are aimed 
at regulating this stream, which comes chiefly from 
southeastern Europe. At a time when unskilled 
labor is not so much in request, when the whole 
question of labor is involved in a struggle to main- 
tain the highest standard of remuneration, it is 
specially undesirable that large numbers of foreign- 
ers, with a much lower standard of living, should 
be admitted. But the racial question is of even 
graver importance; and with the practical stagna- 
tion of the native-bom and the rapid increase 
among the poorest aliens, it is of the highest 
moment that steps should be taken to preserve the 
ascendency of the Anglo-Saxon type of American. 
In Japan there are two races which have lived so 
long together that their origin is forgotten. One 
is aristocratic, the other plebeian. Outwardly 
they are unmistakable, and yet it is practically 
impossible to find the actual line of cleavage. 
One would not desire to see a similar state of 
affairs in America, nor is it possible under a de- 
mocracy ; but the conditions might well be similar 
if the American nation should become superim- 
posed with an alien and inferior stratum. Strong 
as is the assimilative power of this young country, 
which has been turning out young Americans from 
all sorts of material, she will find the assimila- 

6 



GREATER AMERICA 

tion of her new citizens a difficult task. It is 
often boasted that the naturaHzed American and 
his children are more patriotic even than the 
native-bom — plus royaliste que le roi. This state- 
ment the writer has seen justified by a quotation 
from a speech made by a naturalized German in 
one of the Western towns. He concluded a fiery 
oration with the sentiment: "America, our coun- 
try, against the world! America, right or wrong!" 
This may, of course, be with some people the idea 
of patriotism, but it is not enlightened patriotism, 
and it illustrates most forcibly what a perverted 
jingoism may lead to. The native-bom, it may be 
believed, would have too much sense of national 
honor, too profound a respect for the heroes of his 
race, and too true an understanding of the coun- 
try's best interests to utter so shallow and so 
mischievous a sentiment. However this may be, 
if unrestricted immigration from southern and 
eastern Europe continues on a large scale despite 
the restrictions now established, and if the native- 
born continues to increase so slowly, an undesir- 
able modification of national character will take 
place. Already a very considerable change is no- 
ticeable, not altogether due to industrial develop- 
ment. This has been chiefly in the direction of 
quick-wittedness and adaptability. There is noth- 
ing in the climate which could affect a race to such 
an extent; the modification is greatly due to the 
constant immigration to America of the keenest 
and most ambitious spirits. This was the land 

7 



GREATER AMERICA 

to make money in, and to it flocked those to whom 
worldly success was an ideal. 

It is a fact whose significance has seldom been 
appreciated that the flowering period of American 
literature was that immediately before the civil 
war, preceding the great industrial development 
and the era of millionaires. It is easy to under- 
stand why there should have been little literary 
life up to this period; but the comparative pov- 
erty of American achievement since the New Eng- 
land school died out is hard to explain. There 
are modem American writers by the score, a few 
American painters of reputation, and still fewer 
musicians; but modern America has become the 
home of mediocrity — she produces talent but not 
genius — nor is there to be found to-day in any 
part of the United States that peculiar literary or 
aesthetic atmosphere which is so often the cradle 
for genius. It was, and is not.^ 

The solution lies to a great extent in this 
question of immigration. Ever since the forties 
Europe has been pumping in hard-headed men of 
business, keen, ambitious, inartistic. The compe- 

' Unlike any other civilized country, America lacks a national 
capital, a fact which is undoubtedly contributory to the 
peculiar condition of her intellectual and aesthetic develop- 
ment. There is a dispersion of intellectual activity, a lack 
of focus in education and of fixed standards or ideals. Despite 
this fact, it might have been possible for one or other of the 
great cities to become the intellectual centre, as Boston was 
at her best period. At present, however, there is no such 
concentration, and literary and aesthetic life finds no rally ing- 
ground. 

8 



GREATER AMERICA 

tition, under circumstances in which no one is 
handicapped by birth, territorial possessions, or 
tradition, as in the Old World, is tremendously 
keen. There has been a constant sharpening-up 
of wits and faculties and an ever - increasing 
acceleration in the pace set, until American life 
has become one continuous whirl — a never-ceasing 
struggle to be first in an endless race. The im- 
pression given is that every one wants not so much 
to make money as to make more money than his 
neighbor; but the truth probably is that to relax 
would mean to be thrown out altogether. This 
high tension among business-men has undoubtedly 
had its origin largely in the fact that a great many 
of them were, and are, fighting for life in a country 
foreign to them ; but it has now become a habit — 
a national characteristic. The man who hasn't 
made much is absorbed in plans for making more, 
and the millionaire dies young as the result of 
overstrain, and leaves his fortune to his children. 
Here, at last, then, we have a leisured class — a 
cultured class, too, for most of the millionaires' 
children enjoy, besides the excellent education of 
their own country, a polishing process in Europe. 
Here should be the milieu for literary and artistic 
life, the cradle for the fine arts, the forcing-bed 
for the efflorescence of American civilization. But, 
alas! despite the appreciation of European art, 
which has led Americans to buy up wholesale the 
museums of the Continent, it must be confessed 
that the leisured class of Americans is the very 

9 



GREATER AMERICA 

last among which the Muses would be likely to 
make their home. They do not want a capricious 
and extravagant patronage, and, indeed, while 
far from aristocratic in their preferences, they are 
peculiarly averse to parvenus. 

Much the same causes which have led to a cer- 
tain barrenness in the realms of aesthetic achieve- 
ment have affected the public life of the nation. 
While it is generally admitted by all the best 
Americans that their government leaves much to 
be desired, very few will sacrifice time and in- 
clination in order to put things right. And yet 
public service was as traditional with the colonial 
Americans as it is with us, and in the early days 
of the nation's history a man of character and 
talent saw no better way to employ them than in 
the service of his state. What a distance has been 
traversed from then to now, when a gentleman 
will hardly "soil his hands" with politics! This 
is so much the case that the conditions of public 
life in England are hardly understood in America. 
It is almost inconceivable to an average American 
that there are hundreds of men in England who 
spend not only their lives but their incomes on a 
career which offers them practically no material 
advantages or preferments. Social ambition is a 
strong incentive to some, but many are placed 
above even such a temptation. It would, perhaps, 
seem impossible to an American that a great terri- 
torial magnate — a duke or an earl — should spend 
part of his time in discharging the functions of a 



GREATER AMERICA 

provincial mayor; but this does not seem to us a 
surprising self-sacrifice on his part. We are accus- 
tomed to regard devotion to unremunerative public 
duty as the natural field of energy for any man 
who can afford it. 

The case is, of course, different in a democracy. 
Owing to circumstances which must be dealt with 
later, politics have become a trade — and not an 
honest trade, either; but the natural love of the 
Anglo-Saxon for plain, straightforward govern- 
ment would have secured the constant co-operation 
of the best citizens and their devotion to public 
life but for one factor. 

This factor was the constant influx of fresh and 
turbulent elements. While the business-men be- 
gan at once that struggle to wrest a fortune from 
the new land, the political outcasts of Europe— 
the theorists, demagogues, malcontents — who were 
assured of complete liberty, and even Hcense, in 
their new home, became gradually fused into the 
American democracy and soon learned to control 
it. Jobbery, intrigue, party tactics of the most 
unscrupulous kind were weapons which could not 
have been used to such deadly advantage but for 
the fact that a low moral standard had been allowed 
to establish itself. This is not the standard of the 
countrymen of Washington and Lincoln. It owes 
its inspiration to the gutters of Europe. 

Some American writers point proudly to the 
ebullition of national feeling — the "birth of the 
nation" — when first the West made its weight 



GREATER AMERICA 

strongly felt in the Union, and Jackson became 
President, bringing the roughness of frontier life 
into the polished circles of a government which 
had been framed by a Washington and a Hamil- 
ton. Jackson, however, inaugurated the " spoils 
system," whose baleful influence has retarded the 
moral growth of the United States more than any- 
thing else. Who knows to what heights of judicial 
and administrative perfection America might not 
have attained but for this rude interruption of her 
settled and ordered development. There was no 
question of a relapse into hereditary institutions; 
but there was every question of profiting by the 
experience of the Old World and of framing society 
on a model at once fresh and mellowed with bor- 
rowed experience. The frontier element proved 
too strong. It undoubtedly breathed a keener 
and more belligerent spirit into the Union, but it 
pervaded the whole political and social life with 
an element of crudity and unscrupulousness which 
still remain. 

Since the time of Jackson and the earliest in- 
cursion of the Westerner into political life a great 
change has undoubtedly been creeping over the 
country west of the Alleghanies. The most recent 
phase of this is the development of the great 
Mississippi Valley and the rolling of the tide of 
prosperity and progress southward to New Orleans. 
The Federalists, anxious to secure the supremacy 
of the Atlantic States in the Union, opposed the 
annexation of Louisiana, and their prognostica- 

12 



GREATER AMERICA 

tions have been verified, for to-day the West, 
with a minority of electors, has an overwhelming 
majority of Senators.^ 

The Westerners, it must not be forgotten, were 
not the first type of American, and it may be ques- 
tioned whether they were the finest. Before the in- 
dustrial immigration of the thirties most of the im- 
migrants were not absorbed by the Eastern cities, 
but spread westward into newer districts, settling 
mainly on the land. They were far rougher and 
cruder as communities, and intensely democratic. 
It was a long time before they made themselves 
heard in the Union, for, during the period of storm 
and stress, when the East and South were fighting 
the battles of the young republic, winning her a 
place in the comity of nations, arranging her in- 
ternal affairs, and rehabilitating her finances, the 
West, shut off by mountains, was developing on 
its own lines. Isolated by its position from the 
influences of the Old World, the Westerners grew 
up with a sturdy independence and an entire ig- 
norance of world conditions. The dominant note 
which they brought into the Union was an aggres- 
sive desire for an entire separation from European 

' The total population of the United States, according to the 
twelfth census, is 76,305,387. The population of the forty- 
five States is 74,181,336. New York has nearly 10 per cent, 
of this figure, Pennsylvania about 8 per cent., Illinois about 
6^ per cent., Ohio about 5^ per cent., Missouri about 4^ per 
cent., and Massachusetts over 3^ per cent. These six States 
have altogether about 38^ per cent, of the total population of 
the States, but their combined voting strength in the Senate is 
only twelve out of ninety. 

13 



GREATER AMERICA 

interests, and, with true provincialism, they be- 
lieved it possible that the American nation could be 
all sufficient to itself. They joined heartily in — if 
they did not initiate — a policy of expansion which 
would eliminate Europe from the American con- 
tinent. They have ever been in the van in fight- 
ing. Size has a natural fascination for a people liv- 
ing in such a vast country, and the Westerner was 
perhaps the first, though not the last, American to 
make an ideal of bigness rather than goodness. 

With the civil war came a rapprochement between 
East and West, and in recent years the growth of 
industrial life has helped to assimilate the South 
as well as other sections to the dominant type 
of Americanism. With the growth of cities a 
change has come to the West. The Western type 
is no longer that of the frontier-man farmer, but 
includes the business -man and speculator. A 
tendency to a cleavage of interests between ag- 
riculture and industrialism is showing itself. The 
former, once the life of the country, feels itself left 
behind in the promotion of interests. The farmers 
see themselves supplanted by industrial immigrants 
and political adventurers, just as they supplanted 
the colonial American. Physically, the old type 
of Westerner is superior to any other of the 
present day, though not to the old colonial stock; 
mentally and morally, he has advanced consider- 
ably since facilities of communication and educa- 
tion gave his civilization an upward turn. It is 
to a race bred on the soil and in pure air that every 

14 



GREATER AMERICA 

nation must look for constant renewal, and this 
the West supplies; but the evil tendencies of 
political evolution are so serious in their action on 
communities still raw and crude that it is to be 
feared that American national life may be poi- 
soned at the very source from which it should draw 
its supplies of moral as well as physical renewal. 
Where in this constant recasting of the national 
type do we find the true birth of the American 
people? It is customary to speak of Washington 
as the first American, but it would be hard to 
imagine a greater contrast than would be present- 
ed were he to stand beside a modern American, 
whether of the Eastern or Western cities. By right 
of priority the colonial stock may be regarded as 
the first Americans, and the country owes to them 
not only its constitution, but many of its truest ele- 
ments of greatness. In the shock of contact with 
the virile West this type lost many characteristics. 
Traditions and ideals, good or bad, went over- 
board, and only a few little social backwaters — 
like Concord, New England — remained for a time. 
Then to the influence of the stranger from over the 
mountains was added that of the stranger within 
the gates, and with the industrial wave which 
swept over the country the original Americans were 
either submerged or carried away.* 

' Within recent years we have seen the practical elimination 
of one of the oldest and most forceful of American types. 
With the migration of the sturdy New England yeomen dis- 
appears one of the last strongholds of the native American. 

15 



GREATER AMERICA 

A significant feature of modem Americanism 
is the wide-spread movement among descendants 
of colonial times to band together for mutual 
recognition and support. Ridiculous as may seem 
in a democratic community the self - conferred 
distinctions of societies of the Cincinnati, Colonial 
Dames, Sons and Daughters of the Revolution, 
and kindred societies; incongruous as may appear 
the prestige attached to a " Knickerbocker " family 
— these are all signs of the times which cannot be 
overlooked. 

The fascinating study of sociology in America is 
altogether outside the scope of this book. It has 
been treated at length by many abler pens. The 
writer is inclined to believe, however, that the im- 
portance of the modifications in what, for lack of 
a better term, we may call the national character, 
which are due to a constant influx of two distinct 
types of immigrants, has been somewhat over- 
looked. These modifications are going on under 
our eyes. The race fusion of which Americans 
speak with pride has not been a constant as- 
similation of all elements to the American type, 
but the steady modification of that type by fresh 
elements. How else can one account for the 
heterogeneous nature of American society, the 
dissimilarity visible between State and State, or 
even city and city? Americans not infrequently 
boast that the city from which a man comes is 
betrayed not only by his clothes and speech, but 
by his very face and manner. One has only to 

z6 



GREATER AMERICA 

read the classic descriptions of De Tocqueville to 
realize how much more truly homogeneous was 
the democracy of his time, though even then he 
saw elements of incongruity and danger. No 
modem traveller could give an account of the 
American people which would be at once so 
simple and convincing. Bryce, who devoted to 
the task abilities of the highest order, gives us 
a study marvellous for detail, but leaving the 
reader who does not know America without a 
mental picture. The reason is not far to seek. 
One cannot correctly paint a chameleon; one can- 
not fix on paper what is forever changing. It 
might have been possible for a sympathetic ob- 
server to catch the spirit of American life, to 
translate into words the soul of the nation — 
there are books on other countries which do this 
without any attempt at social or political dis- 
section — but is there, in truth, any such element 
in American life ? If it exists it is smothered 
from sight by the excrescences of an evanescent 
modernity. 

This is why all writers who have attempted to 
give a picture of the American nation have failed. 
Either they take local conditions or some of the 
excrescences and magnify them out of all pro- 
portion, or they fall back on some period of his- 
tory — preferably the civil war — and draw a pict- 
ure which has long been out of date. The writer 
has failed, in an exhaustive search, to find any 
book, small or great, which gave at once a pict- 
3 17 



GREATER AMERICA 

ure of the American people and the key to 
their pecuHar and complex civilization. Few 
Americans care for the study of themselves. Like 
Topsy, they "guess they growed"; and it is 
only the more thoughtful who are beginning to 
have misgivings as to the tendency of that 
growth. 

What is the bearing of this difficult and com- 
plex subject on Greater America? In the first 
place, it has been the primary factor in insuring 
the constant expansion by which Greater Amer- 
ica has been built up. Not only the quantity but 
the quality of the immigration at various periods 
has been directly contributory to this. First, the 
adventurous pioneers who helped to win the West ; 
then the industrial element, which devoted itself 
to commercial affairs and stimulated expansion 
by a constant demand for fresh markets ; then the 
Western element, also expansionist in spirit, from 
a desire to insure complete divorce from Europe 
and to secure an outlet on the sea -coast. So 
on in a circle mns the current of American evolu- 
tion : immigration leads to industrial develop- 
ment, and that to further expansion, calling for 
fresh immigration. 

At last a halt seems to have been called in this 
course of development. Chinese and Japanese 
immigration is discouraged; a general disinclina- 
tion is shown to bring into the Union Territories 
where the foreign element predominates; and im- 
migration from Europe is to be closely restricted. 



GREATER AMERICA 

At this period also the United States finds herself 
at the head of a great colonial empire, the centre 
of a governmental system with many variations, 
and pledged to a career very different to the 
isolated splendor she had once marked out for 
herself. 

It is, at first sight, a curious comment on the 
universal truth and wisdom of the democratic 
principle that America should be the mistress of 
not one but many alien races, to whom she can- 
not, or will not, give those individual rights which 
she claims as the heritage of every man. The 
present writer would be the last to question the 
wisdom of this reservation. He hopes to show 
in succeeding chapters some of the salient feat- 
ures of these outlying parts of Greater America, 
and how they affect, and are affected by, the 
national ideals and idiosyncrasies of the United 
States. What are the probabilities that all these 
dependencies may be by degrees assimilated to 
the American ideal, and that democracy may 
triumphantly vindicate itself by becoming the 
basis of every government under the Stars and 
Stripes? 

Misgivings may well arise in the mind of the 
ardent democrat when he recollects with how little 
success he has dealt with the internal problem of 
adjusting the relations of races of different color 
and varying degrees of civilization. 

With the Indians he has attempted to deal more 
or less paternally — if, indeed, a course of action 

19 



GREATER AMERICA 

can be deemed paternal which is so demoraHzing 
for those on whom it acts. The Indian has never 
been regarded as fit for the exercise of rights 
like the white American. First a bitter foe and 
then a conquered and submissive vassal, the one 
aim has been, while depriving the red-man of his 
stake in the land, to keep him apart from his con- 
queror and to secure to him just enough ground 
and just sufficient money to prevent his feeling 
the pinch of want, which might drive him to a 
more strenuous life. Immured, therefore, in res- 
ervations, in which the tribal organization, mean- 
ingless under modem conditions of civilization, 
has been artificially preserved , deprived of the only 
stimulating occupations he had ever known — war 
and hunting, — the Indian might have declined in 
numbers and died out, slowly but respectably, 
had he been strictly and wisely governed within 
the limits of the reservations. Here we find, 
however, the baneful effect of the Spoils System. 
No permanent department has the interests of 
Indians at heart. If there is any subject which 
should be totally outside party politics it is this, 
in which is involved the welfare of so many help- 
less beings without any interest in party govern- 
ment. The Indian Bureau, however, has become 
a mere political machine, and its members are ap- 
pointed on party grounds, and not for their knowl- 
edge of, or sympathy with, Indians. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that incompetent and un- 
suitable men have sometimes been appointed to 

20 



GREATER AMERICA 

oversee the reservations/ and that, seeing dis- 
honesty, ignorance, laziness, and even intemper- 
ance among the men whom they are tavight to 
regard as examples, the Indians, incapable of the 
virtues of American civilization, have lapsed into 

the vices.^ 

In any case, the reservation system, with or 
without political influence, is a bad one under a 
democracy. To maintain a truly paternal rule 
over these communities scattered from Minnesota 
to Mexico and from Michigan to California is a 
practical impossibility for the federal government. 
Then, too, land in America is already getting 
precious; immigrants press in on the reservations, 
and against energy and enterprise the Indian sloth 
and carelessness can make little stand. From the 
circumstances of their lives— their dependence on 
the government, lack of incentive to work, and 
general degeneracy— the Indians in their reserva- 
tions have become, too often, plague-spots on 
American society, centres of depravity and vice. 
At the best, they afford a dismal spectacle and 
an evil example. It is now strongly urged that 
the reservation system should be gradually broken 

1 "The officials . . . work under hard conditions, and also 
under conditions which render it easy to do wrong and very 
difficult to detect wrong. Consequently they should be amply 
paid on the one hand, and, on the other, a particularly high 
standard should be demanded from them: and where mis- 
conduct can be proved the punishment should be exemplary. 
Message of the President, 1902. 

' Lyman Abbott, in North American Review, 1898. 



21 



GREATER AMERICA 

up, and the red-man allowed to mix with his fel- 
low-Americans — on the same plane, at all events, 
as Poles, Hungarians, and Italians. The Indian 
race cannot survive as a separate entity; the one 
hope for it is fusion with the dominant Anglo- 
Saxon; but whether, after a long course of de- 
moralization, it will prove a desirable element in 
the nation is more than doubtful. 

A decaying and enfeebled race like the Indians, 
however, forms but a minor problem beside that 
of the negroes and their place in American society. 
Although the black people are not increasing at a 
ratio which, so far, threatens white supremacy 
(while white immigration continues), yet they are 
increasing steadily, and, moreover, are segregating 
in what is known as the black belt in the Southern 
States. This movement is one that cannot fail 
to cause uneasiness to Americans. Scattered 
throughout the Southern States (with a sprinkling 
in the North), dominated morally and mentally, 
if not numerically, by the whites, the negro race 
was a problem but not a menace. Even now the 
situation is not so grave that it may not be re- 
trieved. The leaders of the black race have no 
other ambition at present than to raise their people 
to a higher level in the cosmogony of America. It 
is as citizens of the American Republic that they 
desire to face the future. And yet overwhelming 
public opinion denies them this position, is pushing 
them slowly but surely away from it, and is making 
their segregation more and more inevitable. 



GREATER AMERICA 

The vital importance of this question to Greater 
America cannot be overestimated. With the bur- 
dens, as well as the glories, of world-greatness upon 
her, America needs above everything to assure to 
herself internal unity and progress. The negro 
problem has already assumed proportions which 
make it possible that the whole policy of the na- 
tion may turn on a point of race prejudice. The 
unhealthiness of this condition must cause the 
gravest uneasiness to every thoughtful man. 
While it is impossible in this book to enter with 
any fulness into this most difficult subject, it 
is necessary to summarize briefly the main points 
in the controversy. 

On the one hand, a large majority of whites, 
especially in the Southern States, feel that any 
attempt to place the negroes on the footing of 
American citizens would, owing to their numerical 
superiority in certain districts, secure to them 
the government not only of themselves but of 
the white minority. Apart from the question of 
whether that government would be good or bad, 
there is, in the white man's breast, an ineradicable 
aversion against being dominated by a black, or 
even colored, people. This is partly race prej- 
udice, partly the result of terrible experience in 
the reconstruction period. In any case, it is too 
strong a sentiment to be rooted out or disregard- 
ed. On this foundation any schemes for the 
future must be laid. 

The writer must confess that to him this prej- 

23 



GREATER AMERICA 

udice, while natural in its original form, is now 
carried to an excess; but to a Briton, secure in 
that form of government which makes black and 
white alike free, but alike bound to obey a superior 
authority (always white!), there is not that lurk- 
ing dread of the power of a black democracy. If 
the American would acknowledge freely and hon- 
estly the break-down of the democratic system, 
would accept his position as the dominant factor 
in a great republican empire, would cease to en- 
deavor to square his theory with his practice, 
he might still advance along the paths of prog- 
ress, might achieve the freest and most liberal 
form of government, but would still not be de- 
barred from dealing justly with alien and subject 
races. 

The negro is a subject race. There is no proof 
of its incapacity to rise to higher things; there is 
every proof that at present it is, as a mass, on a 
lower level of civilization than the white Amer- 
ican. Instinct, which is stronger than logic, and 
common-sense, which is better than theory, tell 
us two things about the negro. First, that race- 
fusion between him and the white man is not the 
solution of the problem, that it is to be deprecated 
on both physical and moral grounds; secondly, 
that unless he is provided with a legitimate ambi- 
tion in life he will find an illegitimate one. Left 
alone, peraiitted to segregate, and deprived of the 
stimulating contact of a higher civilization, the 
American negro will sink to lower levels. He will 

24 



GREATER AMERICA 

act as a drag and a menace to the nation of which, 
after all, he is an integral part. 

Education — the universal panacea of modem 
times — is the only practical remedy which has 
been suggested. In its way it is the most im- 
portant factor. Properly applied and directed, it 
may make a good negro out of a bad one, and a 
good negro is a far better citizen than a bad 
white. But when the negro is educated, is 
raised, not individually but racially, to a higher 
level of knowledge and character, what then? Is 
it to be expected that he will press forward to 
this goal without incentive, without hope of re- 
ward? Is the negro race to be admitted, by de- 
grees perhaps, but certainly and finally, to the 
full enjoyment of the privileges of American cit- 
izens ? At present the exhibition of the strong- 
est civic virtues, the highest talents, and the most 
disinterested ambitions do not secure a negro in 
America from treatment which the humblest sub- 
ject of the British crown, black or brown, might 
resent. Americans who value liberty and jus- 
tice more than life, who have been willing to shed 
their blood to secure them to Cubans and Fili- 
pinos, refuse them to a fellow-American because 
he is black. 

The necessity for a proper adjustment of racial 
relations has, therefore, become a burning ques- 
tion. The writer pleads with his American 
cousins for a fairer and more open considera- 
tion of the subject, and for its readjustment on 

25 



GREATER AMERICA 

rational, honest, and truthful lines. Treat the 
negro as a subject race, but remember that a sub- 
ject race has rights. Draw the line of color as 
strongly as you will, but do not treat the black 
man as if he were not human. The white men 
own the American continent; they have every 
right to dictate to others the terms on which they 
shall inhabit it; but for their own sakes, if for no 
higher motive, they should see that those terms 
will be such as self-respecting people can accept. 
It may be said that the negro is not self-respect- 
ing; if so the terms of existence should be regu- 
lated as to arouse in him that sentiment, which 
is the only basis for a useful life. 

Generalizations like these are open to the crit- 
icism that they are easy to make but hard to 
realize. The negro question, however, has hardly 
yet reached in America the stage of generalization. 
There is no agreement, no settled policy, no unity 
of sentiment on the subject. The one distinct 
and certain feature is the widening of the gulf 
between the races and the embitterment of their 
mutual relations. Every State has its own 
method of dealing with what is, in reality, a na- 
tional matter. Isolated efforts at reform in one 
section are nullified by abuses in another. 

This is eminently one of those quagmires 
through which the American people need the lead- 
ing hand of a strong, constructive statesman. 
Nothing but drastic reform, based on a profound 
change in public sentiment, can revolutionize the 

26 



GREATER AMERICA 

present condition of drift and muddle. The 
placing of all official positions on a firmer and less 
corrupt basis would be a step in the right direction, 
for it would strengthen the powers of the federal 
government in proportion as it weakened those of 
local politicians. Reform should open an avenue 
to the really high -class negro, which could be 
done without increasing by one iota the influ- 
ence of a black democracy. 

It is surely not too much to expect of so adaptive 
and virile a people as the Americans that they 
should be able to evolve at least a working com- 
promise which would deprive the "black cloud" 
of its most baneful possibilities. Imperfect as is 
the British system of dealing with negroes in the 
West Indies, it is truer to the spirit of democracy 
than that found in America, since it affords them 
not only oppgrtunities but incentives to rise, rec- 
ognizes and rewards individual merit, deals out 
an even-handed justice to black and white, and 
finally makes good subjects instead of bad ones. 
And all this while securing for the white popula- 
tion (a mere handful among the blacks) a position 
in the respect and affection of the negroes which 
many a Southerner must envy.^ 

In dealing, however briefly, with the people of 
Greater America, one is constantly obliged to 
refer to education as the suggested solvent for 

' The question is more fully discussed in an article by the 
writer, "The Negro Problem," North American Review, May, 
1903. 

27 



GREATER AMERICA 

many racial and political problems. Nothing is 
more striking in American life than the interest 
taken in educational projects, the sums devoted to 
them by private beneficence, and the importance 
attached to the possession of a training in one or 
other of the great colleges. It must be confessed 
that all this is novel to the average Briton. His 
interest in the education given in the Elementary 
Schools (in America called Public Schools) is limit- 
ed to a grumble at the rates which he has to pay 
for them. The agitation regarding the education 
bill rages chiefly round a point which does not 
actually affect the efficiency of the training given 
in the schools. As for the public schools — Eton, 
Harrow, Rugby, and the others — they have be- 
come a tradition out of which it will be hard to 
shake the conservative Briton. He will continue 
to grumble at the unpractical nature of the educa- 
tion obtained there, in the same spirit as at the 
large bills; but, as a rule, he thinks that public 
schools are the training-grounds which best fit his 
boy, physically and morally, if not mentally, to 
take his place in English society; and, until the 
whole fabric of that society tumbles into ashes, 
perhaps he is right. 

A great industrial people like the Americans, a 
nation made up of "pushers," a society in which 
stagnation has become impossible, could hardly 
take this abstract view. Education to an English- 
man means character development; to an Amer- 
ican it means actual equipment for the battle of 

28 



GREATER AMERICA 

life. The attention paid to the subject, the money 
expended, and the interest displayed have secured 
for American education a foremost place. It is 
up to date in appliances, in mechanical aids, in 
scientific methods. There is an attempt to teach 
just what every American citizen will want to 
know, and, above all, to make him bright, ready 
of expression, quick in decision, self-possessed, and 
practical. The poorest can obtain this type of 
education, which is specially designed to act as a 
solvent on the many elements of which the lowest 
grade of society is composed; and of late years 
patriotism — -love of America and devotion to her 
institutions — has been steadily inculcated. 

Excellent in many of its features, American 
education is open to criticism on one or two points 
which vitally affect the character of the people as 
a nation. First, the tendency is towards material- 
ism — a sacrifice of the more subtle forms of char- 
acter development, which is the true aim of edu- 
cation, for a mere training in certain 'ologies and 
'isms. Efficiency is more sought after than depth 
or thoroughness. There is too much desire for the 
actual advantages that learning can bestow rather 
than love of it for its own sake, and for the possibil- 
ities in the way of happiness which it opens to rich 
and poor alike. It is to this materialistic ten- 
dency that some of the most unpromising feat- 
ures of American society can be traced, for it must 
be remembered that, as true happiness in an in- 
dividual has its roots in spiritual far more than 

29 



GREATER AMERICA 

in material well-being, so it is with the nation of 
which that individual is a unit. 

An interesting comment upon a kindred side of 
American life — the effect of industrial expansion 
and a high state of mechanical efficiency upon the 
real happiness of the people — is afforded by a 
Japanese writer who was sent by the head of the 
Foreign Office to make inquiry 

"in those places where these wonderful machines are most 
used, as to their social effects, and learn what methods, if 
any, have been adopted to cause them to bring that comfort 
and leisure to the masses for which they were evidently 
devised. 

"This I did" [says the writer]. "In Philadelphia I saw 
a new phase of American life. On a former visit, with 
apartments in the Continental, I had seen, I now found, 
but the upper side of things — art-galleries, museums, 
libraries, colleges, costly churches, elegant dwellings, and 
well-to-do, distinguished people. I had, too, no doubt, 
seen great department stores, ship-yards, and locomotive 
works, but all from the point of view of a well-fed and 
contented man. My attention had not been attracted to 
the workers, except that they appeared to be better 
clothed, better fed, better housed, and apparently happier 
than with us. 

"I now, under my instructions, was to abjure the 
civilities of the rich in order to spend my time among and 
learn something about the poor. My former perceptions 
I soon found to be illusive. The better dress, houses, 
furniture, more varied food of these people was accom- 
panied, I was surprised to find, with more tension, more 
anxiety, and, I think, with less happiness than among the 
same classes in Japan. In factories, amid the roar of 
labor-saving machinery, I found considerable numbers of 

30 



GREATER AMERICA 

children and young people of both sexes working ten 
hours daily, which, with the noon hour and the half-hours 
occupied in going and returning, make a twelve-hour day; 
called to toil by shrieking steam- whistles, and so fearful 
of being docked or discharged that usually the larger part 
of them were waiting at the factory doors fifteen to thirty 
minutes before time. Posted conspicuously about the 
rooms I saw 'The Rules,' rigidly forbidding talk, forbidding 
friends to enter, and so on, enforced by fines. I found that, 
with the lapse of time, machines have been speeded faster 
and faster, and that sometimes one person who formerly 
ran but one machine now runs two, three, or even more. 
In cotton factories one young woman now has charge of 
four looms, and occasionally five. I found that these 
workers rarely owned their own homes, three-fourths at 
least being tenants liable to eviction upon thirty days' 
notice. Wages seemed to be no more than a bare living, 
though at a much higher standard than in Japan, very 
few accumulating anything."^ 

There is about these lines an air of truthfulness 
and conviction, and the facts are indisputable as 
far as they go. They lead us naturally to that 
most serious question with which the American 
people are now face to face — the relations between 
capital and labor. 

De Tocqueville noted with approbation the 
equality of fortune among Americans, and even at 
a later date it seemed as though the good things 
of this world were more evenly distributed in 
America than anywhere else in the civilized world. 
Millionairism, in fact, is a modern disease, and, 

' Japanese Notions of American Political Economy. By 
Tentearo Makato. Philadelphia, 1899. 

31 



GREATER AMERICA 

unfortunately, it is one which seems to have be- 
come endemic. The natural sequence of events 
in a country where certain people are inordinately 
rich is that others should be excessively poor, not 
because the rich deprive or oppress the poor 
directly, but because money, piled up million on 
million, becomes too much for the control of one 
man and ceases to be an active power for good. Its 
productiveness is not actually lessened, since it is 
well known that millions beget more millions, but 
it is too often diverted into channels of minor 
usefulness to the community at large. Then the 
combinations known as Trusts, which often in- 
clude several millionaires, not only tend to crush 
individual effort, but, by their power of artificially 
stimulating or depressing the market, are able to 
control the destiny of the laborer or artisan to an 
extent impossible in a country where Trusts are 
still in their infancy. Titanic forces are, there- 
fore, meeting in this conflict of capital and labor. 
On the one hand, men commanding resources so 
vast as to be almost illimitable; on the other, the 
strongest democracy in the world. Neither can 
do without the other, but both are prepared to 
fight to the death for power. All over Europe 
we see the growth of socialism, which teaches men 
to combine for the security of their rights and for 
the express purpose of nullifying the advantages 
possessed by capitalists. The American people, 
with a wholesome regard for the rights of prop- 
erty, have not yet gone to the excesses which have 

32 



GREATER AMERICA 

marred the cause of freedom and liberty on the 
European continent. They have, indeed, enjoyed 
a measure of freedom, opportunity, and comfort 
far above that possessed formerly by other 
peoples ; but their patience is now being sorely 
tried. So long as industrial prosperity lasts and 
workers are at a premium, the pinch of the boot 
may not be so keenly felt ; but there are signs that 
a period of reaction is about to follow that of over- 
production, and this, coming at a time wjhen 
immigration is still high, must force upon the 
people the inequalities of their position as re- 
gards labor. 

It is not altogether correct to attribute to the 
influence of Trusts the present financial condition 
in America. The fact is that a country, like an 
individual, has an earning power of so much a 
year, that a certain portion must be spent in 
living expenses and the rest invested. America 
has been investing out of proportion to her earn- 
ing power in many ways, not least in over-pro- 
duction, and now comes the swing of the pendulum 
and the natural reaction, both of which are as 
likely to go a little too far in the other direction. 
There appears to be no remedy for this state of 
affairs, which is familiar to us in Europe; and 
though artificial conditions can retard or acceler- 
ate the swing, no true equilibrium will ever be es- 
tablished. The sufferers by this economic fluct- 
uation are naturally those who live nearest the 
margin of poverty. If the Japanese observer and 
3 33 



GREATER AMERICA 

many others are to be believed, there are more 
of these in the United States than the generally 
prosperous look of the people would warrant. The 
poverty of the Japanese peasant, and even artisan, 
is inconceivable to a Western mind — it has been 
computed that many families live and are housed 
on an income of some ;^5 a year — and yet no one 
who knows both Japan and America would hastily 
decide as to which country contains the happiest 
and healthiest working-classes. We in England 
are wont to speak wonderingly of Goldsmith's 
parson "passing rich with forty pounds a year!" 
But the picture was a true one when painted; 
the period was one of simplicity and rudeness, 
even in a class above that of the actual worker. 
It is, to a great extent, our needs, and not our 
incomes, which decide our worldly position. " In- 
come twenty shillings, expenditure nineteen and 
six — riches," said the celebrated Mr. Micawber; 
" Income twenty shillings, expenditure twenty-one 
— bankruptcy!" 

Circumstances — education, the claims upon vital- 
ity, the natural pride of a self-governing people — ■ 
have raised the standard of American life to a 
height hitherto unrealized in civilized society. The 
American artisan or mechanic must give more of 
himself, and naturally expects more in return. It 
is, therefore, a very intricate and important ques- 
tion how to regulate the swinging pendulum of 
economic prosperity so that its backward sweep 
does not knock down a large portion of this del- 

34 



GREATER AMERICA 

icately constructed and highly wrought fabric of 
American society. Poor as he is, the Japanese 
peasant knows he need never be poorer, and his 
simple wants enable him to strike a balance, like 
Mr. Micawber, between revenue and expenditure. 
It is one of the weakest spots in a higher and 
more complex civilization that such a simple solu- 
tion of the problem becomes impossible. 

The regulation of Trusts, in which many people 
see the only remedy for these economic evils — for 
the discouragement of milHonaires and the general 
levelling-up of conditions — is an extremely diffi- 
cult matter. Technically, the Trusts are corpora- 
tions, and as such legally sound. Practically, they 
have been largely instrumental in promoting the 
prosperity of the country. So vast a territory, 
with such varied conditions and conflicting in- 
terests, might have been much longer in accom- 
plishing its industrial development but for the 
artificial stimulus of these great combines. Never- 
theless, it is to be hoped, in the truest interests 
of the American people, that some method will 
now be found to check the further formation of 
these monopolistic enterprises, which have al- 
ready answered their purpose and done their best 
work. Any further development of them will be 
against the interests of the democracy and for 
the benefit of a group of millionaires. It will 
widen the gap between capital and labor, for the 
personal relation between employer and employe, 
which is so valuable an element in all difficulties, 

35 



GREATER AMERICA 

is out of the question in these mammoth organ- 
izations. It will strengthen those organizations 
which, depending on a lavish and unprincipled 
expenditure of money for their power, are sapping 
individual liberty, eating out the very heart of 
democracy, and, in fact, delivering America over 
bound and helpless into the hands of a plutocracy. 
It is in the Senate that the strongest support of 
Trusts will be found, for in that body are repre- 
sented the principal interests involved. When one 
recollects the growing influence of the Senate, its 
jealousy regarding prerogatives, and the power it 
exercises over any but the strongest President, one 
cannot but wonder if Americans are blind to the 
nature of the government in which they place such 
supreme confidence. The Senate, from the point 
of view of ability, is a body of which any country 
might be proud; but it is as plutocratic, as much 
representative of class interests in its own way as 
the British House of Lords is aristocratic and con- 
servative in another. Indeed, there are signs of 
far greater sympathy with the masses about the 
latter body. Has Demos cast himself down from 
his throne and set up the figure of Mammon in his 
stead ? 

These and many other questions perplex every 
one who considers, even superficially, the problems 
of modem America and her people. The problems 
are, for the most part, not peculiar to America, 
but are shared in modified form by every pro- 
gressive nation. But the immensity of her territory 

36 



GREATER AMERICA 

and its resources, the number of her children, and 
the lofty ideals which she has set before herself, 
differentiate America from the rest of the world, 
and make her at once the subject for highest 
admiration and for severest criticism. 



CHAPTER II 
AMERICA AND COLONIZATION 

There has recently sprung up in the self-govern- 
ing dependencies of the British Empire a dislike 
to the term "colony," as applied to themselves; 
and a sentiment similar in its origin would lead 
most Americans to demur to the statement that 
the United States is essentially a colonizing power. 
The objection, doubtless, has its root in the original 
meaning of the word " colony," which was at first 
synonymous with " plantation "—a name of un- 
pleasing suggestions, though it originally had ref- 
erence merely to the planting of people on an 
alien soil. Both words, in reality, imply nothing 
more than the taking root in a new soil of people 
who remain in close touch with their mother- 
country.^ 

This being the usually accepted definition, it is 
obvious that limitation and distortion of the word 
" colony " must be in the minds of Canadians and 

* The Century Dictionary gives the following definition: 
"A body or company of people who migrate from their native 
home to a new province, district, or country and inhabit it, 
but remain subject to, or intimately connected with, the 
parent state. Also, the descendants of such settlers so long 
as connection with the mother-country is retained." 



GREATER AMERICA 

Australasians when they reject it. As far as 
America is concerned, she may be said with 
accuracy to be largely composed of colonies, whose 
connection with the parent states is almost as 
variable as the relations of British colonial posses- 
sions to their mother-land. 

It is instructive to note how the motives for 
colonization have recurred with modifications from 
age to age, and how frequently history has repeat- 
ed itself in this matter. The earliest incentive 
which drove men from their homes to settle on 
alien soil was the desire for conquest ; but the first 
great colonial power whose movements we can 
clearly trace was Carthage, a purely commercial 
state, whose dominion lasted six hundred years 
and broke up because of wealth and effeminacy 
at the capital and a lack of defensive organiza- 
tion. Greece and Venice also colonized for trade 
purposes. Rome, on the contrary, expanded for 
poHtical reasons. The strength and virihty of her 
internal constitution made the absorption of weak- 
er organisms inevitable. She was the first state 
colonizer, introducing her own laws and methods 
of government wherever she went, and the uni- 
formity and method with which she assimilated 
left a permanent mark on the world. The causes 
of Roman decay are too complex to be summed 
up in a single sentence, but it must be noted 
that, just as Greece failed through too httle cen- 
tralization, Rome eventually decayed because of 
too much; and that, just as Carthage fell for lack 

39 



GREATER AMERICA 

of military and naval strength, Rome, the great 
empire founded on military conquest, went to 
pieces because she counted too much on her in- 
vincible legions. In the Roman conception of 
colonies as integral parts of the state we find, as 
in so many Roman conceptions, the inspiration 
for modern ideas of colonial policy. 

With the Portuguese began a new era, that of 
discovery and adventure, coupled with the lust 
for gold to be got without much labor. Thus we 
have the three main motives for colonization — 
conquest, trade, and adventure. All these were 
combined in varying degrees by the more modern 
colonizing powers. Spain added to these the mis- 
sionary zeal which was the natural result of her 
fanatical and powerful priesthood. France, whose 
adventurers accomplished so much of the explora- 
tion of the New World, was unsuccessful in her 
attempts at true colonization, and in later years 
her efforts at expansion have been for political 
reasons and by other means. Holland was always 
a purely commercial power, and being poor and 
insignificant as a state, she worked through trad- 
ing companies, whose history illustrates the uses 
and abuses of such agencies. All these powers, in 
trade with their colonies, enforced a strict sys- 
tem of monopolies, and regarded their possessions 
from the point of view of profit-bearing concerns 
for the use of the mother-country. 

While Spain, France, and Holland marked the 
zenith of their prosperity by their colonial enter- 

40 



GREATER AMERICA 

prises, Britain began to colonize at a period of 
insignificance abroad and discord at home. Her 
insular position and the fact that so much foreign 
blood ran in the veins of her people made it more 
natural for them to contemplate leaving their 
country when they were not satisfied with the 
conditions of life there. As a matter of fact, 
they were not groaning under special oppression, 
nor were they worse off than other European 
peoples; but the idea of individual liberty and 
constitutional government had very early taken 
root on this Northern soil, and grew strong in the 
hearts of the sturdy island brood. When Eng- 
lish emigration began, the seed had grown to 
fair proportions and was beginning to find its 
surroundings too cramping. The people, not yet 
strong enough to get their will at home, were ripe 
for transplantation overseas. The middle class 
had grown in numbers and wealth by the increase 
of industries, and the system of land-tenure, then 
as now, made it difficult for either merchants or 
the younger nobility to found families at home, 
while the peasantry were ready for any scheme 
which freed them from the incubus of the decay- 
ing feudal system. The great incentive held oiit 
was that each and all should possess their own 
land, and the consequence was that the stream 
which began to flow westward was of a character 
peculiarly adapted to develop the country they 
adopted as their home. Practically every element 
of civilized communities was transplanted over- 

41 



GREATER AMERICA 

seas, and even in the most aristocratic of the 
colonies a strong democratic feeHng was at once 
apparent. This overflow of population, this seek- 
ing for a wider sphere of opportunities, has been 
throughout the main factor in British colonization, 
and differentiates it from that of other peoples. 
It was not a state movement, for political or 
military or even trade purposes ; it was individual- 
istic, spontaneous, and for that reason no com- 
parison with other colonizations is apposite. 

There is one important factor in colonization 
which has had a peculiar effect on the American 
continents. Religious persecution has driven 
people from their homes in every country and at 
every age, but it was, perhaps, natural that the 
New World, which was not discovered until the 
last and greatest religion of the world had reached 
a mature stage in its development, should become 
the refuge for all whose creeds laid them open 
to persecution. They did not always find a warm 
welcome from the earlier colonists, who were 
often as bigoted in their own way as the persecutors 
of Europe, and this fact played its part in driving 
men on into the West and thus continuing the 
work of pioneer colonization. What they did 
escape was the strong arm of a power at once 
secular and religious. The New World, although 
portioned out by the Pope between the two great 
Catholic States was too far removed from the 
seats of religious dogmatism to be easily domi- 
nated by either of them, and, besides, conditions 

42 



GREATER AMERICA 

of life were strenuous. Therefore, although Pu- 
ritans persecuted Quakers and the Inquisition did 
its best to dominate those parts of the New World 
which were pre-empted by Spain (religious war- 
fare being still the inheritance of Latin America), 
the emigration of people of all creeds from Europe 
has made North America peculiarly the home of 
religious freedom. 

A sixth and last motive for colonization is that 
of national jealousy and rivalry, and the latter 
part of the nineteenth century saw a notable out- 
break of this. The fact that the vacant spaces 
of the world were being rapidly filled up by pre- 
emption of the great States led to a scramble in 
Africa and the Pacific, and is still agitating Asia. 
This movement must not be confounded with 
expansion for trade, colonizing, or other legiti- 
mate motives. As a political move it is legiti- 
mate only so far as it preserves the balance of 
power, and many of the acquisitions made can 
hardly be defended on any of these grounds. 

If we take these six motives — trade, conquest, 
adventure, overflow of population, religious per- 
secution, and political rivalries — we find that the 
United States has practically been animated by 
each in turn in the course of her expansion. 

Trade has been a constant incentive; of this 
the acquisition of Hawaii is an illustration. Con- 
quest — the desire for territorial expansion — 
led to many additions of territory in the early 
days ; the Mexican wars and consequent annexa- 

43 



GREATER AMERICA 

tions will serve as an example. The love of ad- 
venture led to the formation of frontier com- 
munities long before the interior was occtipied. 
The overflow of population (not because of over- 
crowding) from Great Britain has its analogy in 
the movement in 1785, when Congress treated the 
land of the Northwest as federal territory, sold it to 
immigrants, and granted colonial charters on the 
lines of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania ones. 
The poverty and confusion reigning in the older 
States at this period contributed to make the tide 
set in strongly towards the West. While religious 
persecution cannot be said to have greatly affected 
the colonization by United States citizens, we have 
in Utah one case of a colony founded by reason 
of it.^ International rivalry, as displayed in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century by the great 
powers of Europe, may not have consciously in- 
fluenced the United States; but if we come to 
examine the reasons for her recent oversea ex- 
pansion we shall find that this motive also plays a 
not inconsiderable part, while the Monroe Doctrine, 
as now interpreted, has a strong tendency in this 
direction. 

The fact is that from the earliest period of its 
national existence, even while that existence was 
trembling in the balance, the United States has 
expanded steadily. That this expansion was for 

* There are, of course, several other cases, in which reHgious 
persecution was the direct cause of the formation of fresh 
communities. 

44 



GREATER AMERICA 

some time confined to the North American con- 
tinent does not at all detract from the truth of the 
statement that it is as a colonizing power she has 
attained her present proportions and position as a 
great world power. " Accretion, not colonization," 
was the theory until the other day. But, though 
her expansion was at first contiguous, and there- 
fore appears to us less remarkable, the distances 
were so great and the physical difficulties so 
enormous that, until steam and electricity tri- 
umphed over these. West was more removed 
from East, and North from South, than were the 
original colonies from Britain. It is estimated 
that in the early days of federal government a 
courier took two months to go from Philadelphia 
to the farthest frontier. 

The condition of the thirteen original States 
after the recognition of their independence was 
not altogether a promising one. Their fiscal 
system was entirely upset, their trade hampered 
and partially destroyed, while they were held to- 
gether in the loosest manner by a federal govern- 
ment whose control was far from effective. The 
determination to round off their borders had al- 
ready led the colonies to fight for an extension of 
their authority, and they obtained this concession 
in the 1783 treaty, which gave them a large slice 
of territory in the Northwest and a narrow strip 
in the South. This was the only land appertain- 
ing to the States in common, but its area was in- 
creased later by the cession of lands whose posses- 

45 



GREATER AMERICA 

sion was disputed by various States. The first 
act of national sovereignty was the sale by Con- 
gress of land in the Northwest to emigrants and 
companies in 1785. The stream of emigration 
West had begun before this, people being glad to 
leave the old States, with the internal problems 
engendered by revolution, and to live in the wild 
freedom of pioneer communities. Already it was 
estimated that there were fifty thousand people 
west of Pittsburg, enough to found the first news- 
paper west of the Alleghanies — the Pittsburg 
Gazette. As these communities became settled, 
peaceful, and freed from the attacks of Indians, the 
older pioneers — many of them old soldiers and 
frontiersmen — moved on into the wilderness. The 
dangers of the life they led may be estimated from 
the fact that between the years 1787 and 1790 
no fewer than fifteen hundred frontiersmen were 
killed by Indians. 

The second generation were hardy, good marks- 
men, and roughly organized for defence, but lack- 
ing the experience and training of their fathers. 
They were farmers, ignorant, rude, and without 
the traditions which the first generation brought 
from the East, their principal characteristic being 
an intense democracy, natural in such rudely 
organized communities. The next influx from the 
East brought a civilizing influence. Settlers now 
took out proper papers for their land, started 
educational schemes, organized local government, 
and finally founded Territories which were ad- 

46 



GREATER AMERICA 

mitted to the Union as States when they reached 
the required electoral standard. It is this work- 
ing towards Statehood and rapid attainment of 
that goal which differentiates these communities 
from ordinary colonies; but in fact, if not in name, 
they retained their colonial aspect for a con- 
siderable period, owing to their distance from the 
more advanced centres of the East and the strenu- 
ous conditions of life. When they developed, it 
was on colonial lines, free and original, and it was 
not till the end of the first quarter of last century 
that their influence began to be felt in the national 
life. 

In considering the beginnings of American col- 
onization we must remember that at the time of 
the adoption of the federal Constitution, in 1789, 
the population of the thirteen States was only 
some four millions, by no means homogeneous in 
race or language, over one-fifth being colored. 
The proportions in North and South were fairly 
equal, Pennsylvania and the States to the north 
having about two millions, and Maryland and the 
States to the south about the same number. 
Socially and politically, the South was dominant. 
The Southern States were parcelled out into large 
estates, the cultivation of tobacco being gradually 
supplanted by that of cotton, and slave labor 
being, of course, the rule. The North, on the 
contrary, divided up into small holdings, with a 
great diversity of products, was chiefly agricultural. 
Wealth and trade were, on the whole, pretty 

47 



GREATER AMERICA 

equally distributed between the two sections, the 
population being chiefly massed in a narrow strip 
on the Eastern seaboard. 

When these circumstances are taken into con- 
sideration, it becomes the more remarkable that 
from the first the United States has never hesitated 
on her path of expansion. At the same time the 
policy was not commended by many of her great- 
est statesmen, and has met at different periods 
with strong opposition from various States that 
feared a disturbance of the balance of trade and 
power by a reckless extension of boundaries. The 
question of forming fresh States became, of course, 
a burning one in the slavery dispute — at this 
period we see State-aided colonization at work. 
But, even allowing for the stimulus so given, we 
see in the constant pushing forward of United 
States' colonists, in the vigor of their pioneer 
commimities, and the support afforded them in 
all emergencies by Congress, the strong expan- 
sionist bias of the American people, the restless, 
indomitable spirit in their mixed blood, and the 
power of organization which is so characteristic 
of the Anglo-Saxon. 

While the nation was still in its very infancy it 
doubled its area at one stroke by the Louisiana 
Purchase in 1803. This was a daring coup for a 
people who had only just begun to recover from a 
terrible financial crisis; but it was successful, chief- 
ly because of fortuitous circumstances in European 
politics. The importance of the great Mississippi 

48 



GREATER AMERICA 

Valley to the United States can hardly be ex- 
aggerated, but at the time of the purchase it was 
largely conjectural, and as a matter of fact it was 
only hoped by the negotiators to secure the mouth 
of the river and the two Floridas. The offer of 
the whole of Louisiana came from the French. 
There is reason to believe that the infant repub- 
lic, without realizing exactly what that great terri- 
tory might mean, was so anxious to expand and to 
gain command of the great waterway that she 
was prepared to back her request by force if 
Napoleon would not sell. She was aware, of 
course, that the cession of Louisiana by Spain to 
France substituted a strong power for a decay- 
ing one, but that, for the time, France had little 
desire for American colonies. Napoleon was too 
much engaged with schemes of European conquest 
to care for a territory so barren of military glory, 
and he grasped at an opportunity of doing Eng- 
land a bad turn by increasing the power of her 
revolted colonies. Whatever the actual circum- 
stances, however, it is a notable fact that the 
federal government shouldered the responsibility 
of this huge acquisition of territory, with its tiny 
population of fifty thousand whites and the same 
number of black and colored people, without hes- 
itation, although there was considerable opposi- 
tion in the Northern States. 

It must be remembered that such an act as the 
purchase of Louisiana was not directly provided 
for under the Constitution. Jefferson, indeed, 
4 49 



GREATER AMERICA 

thought of proposing an amendment asking Con- 
gress to justify his action. Even at this early 
period of the history of the Constitution, there- 
fore, it became necessary for its interpreters to 
endeavor to make it correspond with their actions. 
The discovery of a loosely worded clause (No. i8) — • 
the so-called "elastic clause" — provided them 
with what they needed. This gives to Con- 
gress the right "to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution 
. . . the powers vested by this Constitution in the 
government of the United States." As a matter 
of fact, it was not until a quarter of a century later 
that anything resembling an authoritative read- 
ing of this clause was given. Chief -Justice Mar- 
shall then laid down that the Constitution "con- 
fers absolutely on the government the power of 
making wars and treaties; consequently, that 
government possesses the power of acquiring 
territory either by conquest or treaty." 

The legality of United States' expansion is a 
question which has been raised many times in the 
course of American history. The liberal inter- 
pretation of her own Constitution is a matter 
entirely for her own conscience, and seems to have 
given rise to rather unnecessary discussion, since 
the Constitution was obviously made for America 
— not America for the Constitution. But she has 
on other occasions committed legal breaches of a 
most serious character in disregarding the de- 
cisions of the highest judicial authority, as in the 

50 



GREATER AMERICA 

case of Indian territory. Although the pro- 
prietary right of Indians to the lands they occupy 
is a vexed question, their claims in Alabama and 
Georgia, for instance, although three times allowed 
in the Supreme Court were disregarded by the 
Executive. 

The period following the acquisition of Louisi- 
ana was one of great prosperity and rapid growth, 
especially in the matter of naval strength, as was 
evidenced by the part played by the United States 
in putting down piracy in the Mediterranean. In 
1812, notwithstanding her ultimate defeat in the 
war with England, the United States navy acquit- 
ted itself with credit. 

Disorders on the boundaries of Florida and raids 
by the Seminole Indians into Georgia led to re- 
prisals by the United States, and finally to the 
purchase of Florida from Spain. A long delay in 
fulfilling the terms of the contract ended in 18 19, 
when the United States refused to temporize any 
longer.^ After this there was no recognized ex- 
pansion by the United States for twenty-six years, 
but the ground was being prepared for further 
advance. 

' Florida had had an eventful history, being originally 
colonized by Spain, but ceded to Great Britain in 1763, in 
return for Cuba and the Philippines. For this loss, incurred 
through an alliance with her, France indemnified Spain by 
ceding New Orleans and the country west of the Missis- 
sippi. In 1783 Great Britain restored Florida to Spain, most 
of the English colonists leaving the country, and till 181 9 
it remained a Spanish colony, one of the last possessions of the 
earliest conqueror on American soil. 

51 



GREATER AMERICA 

The annexation of Texas presents novel features 
in the story of colonization. A colony of United 
States citizens established themselves in Mexico, 
on territory actually belonging to a foreign power, 
just as, for instance, the Germans have done in 
Brazil. Being liberally received, they flourished 
and increased, but the internal politics of a Latin- 
American republic were distasteful to them, and 
they particularly resented being placed, as they 
eventually were, under military rule. They re- 
volted, and, headed by Houston, with the aid of 
volunteers from their native country succeeded 
in establishing an independent State in 1836, and 
in 1845 were admitted to the Union at the same 
time as Florida.^ The rapid development of these 
States and their admission into the Union were, of 
course, partly due to the slavery contest, then at 
its full height. The admission of a Northern, or 
non-slavery, State led to an immediate demand 
for an increase in slave-holding States in the South. 
Arkansas was answered by Michigan, Texas and 
Florida by Iowa and Wisconsin. 

' The annexation was foreseen by De Tocqueville ten years 
before. "The inhabitants of the United States are per- 
petually migrating to Texas, where they purchase land ; and 
although they conform to the laws of the country, they are 
gradually founding the empire of their own language and 
their own manners. The province of Texas is still part of 
the Mexican dominions, but it will soon contain no Mexicans; 
the same thing has occurred wherever the Anglo-Americans 
have come in contact with a people of a different origin." — 
Democracy in America, De Tocqueville, 1898, New York edition, 
vol. i., pp. 554, 555- 

52 



GREATER AMERICA 

In 1842 Fr6mont made his exploring expedition 
towards the Pacific, and the United States came 
in sight of that ocean. Boundary disputes led 
to the second Mexican war in 1845-46, which 
finally resulted in the seizure of New Mexico (in- 
cluding Arizona) and California. Immediately 
after this occurred the discovery of gold in Cali- 
fornia, which led to an enormous rush to that 
country, and so rapidly was it filled up that in 
1849 California applied for admission as a State. 

While matters were moving thus rapidly in the 
South there was an important development in 
the North. The Democratic party pressed for 
the annexation of Oregon, as a reply to Texas, 
and this was eventually carried despite bitter 
opposition. John Quincy Adams declared that 
the admission of Texas would justify a dissolution 
of the Union, while Lloyd Garrison won applause 
by suggesting that Massachusetts should secede. 
The American claims to Oregon were for a long 
time disputed by Britain, the claims being very 
difficult of decision. By right of exploration and 
discovery it probably belonged to Spain, but the 
right of occupation seems to have been pretty 
evenly divided between the United States and 
Britain. From 18 18 to 1846 the country was 
jointly occupied by both powers. Emigration on 
a fairly large scale went on from the States, the 
profitable fur trade being the chief inducement. 
The expansionist spirit, fanned by considerations 
of party interest, was strong in the land, as attest- 

53 



GREATER AMERICA 

ed by the cry of " fifty-four forty or fight," alluding 
to the proposed latitude of the Oregon boundary 
and British claims, but a compromise was event- 
ually arrived at, and in 1846 an Anglo-American 
boundary between Oregon and Canada was settled 
at parallel 49 degrees. 

The acquisition by purchase and conquest of 
the two great slices of territory in North and 
South, during the years 1845-46, was not suffi- 
cient, for it left a wedge of alien possessions in the 
very heart of the United States. Two years later 
the successful negotiations which ended in the 
Mexican cession rounded off America, which be- 
came a solid, contiguous mass, bounded by Canada 
on the north, Mexico and its gulf on the south, 
and stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
This solidarity of position left nothing in ques- 
tion save a settlement of boundary disputes too 
numerous to be mentioned; but it is to be noted 
that in practically every case the United States has 
made a good bargain and increased her possessions, 
usually adopting the method of asking for more 
than she was prepared to accept and backing her 
proposals with determination. 

The new lands, still waiting to be filled up and 
affording ample scope for adventure, did not suf- 
fice for the restless activities of the people. In 
185 1 attempts were made, of a filibustering char- 
acter, to annex Cuba, and in 1853-54 a solemn 
conference of American ministers met at Ostend 
and urged that, the acquisition of Cuba being of ad- 

54 



GREATER AMERICA 

vantage to the United States, in the event of Spain 
refusing to sell, it should be wrested from her rather 
than left to be Africanized like San Domingo. When 
responsible representatives of the government 
could express such spread-eagle opinions one can- 
not be surprised at the daring enterprises of fili- 
busters like Walker, who made an abortive at- 
tempt to conquer Nicaragua and Honduras. The 
President, Buchanan, was so far from deploring 
this tendency of his countrymen that he proposed 
in Congress the establishment of a protectorate 
over the nearer portions of the ' ' dissolving Mex- 
ican Republic " and the control of the whole 
isthmus. The decision of Congress in 1856 re- 
garding Aves Islands authorized the protection 
of American citizens who occupy land or islands 
not already in occupation by another power. This 
principle is, of course, no new one in the history 
of colonization, for the flag has followed trade 
quite as often as vice versa, but it definitely puts 
an end to any theory of the United States as 
a self - contained, isolated republic, and practi- 
cally closes the period of solely contiguous ex- 
pansion. 

At this period one cannot fail to pause and re- 
view the circumstances in which that unparalleled 
development took place, and one is immediately 
struck by the steady continuity of purpose which 
seems half unconsciously to have dominated the 
people and their rulers. In prosperity and adver- 
sity, in defence of slavery and in spite of it, by Fed- 

55 



GREATER AMERICA 

eralists and by Democrats, the work went steadily 
on. If Indian claims stood in the way, they were 
ignored; if the country were pre-empted, it was 
bought — if the owner would not sell, it was con- 
quered. Frontiers were pushed on into the wilds, 
regardless of the horrors of Indian warfare ; 
American settlers in foreign territory organized 
rebellion, helped by their own people, if not act- 
ually instigated by the government, as in the 
case of Houston in Texas. In short, the career 
of the United States has been from the first one 
of masterful, irresistible expansion, not for lack 
of space or opportunity at home, but because of 
sheer force, initiative, and nervous energy, charac- 
teristics which are peculiarly strong in the race 
which the North American continent has devel- 
oped from so many alien stocks. 

The great crisis of the civil war had a tem- 
porary effect in checking the expansionist move- 
ment, for in the reconstruction which followed 
there was plenty to occupy statesmen and cit- 
izens alike. The strong party motives for the ad- 
mission of new States were largely removed, and 
of those Territories which had not attained State- 
hood at the time of the war, one. New Mexico, out 
of which the Territory of Arizona has been carved, 
remains still in embryo. The long - cherished 
schemes for controlling the West Indies, which led 
to a treaty with Denmark, came up at this time, 
but were suppressed by the Senate, although St. 
Thomas and San Domingo were anxious to be 

56 



GREATER AMERICA 

admitted to the Union/ This anti-expansionist 
feeUng nearly prevented the purchase of Alaska 
when it was offered by Russia in 1867. Seward, 
a strong believer in the future of the Pacific, 
needed all his influence to push the matter through, 
though he was helped by the general sentiment 
in favor of Russia, founded on her mythical claims 
to a sympathetic attitude during the war. 

For over a quarter of a century there was no 
increase of United States territory. The country 
developed her resources, increased her manufact- 
ures, and embarked on the most brilliant period 
of her industrial career, assisted by a tariff system 
which, having its birth in the need for revenue 
during the war, was retained as a protection to the 
manufactures which had just been inaugurated, 
and soon led to a vast increase of foreign trade. 

The opening of the Pacific coast naturally led 
to a great development of trade with the Far 
East. Even prior to it American seamen had been 
active in the Pacific, the Stars and Stripes being 
several times hoisted on Pacific islands, but it was 
not till 1869 that America actually took steps for 

1 "These terms not proving acceptable to Denmark, the 
negotiations were prolonged until finally Mr. Seward gave up 
the attempt to fix the date of ratification, concurred m a 
stipulation in the convention for the consent of the inhabitants, 
and offered $7,500,000 for St. Thomas and St. John. 

"On this basis a treaty was concluded on October 25, 1867. 
This was promptly ratified by Denmark, but the United 
States Senate delayed action on it, and finally rejected it m 
the session of 1868, as appears by the records of the Depart- 
ment of State."— Wharton, vol. i., § 6ia, p. 416. 

57 



GREATER AMERICA 

occupying one of them. At that date money was 
voted for estabhshing a naval station and harbor 
on Midway Island, and though the project was 
abandoned, the island was retained. In 1875 her 
predominant trade in Hawaii led the United States 
to make a reciprocity treaty with those islands. 
American interest in the Pacific was increased by 
the rapid absorption of island groups by European 
powers. The native Hawaiian dynasty was bol- 
stered up for a time, but its retention was a farce 
in view of the rapid adoption of American ideas; 
and in 1892 a republic was proclaimed, which was 
recognized by the States, and finally taken over 
in 1897. The acquisition in Samoa is another 
instance of the methods by which a powerful 
government must protect her trade, matters there 
being complicated by the rival claims of Germany 
and Britain. The position of Samoa makes it an 
important point on the American - Australasian 
trade route, and in the harbor of Pango-Pango the 
United States acquired a useful naval base. 

Before the final acquisition in Samoa, however, 
America had embarked on an oversea career very 
different from these peaceful victories in the in- 
terests of commerce. In 1898 the war with Spain 
was rendered inevitable by her action in Cuba, and 
the appeal of the latter to the great neighbor re- 
public. The Cuban war led to a military occupation 
of that island, now merged into a protectorate, and 
the permanent occupation of Puerto Rico. The 
war also, by one of the curious freaks of fate, led 

58 




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/ 












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G 



GREATER AMERICA 

the Americans to Manila Bay, and involved them 
irretrievably in the government of an Oriental de- 
pendency. 

To the present generation of Americans, to 
whom the Mexican and Florida campaigns are 
as much past history as the Revolution, the 
Spanish war came almost as a shock, and seem- 
ed in many respects epoch-making. In no other 
country do events move so fast or are memories 
so short, and it is, perhaps, not to be wondered at 
that the modem American felt startled when he 
realized the lengths to which he had gone. But, 
as a matter of fact, the struggle with Spain has 
been going on steadily all through the century 
and a quarter of the United States' national exist- 
ence. The republic is built up on the foundations 
of the old Spanish colonial empire ; and Louisiana, 
Texas, Florida, New Mexico, California, were steps 
in the path which led them first to the Caribbean 
and then across the Pacific to the Philippines. 

In the last few years of the past century America 
ceased to be a purely continental power. As a 
colonizer she met with extraordinary success with- 
in her own continent, so far as the development 
of the resources of the country, the spread of 
civilization, and the cultivation of a national spirit 
were concerned. In another respect, however, 
she has hitherto been unfortunate. Her experi- 
ence for a long time brought her into contact 
with only two races of lower caliber than her own. 
White men of every nationality she has hitherto 

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absorbed with apparent success, but the Indian 
and the negro have never ceased to be problems 
and burdens. She has attempted to solve the 
Indian difficulty by treating them paternally and 
the negro problem by a (soon abandoned) pro- 
gramme of fraternity. In both cases she has been 
singularly unfortunate, and though the Indian 
reservations, ill-regulated as they are, will grad- 
ually cease to be a serious problem because of 
their dwindling population, there is no prospect 
that the negroes will do anything but increase in 
numbers and power until they can no longer be 
disregarded as a factor in the state. 

From whatever point of view we regard her 
present condition, it is obvious that one of the 
most pressing problems of Greater America is that 
of the government of alien races — an imperial 
problem in some phases, a colonial one in others. 
Strong in the colonizing spirit, Americans have 
pushed on to the limits of their own continent, 
and have then overflowed — not so much in popu- 
lation as in energy — into distant islands of the 
Pacific and adjacent islands of the Caribbean. 
Even on their own continent they became the mas- 
ters of alien peoples — Indians, negroes, the Latin 
populations of Louisiana, California, and Mexico; 
and although immigration from Europe apparently 
fuses without trouble into the American nation, 
it is noteworthy that the three great divisions of 
alien stock which have come under the American 
rule on the continent — the Latin, negro, and 

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Indian — have remained distinct, and present grave 
difficulties in the way of the homogeneity of the 
nation. To this day French is spoken in Louisi- 
ana ; Texas, Arizona, and Cahfornia are partly 
Spanish in feeling; while the negro is beginning 
to segregate in a black belt of which the only 
thing to be said here is that it is about as un- 
American as any community can well be. It 
is, therefore, in the direction in which she has 
been least successful in the past that much of 
America's energy must be expended in the future. 
Steadily, consistently, in the teeth of all difficul- 
ties, she has gone on with her expansion, coloniz- 
ing her own continent, taking over the colonies of 
others, granting self-government only to her own 
people and only when they showed their fitness; 
governing as a colonial and imperial power all 
communities too weak for self-organization or too 
alien in race to be kindred in feeling. The history 
of colonization shows that these circumstances are 
inevitable. Every virile, ambitious people has met 
with the same difficulties, but none has met them 
in quite the same spirit. American democracy 
has yet to demonstrate to the world that her way 
is the short cut to that stability, progress, and 
general prosperity which it should be the aim of 
every strong people to bestow upon the weaker 
ones which come under their wing. 



CHAPTER III 
PACIFIC EXPANSION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 

The Pacific expansion of the United States is 
in a peculiar stage. Hawaii is practically Amer- 
icanized; it has its local problems, but the lack of 
virility in the native people has made them 
singularly malleable to American influence, and 
Hawaii will, no doubt, continue to advance in 
prosperity on the lines of an American colony 
which has little prospect of becoming incorporated 
more closely than at present under its style as a 
" Territory." Samoa, likewise, has little economic 
or political significance, being chiefly important 
for strategic reasons. The interest of Pacific ex- 
pansion is focussed in the Philippine Islands, and 
these, from many points of view, it is necessary to 
study rather closely in order to appreciate the 
present phase of United States expansion. They 
represent the struggle between the principles and 
theories of the United States and the practice 
forced on her by circumstances. She still clings 
to the theory that expansion for her will bring all 
the benefits of increased commerce, prestige, and 
influence without saddling her with responsibilities. 
In the Philippines this cherished delusion is being 

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rapidly dispelled. She still partly believes that she 
has evolved the best system of government, the 
highest form of civilization, and the most com- 
plete recognition of individual rights in the world, 
and is by no means anxious to hide her light under 
a bushel. It is the arrogance and energy of youth 
which have nerved her to the task, but by the 
time she has arrived within sight of its conclusion 
she will be mature, and will have a middle-aged 
tolerance for weak human nature, and that read- 
iness to accept compromises and be less particular 
about ethical perfection, which comes with world- 
ly wisdom. 

Looking around on a vast and prosperous con- 
tinent, on a progress unrivalled in world history, 
and on resources apparently boundless, the aver- 
age American is apt to forget that these con- 
ditions are by no means entirely due to the po- 
litical and social system which prevails. When 
the optimistic American arrived in the Philip- 
pines he was inclined to think that all that was 
needed was the gospel according to Demos. The 
Filipinos were poor, disorganized, ignorant, shift- 
less — all because they had been suffering for three 
centuries from an organized misgovernment by 
an effete monarchy. The American loves phrases 
better than anything— Presidential elections have 
been known to turn on them — and at this juncture 
the favorite phrase set forth the benefits to be 
derived by the Filipinos from the planting of the 
tree of liberty in their midst — glorious liberty 

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under whose branches they had never yet been 
able to shelter. 

"We shall plant our institutions deep in the 
soil," said one of the pioneers of American civiliza- 
tion to the writer when he landed in Manila. "We 
shall give the people liberty and light and freedom. 
There is a certain logical progress in our American 
civilization. We have been progressing from step 
to step, and if we went back on our principles now 
by establishing an ordinary colony we should be 
arresting that progress. No! We shall bestow 
all the benefits which we believe to be the glory 
of America upon these islands, and if we believe 
in our country and her institutions we cannot 
doubt the result. We mean to establish a free, 
self-governing republic in these islands, and to 
introduce the institutions which are our comer- 
stone. If we merely started a colony here or 
established trading communications, we should be 
false to the traditions of our country. We are 
not going to follow on any lines of precedent; it 
is quite a new thing we mean to produce." 

This statement, in the actual words of the 
speaker, represents very fairly the attitude in 
which the ablest of the men who had to deal with 
the problem approached it. There was, of course, 
another group who thought the Philippines should 
be evacuated and left to themselves; but with 
their views we are not now concerned. The ques- 
tion which naturally arose out of this reiterated 
resolution to "plant the glorious tree of American 

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civilization" was, of course, as to the nature of 
the soil in which it was expected to flourish. The 
answer given by the gentleman already quoted 
is so characteristic of a section of opinion in the 
United States that it must be given verbatim. 

"A great many of your countrymen," he said, 
"will say that the only way with a Filipino is to 
beat him every morning — he is sure to deserve it 
before night; but we don't take that view. There 
is the same difference between educated and cult- 
ured gentlemen and ignorant peasants in this 
coimtry as elsewhere ; but the better-class Filipinos 
rise to an extremely high level of intelligence. 
There are native lawyers and judges here who 
would compare favorably with those of any coun- 
try, and if one meets them in controversy or 
argument they can hold their own with great 
skill and eloquence. At a recent banquet given 
on George Washington's birthday there were after- 
dinner speeches by Filipinos which would compare 
favorably with those at any banquet in the old 
country." 

No one who has even a bowing acquaintance 
with the Filipino can doubt the truth of the last 
statement, and there is a consensus of opinion as 
to the high level of intelligence, as far as mere 
book-learning and abstract science are concerned, 
among the educated Filipinos. The difficulty is 
to see how this peculiar form of brilliance consti- 
tutes a people fit to assimilate "the concomitants 
of American civiHzation," whatever that may mean. 

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The mental capacity of educated Filipinos, their 
fluency and forensic ability, can be matched only 
among people of Latin stock, who have proved 
themselves in other respects the very antithesis 
of the Anglo-Saxon races in their ideals of social 
organization and government. Altruism, which 
should be the ideal of democracy, and individual- 
ism, which is its invariable outcome, require for 
the development of the first and control of the 
second a strength and steadiness of character, a 
plain common-sense, and a power of seeing things 
in their true proportions which are singularly in- 
compatible with the artistic Latin temperament. 
Added to this is the general topsy-turvydom of 
Oriental ethics, from the Western point of view, 
and here we have the soil in which "American 
institutions " were to take instant root. Incident- 
ally, the plant was not only expected to draw 
nourishment from the soil, but to change its whole 
character by some occult process. 

Apart from the difficulties which the United 
States leaders made for themselves by the enuncia- 
tion of high-sounding phrases, which Filipinos were 
unable to appreciate at their true value, there 
were many conditions in the Philippines which 
made the establishment of law and order a heavy 
task. 

The islands are scattered and in many cases 
difficult of access, and the physical drawbacks 
were accentuated by the lack of cohesion among 
the people themselves. Although it has pleased 

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a party in the United States to speak of the 
" Fihpino nation," it is well known by all who 
have devoted any study to the history of the 
islands that none of the characteristics of a nation 
are to be found there. There is merely a con- 
geries of tribes, speaking several distinct languages 
and a great variety of dialects, in different stages 
of civilization — some heathens, others Moham- 
medans, and a majority nominally Christians. 
The hostility and distrust among the chief tribes 
are even reproduced in village communities of 
kindred blood, and there had never been any 
approach to a clearly defined national sentiment 
until hatred of the oppressing friars united all 
parties, for a time, in the desire to expel them. 
The widely spread opposition to American arms 
had its origin, not, as is frequently stated, in the 
Filipino desire for freedom, but in a variety of 
causes, in which the ambitions of a mestizo aris- 
tocracy and the ignorance and prejudices of the 
masses were the chief factors, and tyranny, mis- 
representation, and treachery the main instru- 
ments. 

The peculiar features of country and climate 
prolonged the war to an unconscionable extent, 
and before it was well over the work of "planting 
the institutions which are the corner - stone of 
liberty " was commenced. 

The motives actuating the United States were 
threefold. First, she desired to give the Filipinos 
a good government ; secondly, she wanted to 

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give them a democratic government; and thirdly, 
she wanted to do this without following any 
precedent laid down by other nations. "It is 
quite a new thing we mean to introduce," said 
Mr. Roosevelt; "we are not going to follow any 
lines of precedent." 

There was naturally a good deal of trouble to 
reconcile these three ideals. The simple and ob- 
vious method of dealing with a conquered coun- 
try is to place it under military rule until order 
is evolved and trade and agriculture are resuming 
their normal condition. The next stage is one of 
transition, a semi - military rule, in which the 
plainest and simplest laws and regulations are 
enforced by civil measures. The personality of of- 
ficials is the most important factor at this period, 
which prepares the way for civil government, 
under which local autonomy may be introduced. 

As has already been mentioned, there was one 
special difficulty in the way of such a scheme 
as this, and that consisted in the peculiar so- 
cial organization of the Filipinos. Had the isl- 
ands only a native population, with leaders of 
their own race, this method would have met 
the needs of the situation admirably, as, for 
instance, it did in Burma. Unfortunately, the 
Spanish domination had led to the establishment 
of a class known as mestizo, or half-breed, some 
almost entirely white, who occupy the position of 
a self-constituted aristocracy, acquired by their 
superior intelligence and education and the social 

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prestige derived from their descent from the 
ruHng race. They have no hereditary or terri- 
torial hold over the people, but they look down 
on the natives, just as they are themselves 
despised by the pure-blooded Spaniards, This 
mestizo class is most numerous and powerful at 
Manila, and the capital is to them what Paris is 
to the French — a world within a world. They 
have hitherto occupied the place in the political 
and social world which an aristocracy would fill 
in Europe, but with this exception, that they have 
not that interest in the well-being of the peasants 
or that hold on their affections which the feudal 
relation implied. It is to this class that the Amer- 
icans, in the first flush of enthusiasm, pledged 
themselves, and it is they alone who, by education 
and opportunity, are able to flood the government 
offices, and who are already prominent as lawyers 
and politicians. With a class of this kind — rest- 
less, intriguing, brainy, treacherous, and eloquent 
— it would have been difficult to adopt any con- 
ceivable system of government which did not 
provide some scope for their energies. 

The choice was between two dangers — that of 
employing them and of leaving them unemployed — 
and the first was decidedly preferable. The un- 
fortunate circumstance was that the United States 
programme prohibited any form of government 
which was not democratic in its essentials. The 
obvious impossibility of working into such a 
scheme a people apathetic and ignorant, and an 

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aristocracy at once ambitious, irresponsible, and 
arrogant, did not deter the United States from 
making the attempt. 

The Philippines were fortunate in the man sent 
out to superintend the democratization of the 
islands. It must be remembered that the com- 
mission were sent to establish civil government, 
and, having to fulfil that task, they had only to 
adopt the least harmful form. Public opinion 
at home would not have tolerated a less liberal 
provision for the individual rights of the Filipino. 
The war was scarcely over — it lingers still in the 
islands in the form of ladronism — when the people 
were called together and told that they were to 
be shown how to govern themselves. 

The first and foremost step was the bestowal 
of elective powers. After a short period of govern- 
ment by a nominated official, elections were held 
for the post of provincial governors. The educa- 
tional effect of the exercise of the elective function 
is one of the firmest convictions of the American 
idealist, albeit on his own continent he has already 
been obliged to withdraw it practically from one- 
ninth of the nation, and is proposing to adopt 
measures which will exclude still more. The 
problem in the Philippines is whether the Filipino 
gains sufficiently in moral status by merely re- 
cording his vote to compensate for what he loses 
by being ill governed. It is well known that the 
ballot-box is one of the most potent weapons of 
corruption, unless safeguarded most carefully, and 

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it is difficult to see what steps have been, or can 
be, taken to secure a genuine vote. 

All this, it may be said, is true of other countries 
than the PhiHppines ; and yet many of these 
countries apparently enjoy prosperity. But the 
Filipino is at a crisis in his career when he must 
have good government, fair government, strong 
and energetic government, if he is ever to rise 
above his present level. The country is laid waste 
by war and its inevitable consequences of famine, 
disease, and misery. The people have a danger- 
ous facility for politics and a lack of practical 
common - sense which are fatal qualities — the 
very antithesis of the Chinese, who are indifferent 
to affairs of state, but are intent on their own 
business, and in whose blood is the faculty of local 
self-government. It would have been greatly to 
the advantage of the Filipinos if all their energies 
could have been directed into the practical channel 
of self-help and if the development of an elaborate 
political system had been left to a future date. 
Peace and prosperity are the first gifts a nation 
should confer upon the race it desires to elevate, 
and without prosperity it will be impossible to 
crush the hydra-headed monster of discontent and 
intrigue. 

One of the first and most discouraging checks 
which American enthusiasm received in the Philip- 
pines was the discovery that the Filipino could 
not be intrusted with the control of funds; his 
intelligence was, unfortunately, superior to his 

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honesty. It was, therefore, necessary to provide 
in each province an American treasurer, and, as 
the pubhc works demanded also more skill and 
integrity than could be found among the natives, 
an American engineer, called the "supervisor." 
The municipalities enjoy a very complete local au- 
tonomy, so much so that, although the provincial 
Governor is expected to act towards them as 
"disciplinarian," he cannot even force them to 
adopt regulations which would insure a relative 
uniformity in the conditions and requirements of 
civil life in the different pueblos. 

One of the leading Filipinos, and a member of 
the commission, Senor B. Legarda, acknowledges 
that the suffrage and individual rights are entire- 
ly new in the Philippines, and admits the danger 
of the elective system in municipalities, "where 
voters are only influenced by casiquism (bossism) 
or by the party passions and puerile reaction ism 
which incited the late war." But he and others 
— for instance, Pardo de Tavera and R. de 
Luzuriago — claim that a period of two or three 
years' provisional government should fit the 
Filipinos for the unrestricted discharge of citizen 
functions and lead up to admission as a State 
within the Union — a somewhat curious conclusion 
to arrive at on such premises. 

The time that has elapsed since the establish- 
ment of civil government is too short to permit of 
a comprehensive judgment on the results, but the 
extreme optimism of the central government can- 

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not conceal the fact that so far the elections of 
governors and municipalities have been exactly 
what was expected by less sanguine people; they 
are mischievous or harmless, exactly in proportion 
to the amount of American influence brought to 
bear on them and the control exercised by the 
civil Governor and white officials. The process of 
democratization has not been carried very far — 
it is essentially a system of "make see"; but the 
objection to placing authority in the hands of any 
class of officials nominated by government has led 
to an extraordinary degree of centralization. The 
civil Governor, an indispensable figure — entirely 
out of the picture, exercising, as he must, absolute 
power — has to be referred to in every matter. 
He may not be assisted by really responsible 
American officials on whom he can rely, and his 
Sisyphean task is rendered heavier by the necessity 
for closely controlling the sham Filipino governors 
and educating them up to the needs of their posi- 
tion. The burdens of his position include the con- 
trol of the civil-service board, the insular pur- 
chasing agent, the office for the improvement of 
the port of Manila, and the provincial and munic- 
ipal governments. He has, moreover, to assume 
the duties of absent heads of all executive depart- 
ments; he is president of the Philippine commis- 
sion, which involves a large amount of arduous and 
most important legislative work; and, finally, he 
must receive at all times the public and officials 
of all degrees. For all this he receives a salary of 

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$15,000 per annum, which, at the rate of living in 
Manila, will barely cover his household expenses. 
This intolerable conglomeration of functions is, 
perhaps, the inevitable fate of an official who is 
the agent of a democratic government. When the 
"principles of democracy" demand that the man 
who is the head of the greatest republic in the 
world is expected to fritter away on petty personal 
matters time which might be employed in study- 
ing vital national questions, it can hardly be ex- 
pected that the Governor of a United States de- 
pendency should be accorded more liberal treat- 
ment. The effect of this system in the United 
States, however, is far less harmful than in the 
Philippines. The former has other machinery 
than the mere brain and will of the President on 
which to depend, and, in fact, the majority of 
Presidents are not chosen for their capacity and 
are so tied by party trammels as to have little 
scope for initiative. But in the Philippines the 
man at the head is the most important factor, 
and should be a man of capacity and be given 
a free hand and a strong backing. Democratic 
government is impossible; aristocratic government 
would be the result of any attempt to give the 
Filipinos political freedom. A strong paternal 
government is the only form left ; but a weak 
paternal regime will result in spoiled children and 
a divided household. Meanwhile, the attempt to 
check the sham autonomy by a system of referring 
everything to the civil Governor has made the 

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mass of clerical work so enormous that it can only 
be dealt with by the multiplication of bureaus. 

There is something peculiarly fascinating to the 
American mind in the organization of a bureau, 
and no one at all familiar with the United States 
can fail to have observed the relations between 
these bureaus and the great American public. At 
any hour of the day they are open to inspection 
and inquiry by any chance visitor, and in many 
of them special officials are told off to show curious 
strangers the working of the different departments. 
The bureaus and their officials are, in fact, the 
property of the democracy, and there is none 
of the reserve and unapproachableness to which 
Europeans are accustomed in their government 
offices. In some ways the system has undoubted 
advantages, and it is, of course, consistent with 
democratic principles. The tendency, however, 
is the same in many other phases of democratic 
government. That which is accorded to every 
one ceases to be either valued or valuable, and 
the efficiency of a department is impaired instead 
of being increased. The old adage is true, after 
all, that familiarity breeds contempt. 

A second notable feature of American bureaus 
is the prodigious amount of clerical work which 
is deemed necessary to prove their value. Quan- 
tity, and not quality, appears to be regarded as a 
test, and no doubts are entertained of the effective- 
ness of work which involves the use of a record 
amount of stationery. 

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These principles have been faithfully carried 
into effect in Manila, and the record of the work- 
ing hours of officials, the number of type-writers 
in use, the amount of correspondence dealt with, 
the variety of languages to be interpreted, are 
enough to stagger the quondam British official, 
who has been used to imagine that he was over- 
worked and overbound by red-tape in the days 
when he sat under a banyan-tree and dispensed 
rough-and-ready justice to a district in upper 
Burma. Of one bureau we read that a staff of 
six are engaged in reading and answering applica- 
tions for appointments, "many of which exist 
only in the imagination of the writer." There is 
reason to believe that this staff is disgracefully 
overworked. Letters are received in "almost 
every known language " ; and at the present time 
there are interpreters ready to translate from 
"French, German, Italian, Latin (!), Norwegian, 
Spanish, Swedish, Hebrew (modern), and Chinese 
(Amoy), as well as five distinct dialects of the 
Philippines." The task of examining charges and 
complaints against officials seems to be one of the 
heaviest; and we are told that one report occupies 
seven hundred and fifty closely written pages in 
Spanish or Filipino dialects. This bureau also 
draughts the appropriation acts and mails all 
necessary warrants, which vary in amount "from 
$300,000 to 2 cents." 

The system of reporting and publishing verbatim 
all debates and speeches (even if undelivered) has 

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GREATER AMERICA 

affected the whole political life of the States, and 
its malevolent influence is to be traced in the 
writing of reports/ No country in the world has 
such machinery for the output of governmental 
reports on every conceivable subject, and the 
amount of undigested information compiled and 
issued gratis in the form of well-bound volumes 
is simply inconceivable to those who have not 
had ocular proof of it. The motive is laudable 
and the expense of little consequence to a country 
as rich as the United States, but the practical 
effect is not quite what might be wished. The 
American love of magnitude is nowhere more 
evident than in this matter, and the result is too 
often a vast conglomeration of facts, reports, and 
quotations, without sense of proportion, unas- 
similated, badly arranged and indexed, and in- 
volving a vast amount of work by the student 
who desires a clear and succinct idea of the matter 
in hand. When American officials write reports 
they permit themselves a redundancy of language 

* A very outspoken reference to this question was made 
in the President's annual message of 1902. The American 
editor of the 1898 edition of De Tocqueville (vol. i., p. 269) 
has the following pertinent observation on this subject: 

" Instead of complaining that 'little is committed to writing' 
in America, and that 'that little is soon wafted away forever,' 
he ought to censure the inordinate loquacity of Presidents, 
Governors, Legislators and other public officers, whose in- 
terminable messages, reports, and supplementary documents 
are preserved by the public printers in many huge volumes, 
which nobody, indeed, ever thinks of perusing, but which are 
even difficult to consult on account of their number and 
magnitude." 

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GREATER AMERICA 

and a free expression of personal opinions, even 
when the writers are merely required to relate 
facts. In the Philippines this practice is peculiar- 
ly unwise, as it encourages the Filipinos in their 
most fatal gift of shallow eloquence. 

It is to the skilful manipulation of phrases, by 
which a barren report may attain quite respectable 
proportions, that we owe the following gem from 
the report of a provincial Governor. 

"INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE 

"These branches do not amount to much in the province 
of Rizal, as, in general, they are only practised on a small 
scale. However, the spirit of association is awakening, 
and it can be believed that, when peace is firmly established 
in all of the archipelago, civil regime and the good dis- 
positions of the people of the province will give it further 
progress and prosperity." 

It would be a happy moment, both for the over- 
worked bureaus and the people on whom reports 
are written, if the directions which used to be 
well drilled into young British officials could be 
given in the Philippines: Condense, don't gener- 
alize, and avoid sentiment. 

It must not be supposed that the writer wishes 
to decry the labors of the Manila bureaus. A 
certain amount of routine clerical work is inevi- 
table, and there is no doubt that many officials 
have devoted themselves without reserve to these 
duties. From internal evidence, however, there 
seems to be a decided tendency to magnify the 

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importance of mere office -work, and any one 
who has had experience of administration knows 
the danger of allowing this to increase. The 
system established in the Philippines seems pe- 
culiarly adapted for the growth of red-tape, 
and the nature of the Filipinos — especially the 
mestizos — with their love of oratory, litigation, 
and discussion of abstract points, makes them 
liable to exaggerate the weaker side of the political 
system devised by their white mentors. 

The democratization of the Philippines has so 
far amounted to this: Municipalities have been 
given a local autonomy which they never exer- 
cised before, and are subject to all the dangers 
of the system, with its opportunities for undue 
influence by the moneyed class, corruption, and 
jobbery, without any guarantee — save the over- 
worked central government — that they will be free 
from oppression. There is no powerful industrial 
class to control the municipal politicians, and the 
vast majority of the people are ignorant, super- 
stitious, and apathetic. The power of electing 
the provincial Governor by popular vote does not 
secure them a popular government. He will hold 
his position chiefly at the pleasure of one or other 
of the mestizo political parties, which are, in fact, 
aristocratic in their aims; and he is also subject 
to the central government, a fact which may in- 
crease the chances of his efficiency, but does not 
make him more acceptable to the Filipino. It 
must be remembered that good government does 

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■ GREATER AMERICA 

not appeal to Orientals on its own merits; but 
they, like all other people, do appreciate it when 
it brings them freedom from taxation, increased 
prosperity and opportunities. All these cannot 
be achieved in the Philippines for many years, 
so that the present government cannot expect to 
be regarded as a popular one. 

The governors, elected by the people, will in- 
evitably fall between two stools. If they en- 
deavor to enforce the measures necessary for the 
improvement of the country (which cannot be 
agreeable to a majority of the people), they will 
become unpopular with the democracy; if they 
fail to do so, they will be regarded with suspicion 
by the central government. This aspect of the 
case becomes especially serious when the question 
of taxation arises. In assessing the country for 
the land-tax, it was found almost impossible to 
ascertain true values, as officials favored their 
friends. Hitherto, the generous policy of the 
United States has avoided serious friction on the 
question of taxation, but the matter will have to 
be placed on a firm foundation very soon. The 
high wages paid to Filipino laborers and work- 
men in government employ have done much to 
reconcile them to the new regime, but when pub- 
lic works and education have to be defrayed out 
of local funds — as must sooner or later be the 
case — there will be considerable difficulty in ad- 
justing wages on a scale commensurate with 
those paid in other parts of the Orient. The 

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present scale is inflated and the whole system 
artificial. 

The third effect of democratization has been 
the elaboration of central government at Manila. 
How much the working of this machine owes to 
the energy, ability, and tact of a few American 
officials will probably never be known, unless — as 
is their constant aspiration — the Filipinos take 
over the administration of the islands themselves 
in the course of a few years. While the system- 
atization of the work of government and the or- 
ganization of departments specially qualified to 
deal with different branches were a necessity, and 
while the clerical education of Filipinos in ad- 
vanced methods of work — in indexing, classifying, 
and so forth — is a valuable contribution towards 
their progress, it is a grave misfortune that they 
should have this object-lesson in government — 
an elaborate central administration turning out a 
vast amount of clerical work, while the country 
remains in a condition of chaos and public works 
are still in embryo. It is possible that the Amer- 
ican capacity for pushing things through may 
enable them to surmount the red-tape barriers and 
do some really practical work in the Philippines; 
but the unique opportunity they had for teaching 
the Latin Malays a lesson in doing, as opposed to 
talking, is irretrievably lost. The American's love 
of bureaus and report-writing may not harm him 
— he is a thoroughly practical person at bottom — 
but to the Filipino it must prove a fatal snare. 
6 8i 



GREATER AMERICA 

The clash of democracy with Orientahsm is a 
peculiarly interesting study. It must be noted 
that even Americans do not propose to upset 
the aristocratic government in vogue among the 
Moros of the southern Philippines, who are Mo- 
hammedans. The doctrine of individual rights is 
not believed to be applicable to the Moslem, and 
the British method of dealing with these people 
has been practically adopted without variation. 
It is the Christianity of the Filipino, apparently, 
that gives him the claim to individual rights ; but, 
as a matter of fact, it is the white strain among 
the mestizos that counts for most in the political 
situation. Without that the skin-deep Christianity 
(varied by undisguised heathendom) of the peoples 
of the archipelago would not have been sufficient 
to place them (theoretically) on a par with people 
who have fought and suffered for centuries before 
they were able to evolve popular government. The 
interesting parallel of semi-Latin peoples on the 
American continent and in the Caribbean may 
well be studied in this connection, and is dealt 
with elsewhere. Nowhere, it may briefly be stated, 
has a semi-Latin race succeeded in founding a 
popular government. The so-called republics are 
victims of anarchy, the best being governed by 
oligarchies or held together by the strength of a 
practical dictator. The methods of election in 
any Latin-American state are enough to dispose 
of the theory that the democracy has any voice 
in their government. 

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But, after all, the Malay element in the Filipino 
is the strongest, and the Malay is an Oriental. 
Democracy is an alien growth on Oriental soil, 
and it is extremely doubtful whether it can ever 
flourish under conditions so unfavorable. Japan, 
the only Oriental country which has evolved a 
modern political system, is intensely monarchical. 
The self-abnegation of her hereditary aristocracy 
has not by any means destroyed their power, 
which has been accentuated by their entrance into 
commercial and professional life. The Japanese, 
however, are no fair comparison for the Filipinos. 
They are, in fact, a Northern race, strenuous, 
homogeneous, patriotic, whereas the Filipino is a 
true child of the tropics, both in physique and 
character. 

No Oriental tropical race has ever yet evolved 
anything approaching popular government, which 
is opposed to their traditions, inclinations, and 
the conditions of life. The Malay has been pecul- 
iarly backward in organizing political or social 
systems of any kind, and his invariable trend has 
been to an unqualified despotism. Before the 
Spaniards, in the early days, began their work of 
disintegrating the social system of the Filipinos, 
there is no doubt that, like every other division 
of their race, the tribes were aristocratic in their 
organization. Hereditary chiefs have always en- 
joyed power and prestige among people whose 
capacity for co-operation was practically nil. If 
an aristocracy were to come into power at the 

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present day, however, it would consist not of the 
descendants of hereditary chiefs but of the mestizo 
class, whose disqualifications have already been 
stated. 

Is it possible, therefore, that democracy will 
prove the solution of the difficulty? The writer 
thinks not. His experience of Oriental peoples 
makes him more than doubtful whether they can, 
for many generations at all events, reach the 
point of self-government. In the present case the 
immediate result of American evacuation would 
be to place power in the hands of a people who 
do not know how to use it, and who would become 
the tools of the educated mestizos. The ignorance 
of the peasant class may be remedied in time by 
education, and it may be possible to enlarge their 
point of view, which, like that of most Orientals, 
is purely local. When, also, the mestizos have 
given solid proof of their probity, loyalty, and 
disinterestedness, it will be ample time to intrust 
them with power. 



CHAPTER IV 

PACIFIC EXPANSION: THE PHILIPPINES— THREE 
YEARS AFTER 

At the time of writing (early in 1904) it may 
be said that the American administration of the 
PhiHppines has been working for over three years. 
The cession of the islands by Spain to the United 
States, of course, dates from 1898, but the actual 
subjugation of the islands was not anything like 
complete until a much later date. Early in 1901 
civil government was established throughout the 
archipelago, and this may, therefore, be fairly 
considered as a starting-point. 

The amount of administrative and reform work 
which may be accomplished in three years in 
founding a government in the tropics is not much, 
and the writer would have been the last to expect 
great results from such a short period. But the 
general assumption among certain leading Fili- 
pinos (who from their official positions appear to 
be in the confidence of the government), and the 
tone adopted by a section of the Americans them- 
selves, seem to indicate a belief that miracles are, 
indeed, in process, and that the Filipinos have been 
regenerated and placed securely on a footing with 
"the really civilized peoples." 

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The long continuance of Filipino resistance to 
American arms was a most unfortunate sequel to 
an early mistake. The rebellion organized by 
Aguinaldo might never have come to a head 
had the United States adopted from the first a 
firm attitude towards the political party of which 
he was the leader. Disappointed with their own 
status in the country after the cession by Spain, 
the mestizo politicians of Manila were able, by 
entirely false representations, to stir up the pop- 
ulation against the Americans, and it was to a 
false idea of the intentions of the United States 
that the stubborn resistance was due. The conse- 
quent neglect of the ordinary business of life soon 
made fighting a profession to a large number of 
the people, and the wild, free life of a ladrone, or 
brigand, attracted the most daring spirits, who, in 
their turn, terrorized the peaceful inhabitants. So 
popular is this irregular mode of life to this day 
that, according to an official report, a better-class 
girl in certain districts prefers life as the stolen 
mistress of a ladrone to marriage with a well-to-do 
and respectable citizen. The stamping-out of or- 
ganized resistance was practically ended in 1901, 
but there was evidence at a much later date of 
communication between the ladrones and political 
parties in Manila, which leads one to doubt if the 
former are in reality condemned or even regarded 
with disapprobation by all their countrymen as 
irresponsible robbers. There is still a great lack 
of reliable information as to the relations between 

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the insurrectos, or organized rebels, and the 
ladrones, or independent robber-bands; but one 
thing is clear — the secret societies, especially the 
Katipunan, provide a link, though one whose 
exact strength it is impossible to gauge. Secret 
societies have not been prohibited as such, but 
only those which " have for their object the promo- 
tion of treason, rebellion, or sedition, or the pro- 
mulgation of any pohtical opinion or policy." 
This restriction is absolutely useless, and it is 
doubtful whether any legislation which could be 
made to fit in with American principles would be 
successful in stamping out this most dangerous 
pest. In British possessions stringent laws have 
been enforced, and in Singapore, at all events, the 
power of the secret societies has been checked, if 
not destroyed. But wherever there are Chinese 
there will be the organizations so dear to Celestial 
minds; and the Fihpino, prone to political intrigue, 
though backward in organizing power, is sure to 
imitate the secret societies of his Chinese and 
mestizo friends, on the one hand, and the " unions " 
and "leagues" of his American mentors on the 
other. The legalizing of these societies is, there- 
fore, a step fraught with danger. Until 1902 the 
advocacy of seditious principles — i.e., of separa- 
tion or independence — either orally, by writing or 
printing, was forbidden ; but in July of that year, 
as soon as "a state of war" was over, this rule 
was rescinded. The consequence has been a good 
deal of abuse of the license granted, and one news- 

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paper, an American sheet, was, indeed, prosecuted 
while the law was in force. Until the United 
States is able to put an actual period to the term 
of her occupation, it seems a little unwise to per- 
mit the doctrine of independence or separation to 
be preached to an excitable and easily influenced 
people. 

The formation of a native constabulary was 
doubly essential in a country thus infected with 
ladrones and their accomplices. The native is 
not only better able to carry on the pectiliar kind 
of warfare involved, but many turbulent spirits 
who might have joined the robbers were incor- 
porated in the new force, which offered regular 
wages, a smart uniform, and congenial employ- 
ment. 

The result seems to justify the somewhat san- 
guine expectation that few regular troops will be 
needed in the islands, but it is to be hoped that 
the authorities will not move too fast in this 
direction. So far, it has been impossible, owing 
to the severity of their duties, to drill, discipline, 
and organize the constabulary as effectively as 
could be desired, and it must be remembered that 
on training, and not only on courage and spirit, 
depends their permanent efficiency. There is also 
a good deal to be done in establishing relations 
between the constabulary and local native officials. 
This will largely depend on the white officers com- 
manding the different bodies of constabulary, and 
the loyalty of the men is also contingent on this 

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personal question. An effort is needed to render 
this branch of the service attractive to educated 
and rehable Americans. 

It will, perhaps, be interesting, in this brief re- 
view of the Philippines — three years after — to see 
what are the opinions of prominent Filipinos, high 
in government office, on the benefits of American 
rule and the prospects of the archipelago. They 
are singularly characteristic. 

Dr. Pardo de Tavera, a clever mestizo, of almost 
pure Spanish blood, educated in Europe and highly 
qualified in scientific pursuits, is the initiator of 
the Partido Federal, which was an ally of the 
United States during the closing stages of the 
insurrection, in the establishment of civil govern- 
ment. Dr. de Tavera considers that the principal 
benefit bestowed on the Filipinos is liberation 
from the friars. It is possible that the majority 
of his countrymen would hardly subscribe to this, 
since the friars were practically expelled before 
the Americans arrived in the islands, and a good 
deal of discontent has been expressed because the 
United States insists on dealing fairly with the 
religious communities in the matter of confiscated 
lands. The next benefit is municipal government, 
and there is no doubt that every participator in 
this will agree with him and that it is a popular 
measure. We have, at present, however, no evi- 
dence as to the practical nature of the blessings 
it is conferring. The legislative improvements 
effected by the government, especially the law 



GREATER AMERICA 

of habeas corpus, abolition of banishment, im- 
prisonment, and military executions on account 
of political beliefs, are some real reforms which 
Dr. de Tavera and all his countrymen must ap- 
preciate; but freedom of speech, assembly, and 
the press are blessings which, for the present at 
all events, must be regarded as disguised if peace, 
order, and prosperity are the ideals in view. The 
enlightened Filipino attitude towards taxation is 
well illustrated by Dr. de Tavera. He regards 
it as an unpleasant necessity, to be put off as 
long as possible. His unenlightened countryman 
has a simpler creed. Taxation must be avoided 
at any cost, he says, with delightful inconse- 
quence as to how expenses are to be met. 

The two other Filipino commissioners who are 
associated with Dr. de Tavera concur in this 
expression of opinion generally, but one, Senor 
Legarda, contributes a practical suggestion — i.e., 
the sale and development of public lands, and the 
importation of American farmers and laborers 
to teach the Filipinos — presumably to illustrate 
the "dignity of labor." These gentlemen unite 
in the belief that two, or at most three, years will 
see the Filipinos in a position to dispense with 
leading-strings and emerge as a Territory of the 
United States. Meanwhile, they advocate the 
sending of two delegates, elected by popular vote, 
to represent the " nation " at Washington. 

The primary benefit obtained by Filipinos from 
the American occupation, according to Dr. de 

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Tavera, is, therefore, the overthrow of the power 
of the Church ; and as has been said, the expulsion 
of the friars can hardly be ascribed to the Amer- 
icans. There may well be two opinions, however, 
even on the point as to whether the downfall of 
the Church has been altogether of advantage to 
the Filipinos. 

In a country where all education, power, and 
prestige were practically vested in the Church, the 
violent expulsion of the religious orders naturally 
caused great dislocation. The native priests, how- 
ever, continued to exercise their functions, and up 
to the time of the establishment of civil govern- 
ment the Filipinos remained outwardly devout 
Christians, though their ignorance rendered them 
a prey to debasing superstitions. The establish- 
ment of schools in which no religion was taught 
and the indifferent attitude (in their eyes) of 
Americans towards religious matters must, how- 
ever, in time weaken the bonds which tie them 
to the Church. It seems doubtful whether Prot- 
estantism will make much headway with a people 
so sensuous as the Filipinos, but the immediate 
result has been the evolution of an independent 
Catholic Church, which renounces its allegiance to 
the Pope. It is to be feared that this severance of 
ties which involve at least a continuity of doctrine 
will lead to a relapse into extravagances and 
superstitions which will retard the progress of the 
people. Their mental condition may be gauged 
by the amazing story of a man who organized a 

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ladrone band and gave a good deal of trouble for 
some time, being at the time of writing still at 
liberty. He gained his ascendency over the peo- 
ple by an announcement that he would go to 
heaven; and then, descending from a tree in the 
presence of his followers, gave it out that he had 
brought back from the celestial regions a box 
containing independence, which he would open 
and confer on those who assisted him. 

The better-educated Filipinos, especially those 
mestizos who have received European education, 
have the tendency, so common among Westernized 
Orientals, to relapse into religious indifference, if 
not atheism. Altogether, the Philippines appears 
to be a very suitable ground for missionary en- 
deavor. 

The subject of education is by far the most im- 
portant one in the Phihppines, and from the first 
absorbed much attention on the part of the Amer- 
icans. The excellence and liberality of their own 
public-school system made them regard with sur- 
prise and indignation the condition of the FiU- 
pinos in this respect. It is not too much to say 
that the vast bulk of the population were entire- 
ly ignorant, the village schools being taught by 
people nearly as little educated as their pupils. 
Under the Spanish rule, in many of the larger 
towns schools and colleges existed, but these, al- 
ways under clerical guidance, were lamentably be- 
hind the times in equipment. At Manila a certain 
number of the better class obtained, also under 

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priestly regime, a literary, if not a scientific, 
education, and the best men went to Spain or 
France and returned with diplomas as doctors or 
lawyers. Having observed that the immediate 
need was for more light among the poor and 
scattered population, the United States, with 
characteristic impulsive generosity, decided to 
meet this need at once. Education requires teach- 
ers; Americans will be able to train the Filipinos 
to become American in ideals and standards — we 
will send one thousand American teachers at once 
to the Philippines! This appears to have been 
the chain of reasoning, and the immediate result 
was the wholesale chartering of teachers in the 
United States, by a sort of open order to the 
various educational institutions, and within a short 
time an army of teachers was on its way to Manila, 
whence they were distributed broadcast over the 
islands. 

The fatal mistake with Orientals is to be in a 
hurry. That reform was urgently needed is cer- 
tain, but that it could be met by such drastic 
measures is far from certain. The least evil ac- 
cruing from this measure has been a vast waste 
of time and energy, which might have been ad- 
vantageously expended on more permanent re- 
forms. That a number of the teachers were un- 
suited for the work was inevitable ; that many have 
done good service is greatly to their credit, when 
it is remembered that language, country, climate, 
customs — everything, in fact — were new to them. 

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The chief difficulty at present seems to be that 
the majority must return to the United States at 
the end of their term of three years and an en- 
tirely fresh and raw batch be drafted in. The 
enormous cost involved by this method is, per- 
haps, unimportant to the United States. But 
the lack of continuity is a great drawback, and 
it is unwise for a country with a large surplus to 
give lessons in extravagance to an exceptionally 
poor one, which it hopes in time to make self- 
supporting. It is, of course, difficult to gauge the 
exact value of the work done by Americans in 
primary education; but, to take the simplest as- 
pect of the case, it is doubtful whether it is wise 
to adopt suddenly the American system with an 
Oriental race like the Filipinos. The thing to be 
avoided is the turning-out of a vast number of 
superficially educated people with a thin veneer 
of Americanism. The imitative faculty of the 
Filipino and his retentive memory make him 
peculiarly apt to develop on these lines. It would 
have been, in the writer's opinion, a far wiser 
plan to concentrate the energy and money on 
equipping schools for Filipino teachers and es- 
tablishing a system by which they could be in- 
sured good and permanent salaries according to 
the value of the work done. American superin- 
tendents and teachers for the study of the Eng- 
lish language might have been employed, and the 
primary system improved by degrees. All Amer- 
icans should have been given time and required 

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to learn Spanish, and the FiHpino teachers should 
have learned English, and have been required 
to use it in schools. This is theoretically the 
principle adopted as regards the language ques- 
tion, but American teachers, coming for so 
short a period as three years, do not have time 
to perfect themselves in Spanish. It is recog- 
nized now that the Filipino teachers are, after all, 
the agency upon which the future of education 
mainly depends, so that it seems deplorable that, 
to quote the report, "the lot of Filipino teachers 
is not a fortunate one." The inflated prices paid 
by the government to workmen and other em- 
ployes make the pay of the native teachers seem 
small — they are, in fact, the lowest-paid class in 
the community — and the abolition of the old 
system of fees or gratuities from pupils cuts them 
off from what used to be a source of profit. The 
system has made this almost inevitable; nor are 
the average teachers worth more than they get. 
But this is a state of affairs which careful training 
and proper inducements would remedy. 

The democratization of the islands cannot so 
far have been said to react favorably on education, 
since the municipalities, which are now responsi- 
ble for their own schools, frequently disclaim re- 
sponsibility for salaries to teachers they have not 
themselves selected, or, if they agree to pay, make 
the rate as low as they can and withhold it as long 
as possible. 

It seems, therefore, that, although a certain 

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number of little Filipinos may be learning to be 
"mighty smart," and a certain amount of good 
influence is at work, the office of teacher has been 
brought into disrepute among the natives, a feel- 
ing of injustice engendered, and a great deal of 
time and money wasted. That this is the case 
is largely due to American idealism. Not content 
to attempt the education of the Filipinos on 
the simplest and least difficult lines, they were 
bent on infusing into the educational system that 
atmosphere of democracy which is their fetish. 
The aims of education were mixed up with, and 
handicapped by, the desire to "upset the prestige 
and domination of the present oligarchic element 
and secure the emancipation of the dependent 
masses." 

University education and secondary schools are 
receiving attention, and ought to be of great 
service, if they are carefuUy handled and not 
prostituted to a desire for "popularity." It must 
never be forgotten that character-training is the 
chief safeguard to a brilliant and shallow people, 
and that it can hardly be acquired in one genera- 
tion. Technical— or, as it is termed in the United 
States, industrial— education is desirable, but ap- 
parently not particularly popular. The establish- 
ment of schools will not necessarily imply pupils, 
but every effort should certainly be made to lead 
the Filipinos in this direction. Unfortunately 
this specializing of education for the benefit of a 
working class is not likely to be popular under 

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American tutelage, being opposed to the spirit of 
Democracy. 

The educational policy of the United States 
towards the Philippines has been influenced by 
the same motive which dictated her whole policy 
— a desire to do for the Filipinos what had never 
before been done for an Oriental people. The 
example of Japan might have been followed more 
closely, so far as the patient laying of foundations 
was concerned ; but the democratic craze, and the 
general feeling that salvation must come in a 
couple of years or not at all, have combined to 
mar what might have been the most interesting 
educational experiment of the age. Thanks to the 
generosity of the United States in presenting him 
with a ready-made social, political, and educational 
system, the Filipino, before he is rudimentarily 
educated, will be plunged in the vices of over-civil- 
ization, and the chances are that he will pass from 
childhood to decay without ever reaching maturity. 

The subject of education leads one at once to 
the labor question. No local question has, per- 
haps, been more freely discussed than the in- 
dustrial capacity of the Filipinos, and there are 
two diametrically opposite views of their possibili- 
ties. It must be noted, however, that there is 
no one who believes the Filipino to be capable, 
unaided, of doing anything for himself, and 
the history of Malayan peoples in every case 
supports this view. They are neither a com- 
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GREATER AMERICA 

mercial nor industrial race by instinct, and, al- 
though agriculture has been their one avocation, 
they employ to the present day the most primitive 
tools. All the progress made by Malayans in any 
of their habitats may be traced directly to Hindoo, 
Arab, or European influence, and especially to 
actual discipline on the part of the dominant race. 
The intense aristocratic prejudice with which the 
race is permeated lost its picturesqueness under 
the Spaniards through the destruction of tribal 
organization, but was retained and intensified in a 
contempt for commercial and industrial pursuits. 
The Chinese and their half-breeds became the 
merchants and petty traders of the islands and 
also the only skilled workmen. They swelled the 
ranks of local politicians and undermined the 
social and commercial fabric of society with their 
secret societies and their talent for intrigue. 

The Filipino has, therefore, practically no 
status in the world of labor. He has hitherto 
been despised as an economic factor. Apart from 
his innate prejudice against labor, he is handi- 
capped by many things. His physique, like that 
of many a race of mixed blood, is poor. The 
savage tribes of the interior, who have not mingled 
their blood with that of Chinese, Japanese, Arabs, 
Europeans, negroes, and others (as has the coast- 
bred Filipino), are of infinitely finer physique. 
Moreover, the Filipino has not, like the Japanese, 
the advantage of a bracing climate during part 
of the year. The winter is pleasant in Manila, 

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GREATER AMERICA 

and even more so in other places on the coast, 
while some of the hill country is probably healthy 
all the year round, but the climate generally is of 
the damp, enervating character which predisposes 
to diseases of chest and lungs, and at certain 
seasons is as trying and unhealthy in the valleys 
and coast towns (where work has to be done) 
as in any other tropical country. The mixed 
blood of the Filipinos, and especially the white 
strain, which is widely diffused, makes them more 
susceptible to climate than a pure race long ac- 
climatized would be. Joined to physical dis- 
ability, the enervating effects of climate, and 
aristocratic prejudices of great antiquity, is the 
radical, uncompromising, deeply rooted indolence 
of all Malayan people. The Burmese— physically 
strong, active, and by no means lacking in ca- 
pacity — suffer from this same complaint, which 
is nothing but sheer indolence — partly the effect 
of climate, but having its roots deep in the na- 
tional character. 

The Filipino is, therefore, a bad tradesman; if 
he condescends to such an ignoble pursuit, he 
usually leaves the details to his women-folk. He 
has the makings of a fair artisan in such trades as 
do not require much physical strength or sustained 
effort, but as a laborer he is subject to two great 
drawbacks — physical incapacity and moral weak- 
ness. He is unreliable to the last extent, and is 
subject to fits of inconsequence — the child of 
caprice, to whom the warmth of the sun and the 

99 



,f n 



GREATER AMERICA 

coolness of the shade will always be temptations 
to shirk, and whose lack of foresight makes it irk- 
some to work to-day that he may eat to-morrow. 
How much this Oriental characteristic has been 
aggravated by Spanish influence can hardly be 
estimated, but it is quite certain to-day that for 
one man who will steadily set to work to build a 
wall there are twenty who will meet to discuss its 
necessity, its probable cost, the legal aspect of the 
question, and its bearing on local or national 
politics. 

The evidence collected by Americans as to 
Filipino workmen is interesting but in the high- 
est degree inconclusive. Some officials report the 
"flattest failure" in the attempt to get unskilled 
labor performed, even at high wages; others re- 
port that, under an improved system of payment 
and patient supervision, Filipinos have proved 
most satisfactory in certain classes of work. The 
standard by which they judge, however, appears 
in all cases to be that of the work performed un- 
der them by local Chinese coolies, whom they re- 
placed by Filipinos, finding the latter in the long 
run more satisfactory. There is a general com- 
plaint against the Chinese that they object to 
adopt new methods, whereas the Filipinos are 
ready to be taught. The question is whether any 
of the gentlemen who report in this sense are 
acquainted with the work done by Chinese in, for 
instance, Hong-Kong or Singapore. It is quite 
probable that, unsuccessful at first in handling 



GREATER AMERICA 

their coolies, they would with a more extended ex- 
perience have got more satisfactory results. It 
is, of course, highly desirable that the Filipino 
should be employed in his own coimtry, and 
that every effort should be made to fit him for 
an industrial career, but it is hardly fair, on such 
slight premises as can be afforded by a few months' 
trial, to pronounce him the equal, if not the 
superior, of the Chinese in the labor market. 

The government pays inflated rates to secure 
Filipino labor, gives its employes advantages in 
the way of instruction and supervision, and is 
prepared to be lenient to shortcomings. This is a 
benevolent policy and theoretically right, but it 
may react to the disadvantage of the islands. It 
is impossible for the commercial community to 
proceed on these lines, nor will the provincial and 
municipal authorities be able to do so. These 
must have the cheapest labor procurable, and, as 
far as the mercantile community is concerned, 
there is a consensus of opinion that Filipino labor 
is not cheap. 

The compromise adopted after considerable dis- 
cussion has been to allow a limited number of 
skilled Chinese laborers to be imported for three 
or five years, with a head-tax of fifty dollars and 
the obligation on employers to engage a Filipino 
apprentice to work under each. This legislation, 
with its autocratic interference with private liber- 
ty characteristic of modem democracy, may pos- 
sibly be justified on grounds of expedience. The 

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Filipino, despite the declarations of his champions, 
evidently needs to be protected from Chinese com- 
petition if he is to remain the dominant factor in 
the islands ; but the question arises — how can this 
artificial standard be maintained? 

The development of the islands commercially 
and industrially, which depends initially on the 
execution of costly public works and secondarily 
on a spirit of enterprise among its people, must be 
injured by any system which interferes with the 
economic balance. Private enterprise and the in- 
troduction of foreign capital will be retarded by 
this interference with the normal conditions of 
labor supply. Nor will this artificial stimulus be 
sufficient to carry the Filipino on the path of 
material progress, even were it possible for Amer- 
ica to continue its present policy. The suggested 
panacea for this situation seems to be the incul- 
cation of the doctrine of the "independence and 
dignity of labor under a free government." But, 
picturesque as this phrase may be, it is rather 
inadequate for the many problems it is expected 
to solve. The phrase has evidently caught the 
fancy of the FiHpinos, and "labor unions" have 
been formed in Manila. Their principal instigator 
is officially described as a "crack-brained insur- 
recto, with political purposes only." The descrip- 
tion, however, is rather euphemistic, for seditious 
correspondence was found among the archives of 
the president, who was in close communication 
with the ladrones. It is a significant circumstance 



GREATER AMERICA 

that Manila, the headquarters not only of govern- 
ment but of political parties, is still, as it has al- 
ways been, the refuge of rebels and ladrones, who 
come in whenever closely pressed or in want of 
funds. This circumstance would lead one to re- 
gard with distrust the formation of any leagues 
or unions, and the more so that, as already said, 
it has so far been found impossible to get any hold 
on the secret societies which exist throughout the 
islands. 

The "dignity of labor," therefore, is rather a 
weak reed to lean on if it can only be advanced 
by unions. The Filipino has not yet reached the 
stage of being an efficient or reliable laborer ; he is 
in his infancy still, and must be cajoled, bribed, 
and protected. It is, therefore, folly to talk of 
his "combining" or "learning the spirit of co- 
operation" at this stage. He will pick up the 
catch-words fast enough, and may even organize 
a strike for higher wages, if the government pro- 
ceeds too fast with his education. The example 
of Americans is to be one of the most potent in- 
fluences in his regeneration ; and there is no doubt 
that in the use of machinery, the learning of 
modem business methods, and in other ways he 
will profit greatly. But in the department in 
which his labor is most needed, and in which he 
has so far proved most unsatisfactory — that of 
hard, unskilled, daily labor — he cannot learn the 
dignity of the pursuit from white example, because 
the white man cannot perform such tasks in the 

103 . 



GREATER AMERICA 

tropics. There is no doubt that every FiHpino 
would be wilHng to have the white man's job of 
supervising, but it will be difficult for him to 
appreciate the " dignity " of his own position. 

The most hopeful policy is that of raising the 
standard of life by improvements in dwelling- 
houses, sanitation, and so forth, which will bring 
home to the Filipino the advantages of a regular 
wage at a rising scale. The next generation, with 
improved education, will be even more amenable 
to such practical considerations, and in time the 
people may attain to a sound economic position 
which will make genuine co-operation possible. 
The greatest danger they have to fear is to be made 
the tools of the politicians; and until they have 
reached a higher level, socially and economically, 
they cannot appreciate their own interests or pro- 
tect them. It is a cruel kindness to affect to put 
political power into the hands of such a democ- 
racy as this, and the experiment can lead to noth- 
ing but misunderstanding and confusion, which 
will become chaos the minute the strong, guiding 
hand and open purse of America are withdrawn. 

It is obvious, whatever side of the question is 
raised, that there is a vast amount of practical 
work to be done in the direction of providing the 
islands with some of the elements of civilization. 
Every new country occupied by white men turns 
its attention first to public works, being aware 
that on these depend the prosperity and progress 
for which they hope. In conquered countries, 

104 



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such as India and Burma, or a protectorate like 
Egypt, it has been found the wisest pohcy to 
begin at once with the improvement of com- 
munications, thus providing employment for the 
natives, disciplining them in habits of work, and 
opening the way for future trade. 

It was natural to expect that some such policy 
would have actuated America in the Philippines, 
and that the rest of the world would have had 
an object - lesson in such a matter from an in- 
tensely practical nation, whose public works are 
acknowledged to be models. Circumstances have, 
of course, been adverse. Cholera, famine, cattle 
disease, and brigandage have followed in the wake 
of a devastating war; but, at the same time, it is 
surprising to find how little has been done. The 
establishment of an elaborate system of govern- 
ment, the organization of a civil service, the ex- 
penditure of a vast amount of time and money in 
planting American school-teachers all over the 
islands seem to have engaged all the available 
energy. 

It is, perhaps, more astonishing still that an 
illiberal policy should have been pursued towards 
foreign capital and foreigners. It was, of course, 
only natural and right that America should es- 
tablish her own banks and should protect the in- 
terests of her nationals in every way, but the 
attempt made by stretching a point of law to 
prevent an English bank from even bringing in a 
clerk is but one case out of many in which British 

105 



GREATER AMERICA 

bankers and merchants have been hampered in 
their business. It is not too much to say that 
the British community, in whose hands some of 
the most important industries have hitherto been, 
are laboring under a natural sense of injustice, in- 
creased by the fact that inexperienced officials fre- 
quently make matters worse than they need be. 
In the adjacent British colonies no discrimination 
is practised against Americans. 

The question of trade expansion in the Philip- 
pines is not at present one on which any very 
definite information can be obtained. The Amer- 
icans point to a great increase both of exports and 
imports since their occupation, but, apart from 
the fact that no very reliable data are to be had of 
trade in Spanish times, it must be remembered 
that the comparison loses much of its significance 
owing to the military and civil occupation and the 
artificial stimulus thereby provided. In speak- 
ing of "increased trade" also, it has to be taken 
into account that revolution in the Philippines 
had reduced the islands to a very low ebb just 
before the American occupation. The snapping 
of all links with Spain is another misleading circum- 
stance, since most of the trade with that country 
has now gone to swell the bulk of traffic with the 
United Kingdom and the United States, without 
involving a corresponding increase in the total. 
Notwithstanding the optimism natural to the of- 
ficial view, the foreign community, American and 
European, are unanimous in declaring that the 

io6 



GREATER AMERICA 

Philippines are far from being in a promising con- 
dition commercially. The United States must 
supply the chief markets for Philippine products, 
and a higher measure of reciprocity than that at 
present granted is universally demanded. Agri- 
culture is the one resource of the people — the 
only possible pursuit under present conditions — 
and agriculture is described (officially) as being 
"wofully depressed." Tobacco and sugar are the 
most important products of the archipelago, and, 
as in Cuba, the barriers against these in the United 
States markets are likely to prove serious obsta- 
cles and retard the prosperity of the islands. The 
importance of China as an outlet for Philippine 
produce, and the possibilities of Manila as a second 
Hong-Kong or Singapore must be largely affected 
by the result of the dispute between Japan and 
Russia. Commercial treaties with China, such 
as have been recently executed by the United 
States, should vitally influence the development 
of the Philippines, but the power of China to 
execute them is dependent on a very doubtful 
question: whether the Oriental is to retain his 
position in the East, or whether he is to fall ir- 
retrievably under the heel of the Slav. To put 
it more plainly — the intensely protectionist and 
monopolistic policy of Russia makes her aggression 
a menace not only to the Oriental but to every 
power which is interested in the commercial 
development of the Far East. 

The introduction of capital into the Philip- 

107 



GREATER AMERICA 

pine islands for the development of industries 
seems to be an essential, if any progress is to 
be made; but in view of the modem develop- 
ment of capitalism in America, it was felt de- 
sirable to make restrictions which would prevent 
the creation of Trusts and secure the Filipinos 
a proper share in the exploitation of their own 
coimtry. Laudable as was this design, like that 
of excluding the Chinese, it is tmdoubtedly in- 
strumental in preventing the development of the 
country. American capitalists no longer care for 
the smaller forms of enterprise; nor are the con- 
ditions favorable to these. Political power is ex- 
ploited for the support of all great undertakings, 
and can only be commanded by those operating 
on a great scale. The Trusts feed the machine and 
the machine feeds the Trusts, and there is no place 
in modem America for anything small or modest. 

The difficulty is to reconcile the conflicting 
interests of the Filipinos. If they are to be set 
among the really free nations, they must become 
prosperous and industrious as soon as possible; 
and how to accomplish this without resource 
either to Chinese labor or the American capitalist 
is a problem enough to puzzle the wisest. Com- 
promise only is possible, just as compromise 
alone has adjusted the relations between democ- 
racy and imperialism. But compromises are slow 
in working, uncertain in their tendencies, and it is 
impossible to foresee what the future will bring. 

To go back to the material progress of the 

io8 



GREATER AMERICA 

islands, we find that after three years of actual 
civil government — though many parts of the 
archipelago were pacified earlier — not one yard 
of railway has been begun; only one wagon-road 
is in process of construction'; no canals or deepen- 
ing of rivers have been undertaken, nor any im- 
provements of harbors,^ except at Manila; while 
the inter-island communication has only recently 
been facilitated by the purchase of fifteen small 
coasting steamers. The office of chief consulting 
engineer for the archipelago was only organized 
in October, 1902, and the provision made to se- 
cure improvement of public works in the prov- 
inces has proved entirely inadequate, because the 
extremely low salaries offered to the provincial 
engineers could not attract competent men, and 
also because those who were fairly competent had 
no stimulus or encouragement to bestir themselves. 
Efforts have been made to improve sanitation in 
the chief towns, but nothing permanent will be 
accomplished in that direction without the most 
sweeping reforms and strict discipline. The open- 
ing of communications would have been far more 
useful than the spread of democratic theories or 
arguments about the "dignity of labor." Relief- 
works are badly needed in many districts, but 
these can only be profitably carried out by an ex- 
perienced and properly organized Public Works 

* A naval base is badly needed in the Philippines, and a site 
has been chosen at Subig Bay, but the necessary legislation is 
still in abeyance. 

109 



GREATER AMERICA 

Department. The functions of this department 
should have begun, immediately peace was re- 
stored in any district, by the preparation of sur- 
veys. Unfortunately, the uncertainty which pre- 
vailed as to the course which America would take 
led to a makeshift government, a hastily organized 
net- work of bureaus, and a lack of forethought and 
provision for the future. 

Thus legislation on the subject of Chinese labor 
and of franchises has been already subject to 
revision, and will probably need further modifica- 
tion. Much still remains to be done to render the 
judicial system satisfactory and to secure the up- 
rightness of courts ; commercial prosperity has not 
been placed on a sound basis, nor has agriculture 
received the necessary stimulus. 

The work of criticism is easy, and it was inevi- 
table that a great number of serious blunders should 
be made at the outset. When we remember the 
character of the control exercised at Washington 
and the absence of any machinery for dealing 
adequately with these serious problems, it can 
hardly be wondered at that the executive in the 
Philippines has failed in many respects. There 
have been displayed by American officials in the 
Philippines a devotion, ability, and disinterested- 
ness which reflect the highest honor on them- 
selves and their country ; but the conditions under 
which they held office, and, above all, the demands 
made on them by public opinion in America, have 
seriously hampered them in constructive work. 

no 



GREATER AMERICA 

What was wanted was less idealism and more 
common -sense — a curious criticism to make on 
American achievements, but nevertheless true. If 
the average American could see in the expansion 
of his race its true significance, if he could rid 
himself of the idea that he alone possesses the 
touch-stone of freedom, if he were less concerned 
with the ethics of government and more with its 
practical justice and incorruptibility — if, in fact, 
he ceased to masquerade as the apostle of liberty 
and were content to appear simply as a peace-and- 
order - loving Anglo - Saxon, he would immensely 
simplify the task he has set himself. By all means 
let him strive after his ideal democracy. He can 
find abundant material for reform in his own 
continent. Let him do all he can to adjust the 
relations between man and man in the manner 
most perfectly consonant with liberty and equality. 
But let him not, in a blind effort to prove his own 
adherence to a shibboleth to which he gives the 
lie every day in his dealings with negroes or 
Indians, force the Filipino along the path that 
leads to anarchy. 

Common-sense says that the Filipinos wanted 
peace, good government, and commercial pros- 
perity. America has given them political institu- 
tions and legislation. Filipinos wanted education ; 
Americans are determined to give them that. Un- 
fortunately they have forgotten that obedience is 
the first lesson, and that one must not begin to 
rule until one has learned to obey. 

Ill 



CHAPTER V 

CARIBBEAN EXPANSION: CUBANS AND THEIR AMER- 
ICAN FRIENDS 

The present condition of Cuba and her possi- 
bilities for the future are httle understood on 
the British side of the Atlantic, though a less 
confused conception undoubtedly prevails in the 
United States. In theory, we have the edifying 
spectacle of a tiny nation, goaded to desperation 
by the cruelty of their masters, turning on them, 
and, after a life-and-death struggle, being rescued 
by the strong arm of a disinterested neighbor, 
who, after finishing the fight and setting the 
Cuban house in order, departs with streaming 
banners for his own country, followed by blessings 
from Cuba Libre. We expect, then, to see this 
new republic settling down comfortably under the 
protecting wing of her liberty-loving neighbor, and 
becoming a good and prosperous little country. 

Before one can put the lights and shades into 
this very impressionist sketch, however, it is nec- 
essary first to understand to a certain extent the 
character of the Cubans and the conditions of 
life in the island, and also to appreciate the cir- 
cimistances which drove the Cubans to rebellion 

112 



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and the exact relations between the United States 
and her Uttle neighbor. No paUiation need be 
sought for the abuses of Spanish government, no 
unnecessary cynicism displayed as to American 
disinterestedness, in order to show that the ordi- 
nary view of Cuban affairs is hardly a true one. 

It is not unusual, especially in America, to hear 
the Cubans spoken of as if they were a people 
similar to the American colonists at the time of 
the Revolution, and as if they achieved their in- 
dependence after a similar struggle. Apart, how- 
ever, from the superficial resemblance arising from 
the fact that they are a white, or nominally white, 
race, that they revolted successfully against a 
European monarchy, and that their rebellion was 
largely the result of economic exactions on the 
part of the mother-country, there is little re- 
semblance. The Cubans are not only widely dif- 
ferent in character but also in their circumstances. 

To take first the most important question of 
race. The Cubans are a Latin people, that being 
the principal and dominant race in the island, and 
the one whose civilization, manners, language, and 
character color the whole life. Two generations 
in the island go to make a true Cubano ; but there 
can still hardly be said to be a Cuban race. The 
Cuban may be of Latin or negro stock, or perhaps 
combine the two with a dash of Indian blood ; and 
if we speak of the whole Cuban people as a " race," 
or even as a nation, we are evidently beside the 
mark. Although the process of fusing many 
8 113 



GREATER AMERICA 

peoples, till lately mostly of kindred and Northern 
stock, is said to have evolved a national type in 
the United States, there is, in fact, a good deal of 
imagination even about this "American type," 
which, before the recent influx from eastern 
Europe, already varied to a considerable degree, 
according to climatic conditions and the original 
stock with which each region was peopled. A 
small island like Cuba, shut out as far as possible 
by restrictive barriers from the rest of the world, 
save its mother-country, from which it received 
a constant reinforcement, might seem, at first 
sight, to have more chance of evolving a national 
type, but it is far more probable that a type 
evolved under such circumstances would remain 
fundamentally true to the racial conditions to 
which it owed its origin. 

The original stocks were three — Spanish, negro, 
and Indian; but the last was early extinguished, 
and only its traces now remain, although it is 
quite possible to distinguish them in some of the 
half-breed people.^ The two great races of Cubans 
are, therefore, the White and the Black, and be- 
tween them is a large and growing mulatto class, 
of all shades. No rigid line separates the Spaniard 
from the negro, so far as intermarriage is con- 

1 It may be well to note here the mixture of races in Spanish 
America. These were: (i) European Spaniards, (2) Creoles 
(children of Spanish parents), (3) Indians (indigenous), (4) 
negroes (of African race), (5) mestizos (children of whites 
and Indians), (6) mulattoes (children of whites and negroes), 
(7) zamboes (children of Indians and negroes). 

114 



GREATER AMERICA 

cerned; and still less from the Cuban Creole, with 
whom he has always intermarried freely. There 
is no race prejudice — only class distinction — in 
Cuba, and many colored people are placed by 
their circumstances on a footing of equality with 
whites. Here lies one essential difference — a very 
wide one— between the Cuban and the American. 
The prevalence and strength of class distinctions 
is, however, a strong feature in all Spanish-Amer- 
ican countries and owes its existence to the early 
conditions of colonization and to the inequalities 
of wealth caused by the exploitation of natural 
resources. It is only of recent years that the 
United States has offered the spectacle of great 
fortunes co-existing with poverty and misery, but 
this was from the first one of the elements of social 
life in Spanish colonies, where the strong enriched 
themselves at the expense of the weak. This 
radical difference in the fabric of society cannot 
be altered by legislation or wholesale reforms. 

The Spaniards always occupied a unique posi- 
tion. As the dominant race, in the early days 
especially, their peninsular birth gave them a 
social status, increased by the fact that they were 
government officials, wealthy planters, or business- 
men. The Cuban aristocracy was chiefly made 
up of planters, who frequently bought titles — • 
the Spanish "grandees" who owned property sel- 
dom lived on the island — and society was suf- 
ficiently catholic to include every one of means 
and education. A very pleasant society it was, 

"5 



GREATER AMERICA 

despite the formality and etiquette which the cus- 
toms of the old country prescribed. Lavish expen- 
diture, open hospitality, charming courtesy, easy 
gayety, and a considerable degree of refinement 
were the rule. The men were educated abroad — 
in Spain, France, or the United States; the women 
were celebrated for grace and beauty; and, while 
the commercial prosperity lasted, heavy taxes and 
governmental abuses were little felt by the in- 
fluential classes. Even the negro slaves enjoyed, 
on the whole, an easy lot. Although no attempt 
was made to educate or elevate them, the easy- 
going habits of the country made for their hap- 
piness, and, as in the Southern States, the house- 
hold negroes were more pets than slaves. 

Despite the exactions of venal Spanish officials, 
then, the three component parts of Cuban life 
were fairly harmonious until the decline of com- 
mercial prosperity put another strain on their 
relations. The Cuban Creole and the peninsular 
Spaniard were brothers in feeling as well as blood, 
but at the same time a process was at work which 
tended to differentiate them, and with the birth 
of Cuban independence as a sentiment, which took 
place about the end of the eighteenth century, 
began the true evolution of the modem Cuban. 
The growing distrust ripened into a family quar- 
rel, until, at last, feeling became so bitter that a 
Cuban would spit after mentioning the very name 
of Spaniard, and the consequent breaking-off of 
ties naturally led to an exaggeration of all points 

ii6 



GREATER AMERICA 

of difference between the Creole and the peninsular 
man. Even so, it would have been difficult for a 
stranger, in many cases, to distinguish the native- 
bom, and it is impossible to overlook the fact that, 
racially and congenitally, the white Cubans are 
Spanish. 

The modifications of the Anglo - Saxon race on 
the American continent have hardly produced one 
type, but rather several types, of which the most 
that we can say is that they differ in some par- 
ticulars from the English one. These modifica- 
tions are, however, more mental than physical, and 
if we set aside social and political differences 
arising out of different conditions and influences, 
we shall find that the Anglo-Saxon breeds true, 
whether in America, Australia, or Great Britain. 
We can confidently expect of him a certain mor- 
al standard, a large share of practical common- 
sense, an unquenchable energy and ambition, and 
a lack of artistic instinct. The fundamental char- 
acteristics of each race will be similarly observed 
in their several migrations, and are singularly ex- 
emplified in the colonial evolution of the great 
Latin nations. 

In Cuba, despite a certain amount of reinforce- 
ment from the mother-country, a marked physi- 
cal modification has taken place. The Cubano is 
slighter, smaller, and darker than the true Span- 
iard, and there can be no doubt that in physique, 
at all events, he has deteriorated. This is the 
natural effect of a tropical climate on white races 

117 



GREATER AMERICA 

and their descendants, accentuated doubtless by 
the early marriages which seem the natural con- 
sequence of life in tropical countries, where the 
women mature early. Notwithstanding physical 
modification, the Cubano remains in character and 
proclivities very Spanish, the chief change in this 
respect being merely an exaggeration of certain 
traits. Negro blood brings its own inevitable 
tendencies and limitations, and the Indian strain 
has undoubtedly helped to give Cubans their 
character for amiability; but the main charac- 
teristics may without exception be traced back 
to Spain. As regards the mingling of Spanish 
and colored blood, it can only be said that, al- 
though there have been exceptional individuals of 
the mulatto or mestizo class, the result as a whole 
is deterioration from a moral as well as a physical 
point of view. The predisposition to disease in 
half-breeds between white and colored races is a 
recognized fact; and it has been specially noted 
in the West Indies that a contagious malady proves 
more fatal to the slightly colored class than to any 
other. The half-breeds lack the virility and stay- 
ing power of the pure races. Their mental and 
moral qualities are a delicate subject for dis- 
cussion. Englishmen have always felt a strong 
prejudice in this respect, even in the case of 
so refined and cultivated a people as the Hindoos.* 

' In a letter, only published after his death, and written at 
the request of a Japanese statesman, the late Mr. Herbert 
Spencer gives expression to this antipathy for fusion between 

ii8 



GREATER AMERICA 

This objection is, of course, founded on race prej- 
udice, but it has been confirmed by experience, 
which shows that, despite briUiant exceptions, the 
half-breed is as a class unreliable, superficial, in- 
clined to be tricky, to reproduce the worst features 
of both parents, and, even under the most favor- 
able conditions, to degenerate in physique. The 
race question is further complicated in Cuba by 
the fact that in this case the colored element is 
negro. Hitherto the negro problem has troubled 
Cuba but little, but in the near future, when the 
simultaneous introduction of American prejudices 
and individual rights begin to clash, there will 
inevitably arise some very curious situations. The 
jealousy of the genuine negro towards his colored 
half-brother, which is so strong a factor in Hayti, 
is certain to gain ground in Cuba. Despite the 
fact that the mulatto as a class is undesirable, 
there is no doubt that almost every individual of 
the negro race who has risen to real eminence has 
owed something to a white strain. It is the brill- 
iance of these exceptions which makes the rule 

races far apart in characteristics and civilization. He says: 
"The physiological basis of this experience (the physical 
deterioration of half-breeds) appears to be that any one 
variety of creature in course of many generations acquires a 
certain constitutional adaptation to its particular form of 
life, and every other variety similarly acquires its own special 
adaptation. The consequence is that, if you mix the con- 
stitution of two widely divergent varieties which have severally 
become adapted to widely divergent modes of life, you- get a 
constitution which is adapted to the mode of life of neither . . . 
there arises an incalculable mixture of traits, and what may 
be called a chaotic constitution." 

119 



GREATER AMERICA 

of inferiority so much more evident, and at the 
same time casts a serious doubt on the wisdom of 
popular government for Cuba. Popular govern- 
ment — unless it is a farce, as it so often is — means 
the ascendency of the masses and not of the 
brilliant exceptions. Both as regards colored and 
black Cubans this is to be regretted. 

The experience of Britain in the West Indies 
inculcates the lesson of caution, and, according 
to most French authorities, the broad powers of 
self-government granted to the French West Ind- 
ian colonies are by no means an assured success. 
"As regards politics," Leroy-Beaulieu says, "we 
have introduced French liberty into our colonies; 
we give them civil governors ; we admit their rep- 
resentatives into our parliament. ... All these 
reforms are excellent in themselves. It is un- 
fortunately to be feared that they will, in practice, 
result in abuses, and that unless the mother- 
country is very watchful those free powers which 
she has granted to her colonies will become pow- 
ers of oppression."^ 

The proportions of the population seem to 
show, however, that the whites are sufficiently 
numerous to outweigh all others. Roughly speak- 
ing, one-half are white, one-sixth mixed, and one- 
third black, with a few Chinese. Strict analysis 
would undoubtedly reduce the numbers of the first 
considerably and add them to the second. A re- 

' Colonization ckez les peuples modernes. 
1 20 



GREATER AMERICA 

markable influx of white immigrants, however, is 
taking place, though, unfortunately, it is by no 
means permanent. During the last six months of 
1900, of a total of fifteen thousand, twelve thou- 
sand were Spanish, one thousand from the United 
States, and nine hundred were from Mexico/ The 
negro population would probably have been a 
good deal larger were it not for the fact that during 
the years of emancipation great mortality was the 
rule. But, though the blacks will increase more 
rapidly under the new conditions, it seems highly 
probable, if not certain, that the white element 
will have no difficulty in maintaining its superior- 
ity. This element is Spanish by race, traditions, 
and customs. Its civilization is Spanish, and by 
every tie of feeling and sentiment, by mental, 
moral, and social affinity, it is bound to the land 
which gave it birth, although politically the 
connection is severed. This fact is not forgotten 
by the Cubans. Gratitude to the United States 
for her intervention on their behalf and a desire 
to emulate her in the paths of progress have by 
no means bridged the gulf between the Latin and 
Anglo-Saxon races. 

In order to understand the position of Cuba to- 
day, we must gain a clear idea of the Cubans, and 



* During three years ending December 31, 1901, fifty- four 
thousand Spaniards, two thousand Chinese, thirteen thou- 
sand from other countries entered Cuba. Many Galicians and 
Canary- 1 slanders came for the year only. The Asturians en- 
ter clerical service and the Catalans are skilled workmen. 

121 



GREATER AMERICA 

especially of the white Cubans, who must in- 
evitably constitute the ruling class. 

The Cuban, as already said, is the heir not only 
of Spanish civilization but of Spanish character, 
which has filtered down to him through corrupt 
channels. In no case has he developed any 
traits which are not typically Spanish, and from 
various causes he has, on the whole, an average 
record far lower than that of his peninsular 
forebear. The causes may be briefly stated as 
being, first, physical deterioration, the result of 
climate; secondly, moral deterioration (in 1899 
the percentage of lawful marriages was only 15.7), 
partly climatic and partly the result of circum- 
stances; and thirdly, mental deterioration, owing 
to defective educational opportunities, the extent 
of which may be realized when we read that even 
after the American occupation 57 per cent, of the 
population were illiterate. The last two causes 
were, more or less, the inevitable result of Spain's 
mistaken colonial policy, and her repressive meas- 
ures had undoubtedly a great effect in quenching 
ambitions which would have led Cubans on the 
path of progress. Nevertheless, the upper classes 
in Cuba enjoyed during a period of their history 
a prosperity which has left its mark to this day, 
and which opened to them opportunities of self- 
development. They also enjoyed, against the de- 
sire of their masters, a freer intercourse with the 
United States than had any other Latin-American 
colony. They received immigrants with advanced 

122 



GREATER AMERICA 

ideas from the French islands, from Europe, and 
even from Louisiana. Altogether, it is hardly fair 
to represent them as having been entirely cut off 
from the rest of the civilized world. 

It is true that there have been distinguished 
Cubans in Europe — such as Jose de Heredia, 
elected to the French Academy; and Sufier, the 
well-known dramatist in Italy — and that some 
have held office in Spain. But in Cuba we find 
lawyers and doctors by the hundred (some very 
skilful), but no administrators; scientists, but no 
inventors; poets, but (with, perhaps, a couple of 
exceptions) no engineers; politicians, but few 
business-men; orators, but no skilled laborers; 
musicians, but no hotel-keepers. It must be re- 
membered that to French immigrants the Cubans 
owed the development of the sugar-cane, which 
was the foundation of their prosperity. Other 
French settlers introduced apiculture, long a most 
profitable industry ; indigo owed its cultivation to 
the Spaniard Las Casas, and to this day business- 
houses are in Spanish, American, German, and 
British, rather than Cuban, hands. In the ranks 
of the leaders of Cuban independence some of the 
most distinguished names were those of peninsular 
Spaniards ; and, in judging the achievement of any 
eminent man in Cuba, it must not be forgotten 
that two generations at least must be bom in the 
island before we can fairly assume that the type is 
a Cuban one. 

Three salient characteristics of the Spaniard 

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have taken deep root on Cuban soil, being fostered 
by the conditions of hfe in the tropics. They are 
th» aristocratic bias, the love of political theory, 
intrigue, and oratory, and the natural indolence 
both of mind and body. To these we may add a 
natural gayety which, to the Northerner mere 
frivolity, characterizes all children of the Sunny 
South. On the whole, it cannot be denied that 
the main defect in Cuban character — the result of 
heredity fostered by environment — is a lack of 
practical capacity. The greatest drawback to 
Cuban progress is the scarcity of agricultural labor 
and the practical non-existence of skilled labor. 

Such being the main characteristics of the peo- 
ple of Cuba, we will now turn to the effect which 
propinquity to the United States has had on her 
history. It is a natural outcome of the geo- 
graphical and economic conditions of Cuba that 
from the earliest period of American independence 
the relations between the island and the continent 
should have been very close. 

Shortly before the American colonies gained 
their independence an event happened in Cuba 
which had considerable effect in opening her ports 
to trade, and thus permitting a greater freedom 
of intercourse with the continent. This was the 
British occupation of Cuba, in 1762, as the result 
of the Family compact, Florida being also ceded 
to Britain. Although the occupation was short- 
lived, it gave a great impetus to her ports and to 
the upper and wealthier classes. The restoration 

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of Cuba to Spain, in 1814, restored the old regime 
of monopoly, repression, and isolation, and the 
secession of Mexico, in 1821, severed a connection 
which had brought Cuba a large part of her 
revenue. But the era of prosperity which had 
set in continued till 1825, and Cuba, while it 
lasted, was oblivious of other considerations. 
Ports were opened and the cultivation of sugar 
became enormously profitable. Under these con- 
ditions no restrictions or disadvantages could 
outbalance the wave of prosperity, and during 
the palmy days of the West Indian islands Cuba 
was the richest of all. It is hard for any one 
acquainted with the West Indies of to-day to re- 
construct this golden age. Coming across a de- 
serted palace in the midst of wild scenery, in which 
the sugar culture can hardly be traced, we note 
the marble columns, the decaying floors, once 
richly inlaid, the stately staircase with broken 
balusters, and it is almost impossible to realize 
how comparatively short is the period which has 
turned this home, once the abode of wealth and 
luxury, into a haunt for birds and beasts. No- 
where is the contrast more marked than in Cuba, 
where war has destroyed what remained after a 
long period of economic depression. 

The halcyon days lasted for nearly half a 
century, and it is not, perhaps, surprising that in 
the early days of the American Republic Cuba 
would have been welcomed into the Union. 
Annexation was freely talked about, despite the 

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fact that, during the Napoleonic period in Spain 
and the independence of the American -Spanish 
colonies, Cuba had remained stanch, earning there- 
by the title of "loyal Cuba." It is hardly to be 
questioned that at this time Cuba herself, so far 
as she possessed an individuality, would have 
resisted any attempt to annex her. The policy, 
therefore, of the United States was to preserve 
Cuba from European control. Early in the last 
century, in 1809, Jefferson wrote: "I would im- 
mediately erect a column on the southernmost 
limit of Cuba and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra 
as to us in that direction." And Madison, soon 
after, expressed similar views. ^ In 1823, John 
Quincy Adams delivered himself of his famous in- 
struction to the minister at Madrid to the effect 
that Cuba and Puerto Rico are " natural append- 
ages of the North American continent," and the 
former "an object of transcendent importance to 
the commercial and political interests of our 
Union." He pointed out the commanding posi- 
tion of the island, the safe and commodious harbor 
of Havana, fronting a long seaboard destitute of 
these advantages, and the economic dependence 
on the United States. And, in conclusion, he 
added: "Looking forward ... for half a century, 
it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that 

* The United States, he wrote in 1810, "could not be a 
satisfied spectator at its falling under any European govern- 
ment, which might make a fulcrum of that position against 
the commerce and security of the United States." — Madison's 
Works, vol. ii., p. 488. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

the annexation of Cuba to our republic will be in- 
dispensable to the continuance and integrity of 
the Union itself." At this time Jefferson ad- 
vocated the " peaceful acquisition " of Cuba. " It 
is better, then," he wrote, "to lie still in readi- 
ness to receive that interesting incorporation when 
solicited by herself, for certainly her addition to 
our confederacy is exactly what is wanted to round 
our power as a nation to the point of its utmost 
interest!"^ In direct sequence to this declaration 
is the action of Clay, two years later, in warning 
France and other powers off Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, this being actually the first application of 
the doctrine identified with Monroe. 

It was not to be expected that this develop- 
ment of interest on the part of the United States 
should pass unheeded by the Cubans. Prosperity 
had taught them much, too. The sons of rich 
planters went to France or the United States for 
education, and came back full of the newest and 
most revolutionary ideas. Rebellions became fre- 
quent, and in 1835 Cubans claimed from Spain 
representation in the Cortes, and the contempt 
with which the request was refused burned deep 
into their souls. From this period may be dated 
the growth of the movement for Cuban indepen- 
dence. Repression became more and more the 
order of the day, though one or two of the Captains- 
General — Tacon, for instance — introduced reforms 

* Madison's Works, vol. vii., p. 299. 
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GREATER AMERICA 

and kept things together for a time. In 1840 and 
1843, however, it became certain that Cuba would 
not be permitted to achieve her ends by enhsting 
the support of any European power, for the United 
States assured Spain that, in the event of any 
attack on her West Indian possessions, she would 
have the assistance of "the whole naval and 
military resources" of the North American Re- 
public. 

Until 1845 the Monroe Doctrine was applied to 
prevent acquisition by any other European power, 
but shortly after came a development of the 
doctrine, due to the expansionist spirit recently 
roused by the Mexican war. The acquisition of 
Cuba was now desired not merely by the South, as 
an extension of the slave States, but also by a 
section in the North, on account of its command- 
ing position regarding the isthmus, then coming 
into importance as the route to California, the new 
El Dorado. Attempts to purchase Cuba were, 
therefore, made by Polk, who at the same time 
developed the Monroe Doctrine elsewhere (in 
Yucatan), apparently with the view of showing 
Spain the precarious nature of her footing in 
American waters. Spain, however, had no desire 
to sell, and clung tenaciously to the last remnant 
of her great American possessions — "the country 
would prefer to see it sunk in the ocean" were the 
words used. Her method of retaining Cuba was 
the time -honored one of increasing her vigilance, 
preventing intercourse with the rest of the world, 



GREATER AMERICA 

and decreasing the privileges of her subjects, the 
natural result being the crystallization of Cuban 
discontent into a distinct attempt at independence. 
The abortive Lopez expedition, in 185 1, enjoys 
the distinction of being the first blow actually 
struck in the cause of Cuba Libre, although the 
issues were hardly so clear at the time. There is 
no doubt that this expedition was — unofficially, 
of course — actively fostered in the United States, 
and that the ringleaders of Cuban revolt from this 
time onward found a sympathetic asylum, a base 
of organization, and a free field for the ventilation 
of their grievances in the territory of their great 
neighbor. A few years later, in 1854, a fresh card 
was played in the Ostend manifesto, which was 
in fact a deliberate attempt to force a quarrel on 
Spain, and in this, as in all previous declarations as 
regards Cuba, it was the necessity of that island for 
the welfare of the United States which was alleged 
as a reason for detaching it from Spain. It is 
right to add that this proposed action was re- 
pudiated by the United States government. That 
so much persistence was shown was largely due 
to the anxiety of the Southern leaders to increase 
the number of slave States; but many of the 
Northern statesmen were agreed as to the desira- 
bility of acquiring the island. These diplomatic 
efforts were renewed from time to time until the 
civil war absorbed all energies of both parties, 
and in the reconstruction period the sentiment of 
retrenchment and peaceful reform was so strong 
9 129 



GREATER AMERICA 

that the expansionists had to curtail their am- 
bitions. This period saw a change in the attitude 
of the United States. The chief motives for ac- 
quisition had been removed by the abohtion of sla- 
very — with the consequent elimination of the slave 
States — and by the rapid opening of the trans- 
continental railways, which rendered the isthmus 
route to the Pacific for the time being of less value. 
The United States now asked merely for im- 
proved conditions and freer commercial inter- 
course. There was little reference to Spanish 
misgovemment or Cuban liberty in those days. 
Cuba herself, however, was going from bad to 
worse in economic depression and official thraldom. 
The same circumstances which ruined the sugar 
industry throughout the West Indies were in 
operation here, and from 1868 to 1878 there raged 
a bitter guerilla war — a gucrra chiquita, as the 
Cubans termed it — waged by the Creole, or native, 
party, in which the last ties of sentiment which 
bound the Cubans and Spaniards were cruelly 
rent. During this war, in 1873, ^^^ Virginius 
incident^ aggravated the situation, and soon after 
Spain was given to understand that the United 
States did not " meditate or desire the annexation 

* The Virginius, a vessel with United States registry and 
colors, carrying contraband of war, was captured by the 
Tornado, a Spanish war -vessel, and taken to Santiago de 
Cuba, where the captain, entire crew, and four passengers 
were executed. The capture was not made in Cuban waters, 
but it was found that the vessel was the property of certain 
Cubans and controlled by them, and the incident was arranged 
peaceably. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

of Cuba to the United States, but its elevation 
into an independent republic of freemen, in har- 
mony with ourselves and with the other republics 
of America.'" A certain measure of reform was 
accomplished, on paper. Spain granted the once- 
coveted representation in the Cortes, but only to 
nominees of the Captain-General— a restriction 
which nullified any possible usefulness. A large 
number of Cubans now left the island, principally 
for the United States, where they kept alive the 
embers of independence. 

In 1892 a reciprocity treaty was debated be- 
tween Spain and the United States which would 
have helped to restore the fahen fortunes of the 
Cuban planters. Its rejection plunged the island 
in despair. In 1895 the final revolution broke out, 
which, notwithstanding reforms promised in the 
usual Spanish way (in 1895 and again in 1897), 
reduced Spain to the last extremity and led to the 
intervention of the United States in 1898 and the 
final emergence of Cuba Libre— though sadly muti- 
lated and crippled. 

'Foreign Relations, 1874-75. P- 8S9- 



CHAPTER VI 

CARIBBEAN EXPANSION— CUBA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 

A GLANCE at the sequence of events in brief 
outline of one aspect of Cuban history will show 
that the growth of the spirit of independence as a 
national sentiment was certainly largely influenced 
by economic conditions. The decay of the staple 
industry of Cuba, owing to a competition in which 
she was hampered by her European parent, brought 
home to the people, as mere misgovernment had 
never done, the egotism of Spain in dealing with 
her colonies, and the emancipation of the slaves 
put the finishing-touch — or, rather, a series of 
touches, for it was a slow process in Cuba — to the 
distress and discontent of the people. 

The prosperity of their great neighbor, added 
to her frequent overtures, encouraged the Cubans 
in the belief that the United States would lend 
them her countenance, and the question became 
the more pressing when the high -tariff policy 
practically completed the barrier between Cuba 
and prosperity. The development of the Southern 
States as sugar-producing countries made them 
Cuba's natural competitors, but on what unequal 

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terms! The market of the United States is the 
natural one for Cuban produce, but there was 
no prospect of being able to use it. It must be 
remembered that sugar and tobacco form three- 
fourths of Cuban exports, and for the former 
there is practically no room now in Europe, flooded 
as it is with beet sugar. 

The condition of the people under circumstan- 
ces which reduced the incomes of the large estates 
and wiped out the small ones was lamentable. 
The large towns still contained many famiUes 
of wealth and position, and some large planta- 
tions whose owners had the means and fore- 
sight to set up improved machinery were able to 
make small profits; but the majority of men saw 
no prospect for themselves and their families but 
emigration. Meanwhile the emancipated negroes 
retired in large bodies to the woods and moun- 
tains, where they retrograded— and, indeed, some- 
times reverted to a state almost of savagery. The 
poor whites — a very large class in Cuba, and one 
that is on the increase— must have felt severely 
the effects of the general depression ; but it must 
be remembered that in a country like Cuba, blessed 
with a fertile soil, constant sunshine, and a clement 
climate, people who have to keep up no appear- 
ances can live in ease and can without exertion pro- 
vide themselves with the necessities of food and 
shelter. The white peasantry are infected with 
the inertia of the tropics, and, despite their white 
blood, are little more civilized than the negroes. 

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They are absolutely ignorant, no form of public 
instruction having been prescribed by Spain, and 
their children run about naked — as, indeed, do the 
children of poor whites in most Latin-American 
countries. Moreover, as workmen — if they are to 
be persuaded to work at all — they are unreliable 
and unsatisfactory. 

Under these circumstances it is natural that all 
Cubans with a spark of ambition should flock to 
the cities, despite the fact that, as a rule, they 
possess little industrial or commercial ability. The 
modem tendency to forsake the land and crowd 
into cities is deplored even in countries whose fut- 
ure as well as present prosperity depends on the 
development of manufactures and trade. How 
much more, therefore, in an island like Cuba, 
economically entirely dependent on the products 
of her soil. The extent to which she is dependent 
on agriculture may be realized from the fact that 
she has no manufactures, except for the most 
elementary local wants, and that mining is of the 
most primitive character, and, in view of the 
probable resources and neighboring competition, 
is not likely to become important. The labor 
question is, therefore, a serious one. At present 
the island has under four per cent, of its available 
area under cultivation and supports a population 
of but one million five hundred thousand, whereas, 
if properly developed, it could easily maintain 
fifteen million by agriculture alone. In view of 
the inadequacy of the local labor supply, it is un- 

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fortunate that of the considerable number of 
immigrants who come into Cuba so few remain. 
Many of the immigrants belong to the Spanish 
peasantry, and would be good settlers if they could 
be induced to settle. Although opinions differ 
as to their value as laborers compared with the 
Cubans, there is no doubt that, on the whole, they 
practise the virtues of sobriety, frugality, and 
steadiness common to their nation, and that they 
are in these respects superior to the Cubans. 

The general conditions of labor in Cuba are 
unfavorable to the rise of a prosperous peasantry. 
In addition to inherent defects, the Cubans are 
handicapped by the after-effects of slavery, which 
will be felt for a long time to come, and also by 
the store system, which encourages them to run 
into debt, and makes them in consequence de- 
pendent on their employer. The labor question 
in Cuba is not a social problem ; it is as yet merely 
a matter of supply and demand, but it is com- 
plicated by the presence of the black and colored 
population. With the infusion of fresh ideas re- 
garding labor and the remodelling of society by 
American standards will come an inevitable strain 
upon the relations of the two races of which the 
laboring population is composed. If any form of 
modem socialism were to find any real foothold 
on Cuban soil this situation would be aggra- 
vated, since it is one of its vital principles that 
the strong should be handicapped to equalize the 
opportunities of the weak, and the black popula- 

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tion would act as a drag on the whole body of 
workers. 

With a people in the condition of the Cubans at 
the successful close of the struggle for independence 
there was obviously only one course to be taken, 
and the United States took it. The enforcement 
of law and order and the working of the whole 
social and political machinery could only be ac- 
complished by placing one man in authority. The 
military governors of Cuba were able in the short 
time at their disposal to accomplish some much- 
needed reforms ; but it would have been impossible 
to evolve order, much less to carry out measures 
of reform, had affairs been left in the hands of the 
Cubans themselves. The period of military gov- 
ernment was a most valuable object-lesson and 
gave the late revolutionary party time to organize 
itself and to take over the reins, when the time 
came, with a fair show of preparedness and com- 
petency. 

The American legacy to Cuba was highly 
characteristic, both in its practical utility and its 
unpractical attempt to harmonize the irreconcil- 
able elements of Latin-tropical life with Anglo- 
Saxon ideals. The first and most important 
efforts were in the direction of education and 
sanitation. The latter is a subject which a 
military governor's powers gave him peculiar 
facilities for dealing with. In cities like Havana 
only drastic measures are of any use, and by 
means of these the city was cleansed of the most 

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GREATER AMERICA 

flagrant abuses and the public health vastly im- 
proved. Scientific investigations as to the spread 
of tropical diseases also resulted in great im- 
provement in the health conditions of the chief 
Cuban ports, and the sanitary standard set should 
prove of the greatest advantage to the whole 
island. In this respect it is interesting to com- 
pare the work done in Havana and in Manila. In 
the latter, sanitation has been but tentatively at- 
tempted, apparently with the desire to respect the 
private rights of citizens; and the civil author- 
ity has been unable, despite considerable trouble 
and expenditure, to effect any radical reform. In 
the matter of railways and other public works 
Cuba has also profited by a vigorous military 
administration, which did not pause to consider 
whether such measures should not be initiated 
by the people themselves. There were only some 
six hundred miles of disconnected lines of rail- 
way when the Americans began their occupation, 
and when they left there were one thousand five 
hundred miles in working order, the railway sys- 
tem binding the two ends of the island, which 
had been unconnected before save by coasting 
steamers. Roads, however, were neglected, as, 
indeed, they are in the United States itself. 

Education was the most important reform at- 
tempted, and to this General Wood devoted a 
large sum, considered by many to be out of all 
proportion to other necessary work. The need 
was crying. Cuba had practically no public 

137 



GREATER AMERICA 

education at all, and the task was to create an 
entire system without any previous foundation on 
which to build. No one save a military governor 
could have faced the situation in the same way. 
The first step was the arbitrary apportionment of 
a generous sum out of the scanty revenue; the 
second the enforcement of compulsory education; 
and the third the provision of schools and teachers. 
The last was naturally a Herculean task. It was 
accomplished by the same arbitrary method — a 
truly military way of dealing with the problem — 
which laid it down that the first thing was to start 
a school and find a teacher; the second to go into 
details of management. School districts being 
arbitrarily settled, a local school-board was got 
together, school-houses were built or constructed 
out of old ones, teachers of some sort were pro- 
vided at fixed wages, and thus a nucleus was form- 
ed. The control being vested in the military 
governor himself, he was able to correct mistakes 
as he went along, to alter the system here, weed 
out and reject at will, and so gradually increase 
the standard of efficiency, while all the time little 
Cubans were getting some sort of education, which 
was presumably better than none at all. 

The difficulty of procuring trained teachers was 
not met, as in the Philippines, by the importation 
of an army of American school-marms and mas- 
ters. It was realized that the teachers must be 
Cuban if they were to work effectively, and that, 
with proper American supervision, they would im- 

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GREATER AMERICA 

prove in ratio with the growing capacity of their 
pupils. Educational facilities were given in Amer- 
ican colleges to selected Cubans, and these were 
sent back to leaven the whole lump. Enormous 
sums had, of course, to be spent in equipping the 
schools and providing text-books, but the general 
system seems to have been to utilize as far as possi- 
ble any available material, and not to expect im- 
mediate perfection. Normal education was left 
to take care of itself. The first thing was to place 
primary instruction within the reach of every 
child; and it is possible that the first generation 
of literate Cubans will benefit from the fact that 
their brains were not expected to suddenly cope 
with all the refinements of a modern, up-to-date 
education. 

The main fault of this system has been its ex- 
pensiveness. The generous impulse which led to 
a wholesale establishment of schools led, of course, 
to a certain number of mistakes, all costing money ; 
and the responsibilities incurred in equipping the 
teachers, together with the provision of numerous 
school-houses, form a considerable item in the 
expenditure of so poor a country as Cuba. Having 
begun on this scale, however, it will fatally impair 
the efficiency of the system if retrenchment is at- 
tempted; and yet it is no longer possible, without 
the exercise of arbitrary power by the President, 
to insure the appropriation of so large a propor- 
tion of the revenue to education. Other depart- 
ments, especially the public works, cry out with 

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GREATER AMERICA 

good reason for their share, and vested interests 
must be considered. The second danger is that 
the party system will affect educational policy and 
control. The inspectors, on whom efficiency large- 
ly depends, are chiefly, if not entirely, American, 
and educational progress will be seriously curtail- 
ed and efficiency destroyed by changes in the 
personnel or breaks in the continuity of their 
control. 

Both these evils — lack of funds and uncertainty 
of party government — are, of course, aggravated 
by the economic conditions. 

The legislative efforts of the United States in 
Cuba are legacies of far more doubtful value. 
Cuba already possessed, in the Spanish law, a 
highly elaborated system of admitted wisdom, 
framed by Latin legislators for their own people. 
It was not the Spanish laws which were to blame 
for abuses in Cuba, but the maladministration of 
them. In any case, an arbitrary tampering with 
the established laws of a community cannot fail 
to be mischievous, since it strikes at the root of 
social life, manners, and religion, probably the 
natural outcome of race and climate. An example 
of this may be found in the invalidation (for a 
period) of religious marriage without the civil 
ceremony. The present condition of law in Cuba 
is naturally one of confusion; American methods 
of procedure grafted on the old foundation of 
Latin jurisprudence. It is to be regretted, first, 
because the simpler the law the easier its applica- 

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tion, and because the Cubans understood their 
old code far better than they can any new one; 
secondly, because the example set, during the 
United States occupation, of unnecessary legisla- 
tion will not be lost on a Latin people like the 
Cubans, naturally too much given to theorizing 
and experimenting. 

The legacy which the United States did not 
leave was that of restored economic balance. 
Cuba began her independence as a country drained 
of money, with a declining agriculture, a rural 
population hurrying away to the cities, and a 
greatly increased rate of living. 

As regards the general national sentiment, it 
may be said that it was in favor of independence, 
and therefore welcomed the departure of American 
troops, as it had welcomed their arrival. A great 
deal has been said and written about the affection 
of the Cubans for their American brothers and 
their gratitude for deliverance. It was a wise 
man, however, who remarked out of the depths of 
his knowledge of human nature that gratitude is 
a keen sense of favors to come. Although the 
bulk of the population rejoices in deliverance from 
Spain, it also, being ignorant as well as poor, 
expects very shortly a substantial increase in pros- 
perity — some new departure which will restore 
the palmy days of Cuba. Unless that comes there 
will be discontent, as well as poverty, intrigues, and 
even rebellion, since despair is a hard master; and 
there will be plenty of politicians ready to assure 

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the people that another change of government 
would secure the desired improvement. 

The better -educated Cubans, and the members 
of the government particularly, must see the 
issue more plainly, and are, indeed, on the horns 
of a dilemma. The exact political status of the 
island as a "protected republic" is no secret to 
them, and they realize that the United States has 
a hold which no effort on their part will loose. 
It is not likely, after all that has happened, that 
she will abate one jot of her claims on them or 
permit a rapprochement with any other country. 
On the other hand, they have known all along 
that the key to the situation lay in the economic 
question, and that on reciprocity with the Unit- 
ed States depends the prosperity of Cuba, and 
therefore her future. There is undoubtedly a 
party, especially among those Cubans who 
throughout the rebellion preserved a somewhat 
neutral attitude, and therefore kept their business 
or property together, who would welcome annexa- 
tion to the United States on any terms because 
of the economic advantages. But the Latin- 
American is not, as a rule, commercial in his aims, 
nor is he practical, and the majority would un- 
doubtedly view with great hostility anything 
which threatened their rights as a nation. There 
is at least one section, whose voice is unheard, 
who would bitterly resent incorporation within 
the Union — the negroes. 

The sordid American view (that of the party 

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which regards Cuba in the same Hght as did Jeffer- 
son and Adams) is undoubtedly that, placed in this 
awkward position and daily becoming more em- 
barrassed and confused, Cuba will herself ere long 
ask for incorporation as a State, an eventuality 
which would leave no room for inconvenient crit- 
icism as to "grasping imperiahsm." Thus would 
be fulfilled the advice given by Jefferson eighty 
years before, to "lie still, in readiness to receive 
that interesting incorporation when solicited by 
herself." The Democrats, who oppose all annexa- 
tion of territory involving a colonial government, 
and who are averse to admitting ahen and inferior 
colored races, do not have the same objection in 
the case of Cuba, beheving that its people will 
soon graduate for American citizenship. If Cuba 
became a State, in their opinion, a stream of emi- 
gration from the United States would soon Amer- 
icanize the country. The capabilities of the 
Cubans for self-government on State lines have 
yet to be demonstrated, but, judging from ex- 
perience in all other Latin-American countries, it 
will be a long time before they are able to initiate 
any government which will not eventually become 
either autocratic or oligarchic. That white immi- 
gration, even on a large scale, will change the 
character of the Cuban populace is an expectation 
equally contradicted by experience. The history 
of the British in Canada and of the Anglo-Amer- 
icans in Louisiana certainly does not support the 
idea. 

143 



GREATER AMERICA 

The vexed question of reciprocity, which arises 
inevitably in connection with every part of Greater 
America (and this includes her protectorates and 
those States in which she has practically estab- 
lished "spheres of influence"), is peculiarly acute 
in the case of Cuba, which is absolutely dependent 
economically on the United States. After serious 
opposition a certain measure of reciprocity has 
been granted, but, as in the case of the Philippines, 
the reduction in tariffs has been too partial, too 
carefully adjusted to protect vested interests in the 
United States, to be of real and permanent benefit 
to the quondam Spanish colonies. It must be 
remembered that these were in grave economic 
difficulties before they began the wars which have 
still further reduced them to poverty. The snap- 
ping of bonds with Europe practically throws 
them helpless upon the markets of the United 
States, and it is doubly hard for them, in their im- 
poverished and backward condition, to compete 
with highly organized and protected industries. 

One thing is certain — without American energy 
and capital Cuba cannot be developed, and with- 
out the fullest measure of reciprocity and a secure 
and stable government this capital will not be 
invested in the island to any appreciable extent. 

The situation will be seen, even from this brief 
and partial examination of a few of its aspects, to 
be full of difficulty. Sefior Palma began his career 
as President under most unfortunate auspices, and, 
unlike the most successful ruler which Latin- 

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GREATER AMERICA 

America has yet produced — President Diaz — he 
was no longer in the prime of Hfe when he took 
office. He is, of course, honest, enhghtened, weU 
intentioned, and progressive, and, having spent 
so much of his hfe in the United States, he is 
conversant with the pohtical anomahes of that 
country and their possible effect on his own. He 
is, in effect, practically the nominee of the pro- 
tecting republic, a fact which carries its disad- 
vantages, so far as the support of his own people 
is concerned. 

Will he be able, in the teeth of economic de- 
pression, which his government is unable to re- 
lieve ; of the necessity for taxation to maintain the 
reforms instituted by the military governor; and 
of the growth (on Latin- American lines) of demo- 
cratic principles fostered by the United States — 
will he be able, under all these circumstances, to 
keep his country contented and united ? All these 
queries apply to any successor of Palma; and, in- 
deed, the President of the Cuban Republic, under 
any circumstances, has no bed of roses. There 
are few Cubans so capable of filling the position 
as the present one. 

Should he fail and revolutions break out, the 
protector, of course, steps in. Should he yield 
to economic pressure and decide to ask for ad- 
mission to the Union, he will earn eternal obloquy 
from a large section of his countrymen, and will 
probably witness again the horrors of war. Under 
whatever circumstances, it is hard to see how the 
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GREATER AMERICA 

farce of Cuban independence can be prolonged 
much further. There are men who shed their 
blood in the late war to whom this saying is a 
harsh one, but the best friends of Cuba can only 
hope that she will secure the benefits of incorpo- 
ration while there is still an opportunity to se- 
cure the privileges. Cuba depends, has always 
so largely depended, on the economic factor; is so 
incapable of working out her own salvation with- 
out a helping hand in her commercial affairs, 
that no future is possible which is not built on a 
basis securing a free intercourse with the United 
States. Stability of government is hard to es- 
tablish without prosperity, and prosperity will not 
come without the assistance of the United States. 
After all, a worse fate might befall a Latin-Amer- 
ican republic than to become part of the great 
Western democracy. Of the other side of the 
shield — the results of such an incorporation on 
the United States herself — we must speak later. 

Expansion into the Caribbean is so important 
to the United States, and so full of significance as 
to her future, that it cannot be discussed here. 
In the next chapter it will be further considered. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE NEW AMERICAN SPHERE 

When the United States crossed the Pacific, 
and estabUshed herself on the confines of Asia 
simultaneously with her occupation of Cuba and 
the annexation of Puerto Rico, it was generally 
felt that she had embarked on a career of active 
expansion which could not be suddenly checked. 
What would be the next step? 

Many circumstances pointed to the absorption 
of Mexico as the logical sequence of events. Al- 
ready more than half the area of original Mexico 
had passed to the United States, and the formation 
of new and progressive communities on her frontier 
and an economic conquest might be expected to 
lead to a closer union. The story of Texas is still 
fresh, and might be repeated. To the subject of 
Mexican independence we must return later, it 
being sufficient to note here that circumstances 
have led the United States again to non-contiguous 
expansion. Instead of the anticipated slow but 
steady extension of United States control south- 
ward through Mexico, thence to the Central Amer- 
ican republics, and then to the West Indies, we 
find that the oversea acquisitions came first, that 

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the canal question has involved the second step 
in Central America, and that Mexico will be re- 
served for a later stage in the process of expansion. 

There is, both in the British Empire and the 
United States, a very excusable vagueness as to 
the Central American republics. They are, in 
fact, all one country, colonized by the same race, 
having the same religion, language, customs, and 
peculiarities. The architecture, social etiquette, 
and, above all, the moral atmosphere of all pseudo- 
Spanish colonies are almost identical — every- 
where one feels one is in the land of manana and 
noontide siestas. The Central American republics 
enjoy similar climatic conditions — the hot, low- 
lying, unhealthy coast lands, subtropical zone, and 
the healthy, cool highlands, on which are situated 
the principal cities founded by Spanish colonists. 
Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, and the republic of Panama (which politi- 
cally, though not physically, belonged to the South 
American republic of Colombia) — these are names 
with which Europeans and North Americans are 
familiar chiefly on account of their numerous rev- 
olutions and internecine strife. 

Although so near to the North American con- 
tinent and the populous West Indian isles, these 
republics are difficult of access. Few natural 
harbors exist on their coasts, and little has been 
done to provide artificial harborage ; steamer com- 
munication is indifferent, and railway connection 
between the republics there is none. There are 

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several lines from the coast inland, which are all 
intended eventually to link the Atlantic and 
Pacific, but none are completed save the one at 
Panama (an American line), and another at 
Tehuantepec, both being handicapped by lack of 
harborage at either end. The population of the 
Central American repubhcs is very small, only 
some three and a half millions, including a con- 
siderable number of semi-civilized Indians and 
the negroes on the Caribbean coast lands. The 
resources of the repubhcs have been hardly touch- 
ed. AH are rich in minerals, and their highland 
districts are white men's countries, adapted to 
cultivation of all sorts. The crying need of all 
is stability of government, without which the 
foreign capital and enterprise to develop the re- 
sources and provide communications cannot be 
induced to come to the country. Nor is it suf- 
ficient that one republic should enjoy peace to 
insure its prosperity. Costa Rica has been quietly 
governed for some years past and has made 
notable progress, but when her short boom m 
coffee came to an end she was plunged almost into 
bankruptcy and could not continue the public 
works she had initiated. It is essential to the true 
progress of countries so intimately connected, geo- 
oraphically and racially, as are the central states 
of America, that general peace and security should 
reign and that communications from north to 
south should be opened. Their present condition 
of mutual distrust, of isolation save by sea, and 

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of constant political disturbance cannot continue 
permanently. Central America has become to the 
western hemisphere what the Balkan States have 
long been to Europe. Russia, on the one hand, 
and the United States, on the other, are rapidly 
becoming the arbiters of this continual menace 
to the peace of their respective continents. The 
analogy need not be pursued; it is sufficiently 
suggestive in outline. 

It is one of the strangest developments of the 
Spanish colonial system that, although she stamp- 
ed her own characteristics so strongly wherever 
she went, and although her revolted children are 
indisputably brothers by blood, tradition, ap- 
pearance, language, and customs, yet they offer 
the most singular examples of internecine war- 
fare. The Latin- American republican, who likes 
to imagine himself the peer of the United States 
citizen, who refers to "Independence Day" with 
the same swelling pride, and would have you 
believe that his people were on all-fours with the 
revolting British colonies, should ask himself why 
— in face of the Union of the North American 
colonists, despite great differences of nationality, 
creed, and even interests — he and his Latin- 
American brothers have never effected the slight- 
est degree of federation, but hate each other with 
deadly hatred.^ 

* Carlos Selva, an able Nicaraguan, in speaking of the in- 
stability of Latin-American governments, says: "Where are 
the liberties, the guarantees, the rights of the Spanish-Amer- 

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There is no doubt that the prevaihng spirit 
which saved the Northern Union from disintegra- 
tion was not sentiment— that made for disunion 
—but a sturdy common-sense, which is part of the 
Anglo-Saxon heritage. What is the heritage of 
the Latin- American? 

Spaniards have never, whatever may have been 
their faults, laid themselves open to the charge 
of lacking character. Strongly marked traits- 
masterful passions and obstinate prejudices— have 
distinguished them throughout their history, and 
they are the heirs of not only a Roman but of 
an Oriental civilization. The typical Spaniard 
is courteous and ceremonious, as befits the de- 
scendant of a long line of civilized forefathers 
accustomed to social amenities. He is sober, re- 
garding intoxication as uncouth and finding m it 
no subtle humor, as does the Anglo-Saxon. He is 
imaginative, possessing the artistic temperament, 
for he belongs to a race foremost in art and litera- 
ture and still imbued with a deep sense of beauty 
both of form and color. He is a born orator, 
having the facility for words which characterizes 

ican citizen? They exist in the constimions, but only there 
These are generally made very liberal, leaving nothing to be 
desired— nothing except their fulfilment-^ 

As a corollary to this view we have m a recent work by 
Senator Cabot Lodge the statement that as a consequence of 
the movement started by the American Revolution the en- 
tire continental empire of Spain in the Americas broke off and 

became democratic.'" ^ c ^ t-r. t^t 

The admirers of democracy can hardly be grateful to Mr. 
Lodge for this pronouncement. 

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all Latins and the love of hyperbole which the 
Moors bequeathed. He loves intrigue, is caught 
by a theory, captivated by a phrase, adores the 
abstract, and enjoys intellectual subtleties. Spain 
— perhaps the worst-governed country in Europe 
—is a land of politicians and orators, and has had 
written constitutions which were almost models 
of their kind. Nothing illustrates so well the 
divorce in Spanish minds between the abstract 
and concrete. An essential Spanish characteristic 
is bravery, but their very courage is unpractical 
and of far less service to the military commander 
than a blind, unpicturesque obedience to discipline. 
"Spaniards," said Ferdinand of Aragon, "were 
ever a nation of warriors, and also most undis- 
ciplined; everybody wants to be in command and 
nobody consents to obey. Every Spaniard knows 
how to fight; none knows how to command him- 
self or others." 

In comparing modern Spain with that country 
in its palmy days, it is difficult to gauge the degree 
of deterioration in national character due to a 
period of extraordinary prosperity which was the 
result not of legitimate commerce or industry but 
of colonial speculation and exploitation. Those 
who know the peasantry of Spain, who were 
not sharers in these days of wild extravagance 
and idle opulence, will recognize in them the 
sterling qualities of patience and sobriety, viril- 
ity and hardihood, which may yet prove the sal- 
vation of their country, despite the legacy be- 

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queathed by their past and the burdens imposed 
by corrupt pohticians and an emasculated aris- 
tocracy. 

The aristocratic bias of Spanish character must 
not be passed over. The wave of revolution which 
swept across Europe, uprooting autocratic institu- 
tions and giving new form to the aspirations of a 
people who had just shaken off the last shackles 
of feudalism, made but little headway in Spain. 
The Bourbons were expelled, and a popular con- 
stitution was enacted, which would have secured 
the fullest rights and individual liberties of the 
people. Universal suffrage was introduced and a 
popular representative chamber established, with 
powers equal to the Senate. The vital principle 
—that of the sovereignty of the nation— was pro- 
claimed, but this democratic constitution was fat 
from being successful. Strong as is the power of 
the hereditary aristocracy in Spain, there is no 
doubt that, having won this initial victory, the 
proletariat co^ld have maintained its position if 
there had been any genuine national enthusiasm 
for the measures introduced. Instead, we see 
the speedy downfall of the constitution, the 
abdication of its elected king, Amadeus of Savoy, 
and the erection, after a short period of repubHcan 
government and anarchy, of another constitutional 
monarchy, which restored the Bourbons and all 
their traditions. 

This constitution was shorn of all the elements 
of popular government. The king is the chief 

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GREATER AMERICA 

executive, and the Cortes is composed of, first, 
the hereditary nobihty, land-owners, and men of 
high position; secondly, of one hundred members 
nominated by the crown for life; and, thirdly, of 
one hundred and thirty members elected by state 
corporations and the largest tax - payers. Al- 
though local autonomy exists, as it has always 
done in Spain, and municipalities are nominally 
independent, the government provides a check on 
all matters. The country is divided into prov- 
inces, which elect deputies, in ratio with the pop- 
ulation, to deal with all affairs outside politics; 
and the civil Governor of each province, a state- 
appointed official who owes his position to political 
influence, has practically supreme power and re- 
sponsibility. 

It is obvious, therefore, that the checks provided 
prevent any popular power, but it is a remarkable 
fact there has been no real opposition to this 
autocratic form of government. The people as a 
whole are not only ignorant, but apathetic. Social- 
ism and democracy are little heard of save in con- 
nection with municipal elections and in a few sea- 
port towns, the resort of turbulent spirits of all 
nations. Although the recent elections showed 
victories for the republicans, the reason is chiefly 
that only the professional agitators and their fol- 
lowing take any part in them. The mass of the 
people are not affected at all by these modern 
tendencies, despite that undoubted interest in 
matters political which makes every fonda a cen- 

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GREATER AMERICA 

tre of fierce discussion on any night of the week. 
Spain is, indeed, a land of pohtical intrigue, but 
it centres round the figures of pretenders to the 
throne, and is singularly devoid of the spirit of 
enlightened patriotism and desire for genuine po- 
htical reform/ The Spanish politician who rises 
from the ranks to high position is likely, as in 
Russia, to become more autocratic than the aris- 
tocrats. A case in point is that of Senor Canovas 
del CastiUo, who was bom of middle-class parents 
and made his way by the sheer force of brilliant 
attainments. He is in many respects a typical 
Spaniard of the best class — strong, courageous, 
cultivated, witty, a fine orator, with great per- 
sonal charm, faithful to his friends, but at heart 
an absolutist, a Spaniard of the Middle Ages, a 
modem Cardinal Ximenes. It was Canovas who 
prolonged the Cuban stmggle. ' ' To the last dollar 
and the last man," was his ultimatum. 

When we turn to her quondam colonies we find 
the main characteristics of Spain and her people 
reproduced with remarkable fidelity; and, far apart 
as were these colonies scattered over two hemi- 
spheres, cut off by immense distances from the 

' Lest this should seem too harsh an estimate, the following 
words, spoken by Don Francisco Silvela, ex-Prime-Minister of 
Spain, to the correspondent of a Havana paper, and translated 
in the Spectator of January 30, 1904, may be quoted: " No re- 
public is possible without republicans, and no great country 
without great patriots. Patriotism is disappearing in Spain 
... the Spaniard of to-day is either a bull-fighter or desires to 
become one — anything, in fact, except a Spaniard." 

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GREATER AMERICA 

mother-country, they yet present, both in outward 
appearance and in the character of their people, a 
remarkable resemblance to one another and to the 
old country. 

Britons are accused of carrying their own 
customs wherever they go, and of establishing in 
every quarter of the globe their bath-tubs and 
cricket-grounds, regardless of aesthetic fitness. The 
Spaniard went a great deal further. He came in 
many cases to stay, married a native, built his 
house solidly, as was the custom of the old country, 
and imposed his own civilization without reserve. 
The Church largely aided in this work by the 
policy of making proselytes at the point of the 
sword; and so, while a British colony may boast 
nothing more characteristic than a tin tabernacle 
and a bungalow (a comfortable adaptation of the 
native hut), the Spaniards had always imposing 
palaces, churches, solid houses, colonnades, plazas, 
and pleasure alamedas. The churches are of one 
invariable type — two squat towers and a porch 
between, with a large, empty nave. The houses 
are on the Moorish pattern so familiar in southern 
Spain, with the central patio, or open space, and 
the outside walls blank and bare save for a few 
reja-gnsLvded windows. In one respect the travel- 
ler has the sameness of Spanish colonies forced on 
his notice. The hostelries, unless kept by a for- 
eigner, are invariably bad and can only be matched 
in the peninsula itself. The amusements of the 
people are equally invariable — fiestas, cock-fights, 

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GREATER AMERICA 

music and dancing, dominoes, cards, and gam- 
bling. 

The influence of the Church has, of course, had a 
great deal to do with preserving the character of 
Spanish colonial social life. The religious pro- 
cessions and ceremonials, the fiestas, the numerous 
saints' days, have been initiated by the priests, 
and it is due to the natural tendencies of tropical 
people that their more sensuous side has been 
exaggerated. The divorce of Church and State, 
which has taken place in all Central American 
countries, has not greatly shaken the influence of 
the Church on the lives of the people. Indeed, the 
flexibility of the Roman Catholic Church is no- 
where more forcibly illustrated than in Spanish 
America, where she is undoubtedly a living force 
in all matters, even in those states which are most 
anti-clerical. To this subject we must return later, 
with reference to the part played by the Church 
in South America; it is only necessary here to re- 
mark the strong hold which the priests have over 
all people of Spanish blood, and the fact that the 
conservatism of the Catholic Church has been in- 
strumental in maintaining the outward as well as 
the inward resemblance of the colonies to the 
mother-country . 

If Spanish origin is so deeply marked in the 
outward aspects of life — as in architecture, man- 
ners, amusements, or religious observances — it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the Latin- 
American, despite a slight difference in physique, 

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GREATER AMERICA 

can hardly be expected to develop any traits 
foreign to his race. The Latin peoples have, it 
is true, on the whole, suffered more modification 
in foreign environment than the Anglo - Saxon, 
despite their conservatism in outward matters, 
but this is due chiefly to their intermarriage with 
the natives of the country or with Africans, and 
not to the influence of any foreign civilization. 
In character, therefore, the Latin-American is a 
Spaniard, affected by a strain of Indian or some- 
times negro blood, by a hot climate, and by 
peculiar conditions of education. 

It is a serious question whether the North Amer- 
icans, supposing that Central America and Mexico 
are to pass under their control, will be able, as 
colonists, to retain their energy, viriHty, and 
practical natures. As controllers, administrators, 
overseers, they would have constant reinforce- 
ment from a Northern climate; but as colonists, 
even in Mexico, they seem to suffer from climatic 
conditions sufficiently to modify the national type. 
Nor are they able, as are the Germans, to endure 
patiently an exile in Latin-American countries. 
They are antipathetic to their neighbors; they 
chafe and fret at the slowness and inertia around 
them. Their one idea is to be able to leave as 
soon as possible and return to a civilization to 
which their natures are better attuned. The Eng- 
lishman, and still more, the German, goes to for- 
eign countries to make a living; the American 
goes to get rich — a very different matter. Under 

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GREATER AMERICA 

these circumstances it is difficult to see how Latin 
America is to be " Americanized," except in a few 
externals. Will "American civilization" (by 
which is meant that of the United States) be able 
to stand against that much older type which has 
fitted into climatic and racial peculiarities so as 
to almost become part of the soil? There is no 
question that the United States can control, pro- 
tect, or govern alien races if she chooses; but can 
she incorporate them in the nation, or must they 
remain forever "dependencies," anomalies in her 
system ? 

It must be remembered, however, that the 
Union is composed not only of Ohios or Maines, 
but includes also Louisiana and Florida, and that 
the change from Yankee to Texan is gently grad- 
uated, so as not to be too startling. 

The subject of Pan-Americanism, which arises 
naturally out of these questions, must be reserved 
for a future chapter. We are at present concern- 
ed with the most backward part of the Latin- 
American race only. It is hard to understand 
why Central America should have become dis- 
tinguished in this unfavorable way. Nothing 
geographical or climatic is sufficient to explain the 
phenomenon, while proximity to the United States 
ought to have been in their favor. As far as 
Panama is concerned, however, the canal projects, 
upon which all dreams of future greatness were 
built, have been answerable for a great deal of 
demoralization. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

The Spanish war and the opportunities offered 
to the United States by it made a great difference 
in the canal policy of that country, and it is inter- 
esting to notice that, as soon as she made up her 
mind irrevocably as to the canal, she began to be 
precipitated on that path of expansion marked 
out for her by destiny. Having decided on the 
Panama route and settled the difficulties as to 
control entirely in her own favor, she was met 
by a sudden check from the Colombian govern- 
ment. Their motives in refusing to ratify the ca- 
nal treaty were of the most mixed description. A 
proportion of one of real patriotism, not desiring 
to alienate territory, to two of selfish cupidity, and 
four of ignorance worked on by party interests, 
will probably give a sufficiently true idea of their 
stand-point. Without entering into the question 
of the justification of the United States' action on 
the grounds of treaty rights, and without applaud- 
ing the course actually taken, which was certainly 
open to objection on some grounds, the writer feels 
bound to say that in the interests of the world at 
large, and in particular of the American nation, it 
was well to terminate as soon as possible the intol- 
erable condition of affairs in Panama. To have 
secured the necessary rights and guarantees for the 
construction of the canal without friction would 
have been a diplomatic victory worthy of achieve- 
ment ; but such victories are, in fact, little in keep- 
ing with the genius of the American people. In 
the long run, the effect would have probably been 

i6o 



GREATER AMERICA 

the same. The canal is essential to American 
unity and progress, but it must bring in its train 
certain elements of discord. The United States is 
now irrevocably involved in the domestic politics 
of the Central American republics, and especially 
— a matter of far-reaching consequence — of a re- 
gion which politically belonged hitherto to South 
America. Apart from this, the energy to be 
focussed on Panama, the developments which 
v/ill follow, and the growth of American interests 
in that quarter, will render it necessary to secure 
an amount of harmony in Central America which 
has not been possible hitherto. Great Britain has 
had experience of the unexpected lengths to which 
the protection of " a mere strip of land " intersect- 
ed by a canal may lead her. 

The writer has always held that, on account of 
its geographical position, forming practically part 
of the future seaboard of the United States, the 
canal should be built and controlled by her. Its 
functions in uniting east and west are of the great- 
est importance to the American nation, and in the 
development of the vast Pacific and in the fortunes 
of the Far East this great channel of communi- 
cation, between the producing countries of the 
Pacific and Far East and the manufacturing 
centres of the United States, must be a powerful 
factor. Distance is being annihilated all over the 
globe; the isolation of th5 Orient, with its teem- 
ing millions, is a thing of the past; and the vast 
latent forces lying dormant in the Pacific area will 
II i6i 



GREATER AMERICA 

shortly be brought within reach of the mantifact- 
uring nations of Europe and North America. To 
Britain, with its overwhehning interest in ocean 
traffic, the canal will be of great value, bringing us 
thousands of miles nearer to the Pacific shores of 
the New World; but there can be no doubt that 
it will benefit the United States in an infinitely 
greater degree than Europe. It will divert little 
or no European traffic from the Suez Canal, but it 
will confer an immeasurable impetus to the man- 
ufactures and trade of the United States, will 
greatly stimulate her mercantile marine and ship- 
building industry, and will provide a most power- 
ful incentive towards developing her navy. The 
canal will complete an equatorial belt of naviga- 
tion round the world through the gateways of 
Suez and Panama; will do away with the geo- 
graphical obstacles involved by the circumnaviga- 
tion of Cape Horn; will place the ocean coasts of 
the United States nine thousand miles closer to 
each other ; will move the neutral competing zone 
of the United States and Britain from the Pacific 
coast of South America to western Australia, and 
from the Pacific coast of North America to with- 
in the coast-line of China; and will bring Japan, 
northern China, Russia on the Pacific, Australasia, 
and Hong-Kong as near to the Atlantic seaboard 
as they are now to western Europe. 

Great as will be the effect on the economic position 
of the United States of the channel from ocean to 
ocean, it is mainly on account of its strategic value 

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GREATER AMERICA 

that it has been so warmly advocated by the 
supporters of American expansion. It is generally 
maintained that the command of such an inter- 
oceanic highway will double the power of the 
States for offence and defence. "The nation 
which controls this canal," says a distinguished 
American naval officer, "may issue hence squad- 
rons in the height of vigor and discipline, striking 
blows upon both oceans." "With this canal," 
said a United States Senator, " we could move our 
ships-of-war upon short lines with abundant fuel, 
and concentrate a fleet in three weeks upon our 
Western coast that we could not assemble in three 
months by doubling Cape Horn. ... To the United 
States, in a political and strategic view and as a 
seaway to our Pacific coasts, this canal is of greater 
importance than the Suez Canal is to Great Brit- 
ain." Such being the view taken of the strategic 
importance of the canal in the United States, let 
us now consider briefly its strategic value to Great 
Britain. 

First and foremost, the vast changes which have 
been taking place in the Pacific and in the Far 
East of Asia emphasize the value of an alternative 
route for Britain to India, the China Sea, and 
Australasia. Our main line of communication 
with the East — the Mediterranean and Suez Ca- 
nal — is open to attack along the whole route from 
the English Channel to the Red Sea; and the 
advent of Russia on the Pacific, her aspirations 
for ports on the Persian Gulf and even on the 

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GREATER AMERICA 

Mediterranean, and the possibility, by no means 
remote, that Germany may also cut across our di- 
rect line of communication with India and Aus- 
tralia — all these developments make the question 
of an alternative route to our dominions beyond 
the seas a very practical one. 

The present British naval bases and coaling- 
stations in the West Indies, therefore, are by no 
means futile, even though we do not expect to 
make an aggressive use of them. We count on a 
neutralized waterway, and as that will be created 
by an English-speaking race with whom we are 
strongly in accord and whose ideals and aspira- 
tions are similar to our own, we are not altogether 
reckoning without our host. 

The writer is one of those who regard an Anglo- 
American bond as eminently desirable, and there 
has sprung up in recent years a rapprochement 
between the two great nations which makes one 
hopeful. The canal will bring us closer together, 
will strengthen the bonds of mutual interest, will 
help to lift the United States out of a position of 
deceptive isolation, and, by bringing her more 
into the arena of world politics, will materially 
add to the force which the Anglo-Saxon part of 
humanity is to exercise on the world's future. It 
is natural that she should desire to control a factor 
which will have so large a share in shaping her 
history; and Great Britain will not be the loser 
by this. The opening of communications is al- 
ways certain to be of benefit so long as neutrality 

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GREATER AMERICA 

can be secured. We have little cause to anticipate 
that this important line would be closed to us by- 
United States hostility, but the strength of our 
position in the Caribbean is a sort of additional 
guarantee for us. 

The canal, therefore, may be regarded from 
several points of view. From an economic and 
strategic point it should prove valuable to both the 
United States and Britain. From the point of 
view of United States isolation, or freedom from 
foreign entanglements, or other similar blessings 
which American statesmen used to declare were 
essential to their country, it is not quite so clearly 
beneficial. It enlarges the American sphere with 
some precipitation, and it makes the little-desired 
task of controlling Central America an immediate 
necessity. 

Although a strong impression exists that Mexico 
is on an altogether different plane from the Central 
American republics, and although the progress she 
has made in civilization warrants this to a certain 
extent, we have no proof of the permanency of her 
present condition. She is not a republic, save in 
name. Until the advent of President Diaz she 
was as unstable as her sisters. In the course of 
forty-seven years she had ten forms of govern- 
ment, fifty presidents or dictators, two emperors 
(both shot), and one regency. Diaz proved the 
strong man who could hold the country together. 
Coming in on the crest of a wave of military revolu- 
tion, he retained his position by the wisdom of his 

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GREATER AMERICA 

policy and the strength of his hand. His best 
measures were the opening of communications, 
which he accomphshed by the lavish grant of con- 
cessions, for which a price has, of course, to be paid ; 
the strengthening of his army, and the consolida- 
tion of his finances. By means of a well-equipped 
army and good railways he controls the people, 
and the rehabilitated credit of the country has led 
to foreign investments and economic development. 
At first chiefly English and French, the trade and 
financial development have gradually been pass- 
ing into American hands, and at present it is 
roughly estimated that about five hundred million 
dollars are invested by the United States in the 
country, and the amount is increasing annually 
at an extraordinary pace.^ 

While there has been a great advance in the 
material progress of Mexico, that country does 
not present the spectacle of a nation in which all 
classes are making strides towards a more ad- 
vanced civilization. It is said that eighty-five per 
cent., at least, are illiterate. The republican ideal 
of a peasant-proprietor class, growing in prosper- 
ity and education towards an equality of oppor- 
tunity with their wealthier brethren, is as far off 
from Mexico as ever. The large preponderance of 



'This is the consular estimate for January i, 1903. But 
there are a number of American corporations representing 
large investments which do not issue statements of their cap- 
ital; and the total is probably not less than seven hundred 
million dollars gold. 

166 



GREATER AMERICA 

Indians in the lowest stratum of society is one 
drawback, many of these hving in their old tribal 
organization and hardly civilized at all. There 
has been a Juarez, it is true, but only one. In 
this benign climate, a winterless land, the masses 
are not inclined to work. The fluctuations of the 
currency have also been a great drawback to prog- 
ress, and are the subject of an American- Mexican 
commission. The system of government, like all 
democratic systems, is extremely costly and will 
be difficult to maintain. Heavy taxation is nec- 
essary, and the position of the peon is rendered 
more unfortunate by the system of hacienda stores, 
to which he becomes indebted and is practically 
a slave imtil he can work off his debt. Though 
not exactly legal, this system is widely prevalent. 
Taxation has always been a heavy burden on 
the Mexican people, and one of the unfortunate 
features has been the taxation of industries and 
cultivated ground. The alcabalas, or inter-state 
customs, which have been recently abolished — 
officially at least — were heavy burdens; but the 
chief difficulty in the way of economic develop- 
ment has been the tariff policy of the United 
States. The duties have been considerably de- 
creased and a free zone established on the Mexican 
frontier, but the custom-houses between the coun- 
tries, with their delays and inconveniences, caused 
to a large extent by maladministration, are a 
serious obstacle to trade. As Mexico is becoming 
almost entirely dependent economically on the 

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GREATER AMERICA 

United States, she is naturally very much handi- 
capped by a system of restrictive tariffs. The 
only basis for a reciprocity treaty, however, is the 
free admission of sugar and coffee into the United 
States in return for food stuffs and manufactures, 
and this solution would, of course, be inimical to 
the vested interests which are responsible for the 
opposition to reciprocity here as in the Philippines 
and Cuba.^ 

It is of peculiar interest, at this period of British 
economic development, to consider whether any 

*"To British North America the United States supplies 52 
per cent, of the total imports for consumption; to Mexico, 
equally adjacent, but speaking another language than our 
own, 40 per cent. ; to the Central American states, next re- 
moved by distance, though readily reached by water and now 
being tapped by railways, 35 per cent.; to Colombia, a trifle 
farther removed, but equally accessible by direct water trans- 
portation, S3 P^^ cent.; to Venezuela, equally accessible, 27 
per cent. ; to the West Indies, which lie in close proximity, but 
which have been up to the present time controlled by com- 
mercial nations whose policy in many cases has been to retain 
their commerce for their own people, 20 per cent.; to the 
Guianas, also readily reached by water, 25 per cent, of the im- 
ports of British Guiana, 17 per cent, of those of Dutch Giuana, 
and but less than 6 per cent, of those of French Guiana. 

" Up to this point the study of the growth of commerce be- 
tween the United States and other American countries it 
fairly satisfactory. Beginning with 52 per cent, of the import 
trade of Canada, 40 per cent, of that of Mexico, and ranging 
on downward along the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, a 
fairly satisfactory share of the commerce of those countries is 
enjoyed by the people of the United States, though it will be 
conceded that her people have a right to expect a larger share 
of the commerce of the countries lying so near at hand, espe- 
cially in view of the fact that our purchases from them are 
much larger than our sales to them." — Bureau of Statistics, 
Washington (1821-1900). 

168 



GREATER AMERICA 

change from our free-trade policy might not lead 
to modification in existing tariffs throughout the 
world. That its first effect would be to reduce the 
American tariff wall cannot be doubted, and this 
would naturally have great results in Latin Amer- 
ica. 

What will happen in Mexico when Porfirio Diaz 
(already past the Biblical limit of the span of life) 
lets fall the sceptre he has so successfully wielded? 
We are told that his successor has been already 
chosen — every precaution has been taken for his 
" election " — but we have no guarantee that every 
generation will produce a Diaz. There is no prin- 
ciple to guide either government or opposition; 
the personal factor has been supreme, and often 
tyrannical in its manifestation, and while there 
is no question that this form of government, with 
its many drawbacks, has been the most successful 
evolved by Latin- American people, it is not a de- 
mocracy, nor can it be regarded as a training- 
school for constitutional politicians, nor has it the 
permanence of an hereditary monarchy. 

Mexico remains an unsolved problem, but one 
with which Greater America is deeply concerned 
and must ultimately help to unravel. That it 
forms already part of the new American sphere of 
influence can hardly be denied. From the United 
States border a constant stream of influence is 
trickling down through Mexico; or, to change the 
metaphor, the United States is shooting out 
tentacles in every direction on her southern boun- 

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GREATER AMERICA 

dary. Whereas formerly the cry was " Accretion, 
not colonization," iij is now "Absorption, not an- 
nexation," but the Mexicans may well ask " What's 
in a name?" It can never be forgotten that a 
great part of Mexico is already under the Stars 
and Stripes. The actual occupation, with sover- 
eign rights, of the canal strip will act as another 
centre from which United States influence must 
spread still more tangibly, and, as the Monroe 
Doctrine involves its adherents (or rather expo- 
nents) more and more in the meshes of Latin- 
American affairs, the question will be, where will 
the "American sphere" end? A boundary - line 
— the latest of several — has already been found 
for it by sanguine expansionists in the Amazon 
River, but as this includes in the sphere a large 
part of Brazil, the subject becomes at once in- 
volved in that of Pan-Americanism, and must be 
considered in a later chapter. 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE CONTROL OF THE CARIBBEAN 

Nowhere, perhaps, does history afford a sadder 
lesson in the evil effects of the human lust for gold 
than in the story of this beautiful sea, the blue 
Caribbean, studded with countless islands, each a 
gem of tropical beauty. Nature has done every- 
thing for this favored region; man has been the 
destroyer of its peace. From time to time, as if 
in rebellion against the evils which were disfiguring 
her beauty, the earth-mother has revenged herself 
by one of those sudden cataclysms which have 
devastated whole islands; and it is, perhaps, a 
fitting though a terrible sequence in the long chain 
of tragedy that the last few years should have 
seen the greatest catastrophe of all and the whole- 
sale destruction of one island. It is as if these 
beautiful gems of the Caribbean were placed under 
some baneful spell by reason of the evil passions 
of by-gone generations and as a retribution for the 
cruel fate which Western conquerors meted out to 
the gentle, harmless aborigines. 

No one who has ever visited these lovely islands 
can fail to retain an image of their exquisite beauty, 
and he will find it difficult to decide as to the rival 

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claims of each to be considered the queen. Set 
in a sea whose sapphire blue deceives one with an 
aspect of placid loveliness, by no means justified 
by its treacherous currents and contrary winds, 
the coral strands are fringed with palms and co- 
coa-nuts; mountains of indescribable beauty and 
grandeur rise tier on tier till they melt into an 
azure sky; flowers and foliage of radiant beauty 
clothe every ravine. In the brilliance of tropical 
sunlight there is nothing lacking to complete the 
charm of the scene. 

Amid this bounteous nature, however, man has 
moved like a destroyer. The races now in occupa- 
tion of the soil — white and black — are singularly 
out of the picture. No one familiar with the 
tropical East can have failed to notice how per- 
fectly the peoples are assimilated to their own 
environment. Their clothes and dwellings, their 
very figures and faces, seem to have an artistic 
relation to the background in which they are set, 
and even in the case of a fantastic civilization like 
that of China one feels little sense of discrepamcy; 
it has, in truth, grown up from the soil and drawn 
its color from the character of the surrounding 
country and the skies above. It is not a mere 
sense of picturesqueness which leads one to abhor 
the banalities of Western settlements in the East, 
but a feeling that they are out of key with nature. 
Architecture which in northern climes seems right 
and suitable, and therefore aesthetically correct, 
appears grotesque in the lands of eternal sunshine. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

Englishmen have to a certain extent reahzed this, 
and have compromised in their dwelHngs to secure 
modem sanitation without a sacrifice of artistic 
fitness. But in their personal appearance and 
manners they can never fail to appear as stran- 
gers in these countries. They are the growth of 
an alien civilization, and whether it be better or 
no, it certainly does not have that relation to nat- 
ure — that indefinite, subtle connection with the 
scenery, the sky, or the flora which an indigenous 
civilization possesses. 

The West Indies present this anomaly in a most 
striking manner ; nowhere do we find an indigenous 
civilization, nowhere do the people seem to be in 
intimate relationship with their habitat. On a 
Saharan desert, with a fierce, tropical sun bleach- 
ing the sand on which his shadow is cut in deepest 
cobalt, the glowing black of the negro, his fierce 
freedom of gesture, the barbaric note of blood-red 
in his scarf, and the glint of white in his teeth and 
eyeballs make a never-to-be-forgotten picture — a 
perfect harmony. Here, however, he is still un- 
civilized, wild as his own bare country, free as its 
scorching sunlight. 

In the West Indies we find a different being. 
Set in a background of tropical luxuriance, and at 
the same time half converted to a civilization 
which is foreign both to him and to the country, 
the negro is nothing but a travesty of his white 
masters. His language is the debased coin of 
Spanish, French, or English; his clothing their 

173 



GREATER AMERICA 

discarded finery, or rags of his own devising on the 
same model. His home is as devoid of originahty 
as it is of artistic beauty. It is a shelter — noth- 
ing more. It is a significant fact that the curio- 
hunter in the West Indies can find nothing in- 
teresting save the Carib baskets, woven by the 
descendants of the aborigines, or some barbaric 
bead- work of no originality or beauty. The negro 
is far behind the Fiji-Islander in decorating his 
house, the summit of his ambition being to pur- 
chase American "rockers." 

In speaking thus of the West Indian negro it is, 
of course, the outward aspect of the peasantry 
we are considering; and it must be acknowledged 
that from a pictorial and aesthetic point of view, 
the poor black is in all respects preferable to the 
poor white. The cotton clothes of the black 
"mammies" are often clean and stiffly starched, 
and a touch of color is imparted in the turban, 
which is added to, in the French islands, by 
multicolored kerchiefs and skirts, making up a 
bright and effective costume. The present ten- 
dency, however, is to dress more and more in the 
cast-off fashions of white folks, and to abandon 
the turban for the trimmed hat, but the effect of 
clean cotton dresses is still sufficiently flower-like 
to make a not unpleasing note in the landscape. 
The tendency of the poor whites is to a slatternly 
neglect of house and person, which is far more 
reprehensible, both from a moral and aesthetic 
point of view, than the childish vanity of the blacks. 

174 



GREATER AMERICA 

Here, then, is the first fruit, apparent to the 
most casual observer, of European greed in snatch- 
ing the islands. We have peopled them, but we 
cannot replace the ancient race which we ex- 
terminated. Neither we nor the negroes are sons 
of the soil, in the true sense of having evolved 
there our character and civilization; and the con- 
sequence is a permanent divorce between these 
beautiful islands and the people who dwell on 
them. The negro has, of course, found here a 
secure home, but he has not yet recovered from 
the baneful influence of the system under which 
he was brought. The ease with which life can be 
supported has also vitiated his character, never 
strenuous, and it is only when pressure of cir- 
cumstances drives him to it that he can be de- 
pended on for systematic labor. Thanks to the 
economic policy of Europe, the West Indian 
islands have for many years past been driving 
many of their foster-children into the foreign 
labor market, but — and this is part of their curse 
— they do so at the cost of their own prosperity. 
It is at once the lack of laborers and the lack of 
remunerative labor that constitutes a deadlock 
in the West Indies to-day. A people who were 
children of the soil might have wrung from it a 
living even in the teeth of difficulties; the negro, 
with sugar gone and nothing to replace it, when 
he can no longer subsist by scratching up a yam- 
patch, must go elsewhere or starve in idleness. 
The West Indies are interesting not only as the 

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GREATER AMERICA 

second home of a black race, but as an object- 
lesson in the possibilities of peopling the tropics 
with white races. How far the perpetuation of 
these races is due to intermingling with the negroes 
and aborigines, and how much to constant rein- 
forcement from Europe, it is impossible to gauge; 
but it does not require a very close observation 
to see that, in different degrees, the Creoles of all 
the islands are in many respects different from, and 
in the more sturdy virtues inferior to, the parent 
stocks. The Spaniard has in him a touch of 
Orientalism and has no race prejudice, facts which 
have helped him in the task of assimilation. The 
Creoles live a sort of hot-house existence and have 
the characteristics of exotic rather than of tropical, 
indigenous plants. 

Nowhere do we see the growth in a West Indian 
island of a community whose social and political 
life has made independent progress towards the 
goal of individual enlightenment and liberty. 
Many of the islands have now attained to the 
dignity of self-government, and two have achieved 
independence. Hayti is an interesting study and 
a most striking example of a Black Republic, as it 
has now been over a century in the enjoyment of 
a democratic constitution. It was, of course, the 
black element in that island which overthrew the 
dominion of Europe, and the victory was one of 
matter over mind. There is no need to recapitu- 
late the reasons which left the white population 
at the mercy of the blacks, nor the methods by 

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GREATER AMERICA 

which the Black Republic was founded. Right 
and wrong are inextricably interwoven in all such 
cases, and there may be instances in which the end 
may excuse, though not justify, the means. What 
is Hayti to-day, after the long sequence of crimes 
of which her history is made up ? Apologists, both 
white and black, are found who try to put a good 
complexion on the condition of the island, their 
chief reason being to justify or to avert condemna- 
tion of the republican institutions on which its 
government is founded. It is significant, how- 
ever, that the warmest friend can say no more 
than that the evil reports are exaggerated. Can- 
nibalism, they declare, does not now exist, and 
voodoo worship is on the decline; but they can 
furnish no explanation for a state of affairs in 
which the accusations that are current receive 
credence. The plain evidences of corruption and 
anarchy are enough for our purpose, without any 
examination of the darker sides of social and polit- 
ical Hfe, and these are incontrovertible. 

The checkered history of Haytian rulers is worth 
recording. Of these, one was assassinated, one 
killed himself, one was exiled, many were deposed, 
four fled, one was shot, three abdicated, and only 
one died peaceably in office. The trade of the 
country has declined to a mere fraction of what it 
once was; there are not more than ten miles of 
railway; there are no public hospitals, save one 
kept by Sisters of Charity; no sanitation; no pub- 
lic works, save the palaces built by rulers for 

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GREATER AMERICA 

themselves with forced labor. The army is a 
laughing-stock to European visitors, and the whole 
business of government is kept up on a scale of 
tawdry grandeur. Foreigners are not allowed to 
acquire land, and there is only a handftd of whites 
in a population of blacks and mulattoes. We can- 
not find that anything is done to provide enlight- 
ened public instruction, and religious teaching is 
certainly handicapped by the darkest supersti- 
tions. 

Much the same state of affairs exists in San 
Domingo, the Dominican Republic, which em- 
braces the eastern two - thirds of the island of 
Hayti, the chief difference being that the dialect 
spoken in Spanish. At the time of writing, an- 
archy is supreme, trade is at a stand-still, and it is 
becoming more and more certain that action must 
shortly be taken to protect European and Amer- 
ican interests. The American naval commander 
reports that at a recent date no fewer than four 
separate movements (which might be dignified 
with the name of revolutions) were in process 
simultaneously. 

This condition prevails in an island which was 
not only proverbially fertile and rich, but had been 
the focus of influences emanating from the most 
cultivated and refined capital of Europe. Hispan- 
iola, in the French period, was in many respects 
ahead of her sister islands, and the many excellent 
qualities of the French colonists had combined at 
once to make it not only one of the richest, but 

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GREATER AMERICA 

one of the first in the refinements of civiHzation. 
It must not be supposed that the writer is plac- 
ing responsibiUty for failure entirely on negro 
shoulders. The long series of blunders and in- 
justices, of crimes and follies, of which the West 
Indian isles have been the scene have their root 
deep in the past, and for the most part we of the 
Old World, and the unfortunate races whose fate 
is bound up with ours, have but blindly followed 
a destiny to which the lusts of our forefathers 
condemned us. On northern soil man is suf- 
ficiently master of his fate to break through the 
bonds woven for him and make a new world for 
himself, but in the West Indies he must remain 
forever a slave, not only to his own weaker self, 
but doomed to toil forever, to roll back the stone 
which his fathers, in ignorant passion, threw down. 
The recent establishment of another independent 
republic in the Caribbean opens questions of wide 
importance. Cuba is considered elsewhere more 
fully ; it is sufficient here to say that she has been 
given her freedom on terms which merely make 
it a matter of time as to how soon she becomes 
part of the United States. Puerto Rico has al- 
ready been created a Territory, with free access to 
the markets of the United States, but with no 
claims to Statehood or to American citizenship for 
her people. Nevertheless, the supreme court has 
just decided that Puerto Ricans are not aliens, 
since he is either a citizen of the United States or 
of no country at all. Hence it follows that while 

179 



GREATER AMERICA 

he is a citizen in the sense of being amenable to 
United States laws, and entitled to protection, he 
is not a citizen as regards constitutional rights. 
This is an example of the confusion which arises 
from the attempt to reconcile democratic theory 
with imperial practice. Civil government in Puer- 
to Rico was organized in 1900. The insular gov- 
ernment (American) practically controls the whole 
system, but Puerto Ricans have local autonomy 
and are clamoring for more complete self-govern- 
ment, desiring to have all duties and functions 
vested in municipalities as far as possible, in order 
that they may obtain control.* 

So long as capable and disinterested Americans, 
uninfluenced by local politics, are at the helm, the 
present condition of affairs will continue. But if 
they were to be removed, what guarantee is there 
that the party dissensions so characteristic of 
Spanish America will not return with all their at- 
tendant evils? And if Puerto Rico were to be- 
come a Territory with a claim to Statehood, what 



' The central government having been established, the 
legislative council (with an American majority) set to work 
to organize details. Revenue, education, and local govern- 
ment were reformed, but the guiding hand of the central 
government was apparent in all these, although every effort 
was made to give local autonomy and responsibility to munic- 
ipal officials. A code of laws was drawn up and police and 
other regulations enforced. Judicial reforms were introduced. 
Finances are rigidly supervised by an American treasurer. 
The official selections have been made without party bias, 
and administrative heads have endeavored to introduce the 
"merit" system in the civil service. 

180 



GREATER AMERICA 

is to prevent the initiation of all the evils of polit- 
ical life existing in the United States? 

In this new advance of the Americans into the 
Caribbean we see a significant circumstance affect- 
ing the future of that region. Few, if any, of the 
West Indian islands have not changed hands more 
than once since their discovery to the Western 
world, and one of the things most certain in the 
future is that their checkered career as political 
pawns is not yet ended. Here we find the direct 
result of the policy adopted by the early con- 
querors, and we realize the full extent of the 
blighting influence of that policy upon these 
islands. They have been in the past, and, now 
that their brief day of intrinsic value seems to be 
setting, will again become nothing more than 
pawns in the game of world politics. It would 
have been impossible so to regard them had they 
been peopled by a truly indigenous race. Even 
the patriotism of a Creole population like that of 
Cuba is partial, disturbed by other influences, and 
rather a sentiment than a national heritage. 

Before pursuing any further the subject of West 
Indian possibilities, it may be well to give a brief 
resume of the actual state of affairs, political and 
economic. 

At present the British islands contain the bulk 
of the population, some three millions, of whom 
not more than two per cent, are white. The British 
islands have varying forms of colonial government, 
all on the crown-colony pattern, providing differ- 



GREATER AMERICA 

ing degrees of local autonomy and representative 
government. Economically they are decadent. 
No fresh industry on any adequate scale has re- 
placed sugar, and, in face of the over-production 
of that article in other parts of the world, it is 
impossible to see how the industry can ever be 
revived. Its downfall might have been delayed 
by judicious methods in the early period of de- 
cadence, but the most drastic measures would 
not avail now, and the one hope is the creation of 
fresh industries. 

As for the condition of the negro race imder 
these circumstances, it is one of the curious anoma- 
lies with which every student of world affairs is 
familiar. By every law of civilization the negroes 
ought to be in a bad way. They should suffer 
with the whites. Economic depression is supposed 
always to fall first on the lowest strata of society. 
Indifferent government (and the government of 
some of the West Indian islands has been very 
indifferent) should first affect the well-being of 
the poorest, as they are the least able to defend 
themselves. The contrary has been the case in 
the British West Indies. The muddles of govern- 
ments, the decline of prosperity, the increase of 
taxation to support heavy public works neglected 
in palmy days — all these have fallen with crushing 
force on the white planter. They have wrecked 
his home, and they have driven him in despair 
from the islands, but they have left the negro 
practically unharmed. Poor he is, but in the 

182 



GREATER AMERICA 

bounteous West Indies he need not feel hunger or 
cold. The land left by the white planters has 
gradually fallen into the hands of black* squatters, 
and with the wide area available they are able to 
shift their yam or potato patch as soon as the soil 
seems exhausted. 

Froude, in a memorable book full of mistakes, 
but lit up throughout with those inimitable flashes 
of insight— those touches of sympathetic descrip- 
tion which give his work a living value lacked 
by that of more scientifically accurate writers — 
has given us a picture of the happy West Indian 
black. It may be an exaggeration, but the im- 
pressions of a man like Froude are worth a good 
deal as evidence, and are borne out by many others 
of less eminence. There are problems in the Brit- 
ish West Indies — there is poverty, there must be 
misery — but the writer can unhesitatingly affirm 
that, were he a negro, it is in these islands, rather 
than in any other part of the world, that he would 
prefer to have his lot cast. The British have, so 
far as in their power lay, done what they could 
to ameliorate the lot of their black subjects. The 
natural orderliness of the Anglo - Saxon has led 
him to establish the essentials of civilization. Law 
and justice are firm and incorruptible, markets are 
easy of access and well regulated, good roads have 
been made wherever possible, and, in fact, the 
negro lives his primitive life under conditions made 
easy by the protecting care of a higher civilization. 
The race prejudice which keeps white and black 

183 



GREATER AMERICA 

apart has not prevented the ruhng race from 
deaUng fairly and generously with the subject 
one. Froude thought they were going too far in 
this respect. He foresaw the time when the few 
remaining whites would refuse to be governed by 
a black majority and would leave altogether, and 
thus the democratic principle, just struggling into 
birth, would rid the island of the white element so 
badly needed to leaven the whole lump. Since his 
time, however, there has been little progress in 
that direction. The eyes of Britain were opened, 
and a halt was called in that march on which she 
was urging all her colonies. It was realized that 
the race question must count for something in 
matters of government ; and while many mistakes 
have been perpetuated on the islands, there has 
been a genuine attempt to legislate in a dis- 
criminating manner for the backward race. The 
responsibility of ruling the negro has not been 
altogether shifted on to his own unaccustomed 
shoulders. In the larger islands a certain amount 
of progress has been made, and for them it seems, 
indeed, as if the worst crisis were over. The 
growth of the fruit industry is a hopeful sign, and 
also the advance in means of public education and 
a slow but perceptible improvement in the moral 
status of the negro. 

It must be understood by all who would ap- 
preciate the West Indian problems that a con- 
dition of contented poverty, readiness to work, 
if well paid and overlooked, and even a disposi- 

184 



GREATER AMERICA 

tion among the better class to become useful citi- 
zens and efficient government employes, go side 
by side with a most primitive morality among 
the great bulk of the population. Until this de- 
fect is remedied— and that can only be by white 
influence, example, and discipline — any talk of 
democratic principles in the islands is criminal 
folly. A sham democracy is more degrading than 
any other form of government, since it inevi- 
tably leads to the predominance of the most 
unscrupulous. A true democracy in the British 
West Indies would mean the ascendency of the 
lower class of negro, with his inferior moral and 
mental standard, over his superior brothers and 
the handful of whites who could not leave the 
islands. It would be a mere mob rule. 

No tampering with constitutions or rearrange- 
ment of the political grouping would be of any real 
assistance to the islands. It might secure more ef- 
ficiency here or reduce a little extra taxation there, 
but it would not touch the root of the matter, 
which is the economic problem. We must return 
later to that question, but first must glance at the 
condition of those islands belonging to other Euro- 
pean powers— the French, Dutch, and Danish West 

Indies. 

The French islands number two of the most 
considerable of the Antilles— Martinique and Gua- 
deloupe. Even before the recent disasters which 
have depopulated the former, these islands con- 
tained only some four hundred thousand souls. 

185 



GREATER AMERICA 

Many of the British Antilles, of course, were 
originally colonized by the French, and remain to 
this day Gallic not only in language but in many 
other characteristic features of their civilization. 
Dominica, one of the largest as well as the most 
beautiful of this chain of islands, is an example of 
this. The protective tariffs of the mother-country 
have helped to prolong the life of the sugar in- 
dustry in the French colonies, and it has been to 
this alone that they owed their apparent superior- 
ity to the British islands, which has led not a few 
observers to pronounce in favor of the French 
rather than the British mode of government in the 
West Indies. In other respects the French and 
British islands differ considerably. The former 
contain a larger proportion of half-breeds, the 
color-line being less strictly drawn. Whether this 
is in itself an advantage is a matter of opinion. 
In one respect it cannot fail to be a drawback, 
since a pure black population will increase in 
numbers and retain its fine physique far better 
than a colored race. The political system, admired 
by Sir Charles Dilke, is founded on the granting, 
through universal suffrage, of representation in 
the central government. He speaks of the prog- 
ress made by individual blacks under this more 
liberal treatment, but it is to be noted that the 
instances with which he points his remarks are 
taken from British islands — Barbadoes and Ja- 
maica. French observers themselves are less san- 
guine as to their succcess in the West Indies. 

i86 



GREATER AMERICA 

It is significant that the local administration of 
Guadeloupe absorbs fifty per cent, of the annual 
value of the products of the island, while in 
Martinique, before the recent catastrophes, there 
were one thousand four hundred fonctionnaires to 
some fourteen thousand eligible voters. Leroy- 
Beaulieu says: "The deputies whom Martinique 
and Guadeloupe send to our parliament serve only 
to represent the malice, ignorance, and prejudice 
of the blacks. The weak executive power in 
France allows itself to be intimidated by these 
deputies, and sends out to the colonies cowardly 
and incapable governors whose indecision of char- 
acter feeds the more or less barbarous hopes of the 
negro majority. . . . The hatred for the negro in 
these islands is complicated by the hatred of the 
poor for the rich."^ M. Maurice Ordinaire, in his 
study of modern colonization, makes an interesting 
comparison. " The Briton admits that individuals 
of another race, living under other climes, may 
have different wants and ideas from those held 
by himself. He does not pretend to ' assimilate ' 
brethren of all colors, whose brains, for the pres- 
ent, at least, are not quite as well developed as 
his own. Neither does he think that he has ful- 
filled his whole duty towards them and assured 
their happiness forever when he grants them polit- 
ical rights which they do not know how to make 
use of. He thinks quite the contrary, that for 

' Colonization chez les pettples modernes. 
187 



GREATER AMERICA 

primitive societies, such as colonies are, there are 
more urgent Hberties than a mere formal and os- 
tentatious franchise {franchise d'apparat), and that 
the primary benefit to be conferred upon them is 
a regime which develops their initiative, teaches 
them responsibility, and favors their economic as- 
cendency." ^ 

From these quotations and from the evidence of 
other writers one gathers that, although the com- 
mercial prosperity of the French islands may be 
superior, there are many rifts within the lute. 
The absence of friction between blacks and whites, 
the general content and peacefulness which pre- 
vail in the British islands, and the immunity from 
party politics which they are not able to appreci- 
ate, would be poorly exchanged for the fictitious 
privilege of electing seven deputies and four sena- 
tors to parliament. 

The efforts made to improve the actual condi- 
tion of the people have been, as is not unusual 
in Catholic countries, mainly due to the Church. 
Public instruction, public works, and sanitation 
make a better show on paper than in reality if 
the eyes, ears, and nose of an ordinary traveller 
may be trusted. From one point of view — the 
aesthetic — the superiority of the French West 
Indies is undoubted. Some of the colored Creoles 
have a reputation for beauty which is well deserved, 
and until recent years there were to be seen every- 

' Questions diplomatiques et coloniales. June, 1900. 



GREATER AMERICA 

where quaint and distinctive costumes, the result 
of French influence and taste on the color-loving 
negroes. Unhappily, the beauty and daintiness of 
these childlike people have their dark side in the 
shameful passions to which they owe their origin 
and their inheritance of moral as well as physical 
fragility. None but the ignorant sentimentalist 
will prefer the spectacle of a French West Indian 
city, with its picturesque vice, its graceful, multi- 
colored people, and its general air of charm, 
gayety, and lightly concealed squalor, to that of, 
for instance, Barbadoes, where a pure black race 
— devoted to the soil; simple-minded, if ignorant; 
independent, if poor; contented, peaceful, mdus- 
trious, and, in a word, wholesome — are living their 
own lives according to the light vouchsafed them 
and leaving no legacy of sin or disease to future 
generations. 

Little need be said of the Dutch and Danish 
West Indies. The former have only about fifty 
thousand inhabitants, and the trade is so small 
that the islands do not even pay the expenses of 
government. The Danish islands have a popula- 
tion of thirty thousand, and, in view of a steadily 
declining trade and the desire of the United States 
to acquire the islands, it seems impracticable that 
a country like Denmark can continue to support 
the burden of a useless and expensive dependence. 
And yet the fate of the Danish islands is not quite 
so clear as it seems, as will be shown in a future 

chapter. 

189 



GREATER AMERICA 

What is to be the future of the West Indies? 
What power will control the Caribbean, for which 
Great Britain and France fought so long and 
desperately? It is undoubtedly on an economic 
basis that the struggle will very largely be decided. 
But from a strategic point of view the islands seem 
likely to resume their ancient importance, for the 
opening of the trans-isthmian canal will immensely 
increase their strategic and political value. 

The actual bearing of the canal question on 
American expansion is discussed elsewhere, but it 
is necessary here to glance briefly at the effect it 
has had on the control of the Caribbean. In a 
previous chapter we have seen how unlikely it is 
that Cuba can long remain outside the Union, 
even under the guise of a protectorate. Mean- 
while, Puerto Rico is already a Territory — nomi- 
nally, at least — and the desire for more islands in 
the West Indies is only checked by the fact that 
there are none whose owners are willing to part 
with, or too weak to retain, them. 

The Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico have 
often been described as an American Mediter- 
ranean. The Gulf is absolutely dominated by the 
United States. The Caribbean is enclosed by a 
chain of islands, of which one — Cuba — blocks the 
entrance to the Gulf, being only a short distance 
on either side from the American main-land. Thus 
Cuba, the largest, richest, and most highly civilized 
of all the West Indies, occupies a commanding 
position as regards the American main -land, es- 

190 



GREATER AMERICA 

pecially that most important point, the mouth of 
the Mississippi. Either as a base of supphes, a 
strategic point, or a rendezvous for commerce, 
the Mississippi is of paramount importance. The 
United States has in Pensacola and Key West sup- 
plementary strategic points, but the importance 
of these is rendered double by the fact that they 
are practically guarded by Havana, the finest city 
of the West Indies, and called by the Spaniards, 
not inappropriately, " the key of the New World." 
Cuba is well provided on all sides with harbors, 
and the improvements in internal communications 
made during the American occupation have tied 
these together and greatly increased their value. 

It is obvious that these natural advantages 
cannot be fully utilized by the United States so 
long as Cuba, though protected, remains a weak, 
independent republic, backward in civilization and 
hampered with all kinds of internal problems, the 
greatest being undoubtedly that of evolving a 
stable government out of most unstable material. 
But how long will the present condition of affairs 
continue? Already, as if to forestall the con- 
clusion, the Americans have recently provided 
themselves with a point d'appui on the island, im- 
portant positions (Guantanamo and Bahia Honda), 
some forty miles east of Santiago de Cuba, on a 
lease not dissimilar to that of Germany in Kiao- 
chau. The Isle of Pines, which was reserved to 
herself, is more suitable for a sanatorium than a 
strategic point, and has been restored to the sov- 

191 



GREATER AMERICA 

ereignty of Cuba. It must not be forgotten that 
Cuba supplies the lack of harbors which is one of 
America's greatest difficulties in these waters. 
The whole Gulf of Mexico is practically devoid 
of any harborage, and even the littoral of Central 
America is without natural harbors until we reach 
the Chiriqui lagoon and Carthagena. 

Turning to the Caribbean and canal, we see that 
Cuba commands one of the principal entrances 
to the ocean, the Windward Passage, which lies 
between Cuba and Hispaniola (the island which 
consists of the two republics of Hayti and San 
Domingo) . Under present political conditions His- 
paniola may be regarded as a negligible quan- 
tity. The next channel is the Mona Passage, 
between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico. The ac- 
quisition of the latter does not provide the Amer- 
icans with a strong strategic point, being deficient 
in harborage, but it secures to them a most con- 
venient jumping-off place; and very near, on the 
other side of the passage, is a fine position, Samana 
Bay. The future of Hispaniola, with its two black 
republics, is still obscure, but it is certain that it 
will not be possible much longer to ignore this blot 
on the civilization of the Western World ; and the 
Americans, being unable, by the destiny they have 
marked out for themselves, to permit any other 
power to intervene, will eventually have to control 
this island more or less directly. The position was 
to have been neatly rounded off by the acquisition 
of St. Thomas and the other Danish islands, a 

192 



GREATER AMERICA 

process which would not be long delayed if the 
only obstacle were a dwindling sentiment on the 
part of a small handful of the Danish people. 
These islands command yet again a third route 
into the Caribbean from Europe. Having regard 
to the extraordinary rapidity with which the 
United States has advanced on her path of expan- 
sion and the difficulties she has encountered and 
overcome, it is possible that most of us may live 
to see the changes indicated, and with these three 
islands — Cuba, Hispaniola, and Puerto Rico- 
lying so compactly together, either in her posses- 
sion or under her control, the Caribbean will in- 
deed become almost an American lake. 

There is one crumpled rose-leaf, however, in the 
bed which America is preparing — one obstacle to 
her unfettered sway in these waters. That ob- 
stacle is the island of Jamaica. A glance at the 
map shows that it occupies such a position as to 
nullify the importance of some of the American, 
or potentially American, points of vantage. Its 
situation in the centre of the Caribbean is also 
in its favor. But the most important point is that 
it belongs to Great Britain, whose superiority in 
naval strength helps largely to outweigh the dis- 
advantage it suffers through isolation from neigh- 
boring islands or the main-land. Though inferior 
in resources to Cuba, and economically largely de- 
pendent on the United States, Jamaica as a British 
outpost in the centre of the Caribbean has great 
strategical importance. As a military station it 
13 193 



GREATER AMERICA 

has, moreover, the great advantage of healthy and 
easily accessible highlands. As a naval base it is 
also favored, Kingston being one of the best har- 
bors in the West Indies. Captain Mahan is of 
opinion that, taking everything into consideration, 
the superior size and resources of Cuba would give 
her an overwhelming advantage over Jamaica ; but 
he leaves out of consideration the health question, 
and it is notorious that disease killed far more men 
than bullets in the Cuban war. Another point in 
favor of the smaller island is the presence of an 
industrious peasantry, devoted to the British 
crown — a different condition to that of sparsely 
inhabited Cuba, with its mixed races, pulling dif- 
erent ways, and not remarkable either for their 
loyalty or industry. 

Great Britain has one other highly fortified 
post in St. Lucia, which, though some distance 
from Jamaica, serves as an important link in 
communications and as a coaling-station, and is 
provided with a useful adjunct in Barbadoes. 
With Trinidad to the south and Antigua and 
Dominica to the north, these islands are well 
outside the American sphere, but exercise an 
important influence on the Caribbean. There is 
another British colony on the Caribbean littoral, 
which is little considered, and, indeed, despite its 
size and the apparent advantages of its position, 
it is of little real importance, possessing no harbor, 
and the scantiest population. It should be advan- 
tageously disposed of to the United States. 

194 



GREATER AMERICA 

With the transference of the Danish islands to 
the United States there would remain only the 
French islands, Martinique and Guadeloupe, and 
the Dutch Cura9oa group. Of the former, Marti- 
nique may now be considered negligible, owing 
to the volcanic catastrophe which overwhelmed it 
and the abandonment by France of the Panama 
canal. The Dutch islands are economically stag- 
nant, but in any case will not be allowed to pass 
to any other power. These islands are of the 
greater strategical importance as Colon, the At- 
lantic terminus of the canal, is indefensible. 

It will be seen, therefore, that, so far as can be 
done, America has made every provision to insure 
that the main routes to the isthmus from the At- 
lantic should be under her control. The wisdom of 
such a provision does not require to be elaborated, 
but there is an interesting side of the question 
which can only be touched on here. What use can 
America make of the advantages she has gained 
in the Caribbean by her policy of expansion unless 
she is prepared to embark on a naval programme 
commensurate with it? No longer is her sea- 
board confined to her own territory; she has an 
extended littoral; she has a Pacific island de- 
pendency on the one side and a Caribbean sphere 
on the other. To this subject we must return. 

While the United States has been expanding, 
economically and politically, in the Caribbean, the 
British islands have been for some time credited 
with a desire for amalgamation with their great 

195 



GREATER AMERICA 

neighbor. It is safe to say that this desire is 
strictly limited and is purely on economic grounds, 
for the bulk of the population — the negroes — ^who 
are not suffering as much as the white planters 
(in many cases are not aware that they are suf- 
fering at all) — are far from wishing to become 
American citizens. They are perfectly aware 
that as British subjects they enjoy a position of 
respectability, a degree of justice and freedom, 
and even an amount of self-government, which 
would be denied to them in the democracy of 
Greater America. The desire for amalgamation 
with America may, therefore, be expected to de- 
crease with the exodus of white men from the West 
Indies; it has already undergone considerable 
modification even in that dwindling white minor- 
ity since they realized that American domination 
would mean the loss of that last shred of prestige 
which their position as a ruling class gives them, 
even among the wreck of their fallen fortunes. 
On the other hand, the Americans have never been 
desirous of shouldering the burden of government 
in these islands, where order is admirably main- 
tained by the British, where life and property are 
safe, and where trade is free to the world. Jamaica 
they would not object to have, but Jamaica is the 
one island which is not languishing. As for the 
others, while America can have markets without 
responsibility, she is not likely to want more. The 
American business-men who are fast taking up the 
fruit trade are not discontented with the state of 

196 



GREATER AMERICA 

affairs, having every liberty and far less inter- 
ference from government than in their own coun- 
try, even if they do complain of the general 
"sleepiness." 

The situation resolves itself at first sight into an 
impasse. Great Britain apparently cannot help 
her island colonies. America does not want them ; 
and they are by no means imanimous in the desire 
for a change of master. Still, they are powerless 
to help themselves, and unless they can do so the 
islands must become black, and gravitate, slowly 
but surely, into the American orbit. The great 
American Republic seems to loom up on the 
horizon whichever way we turn, and patriotic 
Britons and West-Indians alike may be pardoned 
if, like Froude, they sometimes feel that all is lost 
in the Caribbean, so far as the British Empire is 
concerned, and that nothing remains save to beg 
the United States to " pick up the pieces." 

But, as has been said already, the trans-isthmian 
canal at once sends up the value of the West 
Indies strategically, and, by diverting a great 
stream of traffic through the Caribbean, gives 
them fresh opportunities for economic develop- 
ment. For the British islands another possibility 
arises in the rapid growth of Canada. There 
seems no valid reason why Canada should not be 
to the British West Indies what the United States 
will shortly be to Cuba. These countries are 
complementary to each other, and in the new 
phase of imperial policy we may find the key to 

197 



GREATER AMERICA 

the situation in a commercial bond, though not 
perhaps in a pohtical one, as was first suggested. 
The failure, hitherto, to secure this bond between 
the northern Dominion and the tropical colonies 
need not be taken as a sign that such a thing is 
impossible. We believe that we are about to em- 
bark on a new era in our history and to stake every- 
thing on a grand effort to bind our scattered empire 
together in such a way that every unit will partici- 
pate in the advantages. There should be no Cin- 
derella in our imperial family. The conception is 
such a grand one that it may well excite the ridicule 
of politicians, who are too sure of their own om- 
niscience to have imagination. The power of a 
great idea, a great conception, is quite beyond the 
limitations of mere statistics. As regards the Car- 
ibbean, the question is a crucial one. We must 
turn over a new leaf or be willing to lose our share 
of power in the region with which our naval glories 
are inextricably associated. 



CHAPTER IX 

PAN-AMERICANISM IN THE SOUTHERN CONTINENT 

Mr. Blaine is generally credited with the 
paternity of the Pan-American movement, but 
the claim might well be advanced on behalf of 
Bolivar, the "Liberator." It is probable, how- 
ever, that these two men would have put a very 
different interpretation on the expression "Pan- 
American." Blaine desired the political ascen- 
dency of his own republic, which was to assume 
the attitude of protector, but avoid annexation, 
except in the case of Canada. Bolivar, on the 
contrary, wished to give the Latin- American re- 
publics a more equal position by a contractual 
engagement with the United States, which would 
assure to them their independence. Since that 
period there has been no approximation of the 
ideals of the two continents ; on the contrary, each 
has been strengthened in its own peculiar view of 
the exact nature of Pan-Americanism which is 
necessary to its own development. 

It is obvious that the expression "Pan-Amer- 
ican" does not imply the ascendency of any one 
race of Americans, and although it has of late 
years become usual for the United States citizens 

199 



GREATER AMERICA 

to be spoken of as " Americans " and regarded as 
the people par excellence of the New World, yet it 
must not be forgotten that the southern continent, 
and even a great part of the northern one, are 
inhabited by other peoples equally American, but 
in some cases widely different in race, thought, 
ideals, civilization, language, and religion from the 
inhabitants of the United States. 

The Dominion of Canada, occupying one-third 
of the northern continent, must naturally be the 
first element to be considered in any scheme of 
Pan- Americanism ; but it is of so much importance 
that it must be dealt with separately. We will 
first consider the relations of the Central and 
South American republics to their great neighbor. 

It has already been said that the destiny of the 
United States, having taken her into the Caribbean 
and on to the isthmus of Panama, will compel her 
to intervene in Mexico and to adopt a protective 
attitude towards Central America, and, in involv- 
ing her in the domestic affairs of the backward 
republics, will lead to their gradual absorption. 

The republics of South America are, however, 
governed by different conditions. The southern 
continent is hardly inferior in area or resources 
to the northern one, and, despite the heat of the 
equatorial region, it affords ample space for the 
growth of a great white population. That it re- 
mains to so large an extent unexploited is due 
chiefly to the unfortunate incapacity of Latin 
peoples to found stable governments or succeed in 

200 



GREATER AMERICA 

any practical enterprise. The Spaniards content- 
ed themselves from the first with taking as much 
as they could out of the country without any at- 
tempt to secure its permanent prosperity. 

In every respect, indeed, the colonization of 
South America has differed from that of the 
United States. The northern immigrants pushed 
steadily on, westward over the Alleghanies, south- 
ward to the Gulf of Mexico, organizing as they 
went, keeping in touch with one another, opening 
communications. It was not sentiment which 
bound them together, but practical common- 
sense and the presence of a common danger. Their 
fierce Indian foes, on the one hand, and the 
pressure from Europe, on the other, made them 
realize the importance of homogeneity, and their 
very weakness apart led to their strength in com- 
bination. The Spanish colonies, however, had no 
such incentives to combination. They were hand- 
fuls of white men planted among subdued and 
often gentle native peoples, holding little com- 
munication with one another. The East and West 
had no connection save through Europe— no in- 
tercourse, no mutual interests. When one after 
the other shook off the yoke of the mother-country 
one might have expected a rapprochement between 
the different Latin colonies; but the demon of 
political unrest was too strong. Intrigue, faction, 
and party fights became the occupation of the 
ruling class, and these were fostered by Europe. 
The natural incapacity of the hot-headed Latin 

20I 



GREATER AMERICA 

for self-government, of which we have already 
spoken, had not been modified by his colonial 
training, and the principles of democracy were 
rendered futile by the presence of Indian popula- 
tions which could not understand them and were 
not to be allowed on equality with their white mas- 
ters. As has been well said, " The American Con- 
stitution was reproduced in south latitudes, but 
the inward grace of enlightened public opinion is 
lacking." ^ It was an attempt to pour new wine 
into old bottles, and the result is still visible 
in a generous waste of what might be good 
vintage. 

A brief glance at the various republics is neces- 
sary before we consider the possibility of the Pan- 
American bond. 

Colombia and Venezuela are extreme examples 
of the vicious effects of democratic theories work- 
ing on unprepared soil. It is remarkable in the 
history of each that the only periods of peace or 
security enjoyed have been under the usurped 
authority of some dictator. Guzman Blanco, in 
Venezuela, and Nunez, in Colombia, serve as ex- 
amples of this. Bolivar, the bright star of Latin- 
American independence, was a Venezuelan, but 
enjoyed a great deal of obloquy from his com- 
patriots on account of his aristocratic birth, and 
died of a broken heart in hiding near Santa Marta. 
Miranda, another Venezuelan patriot, worthy of 

' Tropical America, by I. N. Ford. 
202 



GREATER AMERICA 

the chivalry of old Spain, died in a dungeon at 
Ceuta, the Spanish penal settlement in Morocco. 

Perhaps the most remarkable difference in the 
North and South American republics is the respect 
shown by the former to her Constitution, and the 
invariable custom of the latter to "amend" it on 
every occasion. It is a radical difference in the 
conception of laws. The Anglo-Saxon has no nat- 
ural turn for legislation or for the theory of politics. 
The Anglo-American is even content to turn the 
whole business over to paid politicians. To the 
Latin-American, however, this business of politics 
is the breath of life, and he has a profound belief 
in the efficacy of legislation to reform all evils. 

Notwithstanding all this, the Latin-American is 
also curiously apathetic about the actual working 
out of his political theories. Just as the Spaniard, 
who will wrangle all day and all night in a wine- 
shop over the merits of a candidate for election, 
will not trouble to go to the polling-station in the 
morning, so the Latin -American, having fomented 
a revolution, will regard its progress with indiffer- 
ence and is little interested in its effects, except in 
their parochial aspect.^ 

' Bolivar feared unrestricted suffrage, especially in Latin 
America; he believed in equality of civic rights, but not in 
equality of right to govern. Under his constitution, adapted 
to local conditions, there were to be a President, elected for life 
or during good behavior; a national legislature or Congress, 
with a Senate and House, the former an hereditary body or 
elected for long terms, the latter every two years by vote 
of the people; an independent judiciary, for life or during 
good behavior. 

203 



GREATER AMERICA 

In Venezuela, since the achievement of inde- 
pendence, eighty years ago, there have been fifty 
revolutions (ten successful), and each turn of 
Fortune's wheel has meant a fresh tinkering of the 
constitution. Under such circumstances stability 
of government is obviously impossible, the only 
safeguard being the imposition of some more or 
less arbitrary will on the people. This pressure 
must eventually come from outside — since the 
stock of Latin - American dictators seems to be 
running short— and from which quarter it is not 
difficult to prophesy. 

The paucity of the population of Ecuador 
(which, on an area the size of Germany, supports 
some one and a half million people) and the heat 
of the climate on this Pacific slope have not 
prevented her achieving a record in her own way. 
In thirty years— from 1830 to i860 — she had seven 
distinct constitutions, and every year witnessed 
some "amendment" or "reform." 

Her neighbor, Peru, is more interesting from 
many causes. Its area is equal to that of France 
and Austria - Hungary combined. The Indians, 
who are a large majority in a population of some 
three millions, were the heirs of a civilization 
bequeathed to them by the Incas, possessed a 
great system of roads and canals, from the Cor- 
dilleras to the coast, and offered considerable op- 
position to the Spaniards. They are now a partly 
subject race, having no share in the government, 
and their Latin masters, who pride themselves on 

204 



GREATER AMERICA 

the purity of their Castilian blood, have exhibited, 
with the graces of their ancestors, their most fatal 
traits of obstinacy and non-progressiveness. De- 
vastated by the war with Chili, bankrupt, crushed, 
racked with internal dissensions, Peru is trying, 
with the aid of British energy and capital, to re- 
habilitate herself. In the day of prosperity she 
provided herself with the best railway system in 
South America, and although constructed with 
great improvidence and little foresight, it may yet 
prove of value in the future development of a 
country undoubtedly rich in mineral resources. 

Bolivia is the least accessible of South Ameri- 
can repubhcs, now that its ports are absorbed by 
Chili or Peru. The immense mineral wealth of 
the country is discounted by the lack of com- 
munications, and the white and half-white popu- 
lation is too small to render progress likely. In 
disputes with Peru and Brazil, BoHvia has already 
got the worst of it, and will probably decline still 
more. A curious situation has arisen through the 
action of the government in granting a large tract 
of land on the disputed Brazilian border to an 
American syndicate, with power to maintain an 
armed force — a dangerous precedent in many ways. 

The most interesting, in some respects, of 
South American republics is that of Chili, whose 
expansion in late years has been remarkable. Al- 
though cut off from the interior by the Andes, it 
has extended its territory by spreading down the 
whole coast. The Indian population numbers 

205 



GREATER AMERICA 

fifty thousand, of which the Araucanians, formerly 
fierce warriors, are now quite peaceable and settled, 
while the Fuegians are dying out. The Chilians 
proper are a hardier and more energetic race than 
other Latin- Americans. They are for the most 
part of pure stock, live on the sea-coast or adjacent 
mountains, and have kept in touch with Europe by 
a system of excellent steam communication. They 
are said to exhibit more genuine patriotism and 
to have a truer conception of national ideals than 
some of their neighbors, and, in any case, they 
have been successful in war and progressive in 
peace. They never fell under the influence of 
the French conceptions of democracy, and escaped, 
therefore, some of the more baneful effects of the 
doctrines of Rousseau and other apostles of the 
revolutionary period. The country, when con- 
quered by Spain, was already fairly advanced in 
civilization and possessed village organizations and 
settled laws as to right and property. After the 
revolt the government was at first, under the guise 
of repubhcanism, entirely controlled by the aris- 
tocratic and clerical element, and Chili has been 
through her fair share of political disturbances. 
Balmaceda, the leader of the Liberal party in 
1866, introduced many reforms, but came to grief 
in an attempt to establish himself as a military 
dictator. The revolution which ended in his 
suicide showed that the ChiHans were not prepared 
to be governed by military cabals, and since then 
Chili has not witnessed other than party warfare 

2Q6 



GREATER AMERICA 

of a bloodless character. Her government re- 
mains, however, more representative than demo- 
cratic, and a certain stability of public opinion 
is assured by the presence of a large foreign 
community — British, French, Spanish, Italian, and 
German — whose interests are all in favor of a 
settled government. The government, being oli- 
garchic rather than aristocratic, has been hard on 
the peasantry, who do not own the soil and are 
practically in the condition of serfs. They are 
exceedingly poor, and emigrate in large numbers, 
despite the growing prosperity and prestige of 
their country. Public education is liberally pro- 
vided for in Chili, far in advance of any other 
South American country, a fact in itself eloquent 
of the superiority of the people. The mineral 
wealth of the country is its chief resource, but the 
agricultural and pastoral industries have increased 
and great attention has been paid to communica- 
tions, Chili being the first South American repub- 
lic to embark on railways, and possessing some 
fifteen thousand miles of public roads. Half the 
national debt is held in Britain, and that country 
is paramount in commerce and in the development 
of nitrate, which is the principal industry. 

The Argentinos consider themselves the Yankees 
of the southern hemisphere, or did so in the period 
of their short but phenomenal prosperity. As a 
matter of fact, they, in common with all Hispano- 
Americans, are lacking in the steady judgment 
and moral balance of the New-Englanders. This 

207 



GREATER AMERICA 

has been strongly illustrated both in their political 
and commercial dealings. The revolution of 1890, 
brought about by real abuses, failed to remedy 
them, because of the lack of capacity on the part 
of the leaders. The boom in commercial matters, 
though undoubtedly inflated by European specu- 
lation, would not have led to the crash which 
succeeded it but for the utter lack of foresight and 
prudence among the Argentinos themselves. They 
plunged recklessly into expense, piled up the 
national debt, inflated the currency, endeavored 
in everything to imitate the United States, re- 
gardless of their own circumstances (as, for in- 
stance, in building a magnificent federal city), and 
finally collapsed into chaos. 

The prosperity of the Argentine was, indeed, 
not due to their own initiative, but to European 
immigration and capital. The Argentino con- 
ceives it his mission to direct the energies of others, 
and despises labor. Immigration is conducted on 
a large scale, the government assisting the immi- 
grant in every possible way, taking charge of him 
until he reaches his colony or the hacienda where 
he is to live. The best labor is recruited from 
Italian immigrants, and they, together with the 
large commercial settlements of Germans, keep 
themselves apart, with the result that there is little 
homogeneity about the people of the Argentine. 
The country, moreover, is so vast in extent, being 
equal to about one-third of Europe, and with a 
very sparse population (under five millions in 

208 



GREATER AMERICA 

1900), that a large section remains undeveloped 
and lends itself peculiarly to the settlement of 
isolated communities and to the springing-up of 
small independent states. 

The great asset of the Argentine, however, is the 
wonderful waterway of the river Plate, with its 
fertile valleys. The possibilities of this great river 
are unmeasured. It has a more extensive system 
of navigation than any in the world, and more 
miles of open way than all the rivers of Europe 
combined, or even than the whole Mississippi 
system. The tide reaches two hundred and sixty 
miles inland, and vessels of twenty - four feet 
draught can ply at any time of the year as far 
inland as one thousand miles, literally steaming 
right through the cornfields. Vessels of lighter 
draught can penetrate some three thousand miles, 
and a moderate expenditure would enable a vessel 
of four thousand tons to reach even the very 
heart of Brazil. There are one hundred and ten 
million sheep (more than in Australia and New 
Zealand) and twenty-five million cattle, two-thirds 
of the number in the United States. Despite ev- 
ery drawback, there is no doubt that as a food- 
producing country the Argentine must occupy a 
foremost place in the economics of the western 
hemisphere. Stability of government, the reha- 
bilitation of national finances, and the devotion 
to public works and communications of part of 
the money squandered on revolutionary projects 
would soon restore the fortunes of the coimtry. 

209 



GREATER AMERICA 

Uruguay was originally a dependency of Brazil, 
but broke away in 1825, It has an extremely 
despotic government, and suffers from military 
cabals and political assassinations. 

Brazil is another of these South American coun- 
tries whose area and possibilities are so vast as to 
stagger the imagination. Its present population 
of some fourteen millions is only about 4.5 to the 
square mile,^ the coast being practically the only 
settled region. The presence of the negro element 
makes Brazil different from her sister republics. 

The early Portuguese conquerors of Brazil, amal- 
gamating with the Indians, were remarkable for 
energy and daring. Their cruel treatment of the 
natives, however, caused here, as in the West 
Indies, the extermination of the latter and the 
consequent scarcity of labor, which led to the 
introduction of negroes. As the race - line has 
never been carefully drawn by Portuguese, the 
black strain is strong in Brazil, but, as is invaria- 
ble in all Latin- American countries, there is a ten- 
dency for the purer-bred inhabitants to constitute 
an aristocracy. The southern Brazilian, who is 
the descendant of early colonists and Indians and 
has little negro blood, is jealous of his position. 
Geographically, economically, and even racially, 
he is nearer to the Argentine than to tropical 
Brazil, and the unity of the country is threatened 
by these race questions, which are aggravated by 

' According to the census of 1890, that of 1900 showed a 
decrease ; this, however, is considered to be unreliable. 

210 



GREATER AMERICA 

the presence of considerable bodies of indepen- 
dent German communities, holding aloof from 
national life. Of these, however, we must speak 
later. 

The Brazilians exhibit great apathy, as a people, 
on the subject of government, the revolutions being 
chiefly the work of military cabals. The condition 
of the country is not unlike that of the Argentine, 
the extravagance of an irresponsible government 
having plunged it into financial crises. The public 
debt is enormous, amounting to some two hundred 
millions sterling; but the resources of the country 
are vast and as yet little exploited. This state of 
affairs, financially, is due to enormous military 
expenditure, as well as to speculation, reckless 
guarantees, and other unsound enterprises. Little 
is spent on education, and communications are 
in a very inchoate condition. Although there are 
many schemes, some half -finished, for railways, 
there is no uniform plan and not even a uniform 
gauge. Despite all this, trade is bounding forward, 
and the imports increase rapidly even in the teeth 
of heavy duties, England being the principal par- 
ticipator. No description, however brief, of the 
South American states would be complete without 
a reference to the immense power, both for good 
and evil, wielded over their destinies by the Roman 
Catholic Church. In speaking of Central America 
we have already noted the flexibility of the Church, 
which has enabled her to retain her hold of the peo- 
ple despite the separation of Church and State. 

211 



GREATER AMERICA 

This has taken place in all the progressive coun- 
tries, and in Chili, the Argentine, and Uruguay par- 
ticularly the result has been most beneficial. There 
is a higher tone in religious services, better music, 
more sense of fitness in decoration, and far more 
purity of doctrine. The educational work insti- 
tuted by the Jesuits is now, particularly in Chili, 
under the care of the State, and the Church is 
called upon to rise to higher levels with the im- 
proved intelligence of her children. In the more 
backward republics, and even in Brazil, with its 
negro element, the level of religious teaching is ex- 
tremely low; debasing superstitions are the rule, 
and at its best the Church is still in the darkness of 
mediaevalism. This criticism, curiously, applies 
also to Peru. It is doubtful whether any other 
form of Christianity could supplant the Roman 
Catholic. The people might be attracted by a 
simpler form of doctrine, but would be repelled by 
any lack of ritual, which supplies a real want in 
their color-loving lives. As a rule, the Spanish- 
American who lapses from his Mother-Church be- 
comes indifferent to religion, and it is to be feared 
that any rude interruption of their religious con- 
victions would lead the mass of the people from 
superstition to disbelief. There is little chance of 
such an interruption, while the South American 
states remain independent, but it must be remem- 
bered that the Church in those countries would 
view with distrust any attempt at "Americaniza- 
tion " ; any wholesale influx of new or democratic 

212 



GREATER AMERICA 

ideas; any infusion of that spirit of freedom of 
thought as well as action which is associated with 
the United States. Religious toleration is now 
established in the more progressive countries, but 
the Roman Catholic Church remains one of the 
predominant factors in political as well as social 
life, and that factor is strongly in favor of retaining 
the ties which bind South America to Europe, and 
against any Pan-American scheme which would 
mean the domination of a non-Catholic power. 

Chili, the Argentine, and southern Brazil may 
be considered the most important factors in the 
southern continent, and of these the Argentine, 
by reason of its imique resources, and Chili, be- 
cause of its virile people and military and naval 
supremacy, are the coming countries. Brazil lacks 
cohesion, and is, besides, handicapped by a large 
area of torrid zone and by the negro element. 

What are the possibilities of a Pan-American 
bond which would unite these three great re- 
publics with their weaker sisters and their northern 
neighbor? 

In 1826 the first Pan-American congress, in- 
spired by Bolivar, had as its aim the union of the 
American States and the organization of an army 
and navy to resist the encroachments of the Holy 
Alliance and to secure the freedom and indepen- 
dence of the remaining Spanish colonies. 

The period ending with the civil war certainly 
did not encourage the Pan-American movement, 
including, as it did, the episode of the acquisition 

213 



GREATER AMERICA 

of Texas, the Mexican war (with the spohation of 
half its territory), the fihbustering expeditions of 
Walker, the Ostend manifesto, and the constant 
designs on Cuba. 

The development of the United States pohcy 
of Pan-Americanism has been subsequent to the 
civil war, and mainly in the last quarter-century. 
From the outset the scheme of commercial union, 
which was the principal feature, broke down, be- 
cause of the objection to admit sugar free. The 
question of reciprocity between the United States 
and South America is now scarcely a practical one. 
The main products of South America, besides 
minerals, are food-stuffs — corn, meat, and dairy 
produce — and these are now competing with the 
products of the northern continent. In the West 
Indian markets and those of the neighboring states, 
Chili, Argentine, and Uruguay are likely to super- 
sede the food-stuffs from the northern continent, 
and the excellent steam communication with Eu- 
rope makes it possible for them to compete there 
also. South American ports are, indeed, in closer 
touch with Europe than with the United States. 
Trade with the latter country has, in fact, been 
somewhat on the decline, and suffers a great 
disadvantage from the conditions of transpor- 
tation. European ships, sailing from Liverpool 
and Antwerp, are able to discharge manufactures 
at Brazil and in the river Plate, where they load 
coffee and other produce for the United States, 
and take thence a cargo for Europe. This sys- 

214 



GREATER AMERICA 

tern, together with a better understanding of the 
pecuHarities of the South American markets on 
the part of Europe, makes direct trading between 
New York and Brazil, for instance, difficult. It 
also removes any pressure which might cause the 
weaker republics to sigh for commercial union 
with the United States. They are, therefore, not 
conscious of any advantage which it would be in 
her power to offer them. As a matter of fact, 
reciprocity treaties were actually negotiated be- 
tween the United States, Brazil, and Spain in 
Cuba, but were never effective. This is, of course, 
the merest outline of the economic situation, and 
it would be incomplete without a mention of the 
possible changes to be wrought by the canal, 
which, among other things, will undoubtedly bring 
the manufacturing cities of the Eastern States into 
closer touch with the Pacific slopes.^ 

* "Of the total imports of all South America, 87 per cent, is 
taken by the countries bordering upon the two oceans, and 
but 13 per cent, by those bordering upon the Caribbean. 
Marching down the eastern coast of South America, we find 
Brazil importing, in 1899, goods to the value of over $105,000,- 
000, of which the United States supplied about 10 per cent.; 
Uruguay and Paraguay, $26,000,000, of which our share was 
less than 7 per cent.; and Argentina, $112,000,000, of which 
about 10 per cent was from the United States; while a tour of 
the Pacific coast shows importations into Chili of $38,000,000; 
Peru, $8,500,000; Bolivia, $11,600,000; and Ecuador, $7,000,- 
000; the proportion from the United States averaging about 
10 per cent. Thus the northern coast of South America, 
fronting on the Caribbean Sea, imports goods to the value 
of $36,000,000, of which we supply an average of 25 per cent. ; 
the eastern coast, fronting upon the Atlantic, $275,000,000, 
and the Pacific coast, $60,000,000, of which our proportion is 

215 



GREATER AMERICA 

Arbitration has always been one of the most 
cherished goals of Pan- Americanism, and the de- 
sire of the United States naturally has been that 
she, as the head of the American hegemony, should 
act as arbitrator. This scheme, however, broke 
down from the very beginning, owing to the 
jealousies and warlike tendencies of the Latin- 
American peoples. It is notable that in recent 
times, in three distinct cases, European powers 
have been called upon to arbitrate in South 
America, and that not the slightest disposition has 
been evinced to appeal to Washington except as a 
protection against European claims. 

There have been altogether four Pan-American 
conferences. The one initiated by Bolivar at 
Panama was a complete fiasco, the United States, 
Chili, Brazil; and Buenos Ayres being unrepre- 

in each case about lo per cent. In 1868 our sales to the coun- 
tries lying south of us were 20 per cent, of our total exports; in 
1878, a little less than 10 per cent.; in 1888, a fraction above 
10 per cent; in 1898, but 7 per cent.; and in 1901 about g per 
cent, of our total exports. An examination of our list of pur- 
chases from the Central and South American countries seems 
to increase the anomaly presented by their small purchases 
from us. Of Brazil we are by far the largest single customer 
in her chief articles of export, coffee and rubber, while from 
Argentina and Chili our purchases of wool and hides are also 
heavy, and for the tropical products of the other countries of 
South America — sugar, spices, fruits, dye-woods, cabinet- 
woods, textiles, and chemicles — the United States offers a 
constant and rapidly increasing market. From the coun- 
tries of South America the United States, in 1901, purchased 
goods valued at $110,329,667, while her sales to them in 
that year were but $44,770,888, less than one-half of her 
purchases from them." — Bureau of Statistics, Wash- 
ington. 

216 



GREATER AMERICA 

sented. A sort of offensive and defensive alliance 
was entered into by the delegates, but only Colom- 
bia ratified the agreement. Next year, when the 
United States delegates did attend a meeting, 
those from the southern and central republics 
were too much employed in cutting one another's 
throats/ The next conference was not held till 
1883, when a number of delegates from the Span- 
ish-American states assembled at Caracas, and an- 
other body at Buenos Ay res, with no practical re- 
sult. It was in 1889-90 that all the American 
republics met in conclave at Washington, on the 
invitation of the United States President. Of 
their two main objects, commercial union and 
arbitration, we have already spoken; incidentally, 
a variety of other subjects came under discussion, 
but the results were meagre. They included the 
survey for an intercontinental railway ; a monetary 
commission, which led to the Brussels conference, 
but to nothing more ; and, finally, to the establish- 
ment at Washington of a Bureau of American Re- 
publics for the collection and dissemination of in- 
formation concerning those countries. This last is 
practically the only part of the Pan-American 
scheme which has yet been carried through. In 
1902 the city of Mexico was the scene of a further 
meeting, at which all the South American repub- 
lics were represented. Their conclusions are said 

' Clay upheld the solidarity of the interests of all the Amer- 
ican republics, and wished it to assume a concerte form in the 
congress of Panama. 

217 



GREATER AMERICA 

to have been "pacific, if not unanimous." The 
chief result of their deUberations seems to have 
been an agreement to refer cases affecting private 
claims to arbitration, while ten of the nineteen na- 
tions represented agreed to make arbitration com- 
pulsory in controversies which do not " affect their 
independence or national honor." The United 
States did not participate in this decision. More 
practical results were arrived at in the discussion of 
matters such as extradition, copyright, sanitary 
laws, and other circumstances affecting interna- 
tional intercourse; and, to insure the effectiveness 
of all these decisions, it was decided to call another 
conference in five 3"ears' time to consider them in 
the light of experience. 

While it is obviously useful for the young Amer- 
ican republics, on the eve of a wide development, 
to discuss all these questions which have been set- 
tled by usage and international law between older 
nations, yet they cannot be in any way considered 
as steps in the direction of closer union. Very 
different estimates of the value of these confer- 
ences are held in the Anglo-American and Latin- 
American countries. While writers in the United 
States declare that a great advance has been made 
in republican government, elements so discordant 
having been brought to agreement on important 
subjects, a Mexican statesman laments that Span- 
ish-Americans should be thus encouraged in the 
expression of vague and lofty sentiments when real 
mutual interests, the bed-rock of imited action, 

218 



GREATER AMERICA 

are lacking. It is impossible not to feel, with this 
distinguished Latin- American, that anything which 
directs the energies of his people towards academic 
discussion or oratory is to be deplored. 

The interests of the South American republics 
are above ever\i:hing commercial, and it is of 
vital importance to them, in retaining their in- 
dependence, that they should not only become 
as far as possible self-supporting, but should 
be economically independent of any one power. 
Europe, therefdVe, with several powers as com- 
petitors, is a better field than the United States 
would be, especially as South America is com- 
plementary to Europe, but wotild be to a great 
extent an intruder in North American markets. 
From a variety of causes, moreover, the United 
States has failed to estabhsh herself as the rival of 
Europe in South America. Her trade is decHning 
while that of Europe increases. It is remarkable 
that there is no United States bank in all South 
America, all the banks being English or German 
with the exception of a small French one. A cer- 
tain number of concessions for railways and pub- 
lic works are obtained by Americans, but at a 
certain stage they almost invariably pass into Eu- 
ropean hands. Americans, in dealing with South 
American trade, avoid doing business with the na- 
tives, and work entirely through the agency of 
English, German, Portuguese, or Italian houses. 
Their objection to the natives is their imbusiness- 
like habits, and the want of security, but the true 

219 



GREATER AMERICA 

reason is the characteristic impatience of the 
United States citizen and his desire to make a for- 
tune at once. He is not prepared to play a wait- 
ing game, to give long credit, and to possess his 
soul during interminable delays. It is therefore 
not surprising that, while Europe has invested — 
in government bonds, railroads, banks, gas com- 
panies, dock companies, and similar ventures — 
not less than one billion dollars (two hundred 
million pounds) , the United States capital invested 
probably does not exceed ten to fifteen million 
dollars (two to three million pounds sterling) . Eu- 
ropean capital holds the place in South America 
which United States capital has gained in Mexico 
and the West Indies, and the general conclusion 
from all this is that the southern continent must 
be considered as far from being an open field for 
American commercial expansion. Intellectually 
and socially, there is more sympathy with the Old 
World. 

Politically, Pan-Americanism is inextricably in- 
terwoven with the Monroe Doctrine, and although 
we have said that, for Blaine, at least, it meant the 
political paramountcy of his own country, yet the 
fine shades which have been read into the pro- 
nouncement of the unconscious Monroe deserve 
some more detailed discussion. 

It is important to note, first, that the Monroe 
Doctrine, however interpreted, is a matter of 
policy and not of international law. It was orig- 
inally designed in Europe, but has been used by 

220 



GREATER AMERICA 

all successive American politicians to give au- 
thority to whatever policy seemed most likely to 
secure the ascendency of the United States and 
further her prosperity. The fundamental prin- 
ciple underlying every interpretation of Monroe's 
famous message is the very ancient and trite one 
that might is right. The United States at a very 
early period "bluffed" successfully in this matter, 
and now that her position is really strong and 
secure she lays the flattering unction to her soul 
that she is only acting "consistently " in her high- 
handed attitude. There is nothing new in the 
history of nations in all this. Britain has fre- 
quently made use of similar hypocrisies. Russia 
is a past-mistress in the art. Diplomacy was in- 
vented to make such situations possible without 
vulgar jars between nations. It is just as well, 
however, to recognize the truth. "Hands off, 
Europe!" is the plain meaning of the Monroe 
Doctrine, and the United States is prepared to 
back it by force if necessary. She feels strong 
enough in her position as the wealthiest, most 
progressive, and rapidly increasing nation in the 
western hemisphere to maintain herself as prac- 
tically a sovereign, or, to put it less bluntly, as 
"the head of the American hegemony." 

Although the situation is simple enough in out- 
line, it becomes difficult in detail. We have al- 
ready seen that such matters as arbitration and 
commercial union, which should surely be possible 
without a hegemony, have so far proved im- 

221 



GREATER AMERICA 

practicable. American statesmen repudiate the 
idea that the United States desires to establish a 
protectorate of all Latin-American republics, and 
yet in practice, if the doctrine is carried to its log- 
ical conclusion, that is what they are bound to do. 
The difficult thing about a loosely defined policy 
of such wide possibilities is its inevitable growth 
to inconvenient proportions. It began with the 
mere statement that Europe was not to colonize 
on the American continent or be permitted to 
intervene in her affairs. This was enlarged by 
Polk to mean that not only aggression or inter- 
vention by Europe was forbidden, but the transfer 
of territory, the establishment or acquisition of 
dominion, even if voluntarily made.^ The third 
development, chiefly formulated by Blaine in 1881, 
went further than fixing the inviolability of the 
American continents; it abrogated to the United 
States certain rights over territory of other Amer- 
ican peoples — i.e., in the isthmus — and as arbitra- 
tor of disputes. The fourth interpretation — un- 
defined, perhaps, as yet, but inferred — is simply 
the right of the United States to be regarded 
as paramount in the whole of the western hemi- 
sphere, a right which she, believing it to be nec- 
essary to her national interests, is prepared to 
uphold. 

The slight sketch we have given of the growth 
and decline of Pan-Americanism is conclusive of 

* The Monroe Doctrine, 1903, by Whitelaw Reid. 
222 



GREATER AMERICA 

one fact — that, so far as the South - American 
continent is concerned, this Hberal interpretation 
of the Monroe Doctrine is made by the United 
States on her own authority. She is, in fact, 
assuming a position by right of strength which is 
not accorded her unanimously by her weaker sis- 
ters. South America, while ready to invoke her 
when convenient, is not prepared, by joining an 
"American hegemony," to forfeit any of her ini- 
tiative or to loosen the bonds which tie her 
to Europe, where her republics stand on equal 
terms with independent powers, in favor of a 
subordinate position in the family of American 
States. 

From the European point of view the position 
presents great difficulties. If the United States 
is determined to spread her mantle over the two 
continents, what will happen in the event of 
complications between any Latin-American state 
and Europe? We have already had an instance 
of what is likely to happen ; but Venezuela cannot 
be an indefinite precedent, nor is it possible that 
the Latin-American politicians of the more irre- 
sponsible sort can continue to regard the doc- 
trine as a dispensation of Providence to secure 
immimity for their misdeeds. Mr. Roosevelt has 
declared that his country has not the slightest 
wish to assume responsibility for Spanish-Amer- 
ican misconduct, and that, in the event of a re- 
public having a misunderstanding with Europe, 
the quarrel must be settled between them "by 

223 



GREATER AMERICA 

any one of the usual methods."* Unfortunately, 
power, without responsibility, though an ideal 
state, is not easily attained in a too - imperfect 
world. The reference of the Venezuela claims to 
The Hague tribunal will evoke a far-reaching de- 
cision on the subject of "pacific blockade." The 
question is whether such action on the part of 
creditor nations is to constitute a preferential 
claim on their part. If so, there will obviously 
be a great temptation to European powers to em- 
ploy the " pacific blockade " whenever they have 
a difiiculty in collecting their debts, and, when 
the chronic financial troubles of South American 
republics are considered, it is evident that a very 
serious situation may arise. If, however, the 
" pacific blockade " is not to constitute a preferen- 
tial claim, by what means are European nations 
to seek redress for non-recognition by independent 
states of freely incurred obligations? Whichever 
way the decision goes the responsibility of the 
United States seems to be increased; since she 
stipulated (in 1899) that nothing in The Hague 
convention is to be construed as implying a re- 
linquishment by her of her traditional attitude 
towards purely American questions. Therefore, 
she is either in the position of sanctioning action 
on the part of Europe which may lead to a direct 
violation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, 
or she must assume herself the task of keeping the 

* American Ideals, 1897. 
224 



GREATER AMERICA 

recalcitrant states to the fulfilment of their obliga- 
tions. In the latter case she must become either 
a debt collector and board of correction, or an in- 
ternational bankruptcy court/ 

The practical question is, how far south is the 
United States prepared tc follow this doctrine, and 
in this matter she has to consult merely her real 
national interests. It is a foolish ebullition of 
spread-eagleism which insists on the unbounded 
sovereignty of the United States in the western 
hemisphere. A great nation is never greater than 
when it recognizes its true limitations, and the 
United States has to strain herself to the utmost 
to be successful in what she has already under- 
taken. Whatever the fate of Pan- Americanism, 
it is certain that a complete revolution of pre- 
vailing conditions must take place before the 
United States can occupy the place she claims in 
the southern continent. Whether she will be 
wise to pursue the will-o'-the-wisp of an "Amer- 
ican hegemony " is a question which deeply affects 
the future of Greater America. 

' To obtain an idea of the indebtedness of the South Amer- 
ican republics and their financial position, the reader is re- 
ferred to Appendix B. 

IS 



CHAPTER X 
CANADA AND PAN-AMERICANISM 

It is obvious that the expression "Pan- Amer- 
icanism " will never be more than a fafon de parler 
unless the great country of Canada, becoming de- 
tached from the British Empire, can be included 
in a federation of American republics. It is sig- 
nificant that one naturally thinks of federation 
rather than .of annexation, since it is not very 
long ago that the latter expression was heard 
freely on both sides of the Atlantic. The growth 
of imperialism in the mother-country has made 
it almost impossible to realize the frame of mind 
in which British statesmen spoke of the annexa- 
tion of Canada by the United States as inevitable, 
and at the same time there is a far less certain 
note among Americans themselves as to their 
manifest destiny in becoming undisputed masters 
of the whole northern continent. It is not too 
much to say that forcible projects have been al- 
together abandoned, and that the United States 
relies on an economic conquest and on the growing 
strength and prosperity of the Dominion, which 
will cause her to become independent of Britain, 

226 



GREATER AMERICA 

when she will be bound to seek admittance into 
the American family. 

There are two or three main points in the view 
taken by the United States which must be briefly 
stated. She is conscious of her own superiority 
in wealth and progress over Canada, and is con- 
vinced that the latter owes her comparative back- 
wardness to the baneful effect of her "colonial" 
position. An average American is certain that 
Canada has only to "cut the painter" in order to 
become in all respects as prosperous as the United 
States. Incidentally, he is also convinced that 
independence of Great Britain would mean de- 
pendence on the United States, and in this he is 
probably correct. It is impossible to dissociate 
these two ideas, so that in no case can the Amer- 
ican view be considered disinterested. The po- 
tential value of Canada to the American Republic 
is hardly to be questioned, especially since the 
opening of the Northwest, but there may well be 
two opinions as to the advantages to be reaped 
by Canada from a political, or even a commercial, 
union with her great neighbor. 

Without discussing in detail the relations be- 
tween Canada and the United States in the past, 
it is necessary to recall the main features of their 
intercourse. First we have invasion by the new- 
bom republic and a long period of hostility, in 
which the religious and racial antipathies of the 
French of Lower Canada and the Puritans of New 
England played a great part. After 1812 actual 

227 



GREATER AMERICA 

hostilities ceased, except for the abortive Fenian 
invasions in 1866 and 1870. The commercial re- 
lations, however, were strained in proportion as 
actual aggression subsided. Until the middle of 
the nineteenth century the British American col- 
onies had the advantage of British preferential 
tariffs, which did as much for the timber trade in 
Canada as for sugar in the West Indies. To this 
period belongs the activity in Canadian ship- 
yards which is now quite a thing of the past. 
The adoption of free- trade by the mother- country, 
followed as it was by a period of great progress 
and prosperity, which owed much to the dis- 
coveries of science and to European conditions, 
was felt by -the Canadians as inimical to their" 
interests. The negotiation of a reciprocity treaty, 
in 1854, with the United States by Lord Elgin 
(who was said to have floated it on " seas of 
champagne") was, however, a great stimulus to 
the struggling British and French communities, 
providing, as it did, for a free exchange of the 
products of river, field, wood, and mine. In the 
then condition of communications with the moth- 
er-country this was most important; but, even so, 
the desire for protection of Canadian industries 
led to the formation of a protection association 
in 1858, and the Gait tariff was framed, despite 
protests from England. Thus began the local 
control of tariff conditions. The American civil 
war, which dislocated commerce in the States, 
proved a great stimulus to Canada, which enjoyed 

228 



GREATER AMERICA 

a period of prosperity, at first little disturbed by 
the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty in 1866, 
since the Canadian tariff, though low, was sufficient 
for the protection of local interests. But when 
American industries began their career of phe- 
nomenal success and expansion, the Canadians, 
who had not the same stimulus, felt the need 
either for more protection or for commercial union. 
They saw two great streams of economic pros- 
perity, in their mother-land and the neighbor 
republic, both passing them by. Canada, more- 
over, was at this time in the throes of political 
change. Responsible government in 1864 proved 
ineffective, and was finally succeeded, in 1867, 
by federation. Public opinion being then for the 
first time divided less on racial and more on 
political lines, Canada entered on a more coherent 
phase of her history. Protection, on the one hand, 
and reciprocity with the United States, on the 
other, were keenly discussed, but the doubts en- 
tertained by the Conservative party as to the 
ultimate results of the latter on Canadian na- 
tionality led to a protection policy during the 
whole period of Sir John Macdonald's ministry. 
In 1 89 1, pressure brought to bear by the Liberals 
under Mr. (now Sir Wilfrid) Laurier, who made 
"unrestricted reciprocity" the battle-cry, led to 
the despatch of a delegation to Washington. The 
United States, however, declined any terms save 
those of a common tariff against the world. In 
1896 a joint high commission met to discuss a 

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number of disputed points between Canada and 
the United States, but the latter decUned to 
consider the question of reciprocity. Rebuffed 
thus in his efforts to obtain reciprocity, Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier openly stated in Parliament, "There will 
be no more delegations to Washington " in search 
of reciprocity, and the Canadian government 
forthwith made British preference and the cultiva- 
tion of the British market the centre of its policy 
as regards external trade. The results of an in- 
dependent attitude speak for themselves. 

The question of sentiment has been freely can- 
vassed in connection with Canada, and must, of 
course, play a great part in her relations with 
Britain. There are, however, several interesting 
features about this question, and not least is the 
fact of its very recent development. In the 
early years of the United States independence 
the avowed intention of the revolted colonies 
to take Canada at the point of the sword 
united the British and French in that country. 
The settlement of a number of fugitives from all 
parts of the revolted provinces, the United Empire 
Loyalists, imparted a spirit of devotion to the 
flag for which these people had sacrificed their 
homes and come to a land believed to be in 
perpetual winter. During the years which follow- 
ed, the presence of a large French population in 
Lower Canada had a twofold influence. It large- 
ly prevented amalgamation between colonists on 
either side of the border-line, the religious question 

230 



GREATER AMERICA 

alone being sufficient to do this, and it prevented 
Canada from attaining within her own borders 
that homogeneity which is essential to the devel- 
opment of a true national spirit. If Canada re- 
mained colonial in spirit, as well as in fact, she 
owed it to the jealous antipathies of the French 
Canadians, who, in their anxiety to guard their 
own idiosyncrasies, effectually barred the way to 
a wider and fuller national existence. How well 
they have succeeded is notorious. They have 
preserved language, traditions, habits of mind and 
thought, and, above all, the prejudice and super- 
stition of their sturdy northern French forebears. 
The peasantry are, as a rule, densely ignorant, 
dominated by their priests, whose influence, if 
patriarchal, is conservative and opposed to mod- 
em education and progress. They are the best 
of settlers, farmers and agriculturalists, and the 
upper classes are brilliant in the learned professions 
and arts ; but they are the antithesis of the Anglo- 
American, and are not likely to rival him in com- 
mercial progress. Their sentiments towards Great 
Britain are the fruit of peculiar circumstances. 
Under her flag they enjoy the utmost freedom, 
and they are not discontented, as are some other 
Canadians, with the economic position of the 
country as compared with the United States. 
But, intellectually, their sympathies go rather to 
the country whose language and literature are 
theirs, and although they may be loyal to Britain, 
it is a matter not of sentiment but of interest and 

231 



GREATER AMERICA 

convenience. As Canadians they are more con- 
sistent, desiring the independence of the country 
and its freedom to work out its own salvation, but 
above everything they are jealous to preserve their 
own influence on its affairs. Their loyalty to the 
Dominion, therefore, need not be questioned, but 
the imperialist ideal, unless it can be made to 
appeal to their self-interest, will fall on deaf ears. 
What do the arguments about the past glories of 
the empire, the ties of blood, or the common 
heritage in literature and tradition, mean to a 
people who are intensely conservative of their 
French blood and habits? 

At the same time it is hard to see what induce- 
ments the American Republic could offer which 
would persuade the French Canadians to come 
under the Stars and Stripes. The peculiar form of 
autonomy which they possess would be, to say the 
least, considerably modified by the Americaniza- 
tion of the Canadian provinces. Their numerical 
advantages would be lost, their influence out- 
weighed, and, above all, the paramountcy of the 
Church, which is an extraordinary factor in French- 
Canadian politics, would be seriously threatened. 
The liberty accorded to religion in the United 
States is undeniable, but the spirit of American 
democracy is wholly opposed to the exercise of 
priestly authority in political affairs, and the 
Canadian cures are well aware of this. When 
one remembers the very large proportion of Ro- 
man Catholics in Lower Canada, it is ixapossible 

232 



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to discount the religious factor in the question of 
Canadian relations with the United States. 

While French immigration to Canada stopped 
some forty years ago, so that the French popula- 
tion has had a period of crystallization, constant 
intercourse with the mother-country, on the one 
hand, and the United States, on the other, has 
introduced new and incongruous elements into 
Canada. The prevailing type, however, may be 
generally said to be more akin to the American 
than the British, which is only natural. The 
conditions of life approximate far more near- 
ly on the continent on both sides of the bor- 
der, and climatic and physical conditions are 
similar. 

It becomes increasingly difficult to estimate the 
exact degree of the sentimental bond between 
Canada, as a whole, and the mother - country. 
There are, of course, extremists on both sides — 
men whose intense loyalty to the crown and 
capabilities for sacrifice to the cause of imperial 
unity are their most vital characteristics; and 
others who declare openly that the old country is 
played out, that they owe it nothing and can gain 
nothing by allegiance to an obsolete form of gov- 
ernment. Public opinion, too, is of all shades, 
varying in different parts of the country, but in 
one respect there has been ever since federation 
a bond of unity between all sections which grows 
steadily in strength. This is the sentiment of 
Canadian patriotism — an increasing pride and be- 

233 



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lief in their own country and a desire to set her 
firmly among the nations. 

The progress and expansion of the last decade 
have bred self-confidence. No longer does the 
Canadian sigh for the crumbs that fall from the 
United States table. Already he looks forward 
to a period in which he will be as strong and 
prosperous as his neighbor; and as the tide of 
immigration turns steadily towards his vast, un- 
populated regions, he feels confident that a few 
more years will make Canada great not only in size 
and resources but in population and power. It 
is not unreasonable that the loyal Canadians 
should put Canada first and the empire next, and 
it must be confessed that the policy of the mother- 
country has sometimes strained their patriotism 
to the utmost. The important point is to realize, 
as far as possible, the extent to which Canada will 
find it to her own interest to remain within the 
British Empire. Given a sound backbone of tra- 
dition and sentiment, what are the practical con- 
siderations which will weigh with a Canadian who 
desires first of all the prosperity of his own 
country ? 

They are twofold in character — political and 
commercial. The former include the consideration 
of what Canada avoids by being under the British 
flag. She is spared the full burden of defence, for 
whatever may be said by the Little Canadians 
and the opponents of militarism, it would be im- 
possible for Canada, as an independent republic, 

234 



GREATER AMERICA 

to escape from the modem tendency which is 
arming every nation to the teeth. This prevalent 
tendency is not confined to Europe. Nor could 
Canada presume on her isolation — isolation at this 
period of world-history is mythical. It has been 
recently urged that so far as defence is concerned 
Canada would be no worse off without the mother- 
country, this argument being founded on the idea 
that the only power who would or could attack 
her is the United States, and that Britain is both 
unprepared to oppose the United States in any 
case, and incapable of garrisoning the Canadian 
frontier. The propounder of this argument for- 
gets that frontiers are not the only points of at- 
tack ; that naval warfare in the Caribbean decided 
the fate of Europe, and that trade expansion in 
modem times must inevitably be defended by a 
fleet. The United States, Russia, and Germany 
are all becoming strong naval powers. How could 
an independent Canada hold her own with them? 
As an independent nation she might form a 
defensive alliance with the United States, but she 
could hardly secure this without taking some of 
the burden on her own shoulders, and would there- 
fore be launched on that career of " militarism " 
which she is so anxious to avoid. It must be 
remembered that the day of isolation, of freedom 
from European entanglements, is over for North 
America; and Canada, as part of the British 
Empire, actually avoids, instead of incurring, the 
responsibilities which intemational relations im- 

235 



GREATER AMERICA 

pose. That she is anxious to control more fully 
her own foreign relations is perhaps not un- 
natural when we remember the mistaken policy 
of the past. That some people even desire to 
make their own treaties, looking to Britain to 
enforce them, is, perhaps, a sign of the times; 
but the true statesmanship of the country sees the 
inconsistency of the attitude, and will concentrate 
its efforts rather on the building up of a genuine 
imperial policy and securing adequate colonial 
representation in all cases. 

To turn to the commercial aspect of the situa- 
tion, it may be premised that whatever may be 
the arguments for or against commercial union 
with the United States, it must not be concluded 
that consolidation of interests is always an un- 
mixed blessing. In national as well as in business 
affairs the Trust may become a power for evil. 
This would apply with equal force to. commercial 
union with the mother-country were it not that 
her geographical circumstances and her extraor- 
dinarily diversified interests make a monopolistic 
policy impossible to her. So far the failure to 
obtain reciprocity with the United States has 
decided Canada to develop her trade on inde- 
pendent lines, with the result that it has more than 
doubled in the last seven years. But owing to 
the proximity of the United States and the 
facilities of transportation afforded by the rail- 
ways across the border, converging on American 
ports, and to the neglect of Canada and the 

236 



GREATER AMERICA 

mother - land to open the country and settle it 
up, the balance of trade is greatly in favor of 
the United States. While the exports to that coun- 
try are seventy million dollars and the imports over 
one hundred and twenty millions, the exports to 
Great Britain are one hundred and five million 
dollars and the imports only forty-nine milHons. 
The exports to Great Britain form 57 per cent, of 
the total, against 34 per cent, to the United States, 
while the imports are respectively only 24 against 
60 per cent. There is, therefore, a credit, as re- 
gards British trade, in favor of Canada of fifty-six 
million dollars annually, while, on the contrary, 
in the United States trade the credit is against 
Canada to the extent of fifty million dollars an- 
nually. It is significant that the United States 
trade with Canada's population of six millions 
is greater than with the fifty-four millions in 
Mexico and Central and South America. It is, 
therefore, obvious that whatever may be the in- 
ducements towards a commercial union with the 
United States, they cannot at present outweigh 
those in favor of retaining and expanding the trade 
with the mother-country. Later on we must re- 
turn to the subject with a view to its effect on 
Canadian development. 

The advantage of unrestricted trade with the 
mother-country Canada has hitherto shared with 
other nations, but the turning-point in Bntam's 
commercial history has now arrived, and in the 
near future we may be able to point to a distmct 

237 



GREATER AMERICA 

and tangible advantage which our colonies will 
possess over their rivals in our markets. The im- 
mense revolution in public opinion in Great Brit- 
ain as regards the self - governing dependencies 
has certainly knit closer the bonds of empire, and 
those bonds are not altogether sentimental ones. 
It is to our interest to retain the colonies, though 
we have been some time in realizing it, but it is 
to their interest to stay with us, and we are power- 
ful enough to make that interest still stronger. 

As has been said already, recent years have 
witnessed a remarkable growth of what is known as 
the Imperialist spirit. There is still a good deal of 
misapprehension on this subject, and it would be 
well if we could clear away the idea that Imperial- 
ism is founded entirely on sentiment. Sentiment 
plays a part in practice, but it is just as well to 
reckon without it in theory; then one is on the 
safe side. The modern school of Imperialism owns 
as its adherents some hard-headed business-men, 
and is, in fact, founded on the solid rock of self- 
interest and self-preservation. We of the mother- 
land do not ask any sacrifices of our colonies in aid 
of Imperialism ; we have exacted them before, and 
even recently, but they have been the fruit of an 
essentially non-imperial policy. We do not desire 
to drag them into European wars, nor to restrict 
their autonomy, nor to sap their independence in 
any way. None of these measures would, in our 
opinion, be advantageous either to them or to us, 
since their prosperity, progress, and contentment 

238 



GREATER AMERICA 

are as essential in our eyes as in their own. It is 
merely a question of the long and the short view, 
and just as the keenest business-man is he who 
can look farthest, the best Imperialist is he who 
looks to the future and permanent prosperity of 
every part of Greater Britain rather than to a 
temporary advantage for one or other section. 
Young countries — little versed in world affairs, 
inexperienced, often slaves of a democracy which 
cannot see beyond its own nose — find a difficulty 
in taking this view of their affairs ; but in the case 
of Canada the alternative to Imperialism is so 
plain that a decision is forced on her. Great Britain 
has a great part to play in this matter, and in the 
fervor of her new Imperialism she may play it 
well. If Britons had only the sturdy self-con- 
fidence and belief in their own destiny which ani- 
mate the citizens of the United States they would 
not contemplate the secession of Canada for one 
moment. 

We believe that with our help Canada can be- 
come, if not economically independent of the 
United States, at all events so placed that she 
can obtain advantageous terms with that country. 
She will be enabled to hold her own without be- 
coming a part of the hegemony of the North 
American continent — a hegemony in which she 
could only play a subordinate part. There is nat- 
urally a strong objection held in Canada to the 
Monroe Doctrine in its extreme form. If the 
doctrine is to mean merely that there is to be 

239 



GREATER AMERICA 

no new territorial acquisition in America by any- 
European power, then there can be no objection. 
That is a protection to Canada, But should an 
attempt be made to exercise control or authority 
in the hemisphere over countries independent of 
the United States, the doctrine would then be- 
come intolerable. 

We have seen how the expansion of the United 
States, while bringing the advantages of a superior 
civilization to tropical countries, has superimposed 
the problems of a modem democracy on those of a 
less advanced stage of social evolution. It has also 
introduced alien problems into the home govern- 
ment; and, in effect, we see a country, nominally 
under the most simple and direct forni of govern- 
ment — the will of the people — in reality manipu- 
lated by the most complex and expensive machine 
in existence. Canadians, though enjoying to the 
full every right of local autonomy and citizenship, 
have so far been spared many of the undesirable 
sides of American political life — the recklessness 
in expenditure, the terrible corruption, the Spoils 
System, and the complications of the "machine." 
They are spared much of the interference with 
labor conditions, which is one of the gravest 
problems in the United States; they are spared 
the evils of the elective judicial system; and, 
being assured of fairness and impartiality in their 
courts and a less procrastinating method of pro- 
cedure, they do not resort to lynch law. They 
have, moreover, the advantage of more uniform 

240 



GREATER AMERICA 

codes, which obviate the disorder and incon- 
venience arising from a multipHcity and variety 
of State laws. A permanent Civil Service main- 
tains a regular and able administration. Under 
a monarchical form they are able, in fact, to 
control their own government absolutely. In the 
United States the election of a President practical- 
ly settles the policy of the country, not merely on 
great but on small matters also, for four years. 
The Canadian government can be overthrown and 
replaced in forty - eight hours, and holds office 
practically only so long as it has the confidence 
of the people. As for the direction of foreign 
affairs and relations, those prerogatives are, in 
truth, as much under popular control in the one 
country as in the other. The Canadians would 
not gain any real and practical accession of liberty 
by changing their flag. They are free also from 
foreign entanglements and race problems, in all 
of which the British Empire bears its burden 
without assistance from Canada, save what she 
chooses to give at critical times. An inclusion in, 
or federation with, the Union would necessitate 
a full share in all continental and even some over- 
sea problems. There is a great repugnance in 
Canada to a country with a vast black problem — 
blacks with votes, to balance theirs — instead of, as 
now within the empire, blacks without votes. To 
leave the British Empire for the American fed- 
eral empire would, therefore, be not altogether a 
change for the better; and although a time may 
16 241 



GREATER AMERICA 

arrive when Canada is strong enough to be in- 
dependent of either the United States or Great 
Britain, she has certainly not yet arrived at that 
stage. 

But, although the Americanization of Canada 
may seem neither imminent nor desirable to us, it 
may appear quite otherwise to men born and 
bred tmder the Stars and Stripes who are now 
pouring over the border into the Dominion. This 
immigration from the United States has amount- 
ed to one hundred and twenty thousand in the 
last few years, and equalled last year that from 
Great Britain. Of these immigrants, however, 
some were returning Canadians, or children of 
Canadians, while others were recent emigrants to 
the United States of alien origin. Over seventy 
per cent, become naturahzed, that being necessary 
for the holding of government lands. The simple 
reason for this immigration is the cheapness and 
fertiUty of land in the Canadian northwest and 
the fact that most of the good United States 
lands have been taken up. So much is this the 
case that artificial irrigation is already widely 
applied over considerable areas and will be greatly 
extended as the land pressure increases. 

Canada has three hundred and twenty million 
acres still available in the northwest, and, besides, 
an enormous territory in British Columbia and the 
east, the extent of which cannot at present be 
estimated, all within the zone of wheat. At a 
moderate estimate the Dominion could support a 

242 



GREATER AMERICA 

population of at least a hundred millions; but it 
is quality and not quantity which should be the 
desideratum. 

Unless these wheat-growing lands are to be pre- 
empted by the United States, we must be pre- 
pared to increase the tide of immigration from 
Britain. The United States immigrants are, of 
course, given a strong handicap from the first. 
They are accustomed to the sort of life they will 
lead in their new home, being largely of pioneer 
stock, and they have no sea journey or uprooting 
from age-long traditions to face. The British 
immigrant has other disqualifications. He is too 
often city-bred, for the agricultural population of 
Britain has dwindled to a point when laborers 
are at a premium; and, therefore, it is the over- 
crowded urban centres which need to be depleted. 
The promoter of British immigration has, there- 
fore, to expect a certain percentage of failure, but 
there has been a distinct improvement lately in 
this respect. Of the steady stream which has 
been, for years, pouring overseas, too large a 
part used to be absorbed in the United States. 
The tide has now turned in favor of Canada; an 
improvement in the quality of immigrants is 
rendered possible by the prospects afforded in 
the Canadian northwest, and, despite the influx of 
American farmers, there is a hopeful prospect of 
maintaining the ties of blood with the mother- 
country. 

This is the situation at a time when Great 

243 



GREATER AMERICA 

Britain is asked, not to reverse her whole commer- 
cial policy, as is sometimes stated, but to recon- 
sider it in detail. The bearing of this momentous 
question on Pan - Americanism in the northern 
continent may not be clear to some people, who 
deny either the necessity for action or the efficacy 
of the measures proposed. The writer has tried 
to make plain the grounds on which he founds his 
belief that action of some kind, both to stimulate 
Canada's progress and to knit her closer to us, 
is of urgent necessity. Upon our relations with 
Canada in the present depends the trend of her 
future development. Upon the amount of influ- 
ence with her which we retain depends that to be 
exercised by the United States. This is not the 
place in which fiscal policy can be discussed, but 
there is an aspect of the question which must be 
considered. Canada must have reciprocity either 
with us or with the United States. The latter 
has hitherto refused it, apparently on the prin- 
ciple of all or none ; but her attitude as to tariffs 
must in any case undergo a modification before 
long, and, far from being inclined to retaliate upon 
Britain, should the latter embark upon a system 
of preference, she is far more likely to make the 
best of the situation and come to terms. If Great 
Britain persists in her present commercial policy, 
however, she will see a reciprocity treaty between 
Canada and the United States, obtained by the 
sacrifice of purely British interests in the Do- 
minion, and the consequence would be not only 

244 



GREATER AMERICA 

closer commercial union but the beginnings of 
political assimilation. When two countries, so 
closely united by propinquity and by many points 
of character as Canada and the United States, be- 
come one for purposes of commerce, the result is 
inevitable. It has been said already that this 
would not be, in the writer's opinion, for the truest 
interests of Canada, nor desired by loyal Cana- 
dians, but the strengthening of the commercial 
bond would mean the constant increase of the 
American stake in the country,^ the exploitation 
of its resources by people politically non-British, 
and the swamping of the Canadian by his wealthier 
and more powerful cousins across the border. 

It is said by some opponents of fiscal reform that 
Canada cannot afford to put any restrictions on 
her trade with the United States, since the latter 
could crush her by retaliation. As the Canadians 
take far more from the United States than they 
send to her, this is not a very conclusive argument ; 
but the strongest point in the case for closer com- 
mercial union with Great Britain is the fact that 
the British Empire is an unrivalled market for 
Canadian produce. 

* The amount of American capital invested in Canada 
cannot be estimated with any approach to accuracy. It 
is found in large amounts, stretching across the continent 
from Cape Breton to Vancouver or to Alaska, and would, 
according to a good authority, "run into the hundreds of 
millions" (dollars). A considerable portion is invested 
originally for the purpose of bringing enterprises to such a 
stage of development as will induce British capitalists to 
buy at an enhanced price. 

245 



GREATER AMERICA 

The actual attitude of Canadians towards the 
reciprocity question is hardly less involved than 
that of their sentiment for Great Britain, with 
which, of course, it is closely connected. Generally 
speaking, it may be said that the manufacturing 
interest is solidly in favor of reciprocity with Great 
Britain. As Britain would aim particularly at 
the protection of agricultural industries, the food- 
supply question being the basis of any rearrange- 
ment of her fiscal system, there is every reason to 
believe that the scheme will appeal to a wide circle 
of Canadians. The northwest, at present cut off 
from communications except southward, and with 
a large element of American citizens as a make- 
weight, is, perhaps, inclined to favor American 
reciprocity ; and a section in the northeast, whose 
trade is largely with New England, shares these 
views. The French element is uncertain, inclined 
to oppose anything which strengthens the ties 
with Britain, but more averse still to the increase 
of United States influence. Taking all these di- 
verse views and interests into consideration, it 
is clear that, at present, the country as a whole 
still looks to Great Britain for that support which 
will enable her to continue the work of self- 
development. 

There is one agency at work, silently, unob- 
trusively, which is tending to strengthen Amer- 
ican influence in Canada— namely, the dependence 
of the Dominion on the American press, supple- 
mented by the service supplied by the cable 

246 



GREATER AMERICA 

agencies. These naturally supply news dealing 
with American topics and tinged with American 
ideas, for the cabled news is prepared primarily 
for consumption in the United States. It is dif- 
ficult, no doubt, to combat this influence, in view 
of the capital and enterprise of the American press 
and news agencies, but a direct service of news, 
dealing with affairs from the British stand-point, 
is one of the measures which would help to develop 
the Dominion on British lines. There should also 
be a more enlightened policy on the part of the 
British post-office, which actually puts such a 
tax on English periodicals sent to Canada that the 
Canadian market is supplied with American edi- 
tions of the English illustrated papers and maga- 
zines, all crammed, of course with American ad- 
vertisements. 

In this work the matter of communications is 
of equal importance with that of commercial union. 
Is the stream of progress, the route of trade, to 
flow east and west or north and south ? Railways 
must largely decide this. At present, it must be 
confessed, the railway system is very greatly de- 
pendent on the United States, and closely linked 
to it. The defective steam communication with 
Great Britain has been responsible to a great ex- 
tent for the settlement of so large a proportion of 
British immigrants on United States soil. Not 
merely has the superiority of the lines to New 
York and Boston drawn great numbers of immi- 
grants to settle in the United States, but many 

247 



GREATER AMERICA 

intending to go to Canada have been diverted by 
the railway companies on landing at the American 
ports. With improved lines of fast steamers and 
increased activity on the part of Canadian emigra- 
tion agents in Britain, we may expect to see a 
steady increase in the stream which has set in from 
the old country direct to Canada. 

It is, perhaps, of even greater importance to 
be able to convey immigrants, on landing, straight 
to the new lands which await them. Too often 
they drift into the large cities or towns, and a good 
settler is lost. Eastern Canada is now in process 
of development as a manufacturing centre, and its 
interests are widely different from those of the 
centre, northwest, and west, which are essentially 
agricultural, mineral, and forest lands. The Ca- 
nadian Pacific Railway has done something to tie 
together the different sections, but it deals only 
with a comparatively narrow belt, and in such a 
vast territory a single line is altogether inadequate. 
The "Inter-Colonial" line (one thousand, three 
hundred, and thirty- three miles in length) , built to 
bind together the outlying Atlantic provinces to 
the rest of the Dominion, has accomplished the 
business for which it was built. Confederation 
could never have been carried through without it. 
There has often— but not always — been a de- 
ficiency of earnings ; but that is because it has been 
worked as a State railway for national ends. The 
results have been worth ten times the sacrifice. The 
principal proposals for opening up the Dominion 

248 



GREATER AMERICA 

are those for the Canadian Northern, the Grand 
Trunk Pacific, and the Trans - Canada railways. 
The directions of these may be best seen by a ref- 
erence to the sketch map. Of the three only one 
is at present in active construction — the Canadian 
Northern, of which one thousand, four hundred 
miles are completed. A bill has now, however, 
passed the federal Parliament for the second, 
and this line, which will be nearly four thou- 
sand miles long, gives an important alternative 
transcontinental line. The most far-reaching of 
these projects is, however, the Trans-Canada line, 
which, stupendous as it may seem, running to a 
large extent through territory now unpopulated, 
would undoubtedly possess the greatest economic 
and strategic value; tapping, as it would, that 
great northwest to which the future of Canada so 
largely belongs, providing a route at a safe distance 
from the international boundary, and encounter- 
ing few engineering difficulties, except in crossing 
the Rockies. In these days of rapid construction 
such an enterprise, even preceding settlement, is 
not so fantastic as it may seem. Until, by means 
of such lines as these, Canada is really opened to 
immigration from the east as well as the south, 
and her prosperity insured by bringing her produce 
within reach of the European markets, there will 
undoubtedly be a critical period in Canadian his- 
tory. For the opening of communications from 
east to west, Canada enjoys a great advantage 
over her neighbor republic in the possession of fine 

249 



GREATER AMERICA 

ports both on the Atlantic and Pacific, and splen- 
did coal supplies on either seaboard; still more 
in her wonderful system of water-communication 
— the finest in the continent — the St. Lawrence, 
with the Great Lakes, and possible canals to com- 
plete the efficiency and cheapness of these lines of 
transport. American wheat traffic is already be- 
ginning to be deflected to Montreal, and improve- 
ments will increase the tendency. The conflicting 
elements in Canadian affairs seem to be summed 
up in this matter of north and south versus east 
and west. It is generally assumed that Canada is 
fighting against nature in the effort to develop on 
latitudinal lines. There are, however, two strong 
magnets drawing Canadian trade from east to 
west. One is the recently opened and rapidly 
developing Pacific region, with the Orient and 
Australasia. Canada possesses admirable ports on 
the Pacific coast, an advantage over the United 
States, which has none farther south than Puget 
Sound, save San Francisco. On the other hand 
is the magnet of the European market, which is 
complementary to Canada, whereas the United 
States is to a great extent her competitor. The 
different sections of Canada are precisely similar 
in conditions to the corresponding States just 
across the frontier. Ontario differs from Manito- 
ba, but is similar in products to New York. Man- 
itoba is different from British Columbia, but re- 
sembles Dakota and Minnesota, while Washington 
and Oregon resemble British Columbia. To de- 

250 




Map Showing Existing & Projected 
TRANS-CANADA RAILWAYS 



GREATER AMERICA 

stroy the frontier - line would be to concentrate 
trade in the older and better-established American 
cities and to deplete the rising Canadian ones. 

As it is, the United States farmer will probably 
emigrate in larger numbers to this virgin soil; 
the capitalist will continue his attempt to gain 
control of industries and communications; and 
propinquity may even prove too strong a factor 
for the young Canadian nationality to resist. 
But, as Canada has successfully escaped assimi- 
lation during her lean years, when the amazing 
prosperity of her neighbor was balanced against 
her own poverty and the indifferent attitude of 
the mother-country, there is ground for confidence 
in the breasts of loyal Canadians now that she is 
herself on the crest of the wave and now that Great 
Britain is at last awakening to the true Im- 
perialism. 

What, therefore, are the chances for Pan- 
Americanism on the northern continent? It is a 
difficult question to answer, depending as it does 
on so many alternatives. The main point, how- 
ever, is the strength of Canadian sentiment — not 
what is usually called loyalty, but the honest 
determination of Canadians to work out their 
salvation on their own lines. They have far 
more chance of doing so under the wing of Great 
Britain than as a younger sister of the United 
States, and it is the loyalty of Canadians to their 
own country, the growth of a Canadian nation- 
ahty, which should preserve the Dominion for 

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GREATER AMERICA 

a glorious future as part of a Federated Greater 
Britain. 

When one remembers the size to which the 
American RepubHc has already grown, the rapid 
growth of "problems" which it has to face, and 
the probability that it will be drawn still farther 
into the arena of world politics, it seems far better 
for Canada (and for the United States also) that 
she should become a prosperous and independent 
nation, bound by links of blood and interest, but 
not by political ties, to her great neighbor, and 
destined, perhaps, to be one day a partner in a 
great federation of the English-speaking peoples 
— the mightiest union the world has ever seen. 



CHAPTER XI 
HOW GREATER AMERICA IS GOVERNED 

The term "United States of America" has 
ceased to be an accurate description of the coun- 
tries over which the Stars and Stripes float. Like 
"United Kingdom," it apphes merely to the 
central and dominating body, the seat of empire ; 
and Greater America comprises almost as wide a 
range of governments as Greater Britain itself. 

Broadly speaking, the American empire is com- 
posed of States, Territories, dependencies, and pro- 
tectorates, but there is no uniform plan even with- 
in these limits. The two main features which 
distinguish each is the differing degree in which 
they enjoy control of their domestic affairs and 
the nature of their relations to the federal gov- 
ernment. All States, being entitled to two Sen- 
ators each, and representation in the House in pro- 
portion to their population, are on equal terms. 
Their relations to the federal government are 
somewhat difficult to define. To an 'American 
they are so much a matter of course that he does 
not pause to consider them, while a Briton tries 
in vain to find for them an analogy in his own 
experience. States are far more than English 

253 



GREATER AMERICA 

counties, and yet far less than sovereign bodies. 
Their independence is based on the Constitution, 
which was framed with the express purpose of rec- 
oncihng them to a federal form of government, 
and yet, as Hamilton foresaw, the tendency has 
been, while retaining the letter of independence, 
to forfeit the spirit. 

According to the Constitution, the government 
consists of three separate authorities — the execu- 
tive, the legislative, and the judicial. The exec- 
utive power is vested in the President, holding 
ofifice for a term of four years, elected not by the 
qualified voters, but by a number of electors 
appointed by each State. The two elective legis- 
lative bodies, the Senate and the House of Rep- 
resentatives, which constitute the Congress, were 
created with the express purpose of drawing the 
States together. The Senators, elected by the 
legislatures of the States, without reference to the 
number of voters, hold office for six years, one- 
third going out every two years. They can hardly, 
therefore, be regarded as a popular body. Their 
influence was expected to bring about a fusion of 
State into national interests (which it has actually 
accomplished), and a continuity of policy which 
would have been impossible with a more popular, 
easily swayed, and often - changed body. The 
office of Senator is one that is much sought after 
for various reasons, and carries with it a certain 
position, despite the general contempt of better- 
class Americans for any form of political life. The 

254 



GREATER AMERICA 

House of Representatives numbers at present 
three hundred and eighty-six, elected for terms 
of two years. Electors selected in each State 
meet on a certain day and vote for the President 
and Vice-President, but each elector is pledged in 
advance to support the candidates selected by 
the party. The form of casting votes is, therefore, 
a farce. A majority of the electors elects the 
President, not a majority of the popular votes. 
The prevalent idea in Europe that the President 
is elected by a plebiscite is about as far from the 
truth as possible.* The creation of a body of 
selected electors to vote for the President was 
intended to remove that function from popular 
influence and insure that the choice should be 
made by men qualified to judge. In practice it 
has merely strengthened the hands of parties work- 
ing the machine. 

The functions of the federal government are so 
carefully laid down and so distinct from those of 
the States that since the civil war, which turned 
far more on a question of State privileges than on 
the actual point of slavery or non-slavery, there 
has been little friction. The States have the most 
complete control of their domestic concerns, and 

« This description of elections in the United States is, of 
course, elementary. The British reader can find in more 
detailed works a full account of a most complicated system, 
the American reader knows all that is necessary of it. It is 
hardly possible for any one not a professional politician to 
follow the actual working of each part of the "machine" 
and appreciate their relation to one another. 

255 



GREATER. AMERICA 

are legally empowered even to misgovern them- 
selves, if they desire, with the simple proviso that 
they may not discriminate in tariffs against other 
States and that the federal government has the 
power to interfere in cases of riot or disorder. 
Police and judiciary are distinct in each State, 
a fact which is answerable for many anomalies in 
social conditions. The English reader, who is 
shocked at outbreaks of lynching, at the escape 
of a murderer from justice because of his high 
position in the State, and at other circumstances 
which, if they occurred in Europe, would argue a 
rotten condition of the entire judicial and police 
system of the country, must understand that these 
blemishes are due chiefly to local conditions, and 
that, deplorable as they are, they must not be 
taken as indicative of the whole tone of Ameri- 
can society. A very serious drawback to true 
progress and a higher form of civilization is, 
however, found in the differences which exist be- 
tween the constitutions of the various States.* 
Some are merely inconvenient; others are dis- 
tinctly vicious in their influence; and all should 
by degrees disappear under a broader and more 
national system. They are the more anachronis- 

^ Examples of the differences in laws between the States are 
found in those relating to marriage, aliens, the ballot, census, 
constitutions, corporations, courts and judges, duelling, 
education, Governorships, salaries of State officials, divorce, 
insolvency, libel and liberty of the press, statutes of limita- 
tions, and other minor matters. The tenure of office varies 
greatly. 

256 



GREATER AMERICA 

tic because, despite these attempts to maintain 
State individuality, there is, in fact, Httle of the 
real spirit of State patriotism. A sentiment which 
would inspire a man to labor for the better ad- 
ministration, or the social and educational prog- 
ress, of his own State is far less common than it 
might be, and is chiefly replaced by a desire to 
make the most out of the State by obtaining those 
privileges and preferments which it is within her 
right to bestow. State politics have dwindled — 
the average man feels little interest in them; like 
every other branch of political life, they have been 
delegated to the professional, and so engulfed in 
the huge machine of party government. State 
elections are fought, not on State platforms, which 
might secure candidates pledged to local reforms, 
but on the wider national issues, and more par- 
ticularly in the interests of the next Presidential 
election. This decay of the State is due to two 
causes — first, the awakening after the civil war of 
a more truly national spirit, fostered by freer 
communication and approximation of interests; 
secondly, the increase of national questions, and 
more particularly the oversea expansion of the 
past decade, which has inevitably strengthened 
this. Americans were a long time emerging from 
their colonial period — many of the States are little 
more than colonies even yet; but the assumption 
of imperial functions has had a wonderful effect in 
uniting the people of all sections; and the focus 
of their attention has become, not the local ar- 
17 257 



GREATER AMERICA 

biter of provincial concerns, but the great fed- 
eral power, which derives from themselves, and 
which they feel is playing a grand part in af- 
fairs of wider importance and more vital inter- 
est. Coincident with this growing sentiment of 
nationality has been, by a curious anomaly, the 
growth of the party system. The Constitution 
precludes the working of parties in Congress in 
the method to which Britons are accustomed. It 
was not intended that any group of men in the 
federal government should be able to rule the 
others, and yet the party system, on one basis or 
another, was inevitable. It has assumed in the 
United States the most insidious form — that of 
patronage. 

As early as 1835, when De Tocqueville visited 
the country, there was evident that apathy as 
regards public affairs which has become so strik- 
ing a feature of American life. With the modern 
phase of industrialism this is even more marked. 
The earlier stages of American history found peo- 
ple too busy to devote time to public affairs, and 
so professional politicians began their work. We 
have already seen how constant immigration 
tended to keep up this aloofness, on the one 
hand, and to supply ready-made politicians, on 
the other.* In the later stages we find America 
saddled with the results of this movement, in the 
shape of a huge monopolistic machine, through 

* The American People, chapter i. 
258 



GREATER AMERICA 

whose instrumentality the whole body politic is 
kept in motion, and whose levers are vested inter- 
ests and patronage. Aloofness of the better-class 
citizens has become a habit accentuated by dislike 
and contempt for the methods of the "machine." 
All nominations are made by and through the 
"machine" ; all appointments are held for the term 
only during which a certain party can maintain 
its majority in the electoral college. Party, which 
to all outside observers seems singularly unob- 
trusive in Congress, has in reality secured a control 
which is all but absolute; and as there are prac- 
tically only two parties — Republican and Demo- 
cratic — it is obvious that a host of minor points of 
disagreement must be sacrificed to attain party 
unity. The work of legislation for so vast a 
territory as the United States alone, and the 
adequate protection of all the interests involved, 
are enough to absorb the time of the most care- 
fully organized Congress. That body, however, 
was originally almost unorganized. It was devoid 
of the parliamentary machinery for introducing, 
forwarding, and despatching business which is 
provided in Britain by a ministry, with depart- 
ments of specialized information under its control. 
No member of the executive sits in Congress, and, 
therefore, no one responsible for the carrying-out 
of the laws enacted is in a position either to initi- 
ate them directly or to criticise them when under 
discussion. The President alone can, and at times 
does, reject or veto them. 

259 



GREATER AMERICA 

Under a system by which all bills are prac- 
tically private members' bills, and there is no 
guarantee for their responsibility or importance, 
it was necessary, even from the point of view 
of time, to provide some method of sifting them. 
Accordingly the practice of committees began, 
and is constantly increased. Many of them, of 
course, deal with subjects that overlap; all have 
by degrees become more and more subservient 
to party needs. Committees in the Senate are 
nominated by chairmen, each of whom, although 
nominally elected by vote in the open Senate, 
is in reality chosen in secret party conclave, 
and, as the party majority will not split its vote, 
the result is certain. The Speaker nominates 
the committees of the House of Representatives, 
and the member first named becomes chair- 
man. Enormous power, therefore, rests with the 
Speaker, who also owes his election to a party 
majority. 

This is no place in which to discuss at length the 
merits or demerits of the committee system. All 
that need be said is that government by committee 
is not popular government. The sense of the na- 
tion is not represented by a small group of men, 
arbitrarily selected, often for the direct purpose 
of either putting through some particular measure 
or of quashing the business in hand. Although 
the committees only advise, they have it practi- 
cally in their hands to decide the fate of a bill, if 
not by a directly adverse report, by one or other 

260 



GREATER AMERICA 

of the many tactics familiar in political life. But 
while they assume this position, they are not held 
responsible. It is the irresponsibility, as well as 
the inevitable privacy and consequent tendency 
to corruption, which makes the committee system 
a good servant but a bad master. Committees, it 
must be remembered, take the place of the min- 
istries in other countries in supervising and check- 
ing the departments. They can summon depart- 
mental heads before them and demand minute 
reports. Nevertheless, it is notorious that they 
have frequently failed to detect the grossest cases 
of peculation and fraud; and this is, perhaps, not 
surprising when one recollects the methods on 
which they are constituted and the interests they 
are expected to guard. 

In this brief and meagre description of the 
governmental system of the United States little 
has hitherto been said of the President, who is 
the head of this system. Very great difference of 
opinion prevails as to the exact extent of power 
wielded by the first citizen of the United States. 
In attempting to discriminate it is well to remem- 
ber that written or constituted authority by no 
means exhausts the possibilities of the case, as 
has frequently been shown in the history of rulers 
of every kind. Much may depend on usage, much 
more on the temper of the people ruled and the 
circumstances of the moment, but most on the 
character of the man himself. Therefore, though 
the President may not de jure enjoy powers as 

261 



GREATER AMERICA 

great as those of a British prime-minister, or even 
of a colonial or foreign minister (he cannot, for 
instance, come down to the House with a project 
for reorganizing the fiscal system and then sweep 
the country in a grand oratorical campaign), yet 
he may, in an emergency, exercise powers equal 
to those of the constitutional monarch and his 
responsible ministry all rolled into one. He is not, 
during his term of office, dependent on a party vote 
for his position, though he must be careful not to 
alienate his party, especially if he desires re- 
election. He cannot directly initiate measures, 
but he can veto them ; he can also suggest them in 
his annual message. He is the head of the army 
and navy, and, although Congress specially re- 
serves the right to make war, he can, as the head 
of foreign affairs, precipitate matters to a point 
where war is inevitable. Presidents, indeed, have 
not always waited for Congress when they have 
felt the sense of the nation behind them. In his 
control of foreign affairs the President is checked 
by the Senate, which has the right of ratifying, 
and rejecting, if it will, all treaties (a two-thirds 
majority being required for ratification), this be- 
ing a part of senatorial functions which has as- 
sumed much importance. Finally, the President 
is the fountain and head of patronage, and this 
gives him enormous influence, despite the en- 
croachments on this domain by the Senate, which 
has not only the right of confirming or rejecting his 
appointments, but also claims, in the person of 

262 



GREATER AMERICA 

each Senator, a voice in all appointments in their 
respective States. 

It will be seen that the President is so hedged 
about with restrictive measures that it is quite 
possible for a weak, or even a malleable, man to 
be entirely under the thumb of the Senate, and, 
therefore, of the party majority in that body. 
But this state of affairs is at once altered if the 
President be a man of marked ability, high char- 
acter, and strong convictions. The first genera- 
tion of Presidents^ Washington, Adams, Jefferson, 
Madison — were men of this stamp. The second 
period was remarkable rather for the distinguished 
character of the men who failed to attain the 
Presidency — Webster, Clay, Calhoun. Jackson 
was the last President before the civil war who 
could lay claim to distinction due to sheer force 
of character. Later came a long list of mere 
party-men, Lincoln — the great exception — being 
elected almost by accident at a period of gravest 
national crisis. The generality of Presidents since 
the war have been men of mediocre talents though 
high personal character, it being the policy of 
the parties to place the Presidency as far as 
possible beyond the reach of men with character 
or initiative. Roosevelt, as is well known, was, 
with this object in view, made Vice-President, a 
post which, under ordinary circumstances, would 
have disqualified him from ever holding office as 
President. 

The point with which we are chiefly concerned, 

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GREATER AMERICA 

however, and which could not be approached with- 
out a brief summary of poUtical and governmental 
conditions, is how the United States is quaHfied 
to deal with the wide range of Territories and 
dependencies of which she is now mistress. These 
variations on the original scheme have, of course, 
grown up slowly, and each case has been dealt 
with more or less on its merits, just as in the 
British colonial empire. No difficulty was ex- 
perienced in interpreting the Constitution so as 
to fit in with schemes of territorial expansion, 
and for a short period it seemed as if Congress 
was admirably adapted to meet the needs of the 
situation — to deal with each problem in colonial 
government as it arose. 

Conditions altered gradually as the United 
States assumed the task of governing people to 
whom it could not give representation. As soon 
as it became obvious that certain sections of 
United States territory would not grow rapidly 
into States, but must remain under tutelage, there 
naturally arose a group of governmental problems 
with which a body like Congress, constantly chang- 
ing, is fundamentally incapable of dealing ade- 
quately. There is, therefore, a tendency to throw 
the decision of matters on which Congress has 
no decided views, or shirks responsibility, or is not 
particularly interested, on to the shoulders of the 
President ; to which category belong a large number 
of questions vitally important to the dependencies 
but little appreciated by the federal government. 

264 



GREATER AMERICA 

It must be remembered that this state of affairs 
prevails even in the North American continent 
itself. Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma are 
permitted to send delegates to Washington, but 
these cannot vote. These three Territories elect 
their own legislatures, but the Governors and 
judges are appointed by the President; and Con- 
gress retains the power to annul decisions and to 
legislate direct. The suffrage is granted on vary- 
ing qualifications, and not on the simple manhood 
terms as in the States. The elevation of these 
Territories to the rank of States has been de- 
bated for some time past, but is opposed on party 
grounds, and there seems little chance of a State- 
hood bill passing on its merits. 

Alaska is the extreme example of Territorial 
government on the American continent. Having 
a small white population (some thirty thousand), 
with an equal number of Indians, and being, more- 
over, remote from the seat of government, it has 
neither representation nor elective faculties, and 
is practically ruled as a crown colony by a Gov- 
ernor, appointed by the President, with supreme 
legislative and executive power. The Indian terri- 
tory on various reservations, which constitutes 
another class, has no single government. Each 
tribe has its own organization, the external re- 
lations being governed by treaties, whose inter- 
pretation, as well as the administration of justice, 
are in the hands of the federal courts. Residents 
are appointed to overlook the reservations, whose 

265 



GREATER AMERICA 

functions somewhat resemble those of residents at 
the British Indian native courts. 

Hawaii, also classed as a " Territory," represents 
the first effort of the United States at oversea 
government, and it must be noted that the islands 
were first taken over as a protectorate over a 
native monarchy, which became a republic, and, 
finally, both systems being found impossible, gave 
way to a form of government resembling that 
found in many British colonies. A Governor is se- 
lected by the President, and he appoints the ad- 
ministrative heads of departments. The govern- 
ment regulates the electoral franchise, an educa- 
tional test being exacted. Samoa is dealt with 
even more arbitrarily, being administered by a 
naval officer deputed by the President, as are also 
Guam, Wake, and other islands in the Pacific. 

Puerto Rico has a government almost exactly 
like the crown colony of Jamaica. The Governor 
and executive council of eleven are selected by the 
President, five of the council being Puerto-Ricans. 
There is a house of delegates, with thirty -five 
members; but practically no power rests in the 
hands of the people, nor are they regarded as 
United States citizens. The franchise is restricted 
by a small property qualification and an easy 
educational test, and there is no representation at 
Washington except by a resident consul. 

The cession of the Philippines to the United 
States involved her in problems of government far 
more difficult than any she had yet faced. The 

266 



GREATER AMERICA 

situation was met by conferring on the President 
powers similar to those vested by Congress in 
Jefferson in the case of Louisiana, and in Monroe 
as regards Florida. The exigencies of the case 
necessitated at first a military government, which 
was succeeded in 1901 by a civil government, with 
a head chosen by the President. This will, it is 
hoped, be changed in time for a government by a 
popular legislative assembly of Filipinos — at a 
period not yet determined, but assumed to be 
within a few years. At present the Governor en- 
joys supreme authority, being assisted by four 
departments officered by Americans. The civil 
commission is formed of the Governor, the four 
departmental heads, and three Filipinos. Local 
autonomy, under certain restrictions, has been 
given; municipalities elect their own presidents, 
and are practically independent; and the prov- 
inces elect, through the presidents, their own Gov- 
ernors, who are answerable only to the Governor 
at Manila. The finances, however, are controlled, 
as far as possible, by American treasurers, while 
the public works are supervised by American 
engineers. It must be noted that the Filipinos 
had never before had the franchise. 

At the end of the governmental scale, of which 
Samoa represents one extreme, comes Cuba, now 
an independent republic in name, but in effect a 
protectorate. Cuba has adopted a constitution of 
the usual Latin- American pattern, founded on 
universal suffrage, a proceeding of doubtful wis- 

267 



GREATER AMERICA 

dom in a country containing such a varied com- 
munity and so ignorant and unstable a society. 
The United States controls foreign policy, and 
reserves the right of intervention under a wide 
range of conditions, and of securing coaling-sta- 
tions if she wishes. 

It will be seen that the United States govern- 
ment is the head of a group of governmental 
systems adopted with a view to the needs of 
peoples alien in the chief conditions of life — in 
climate, race, religion, and customs. So long as 
the new territory was continental, so long as the 
question of race was not raised, there seemed no 
reason why new acquisitions should not eventually 
become States. Alaska, for instance, with its 
great mineral wealth and a small and dwindling 
native people, may become the centre for a white 
population large enough some day to claim State- 
hood. There must always, it is true, be a certain 
difficulty on account of its isolation, and as a State 
it may be found difficult to reconcile the interests 
of Alaska with those of the rest of the Union. 
The development of the great northwest of 
Canada, too, cannot fail to affect this Territory, 
which, with a climate in parts not unlike that 
of northern Europe, a seaboard of tv/enty-three 
thousand miles, and a river navigable in a great 
semicircle for two thousand miles, is undoubtedly 
destined to play a conspicuous part in the future. 
The great need is the improvement of communi- 
cations, which will yield ready profits by reason 

268 



GREATER AMERICA 

of the immense mineral wealth of the country. 
For the present, the quasi-military rule now in 
force is certainly the best for the rude mining 
communities, which are still mushrooms, but al- 
ready these communities are beginning to de- 
velop, and in the future it is not difficult to fore- 
see a serious problem as to how this isolated re- 
gion is to be included as an actual State of the 
Union. 

The moment we pass oversea, however, and it 
becomes a question of tropical countries, fresh 
difficulties arise. Puerto Rico and Hawaii, as has 
been said, are governed on the crown-colony plan. 
It is hardly suggested that there is any possibility 
of their becoming self-governing or entering the 
Union as States. Tropical and thickly populated, 
they can never become true white man's countries. 
Puerto Rico, for instance, has a population de- 
scended from Spaniards, there being some six 
hundred thousand whites, with very little, if any, 
Indian blood, but some four hundred thousand 
black and colored. In religion, dress, and customs 
all are Spanish. The island most resembling 
Puerto Rico in the conditions of race, climate, soil, 
and government is Trinidad when taken over by 
the British; and similar conditions are found in 
the republic of San Domingo, on the east side of 
Hispaniola, with a population of six hundred and 
ten thousand — mixed, white, and negro. Both 
had Spanish laws and institutions; in both were 
a considerable number of negro slaves ; in neither 

269 



GREATER AMERICA 

were there Indians. The former became a British 
crown colony and the latter an independent state. 
The contrast between the conditions of these two 
islands doubtless influenced the United States in 
their choice of government for Puerto Rico. 

It must be remembered that these people have 
no traditions of self-government, no natural gift 
for organization, and that their whole history has 
been an education in governmental abuses. Al- 
though the majority are of white descent, they 
have lived too long in the tropics not to lose some 
of the characteristics of their forefathers. The 
success of Latin-Americans in founding republics 
has been far from signal, even on the continent, 
where conditions were more favorable; but in 
small and densely packed islands, with a number 
of black and colored people in the lower strata of 
society, it was impossible to evolve anything but 
class government. The control of white men, of a 
superior grade, more efficient and enlightened than 
any native, could only be applied as it has been, as 
a supreme authority, allowing the people every 
possible liberty, but reserving such powers as 
would secure their order and well-being— even 
without their sanction, if necessary. In Puerto 
Rico, therefore, we find a paternal government, 
such as has been given by white men to many 
colored or tropical races. 

While in every dependency different govern- 
mental systems have been evolved, in the Philip- 
pines alone a new experiment is being tried — that 

270 



GREATER AMERICA 

of presenting the people with an entirely fresh 
system, founded on principles which are new and 
foreign to them. The situation was complicated 
by the fact that an enormous gulf lies between 
the educated and uneducated Filipino. The for- 
mer — in a small minority, met chiefly at Manila 
— is the equal of the average American in many 
of the superficial elements of civilization. He is 
probably his superior in artistic perception, ora- 
tory, and dialectical skill. He is in many cases 
only to be distinguished from a southern Euro- 
pean by a slendemess of physique and a slight Ori- 
ental cast of features. His peasant cousin — they 
are hardly brothers either in blood or feeling — is, 
on the contrary, an ignorant. Oriental, tropical 
semi-savage — the old Malay, a polite savage, per- 
haps, but with little indigenous civilization, slight- 
ly veneered with Christianity and wearing the 
travesty of a shirt. There are many shades and 
grades between, and there are tribes which are 
frankly savage and heathen; others which are 
Mohammedan, and, therefore, civilized on anti- 
Christian lines. It is to this heterogeneous popula- 
tion, scattered throughout a maze of islands, that 
the United States is in the act of extending that 
political and social system on which her own 
greatness has been built up.^ 

In so doing, she disregards the fact that what 

' Self-government is not actually being extended, or even 
promised, to the really uncivilized tribes, and it is difficult 
to see their place in the present scheme. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

may work well in a country where the conditions 
of life have from the first had a levelling tendency, 
and where equality of opportunity has led to a 
greater equality of position and general efficiency 
than is found in any other country, may work 
ill in the tropics. She forgets that a country 
where the conditions of life made self-help es- 
sential to existence, and which was pioneered by 
the best of northern stocks, cannot be regarded 
as a fair parallel for a tropical country where life 
has hitherto been easy and self-help little more 
than plucking the fruit when it ripens, and where 
three hundred years of political dependency have 
still further reduced the initiative of the people 
as a mass. She forgets that there is no Filipino 
nation — only a congeries of tribes, no Filipino 
country — only one thousand seven hundred isl- 
ands; no common language, no communications, 
no industries, no manufactures, and only the most 
elementary agriculture. The FiHpino is handi- 
capped by racial traditions, by lack of cohesion, 
by bad training, by climate, and by poverty— a 
formidable array of disqualifications; but it must 
not be supposed that he has any doubts as to his 
capacity for self-government. Americans beheve 
that he can be made capable of education, and, 
as the experiment has never yet been tried, they 
may prove right, if they are willing to prolong 
their efforts over two or three generations, the very 
shortest period in which any revolution of charac- 
ter and infusion of energy can be accomplished. 

272 



GREATER AMERICA 

It must be remembered that elsewhere educa- 
tion has not yet proved a panacea — at least, not 
the ordinary education of American school-life. 
Otherwise we should not see the negro race retro- 
gressing, as it has done in some ways, under a 
regime which is turning out excellent white cit- 
izens of the republic. Filipinos may not possess 
the disqualifications which handicap the negro 
race, but they belong to the least progressive of 
Oriental peoples, and not least of the difficulties 
in the way is that invisible, unsurmountable 
barrier which divides the Oriental from the 
Occidental mind. Whether a system of govern- 
ment by democracy, presented to them ready- 
made — given, not gained — and bringing in its 
train some of the peculiar features of political 
life in the United States, will prove an unmixed 
blessing is extremely doubtful. The subject has 
been discussed more fully elsewhere. Here it is 
merely necessary to point out that the status of 
the United States in the Philippines is at present 
that of a guardian, who protects, disciplines, and 
educates a child, paying his expenses at the same 
time, with the declared intention of leaving him 
to himself at the earliest moment possible, while 
reserving the right to interfere if necessary. There 
must naturally be a good deal of difference of 
opinion as to the " earliest possible moment." The 
Filipinos themselves go further in their previsions, 
fully expecting to rapidly organize themselves and 
to be received with open arms as a State within 
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GREATER AMERICA 

the Union, thus becoming the first Oriental race 
to form an integral part of a great world-power. 
There is, of course, another Filipino point of view, 
in which the United States is to play little part 
in the future, but the archipelago is to be a sec- 
ond (but a repubhcan) Japan. How far all these 
visions are from realization must be left to the 
reader to judge. 

The advocates of these views may point to Cuba 
as an instance of a people who, after a brief pe- 
riod of military government, have been restored 
to independence. It is, however, clear from the 
terms on which that independence was granted 
that Cuba has become a protectorate of the United 
States. The mark of a protected state is that " it 
cannot maintain political intercourse with foreign 
powers except through, or by permission of, the 
protecting state." Beyond this the United States, 
as has been noted, retains the right to interfere 
even in domestic matters, such as the restoration 
of order and sanitary regulations, and to purchase 
ports for coaling and strategic purposes when they 
see fit. There is nothing novel in this relationship 
between a great power and a small one; it is as 
old as history, although the term " protectorate " 
is a comparatively modem invention. It is an 
arrangement which naturally finds favor with 
both parties, since the weak one retains the 
semblance of independence longer than it other- 
wise might, and the strong one obtains all the ad- 
vantages of conquest without the expense and 

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GREATER AMERICA 

responsibility of governing. At the same time 
it is a condition which cannot be permanent, and 
simply marks a transition stage which will be of 
longer or shorter duration according to circum- 
stances. 

There are two principal divisions of protected 
states. First, civilized states whose independence 
is guaranteed by treaty, international or other- 
wise, such as Montenegro. These are generally 
of a fairly permanent character, though there is at 
present in Europe a movement towards the ab- 
sorption of these little independent states in one 
or other of the great federated powers. The 
second category includes uncivilized and semi- 
civilized states, and also those which, like Cuba, 
are unable to hold their own against the modem 
civilization of more powerful nations. Their in- 
ternal weakness is an excuse, but the ambitions 
of the protector are invariably the prime motive 
in the relations.* 



* A brief survey of examples of existing protectorates shows 
the wide range of circumstances under which the poHcy may 
be adopted. The native Indian states — some spoken of as 
"feudatory," "independent and protected," "mediatized," or 
"half sovereign "—afford illustrations of various stages of the 
relationship, and the Indian princes are said to be "under the 
suzerainty of the British crown." Other British protectorates 
in Asia are the protected chiefs near Aden and Socotra. In 
Africa we have British Central Africa, East Africa, Uganda, 
Zanzibar, Somaliland, Basutoland, and British Bechuanaland. 
There is a group of protected Malay states, in the peninsula 
and Borneo, while the chartered company of North Borneo 
is also a protectorate. The territories of all chartered com- 
panies must for practical purposes be regarded as pro- 

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GREATER AMERICA 

It is not unusual for the treaty which estabhshes 
the protectorate to define the obhgations on either 
side, this being the case with Sarawak, for in- 
stance; and the French usually expressly provide 
for direct interference even with internal affairs. 
The United States treaty with Cuba is framed 
rather on the French code, except that the obliga- 
tions are all on the side of the protected state. 
This, however, does not diminish the actual re- 
sponsibilities of the protector, who is bound to 
act in loco parentis as regards her protectorate in 
any circumstances which may arise — complica- 
tions with foreign powers, internal disorders, and 
so forth. 

Brief and inadequate as this sketch must nec- 
essarily be, it is sufficient to show the essentially 
imperial character of Greater America. To cope 
with the varied problems of government involved, 
there is no other machinery than that originally 
designed for the control of federal States, all 
presumably on the same level of civilization, 
peopled by kindred races, and each possessing a 
voice in federal affairs. Although the Constitution 
gave to Congress power to deal with United States 

tectorates. Finally, in the Pacific there are groups of islands 
under the same head. 

The French have made considerable use of the protec- 
torate system, their policy being to transform these as rapidly 
as possible into actual dependencies. Of this Tahiti and 
Madagascar are examples. Germany has recently begun to 
adopt a similar policy, all her colonial possessions, whether in 
Southwest Africa, East Africa, New Guinea, or China, being 
euphemistically called protectorates. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

territory — an " elastic clause " which has been 
used to cover every phase of expansion — it made 
no provision for such a situation as has now 
arisen. It was, indeed, impossible that the states- 
men who met at Philadelphia to frame the Con- 
stitution should have foreseen a development of 
their country's power so remarkable and so rapid 
as has actually taken place. Whatever may be 
thought on this subject, it has become increasing- 
ly evident that Americans are no more consistent 
and logical in their government than other people. 
Democracy is essentially opposed to a system of 
patronage, yet the Spoils System is the comer- 
stone of governmental power in the United States. 
Democracy is equally opposed to any form of 
colonial government, yet her expansion, which 
has been no spasmodic effort, but a genuine and 
logical growth, has placed the United States in a 
position where such a form of government is im- 
perative. 

But these questions of form and ethics are 
really of less importance than that of actual 
efficiency. It can hardly be denied that the 
purely democratic character of the federal gov- 
ernment, and, indeed, of American political life 
generally, has disappeared, if it ever existed. 
There remains a general desire to approximate as 
nearly as circumstances will permit to the demo- 
cratic ideal, and this involves a disinclination to 
acknowledge the permanence of a colonial empire. 
What is the result ? Not only a lack of machinery 

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GREATER AMERICA 

which would secure efficiency in deahng with these 
problems, but a lack of purpose and continuity 
in policy as regards dependencies, and a short- 
sightedness in the view taken of them — a dis- 
inclination to speak boldly of their future and 
prospects. This difficulty has only just begun to 
assume serious proportions, but it will make itself 
more and more felt, especially in the Philippines. 
The people, encouraged by irresponsible politicians, 
will not settle down comfortably as American 
dependencies, because they expect a closer union 
with the United States or complete independence. 

It is obvious that, unless the President be a 
man of exceptional initiative, the appointments 
of colonial officials will be made on party grounds, 
and the whole internal government of each de- 
pendency, as well as the policy of the federal 
power towards it, will take its color from party 
conflicts.^ The injustice of carrying such conflicts 
outside the country to whose local conditions they 
owe their birth is obvious, and for this reason, if 
for no other, there should be some provision for 
the control by the federal government of all over- 
sea or alien dependencies on a basis of permanency, 
impartiality, and a thorough acquaintance with 
local conditions. 

The key to the situation does not necessarily lie 

* The Philippine Civil Service, except in the highest posts, 
has been removed, it is claimed, from the influence of the 
Spoils System, but the "highest posts" form an important 
exception. 

278 



GREATER AMERICA 

in an extension of Presidential power. Already, 
as has been said, the President can control both 
foreign and colonial policy to a great extent. With 
so unwieldy a machine as Congress, summoned 
from the four corners of the continent, there will 
inevitably arise questions of moment which must 
be dealt with by the Executive. The Panama 
affair is a recent instance. Some Presidents would 
not, perhaps, have shouldered the responsibility 
of that incident as boldly as Mr. Roosevelt, and 
certainly few Secretaries of State could have put 
it through with such aplomb as Mr. Hay. The 
personal equation in this matter was extremely 
powerful, and cut short a situation which might 
have puzzled the united wisdom — and divided 
interests — of Congress for many a month. But, 
in dealing with the details of government in de- 
pendencies, in deciding the many difficult points 
which arise in connection with their administra- 
tion and relations to the federal power, it may be 
equally necessary to have a firm and immediate 
decision. The threads must be held in Washing- 
ton and the wires pulled at the right moment. 
But by whom? The President? This surely puts 
on his shoulders functions which he is not qualified 
to fill. He is not chosen for a knowledge of such 
matters, has no trained advisers,' nor has he much 

' For instance, in the recent Chinese crisis, but for the fact 
that Mr. Rockhill happened to be in charge of the Bureau of 
American Republics, there would have been no expert adviser 
on Far Eastern affairs available in Washington. 

279 



GREATER AMERICA 

opportunity for study. The Senate and House 
of Representatives are, nominally, the voice of the 
American people. They must have a voice in all 
matters of actual policy. But matters of detail 
cannot be decided without much preliminary 
knowledge and careful elucidation of the subject, 
and who is to perform this task? 

There is at present only one method of dealing 
with it — by committees. If the committees were 
permanent bodies, composed of men chosen for 
special knowledge or aptitude, they would in time 
come to have a working acquaintance with their 
subject and a more or less consistent method of 
dealing with it; but then they would no longer 
form a part of the present Congressional system. 
They would become a body apart. It would be 
obviously impossible to dedicate entirely to such 
a task Senators or Representatives who had been 
elected to fulfil other and more general missions. 
Representatives, too, change every two years, and 
Senators every six. There is no man in either 
House whose position corresponds with that of the 
British Foreign or Colonial Secretary, and who 
can, therefore, bring all such questions before the 
representatives of the nation, or even before the 
committees. In short, there is an absence of all 
the machinery w^hich would secure to every coun- 
try under the Stars and Stripes a fair hearing on 
matters of colonial or Imperial importance; and, 
in the lack of authoritative expression in Con- 
gress, it is doubly hard for the dependencies or 

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GREATER AMERICA 

protectorates to understand their own position 
and the sentiments of the United States towards 
them. 

In preceding chapters we have already touched 
on many problems arising out of American ex- 
pansion. We have seen that in the Pacific, in 
the Caribbean, and in Latin America the United 
States has come to occupy a place which makes 
the government of those regions more or less 
dependent on Washington. In this chapter we 
have tried briefly to show what Congress is, under 
the present system of party management. It is, 
in theory, the representative body of the American 
nation — the voice of the people. In practice, it 
has become an instrument upon which the skilful 
politician may play at will. Federal authority 
has been strengthened, but it has ceased to receive 
its true strength from the popular vote, and is, 
in fact, the creature of an oligarchy. The Presi- 
dent has gained in power also — that is, in po- 
tentialities; btit he must use that power accord- 
ing to the wish of the oligarchy, or run serious 
risk. In the teeth of this situation, he has, indeed, 
become to a certain extent more the representative 
of the people and the focus of their pride and 
ambition than Congress. He can appeal to them 
direct; he may rise superior to considerations of 
party if he feels the pulse of the nation. This 
personal loyalty would hardly be possible to a 
mere party candidate, though it has been the 
policy of both parties to choose a candidate whose 

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GREATER AMERICA 

private character displays the homely virtues 
particularly dear to American minds. President 
Roosevelt, by a concentration of energy, talent, 
patriotism, and civic virtue in one person, has 
appealed to the nation in a peculiar way. It 
appeared possible for him to ignore party and 
take his authority from the people without jeop- 
ardizing his position. He has accordingly ex- 
ercised his initiative on various occasions, without 
that reference to party interests which is ex- 
pected of the party nominee. To the outside 
world he stands for all that is best in American 
character; for domestic virtue, public spirit, 
honesty, fair-play, keen wit, courage, justice, and 
virility. He has offended one section of his 
countrymen by an attempt to do justice to a 
neglected part of the American nation; he has 
estranged another by his action as regards Panama, 
which, whatever its ethical aspect, has certainly 
the merit of being a short cut to a more satisfactory 
condition in that region. A far more serious 
offence is, however, his attitude towards vested 
interests. Whatever the estimate now, the verdict 
of posterity will be in favor of Roosevelt, and he 
will rank among the really great Presidents. His 
name will stand for reform, at a period when 
reform was as anathema maranatha to politicians. 
He will be remembered as a true leader of men, 
at a critical period in the history of Greater 
America; but it is still doubtful whether the 
American people are to have true leaders, or 

282 



GREATER AMERICA 

whether they are to follow a mere bell-wether, 
driven by bosses. 

The reformer of American politics has two ob- 
stacles to overcome — first, the serried ranks of 
party, determined not to lose their power or be 
docked of their privileges; secondly, an extraor- 
dinary mixture of apathy and prejudice in the 
nation — apathy as regards much which to an 
outsider would seem to touch their pride as well 
as their pockets, and an invincible prejudice on 
certain points. 

Keeping in mind these difficulties, let us look 
at another of the main problems which expansion 
has forced upon the nation. 



CHAPTER XII 
AMERICANS IN THE TROPICS 

Let us summarize briefly some of the conclu- 
sions which lead up to the hypothesis that Ameri- 
cans are now called upon to assume the task of gov- 
ernment in the tropics. By a process of evolution 
on logical and consistent lines — if we regard her 
history in the light of action rather than profession 
— the United States has become the centre of an 
empire governing, in a variety of ways, a wide 
range of dependencies. The apparent inconsist- 
ency of this position disappears when we study 
the history of her expansion and find that, from 
the very first, she has not hesitated to assume the 
responsibilities of a sovereign power and to follow 
her destiny by any path which seemed shortest 
and surest. She has never been bound by the 
shibboleths of democracy, and at every critical 
point in her history she has been able by the 
elasticity of her Constitution to justify whatever 
course it seemed politic to take. So long as the 
government of dependencies was merely a matter 
of controlling white communities up to the point 
when they could take the responsibility in their 
own hands, there was no particular difficulty to 

284 



GREATER AMERICA 

be faced, but the government of alien races in a 
different stage of civilization, and with widely dif- 
fering theories and standards, involves a problem 
of extreme difficulty and intricacy which has been 
exercising the progressive races since history began. 

The situation is a simple one at bottom. The 
strong man will, and must, rule the weak; the ed- 
ucated man should control the ignorant; the civ- 
ilized man cannot leave the savage to go his own 
way. Certain races have got ahead in the march 
of progress ; they are not free from faults, but they 
have reached a higher standard of efficiency, and 
in the nature of things they must, when brought 
in contact with weaker and more backward races, 
control them — in other words, rule them. 

There is no space here to discuss this time-worn 
subject; it is merely necessary to point out that 
no people, from the earliest period of history, has 
ever achieved greatness without coming into con- 
tact with, and ultimately assuming control of, 
people less advanced than themselves. At the 
present era, when distance is annihilated by the 
achievements of science and physical barriers are 
no longer stifficient to preserve isolation, we see 
that the most progressive powers, those whose 
virility is as marked as their intellectuality, are 
expanding rapidly at the expense of all smaller 
and less advanced political and social organisms. 
In the case of countries like Finland we see that 
even advanced civilization and enlightened govern- 
ment cannot save a nation numerically weak from 

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GREATER AMERICA 

being absorbed by a strong neighboring power. 
The day of small, independent states is past. 
Europe will soon be a group of huge federations; 
Asia will be partitioned among three or four great 
powers, as Africa has been ; and the world will be 
made up of a few great powers, each with its group 
of dependencies. 

It is, of course, inevitable that the dominant 
nations should be of northern stock. The trend 
of history is too unmistakable to allow any doubts 
on that head. The tropical races cannot hold their 
own against people from the temperate zone; and 
already we see that of the great Oriental states 
practically only one — Japan not in the tropics — 
retains more than a nominal independence. It 
was, therefore, inevitable that the United States, 
in her course of expansion, should sooner or later 
be confronted with the problem of the government 
of alien races. In her dealings with the Indians 
and negroes she has always had two sides of the 
problem to contend with; in Hawaii she met a 
third, in the Caribbean a fourth; in the Philippines 
she has reached the culminating point in the his- 
tory of her relations with alien peoples, when she 
is obliged to assume the government of a tropical 
country inhabited by seven millions of people. 

It is not my purpose in this chapter to discuss 
the possibility that any of the oversea people now 
under the Stars and Stripes might eventually be 
able to govern themselves. At present there is 
no question as to this, the United States having 

286 



GREATER AMERICA 

adopted in the various dependencies different 
systems of colonial government, the main feat- 
ure of all being that the President appoints the 
governors and that Congress exercises sovereign 
rights. This condition of affairs must continue for 
an indefinite period, and meanwhile a large body 
of American officials are, and will be, employed 
in the task of governing these alien peoples. 

The task was a novel one for men of American 
birth. Their relations with the two alien races 
on their own continent had not prepared them in 
any way for this problem. As a matter of fact, 
the history of the relations between Americans 
and the negroes and Indians is a record of mis- 
takes and failures which contrasts ill with their 
brilliant success in other ways. The United States, 
as soon as she awoke to the position in which her 
scarcely perceived evolution had placed her, made 
a hurried survey of the methods employed by 
other colonial powers. Unfortunately, there was 
no country affording a complete analogy to the 
Spanish colonial possessions when they fell into 
American hands. The Philippines especially, with 
three hundred years of nominal Christianity and 
civilization and an extraordinary mixture of racial 
peculiarities, had no parallel in history. Even if 
such a parallel had existed, the United States 
would not have derived much benefit from the 
experience of others, being obsessed by the idea 
that she was destined to inaugurate an entirely 
new system of dealing with a conquered tropical 

287 



GREATER AMERICA 

people. "We hope to do for them," said Mr. 
Roosevelt, "what has never before been done for 
any people of the tropics ... to make them fit for 
self-government after the fashion of the really free 
nations." 

Idealism played a large part in the early dealings 
with the Filipinos and in the conceptions of the 
men sent to lay the foundations of future govern- 
ment. It is not surprising that many mistakes 
were made, chiefly through ignorance of the char- 
acter of all peoples save the Anglo-Saxon, with its 
clear standards of right and wrong. Brought up 
on traditions of the ennobling influence of demo- 
cratic ideas, the sacredness of individual rights, 
and especially of equality, it was extremely dif- 
ficult for the American to understand Oriental 
character. The first mistake was to treat the 
Filipino as if he were an American with a brown 
skin, a point of view which is still cherished in 
face of many disillusionments. This has been the 
cause of much discontent among the Filipinos, who 
complain that their conquerors have not acted 
up to the promises made in the first flush of en- 
thusiasm. The reason is obvious — the promises 
were made under the delusion that the Filipino 
could be rapidly changed, and that he was as con- 
sistent as if his skin were white and his habitat 
in a northern latitude. 

Unfortunately, fickleness and duplicity (judged 
by Western standards) are as invariable among 
tropical peoples as the histrionic and artistic sense 



GREATER AMERICA 

among the Latins. Filipinos inherit both from 
their mixed ancestry; but their habitat is still 
the tropics, and they are incapable of rising above 
the limitations imposed by it. They have not the 
virility of a people constantly reinforced from a 
temperate clime, and they enjoy life under phys- 
ical and climatic conditions peculiarly unsuited 
for moral development. The strenuous life is im- 
practicable in these beautiful, isolated, enervating 
islands. The prospect of educating the Filipino up 
to the point of capacity for self-government (as un- 
derstood by Anglo-Saxon nations) is by no means 
promising, but he will doubtless be able in a 
comparatively short time to satisfy outward re- 
quirements by wearing American clothes, drink- 
ing iced water, and adapting his own flowery 
hyperbole to the stump-orator style of his trans- 
atlantic brothers. He is extremely imitative, 
even more so than the Japanese ; but he lacks the 
thoroughness, persistence, and strong national feel- 
ing which made Japanese reform a reality and not 
a sham. 

The United States must, therefore, settle down 
to a considerable period of colonial government, 
if not a permanent one. The organization of a 
service to meet the demands of this situation be- 
comes an imperative necessity, and, without dis- 
cussing here at length the details of such a ser- 
vice and the demerits of the system at present 
adopted, it is interesting to draw a comparison 
between the position of the United States and 
19 289 



GREATER AMERICA 

other powers as regards the question of colonial 
Civil Service. 

So long as the white man is merely called on to 
govern or organize, in a climate congenial to him, 
people of similar race and instincts to his own, he 
needs little more than the ordinary ability and 
training which would qualify him for any post of 
authority at home. But when he must adopt a 
mode of life foreign to his bringing-up, must sub- 
mit not only to climatic influences but to constant, 
and perhaps exclusive, association with minds on 
a different level to his own — when the social at- 
mosphere is as novel as the landscape and there 
is nothing to keep him up to the mark save the 
knowledge that is in him, deterioration, not only 
physical but moral, is a danger which cannot be 
overlooked. There is no question of American 
colonization in the Philippines; even were the 
country not already well populated, the climate 
forbids it. The Americans, like the British, are 
not prone to mix their blood with that of the 
natives, as Portuguese and Spanish have done. 
The government will, therefore, involve on the 
part of the governing class a certain degree of 
exile, only comparable to that endured by British 
and French officials in their dependencies. The 
Dutch, in Java, at all events, are on a different 
footing. The widely scattered nature of British 
dependencies and their distance from the mother- 
country have made the task of government pecul- 
iarly arduous ; but whatever the criticisms of the 

290 



GREATER AMERICA 

system may be, it is generally conceded that Britain 
has attained greater success than any other power. 
A great proportion of this success she owes to the 
high standard of the officials she has employed, and 
even those who criticise her government of alien 
races allow that among those races the instruments 
of that government are held in a repute which 
makes the " word of an Englishman " a sacred oath. 
It is also undeniable that the British dependencies 
have been of the greatest value in providing a 
training-school for her governing class, and that 
the colonial and Indian services have a favorable 
influence in preserving the best traits of national 
character. 

Whether under the Colonial or Foreign offices, 
the entrance to government service is always by 
competitive examination on general lines, followed 
by examinations in native languages. There are 
many arguments both for and against the com- 
petitive system, but its detractors have not been 
able to devise any other which would be of more 
all - round usefulness. It is said that the in- 
tellectual test is not the best for many of the 
posts, and that some of the most successful ad- 
ministrators have cut a sorry figure in the ex- 
amination-room. The system is in its theory 
democratic, as opposed to patronage or selection, 
but in practice it is now rather tending the other 
way, as the tests are so high that an expensive 
education and special cramming are almost neces- 
sary to the candidate. Parents, however, value 

291 



GREATER AMERICA 

the position so much that they make sacrifices out 
of all proportion to their incomes to give their sons 
the necessary training, so that the service is by no 
means confined to the wealthy classes. The best 
check on the tendency of competitive examination 
towards exclusiveness is in a judicious element of 
selection and of variation of tests, and in this 
somewhat modified form the system is admirably 
adapted to the United States, where educational 
opportunities are so widely diffused. The Brit- 
ish cadet who has passed successfully through the 
entrance examinations will serve a long probation 
in India, China, or one of the colonies before he is 
intrusted with any direct responsibilities. During 
that period he must acquire proficiency in the 
languages and customs of the natives, and some- 
times in their laws. The Indian and colonial 
services attract the best class of British youth, 
and the careers are considered desirable for young 
men of position ; there is even a large class whose 
families have been connected with the services 
for generations, so that there is always an ample 
supply available. 

The careers of a majority of these men will not 
be brilliant, and the prospects held out do not, 
on the surface, seem likely to attract clever and 
ambitious youths. Entrance into the Indian or 
colonial civil service means exile from home, sep- 
aration from family, a salary adequate but by 
no means princely, with slow, if sure, increase. 
His highest hopes cannot soar beyond a colonial 

292 



GREATER AMERICA 

governorship. When at the zenith of his career 
he will receive a salary which, although hand- 
some, will have to bear heavy demands in the 
way of entertainment, and provides no margin. 
If he marries, his early years will be a struggle to 
make both ends meet, and his later ones will in- 
volve frequent separation from wife and children 
and a constant effort to maintain two establish- 
ments in a manner suitable to his position. Though 
hard work will be required of him, if he is to pass 
successfully through the stages of advancement, 
it will not necessarily accelerate his progress or 
bring a certain reward, for influence and luck play 
a considerable part in the matter. It must be 
explained that the influence will be of a social or 
family origin, and seldom, if ever, political in its 
character. Even in the appointment of colonial 
governors and viceroys, which are made by the 
government that happens to be in power, there is 
usually an absence of party motives, and although 
sometimes regarded in the light of rewards for 
brilliant services, the party question has little to 
do with them. As far as pecuniary advantages 
are concerned, it is well known that only men with 
large private fortunes can afford to accept many 
of the highest positions. 

The colonial career, therefore, seems to offer little 
attraction to a young American, who is not driven 
by force of circumstances to seek his fortune abroad, 
and who is brought up in the belief that to "get 
on " is the first duty of man, and his chief pleasure. 

293 



GREATER AMERICA 

The attractions, from the British point of view, 
are, first, the social status which undoubtedly 
attaches to government service. This, unfortu- 
nately, is far from being the case in the United 
States, where a government career neither con- 
fers nor confirms a man's social standing — rath- 
er the reverse. Nor would such an inducement 
be a strong one to the best type of American, 
as it is to the best type of Englishman. Sec- 
ondly, the element of adventure and the pros- 
pect of a wider field of interest in an unknown 
land have a strong attraction for the dweller in 
small, overcrowded Britain, and the spirit of his 
forefathers stirs in many a youth the desire for 
fresh fields and a wider life, though after - ex- 
perience too often proves that he merely exchanges 
the narrow circle at home for a still narrower one 
abroad. The spirit of adventure might prove as 
strong an inducement to the American as to the 
Englishman but for the fact that he does not need 
to leave his own country in order to gratify it; 
indeed, in leaving the United States he turns his 
back on many opportunities and also on a life 
of risk and excitement, of hard work and quick 
profits, which appeal peculiarly to his energetic, 
nervous temperament. The third and most serious 
consideration to the Englishman is the pension 
which invariably attaches to government service, 
and this inducement has proved strong enough 
in many cases to weigh against more tempting 
offers of immediate advancement. Rather than 

294 



GREATER AMERICA 

forfeit this small but sure provision for old age, 
men have been known to refuse good and even 
brilliant offers. The pension will never, of course, 
be large enough to support a man and his family 
in affluence, but if he serves long enough it will 
make a decent and comfortable provision for his 
declining years, and, in case of ill-health or break- 
down, he will be secured from actual want. The 
Englishman as a rule looks forward with pleasant 
anticipations to the time when he can retire to a 
country-house, and, with the surety of a small but 
regular income for the rest of his life, can indulge 
in one of his many hobbies, take a leading part in 
local politics, and see his sons launched on careers 
similar to his own in their moderate expectations 
and honorable position. 

Such a provision for old age does not at all 
appeal to an average young American, who could 
not contemplate complacently an old age spent in 
calm retirement on a reduced income. American 
men do not think of old age in the same way as their 
English cousins ; and if they do, it is merely a spur 
to them to make a " big pile " as quickly as possible. 
Death is provided for even more universally than 
with us by heavy insurances, but no one who has 
any experience of the United States can fail to 
have been struck not only by the youthfulness of 
most men in responsible positions, but by the 
general assumption that youth and middle age are 
the only periods of life worth consideration. 

The British government pursues a wise policy 

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GREATER AMERICA 

in granting liberal furloughs to all officials, and 
this must be taken not only as a compensation and 
inducement, but as a means of rendering the man 
more efficient. Without the long and regular res- 
pite from arduous duties and the renewal of the 
springs of life afforded by his visits home, the 
colonial official could hardly keep up, physically, 
mentally, or morall}', to the standard required. 
The idea of giving long furloughs, on handsome 
pay, is somewhat opposed to American theories. 
The rule is "no work, no pay," and the liberality 
of the United States government does not apply 
in the matter of official salaries, which are in- 
variably, and even scandalously, inadequate. 

The next feature in the life of colonial official- 
dom which makes it popular with Englishmen is 
that the work itself is congenial to them. Their 
whole training has made them self-reliant in the 
sense that they are prepared to take responsibilities 
and to act independently. They inherit a sense 
of justice, scrupulous fairness, and esprit de corps 
which are fostered by public - school training, 
despite its defects. They are not cowed or de- 
pressed by solitude if called upon to dwell far 
from any of their kind. Boys fresh from school 
or college go cheerfully to distant frontier districts 
where, excepting one or two other officials, they 
may not see a w^hite man for months. After this 
period of training they often go to a more complete 
isolation. Such conditions would drive a French- 
man crazy; but, though there are occasional cases 

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GREATER AMERICA 

of break-down, some stolid Britons even grow to 
enjoy their isolation, helped by the natural taci- 
turnity and self-reliance of their race and class. 

There is still, even in these days of luxury, a 
certain element of Spartan discipline in the lives 
of British boys which makes it far easier for them 
in after-life to enjoy such careers as these. The 
little chap who, at eight or nine, leaves his mother's 
arms for a boarding-school, has to cultivate at 
that tender age a self-possession, reticence, and 
decision which become second nature to him and 
lay the foundations of successful administration in 
later life. Not only does the rough-and-tumble 
of his school-days make the boy hard and self- 
reliant, and develop in him that knowledge of his 
own powers which will be so valuable to him, 
but he has, naturally, a capacity and love for 
ruling. He has no illusions as to the equality of 
the people he rules; on the contrary, he is firmly 
imbued with the idea of the superiority of the 
British race over any other, white or black. At 
the same time he has no repugnance or dislike for 
"niggers," regarding them generally with a sort 
of paternal tolerance. He enjoys the struggle with 
prejudice and ignorance, and likes to evolve order 
out of chaos, feeling himself the pivot on which 
the whole system turns. 

It must be remembered that the Indian or co- 
lonial officer is almost invariably of gentle birth, 
and invariably of gentle education — in the best 
sense of the word a gentleman. This implies, in 

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GREATER AMERICA 

Great Britain, that he is acquainted with the 
ordinary etiquette of civiHzed society, that he has 
been taught the self-control and consideration for 
others on which that society has its basis, and that 
he is not uncouth or rough in speech, appearance, 
or manner. When we remember that he will prob- 
ably be sent as an interloper into the midst of 
communities civilized and cultivated in varying 
degrees, on lines quite different to our own, it is 
easy to see the value of such an equipment. The 
Oriental is peculiarly keen to notice any lack of 
breeding in the European he meets, and, contrary 
to the general belief, he can appreciate perfectly 
the difference between men who have and men who 
have not this quality. It is not necessary to adopt 
Oriental etiquette, with its endless ramifications; 
but the Indian, Chinese, or Malay is quick to 
notice if his European friend is deviating from 
what he soon learns to recognize as the European 
standard of good manners. There is an unwritten 
code of manners which well-bred men all over the 
world practise and by which they recognize each 
other. 

The desire to rule is not implanted in the 
American breast. Indeed, he is firmly imbued 
with principles which make despotic government 
by one man repugnant to him, and although he is 
obliged in the relations of daily life to recognize 
that some must rule and others obey, if the world's 
work is to go on, he does not wish to acknowledge 
this or go to an extreme and illustrate the fallacies 

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GREATER AMERICA 

of democracy in his own person. Solitude to him 
is almost an unknown evil. Life in the United 
States is far more sociable and gregarious than in 
Great Britain, and it does not occur to a man that 
a high wall round his grounds is absolutely essential 
to enjoyment of life. There is also a reluctance, 
especially among wealthy parents, to submit their 
children to that Spartan discipline which is en- 
forced on the richest as well as the poorest of 
British boys, and although this is largely coun- 
teracted in later life by the independent spirit 
which is characteristic of American youths and 
their enterprise and audacity, yet the general im- 
pression they give is that they are less hardy, more 
sensitive, physically and mentally, less able to 
endure the peculiar conditions of life in the tropics 
than their more phlegmatic English cousins. 

Besides the illusory theories as to universal 
equality, which handicap the American at the 
outset of his life in the tropics (because they in- 
volve friction between his ideals and his prac- 
tice) , he has also to contend with a physical repug- 
nance for colored people, which is the result of his 
home environment. Social equipment has hither- 
to formed no part of the requirements for public 
service in America or her dependencies, and it is 
difficult to see how it can be made to play a part 
in the matter. In a country where cultivated men 
not unfrequently assume a roughness of speech 
and manner quite foreign to them, in order, pre- 
sumably, to gratify some curious theory of demo- 

299 



GREATER AMERICA 

cratic equality, it can hardly be required that 
officials shall be expected to acquire external 
polish, even to enable them to deal with the polite 
and evasive Oriental. There is a good deal of 
unnecessary contempt, not only in the United 
States but in Great Britain, as to the elaborate and 
"senseless" ceremony prescribed by Oriental eti- 
quette. There is frequently a great deal of mean- 
ing underlying these ceremonies, and the Oriental 
point of view is that, without these prescribed 
forms, there is a tendency to relapse into a license 
which approaches savagery. No one acquainted 
with Orientals, the Chinese particularly, can fail 
to be aware that their etiquette is of extreme and 
practical use in daily life. Any attempts to de- 
stroy at one blow this accretion of centuries would 
have disastrous effects, and the Europeanized 
Oriental is apt to lapse into the worst excesses 
of his adopted country. The reaction from an 
artificial standard of manners and morals to none 
at all is too great ; he is not able to be a law unto 
himself. It is, therefore, the man whose breeding, 
natural or acquired, teaches him to respect the 
laws of etiquette in others, though he may con- 
form to entirely different ones himself, who will be 
able to influence and eventually control Orientals 
most effectively. This is peculiarly the case 
with Mohammedans, but in every case of a people 
whose religion is inclined to fanaticism, the re- 
spect for etiquette, convention, outward forms, 
and symbols is most important. Such an attitude 

300 



GREATER AMERICA 

of mind is not to be confounded with mere indif- 
ference and tolerance, which are certainly to be 
found in excelsis in the United States. It really 
involves another abandonment of one of the 
cherished delusions of the American, for if he is 
to govern in tropical countries among Oriental 
peoples, he will have to learn that there, at all 
events, "manners maketh man." 

Neither as a practical career, then, nor as an 
honorable profession, nor as an interesting and 
congenial life-work, does the career of a colonial 
official appeal to the best class of young American. 
The service must, therefore, be recruited largely 
from less desirable ranks. There are now, and 
will continue to be, honorable and distinguished 
exceptions to this rule, especially among the heads 
of departments; but in order to improve the rank 
and file, who, after all, are the main motive-power 
in the machine, a different system of recruiting 
must be adopted and far greater inducements held 
out. 

The question as to how the United States can 
secure an efficient service for her tropical de- 
pendencies cannot be dealt with here, but it may 
be laid down as a principle that nothing can be 
done in the direction of reform until the greater 
part, if not the whole, of the colonial service is 
removed from the baneful influence of the Spoils 
System. 



CHAPTER XIII 
PROBLEMS OF EXPANSION— CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 

Obviously the first problem of expansion is to 
provide each fresh territory or dependency with 
the best possible form of government, and to se- 
cure harmonious relations with the federal sov- 
ereign. Everything must have a beginning; it 
was not to be expected that systems would spring 
up fully organized and properly correlated. The 
matter, however, becomes singularly complicated 
when the sovereign power, not being quite sure of 
its position, is continually halting between two 
opinions; in the same breath assuming despotic 
powers and assuring its new dependants that they 
are to govern themselves. To be brief, rigid dem- 
ocratic government in Greater America has proved 
not only theoretically but practically incapable of 
dealing with a colonial empire. Where the govern- 
ment has been most successful it has been least 
democratic. This constant .warfare between the- 
ory and practice is, however, demoralizing. It 
is necessary to find some compromise which the 
American nation can adopt, not, perhaps, as their 
ideal, but as the best expedient, and one which, 
therefore, they are not bound to excuse or cloak 

302 



GREATER AMERICA 

under some specious guise. Having gone so far 
from the principles which democracy had set up 
(though not from the intentions of the founders of 
the repubhc,who were anything but democrats), in 
the interests of efficiency Americans must desire 
certain changes in their form of government in 
order to fit it for the discharge of imperial duties. 
First and foremost comes the pressing need for 
Civil Service reform. Under any circumstances, a 
pure and efficient Civil Service must be an essential 
of prosperous government. Americans have such 
an extraordinary facility for making the best of a 
bad job that they have tolerated a condition of 
affairs which would have aroused their phlegmatic 
cousins to indignation. When land was cheap, 
work and wages plentiful, and every one par- 
ticipating in a wave of prosperity, corruption in 
the body politic left the bulk of the nation good- 
humoredly tolerant. But, although there is no 
reason to believe that the industrial progress of 
the United States has received a permanent check, 
it is certain that she (like ourselves some little 
time back) has entered on a different phase of her 
career. Land has mostly been taken up, great 
inequalities in wealth have arisen, disputes be- 
tween capital and labor become more and more 
serious, and the struggle for life generally is taking 
on a sterner aspect. Civilization in America is no 
longer in the primitive, or even the secondary, 
stage; and the more complex it becomes the more 
it will depend upon government for well-being and 

3°3 



GREATER AMERICA 

security. The happiest country is said to be that 
which is least governed, but the saying is founded 
upon a fallacy, otherwise a savage tribe might be 
entitled to the eulogium. In reality, we know 
that the conditions of modern hfe make it appH- 
cable to a people whose government is so highly 
organized that it works without friction, so that 
they are not conscious of the extent to which they 
are governed. 

The comer-stone of political and official life in 
the United States is the system of party patron- 
age. Although a strong reaction has already taken 
place and a certain amount been accomplished in 
decreasing the number of appointments affected 
by this system, there are still about one hundred 
thousand posts in the United States to be filled 
through it. The Senators have become the ar- 
biters of patronage in each State, and the whole 
fabric rests on party influence. It is not only the 
federal offices which are concerned. The State, 
Territorial, and especially the municipal appoint- 
ments are all engineered on the same basis, and 
the entire country is honey-combed by these per- 
nicious influences. 

Apart from the fact that appointments for 
party reasons are obviously not calculated to 
secure any fitness in the appointee, it must be 
remembered that the defeat of his party at the 
next election will at once throw him out of em- 
ployment. Americans are extremely adaptable; 
they seem to have a remarkable ability for touch- 

304 



GREATER AMERICA 

ing pitch without becoming altogether defiled, and 
many party appointees would in time make good 
and efficient officials. But insecurity of office 
does not stimulate devotion to duty ; there is lit- 
tle inducement to make a real study of the work 
and every inducement to keep in with the party 
machine. One and all must feel the temporary 
and precarious nature of their employment and 
the evil influences of a constant subservience to 
party interests, and the temptations of an official 
position in such surroundings are very great. 

In 187 1 the first Civil Service reform act was 
passed, but remained in abeyance for lack of 
support until revived in 1883, when open com- 
petition was provided for, within certain grades 
known as the classified list. From the successful 
competitors, classed as "eligible," appointments 
are made by the President, with consent of the 
Senate, upon the basis of the population of the 
various States and Territories. Non-competitive 
examinations are also held under the Civil Service 
board, by which candidates may qualify for certain 
grades of employment. This attempt, although 
it is claimed that it "removed a vast number of 
offices from the spoils system," was only in the 
nature of an expedient. It has undoubtedly con- 
duced to a higher standard of efficiency and se- 
cured in the classified list a selection of good 
material and an element of permanence. But the 
actual appointments, as well as dismissals, may 
still be influenced by party considerations, and 
20 305 



GREATER AMERICA 

especially does the system confirm the power of 
Senators in this matter. The essentials of a truly 
national service are that it should not be restricted 
or influenced by any personal or party considera- 
tions. When one remembers how little real energy 
or interest is displayed by the nation in State poli- 
tics it seems not unreasonable that it should be 
expected to set aside State jealousies in such a 
matter as this; and were it not for the vital ques- 
tion of patronage, this difficulty would soon dis- 
appear. It is a battle against privilege such as 
was fought and won in Britain many years ago. 
At the present day we regard it as an undue ad- 
vantage that our members of Parliament should 
have enjoyed the privilege of franking letters in 
the old days. Yet in no country did privilege in 
the past exercise such a profound and corrupt 
influence as in England, which makes it the more 
remarkable that no such prerogatives and per- 
quisites are now permitted to our public men in 
democratic England. But the American does not 
object to the exercise of patronage or other 
privileges on the part of his Senators — they mail 
their letters free, travel free, and are the dis- 
pensers of patronage— surely a striking anomaly 
in a land where all men claim equality. 

The system of patronage has been almost en- 
tirely eliminated from the public service in Britain, 
and so thorough has been the process that we are 
liable to forget its recent date. Still we offer no 
opposition to a method of recruiting the services 

306 



GREATER AMERICA 

which, though through open competition, gives 
superior opportunities to a certain class. The 
conditions under which our governmental offices 
of all kinds are filled are such that a special 
education — of ten a university training — is nec- 
essary for candidates, and although boys from 
the poorest classes can, and do, win their way 
through scholarships and bursaries to high posi- 
tions, just as privates in the army sometimes rise 
to commissions and high commands, such men 
must be of unusual caliber, and will be handicap- 
ped through life through the hostility — not of 
their fellow-officials — but of their equals in birth 
who have become their inferiors in position. The 
absence of this ineradicable class-feeling is one 
of the greatest advantages possessed by America, 
but it has the defects of its quahties, and one of 
these is that, as privileged persons and dispensers 
of patronage may be recruited from any section of 
society, the nation at large does not perceive how 
far it is retrograding from the true principles of 
democracy in sanctioning their existence. 

In one way the Americans are certainly en- 
titled to boast that theirs is the truest ideal of 
democracy. Every man is to have an equal 
chance of controlling his own fate; this is the 
bed-rock, and it is sound justice and humanity. 
Upon this, however, patronage has been grafted. 
Human nature, it seems, is too lop - sided to 
maintain an equilibrium. If a man is cleverer 
or more lucky than his fellows, if he gets to 



GREATER AMERICA 

the top of the tree, he at once sets about un- 
equahzing the opportunities of others, taking away 
the chances of his enemies and giving them to his 
friends. The grave fault in the American democ- 
racy is that, in the desire to give every man the 
length of his tether, this human failing has been 
encouraged and legalized. So deeply rooted is 
this canker in the body politic that it would have 
been a serious menace to society were it not for 
the conditions which have made political life a 
thing apart. American society of the best sort 
to-day prides itself on its aloofness from political 
affairs,* just as in England politics is an indis- 
pensable feature and interest in all good circles. 
The plainest language is used by American states- 
men on the subject, and nowhere are its effects 
more plainly stated than in a recent utterance of 
Roosevelt's. 

"Bribe-giver and bribe-taker are equally ^ilty; both 
alike sin against the primary law of the state's safety. A 
question like this lies at the root of decent and honest 
government. In the last resort good laws and good govern- 
ment alike must rest on the broad basis of sound public 
opinion. A dull public conscience and an easy acqmescence 
in corruption infallibly mean debasement in public life. 
Such an end means the ruin of free institutions . . . self- 
government becomes a farce. Freedom is not a gift which 
can tarry long in the hands of the dishonest or of those so 
foolish or incompetent as to tolerate the dishonesty of 
public servants." 

* Even in De Tocqueville's time this tendency was noted. 

308 



GREATER AMERICA 

The magnitude of the army of professional 
politicians who are involved in this system is 
almost incredible. According to Bryce, a very 
friendly observer, they nimiber hundreds of thou- 
sands, including office-holders and office-seekers. 

As this book is concerned with Greater America 
we need not further consider the question of Civil 
Service reform on the continent itself, although 
that lies at the foundation of everything, but 
must see what is wanted for the oversea empire. 

The problems of contiguous expansion are dif- 
ferent to those connected with oversea depend- 
encies, and the fact that a certain form of gov- 
ernment has worked without detriment in the one 
case cannot be considered a guarantee for its suc- 
cess in another. If Civil Service reform is nec- 
essary at home, how much more is it needed when 
it affects the happiness and prosperity of alien 
peoples who have neither the opportunities nor 
the abilities which enable the American to rise 
superior to faults in his own system. 

The essentials for dealing successfully with alien 
peoples are, first, a clearly defined and consistent 
policy; and, second, a high standard among the 
men intrusted with the task of government. 

It is difficult in any form of government not 
an absolute monarchy to secure a steady and 
definite policy on any subject, especially on matters 
of foreign policy, which cannot be trusted to the 
common-sense or united interests of the people. 
Foreign affairs in the United States have always, 

309 



GREATER AMERICA 

therefore, been the especial province of the Presi- 
dent and his cabinet. Then arrives the point at 
which foreign merges into colonial policy. Here 
again the exigencies of the case have tended raore 
and more to give the President the power of 
initiating. With the assistance of his cabinet and 
the sanction of Congress, he becomes, in fact, the 
arbiter of fate to these millions of dependants, 
and, if strong enough, he may secure to them for 
a time the broad outlines of a steady policy, with 
this important exception, that the Senate may 
act as a check or drag at any moment if he runs 
against the interests they represent. 

But what can his knowledge be of the multi- 
plicity of detail that goes to make up the history 
of colonial administration? How can he even 
check and supervise the officers he appoints? His 
duties in connection with home affairs are already 
vast; he has to keep the threads of foreign policy 
clear; and, in addition, he has this burden of 
administrative detail thrust on him. He has no 
machinery to help him, save the spasmodic ef- 
forts of committees, chosen apparently with little 
reference to qualifications. Without elaborating 
any further the self-evident fact that the United 
States is attempting to rule dependencies without 
providing adequate machinery for the task, we 
may as well come at once to the point. There 
are only two courses open to her. Either she 
must give self-government to these dependencies, 
regardless of the consequences, or she must pro- 

310 



GREATER AMERICA 

vide herself with the necessary machinery for 
governing them. 

To follow the first course would be, as all 
thoughtful men will agree, to deliberately shirk 
the consequences of her own acts by evading a 
responsibility she voluntarily assumed, and to 
put back the hands of civilization. To follow the 
second need not, as Americans sometimes assume, 
involve any further derogation from the principles 
to which they are pledged. Theory and practice 
are already far apart, and they will suffer no 
further divorce from a frank recognition of the 
circumstances and an attempt to adjust them on 
a basis of common-sense. 

It is not to be desired that Americans should 
adopt wholesale the methods of Europe; indeed, 
there is no colonial system extant upon which she 
might not make improvements. She has the ad- 
vantage, if only she cares to profit by it, of cen- 
turies of vicarious experience. She need not pass 
through the period of ignorance and corruption, 
followed by sublime indifference, which laid the 
foundation of many colonial problems in Great 
Britain to-day. She can see in our history the 
evils of patronage in a colonial Civil Service and 
the remedies by which we eradicated it. She 
need not abandon her cherished ideal of making 
a true democrat out of each of her alien subjects, 
but she must recognize that she must show him 
the strength as well as the beauty of her ideal be- 
fore she can expect him to adopt it. 

3ir 



GREATER AMERICA 

We have dealt already with the subject of the 
American in the tropics, the difficulties which be- 
set him more, perhaps, than other men, and the 
desiderata for the foundation of a colonial Civil 
Service worthy of the United States. The effort 
already made to place the Philippine Civil Service 
outside political influence and on a permanent 
basis is a step in this direction, but, as stated in a 
previous chapter, the well-meant effort has suffered 
from the truly American fault of too great haste. 
No isolated attempts to deal with the problem 
will, however, be successful, unless the root of the 
matter is successfully attacked. Until patronage 
is rooted out at home the Civil Service will never 
be satisfactory in any quarter, and, until the 
machinery at Washington is adequate to its task 
of administration, no amount of work done in 
the dependencies will be really successful. 

For the control of the colonial administration 
a permanent department is now essential. This 
would do in Washington what is done in London 
or Paris ; collecting and holding all the threads of 
government, and, in the light of the fullest in- 
formation and knowledge of previous circum- 
stances, advising the executive how to act. The 
functions of a permanent department necessarily 
become in time more than advisory in the matter 
of detail, though its policy must on broad lines 
always be dictated by the chief of the executive. 
The existence of this permanent body in no way 
threatens the prerogatives of the popular govem- 

312 



GREATER AMERICA 

ment, but it does secure the people governed from 
caprice, ignorance, and inconsistency, which are 
inevitable without it. The broad lines of policy 
are, after all, what the nation wishes to control; 
as to the details of administration it is at once 
ignorant and indifferent. 

As for the constitution of the Civil Service, it 
has already been said that one of the greatest 
difficulties is the prejudice of Americans against 
any specialized training. They fear to create a 
class from which alone civil servants can be re- 
cruited, and thus fall under their pet aversion, 
officialdom. They have already, however, in the 
army and navy, two branches of service for which 
special training is exacted, and it is noteworthy 
that both of these enjoy reputation and popularity 
among their countrymen. There seems no real 
reason why a college, on similar lines to West 
Point or Annapolis, should not serve as a portal to 
the higher grades, at all events, of a Civil Service 
destined primarily for work abroad. The army 
and navy have already established the principles 
of permanence, steadily progressive pay, and cer- 
tain pensions, all conditions which, of course, 
should be indispensable in any government service. 
Although the high general standard of education 
in America would help to reduce the work neces- 
sary in the Civil Service college, special attention 
should be paid to the acquisition of languages and 
to other subjects specially useful to the candidate 
in the branch for which he is qualifying, but more 

3^3 



GREATER AMERICA 

especially in the inculcation of the spirit of self- 
reliance, coupled with strict obedience and esprit 
de corps, which educationists in America are per- 
haps inclined to overlook. 

It would, in the writer's opinion, have been 
better had it been possible to keep the Philippine 
Civil Service on a national basis. It would cer- 
tainly have attracted a far higher class of Amer- 
ican. The desire to include as many natives as 
possible has led to a sacrifice of efficiency, and this 
is the more to be regretted because, as the ex- 
perience of Britain in India shows, it is possible 
under a small but well-paid and highly trained 
supervisory staff to govern almost entirely through 
natives without establishing a purely local Civil 
Service. To this subject — the employment of 
natives — ^which is so serious a problem of expan- 
sion, we must shortly turn. It is necessary now 
to touch briefly on some other branches of Amer- 
ican Civil Service which would benefit by being 
placed on a more permanent footing. 

The American consular service (organized under 
a law of 1856, under conditions which have passed 
away) is becoming an important body. With 
the expansion of trade and the extension of in- 
fluence, especially into Latin America, an immense 
amount of interest and influence comes to rest in 
the hands of these men. It is notorious that they 
are almost invariably inadequate for the tasks 
involved. Many do not uphold American dignity 
worthily, though they seldom fail to "spread- 

314 



GREATER AMERICA 

eagle " themselves if occasion offers. They are 
not valuable as channels of information, and they 
are not able to forward the interests of their 
countrymen. The reason is simple. They owe 
their appointment entirely to party influence; 
their tenure of office is short and insecure, and 
their salaries are quite inadequate. The consular 
service, being devoid of attractions, has become 
the refuge of disappointed or broken-down poli- 
ticians and others who are failures. No others 
would attempt to live in a foreign country (always 
distasteful to any but the richest Americans) on 
the wretched pittances given, and tl]e opportuni- 
ties for usefulness are rendered almost nil by 
the fact that, as soon as a man has established 
relations with his new environment, has (in many 
cases) begun to speak the language and under- 
stand the ways of the people, he has to go, un- 
seated in the "general post" which keeps all 
United States officials forever on the move. The 
wonder is that, under these conditions, so many 
men have risen superior to circumstances and have 
once more illustrated the American capacity for 
making the best of a bad bargain. 

The diplomatic service, despite its almost in- 
evitable dependency on party politics, has always 
presented an honorable exception to other branches 
of American public service in that it attracts a 
high and disinterested class of men. The circum- 
stances are peculiar. The representative of a great 
country at a foreign court must support the 

315 



GREATER AMERICA 

dignity of that country, despite the fact that his 
government is far from lavish in her allowance to 
him. Diplomatic appointments have not as a 
rule been possible as "rewards," save to men 
whose ambitions were of a purely unmercenary 
character. The careers offered were, therefore, 
free from the taint which clings to other offices, 
and were, moreover, likely to attract those to 
whom association with the best men of other 
nations, rubbing against foreign culture, and the 
study of world affairs would outweigh the possi- 
bilities of mere money - making in their own 
country. Tl^^e proportion of distinguished men 
who have graced this branch of American service 
is very high, and compares favorably with that of 
any other country. 



CHAPTER XIV 

PROBLEMS OF EXPANSION— THE EMPLOYMENT OF 
NATIVES 

When white people undertake the govern- 
ment of a tropical country, and become re- 
sponsible for its peace and well-being, one of the 
first problems presented to them is how to find a 
place for the native leaders in the new state of 
affairs. The enlistment of prominent men among 
the natives on the side of the conquerors is a 
step of the greatest importance and usefulness. 
Unless something of the sort can be effected 
it will be necessary to keep the country per- 
manently under a strict military rule, with an 
immense official staff to administer the laws and 
keep order. In a further stage of pacification it 
becomes desirable to turn the warlike energies 
which are found in every community, civilized or 
otherwise, into a profitable channel by the forma- 
tion of native troops or police, whose loyalty to 
their foreign commanders, however, must be se- 
cured in various ways. These two measures— 
the employment of the intelligent and leading 
natives in civil capacities and the enlistment of 
the restless and warlike section of the community 

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as troops and police — are, perhaps, the most im- 
portant steps to be taken in organizing the govern- 
ment of tropical countries, and upon the tact and 
skill with which they are accomplished depend 
largely not only the success of the foreign ruler but 
the welfare of the tropical people themselves. The 
great danger in organizing a newly conquered 
territory is that much discomfort, much misunder- 
standing and trouble may be caused by the whole- 
sale importation of raw officials. In Oriental 
countries, particularly, it is impossible for an 
Occidental to acquire, save through long ex- 
perience, the power of dealing sympathetically 
and successfully with natives. A native official 
may not be as enlightened, but he will at least be 
unlikely to wound the susceptibilities or prejudices 
of his people. 

It would seem natural that in dealing with alien 
races in the tropics the United States should study 
the work accomplished by Great Britain. It is to 
be feared, however, that a fundamental difference 
in the point of view of the two great Anglo-Saxon 
nations has led the younger one to rash and hasty 
conclusions as to the elder, which prevent the 
useful experience accumulated in India and else- 
where from being of assistance to the United 
States in her new departure in the Pacific. An 
extraordinary amount of misconception, founded 
chiefly on ignorance of past history, prevails in 
the United States — and, indeed, in our own coun- 
try — as to British rule in India. There is a gen- 

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eral impression that we won our Indian Empire 
ruthlessly by the sword, dispossessed the "native 
princes" either by force or fraud, and are now en- 
gaged in governing arbitrarily a subjugated na- 
tion. This broad outline of our relations with In- 
dia is sufficiently justified to gain acceptance for 
that most dangerous kind of generalization — the 
half-truth. Filled in by a vivid imagination, it 
may assume forms which are a gross libel, and it 
is the distortion of the main facts which has led 
so many, and not merely thoughtless, Americans 
to dismiss British methods as contrary to the spirit 
of true liberty and democracy, and, therefore, as 
of little value for the United States. 

In many aspects of the situation, however, there 
is a striking likeness between the problem in the 
Pacific, and that faced by the British in India. 
The inhabitants of the Philippine islands, known 
as Filipinos, are, as already said, not in reality a 
nation or a people, but a congeries of races speak- 
ing several different languages and innumerable 
dialects, and scattered through a number of islands 
often difficult of access. They had, when the 
Spaniards finally left the islands, no settled form 
of government, no unity of religion or customs, no 
allegiance to a central authority. In Spanish days 
many islands even maintained a savage indepen- 
dence. They had no hereditary aristocracy to 
whom the mass of the people owed unquestioned 
obedience, and among the wilder people the tribal 
organization lingered, but the Spaniards had done 

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their best to eradicate it for three hundred years. 
The upper class — which took the place of an ar- 
istocracy — ^was exclusively formed of half-breeds, 
who are to this day almost foreigners in traditions, 
manners, and appearance, and have no real hold 
on the affections or allegiance of the people. In 
the Mohammedan islands of the south the govern- 
ment of hereditary chiefs survived, fostered by 
religious traditions, but the problem was com- 
plicated by other conditions of life which are an 
essential part of a Mussulman state. 

It may surprise some people to learn that all 
these difficulties, in an aggravated form, had to 
be met in organizing a stable government for 
India. The enormous empire which bears that 
name offered physical difficulties far greater, at 
the time of conquest, than any encountered in the 
Philippines. The peoples of that country are more 
diversified in race, religion, and customs than the 
inhabitants of the archipelago can possibly be. 
It is not too much to say that the natives of India 
offer more startling contrasts in these respects 
than the inhabitants of Europe, and the nature 
of the country and climate is equally varied. 

To suppose that Great Britain conquered this 
vast empire by force of arms or fraud, deposing 
native governments as she went along, is to pay 
a compliment to her resources and endurance 
which is not deserved. There was no stable gov- 
ernment in the country generally or among the 
innumerable states of which it was made up. 

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The Great Mogul emperors, themselves aliens and 
conquerors, had gathered a large portion of the 
country together into a vast empire, governing, as 
is the Oriental manner, in the loosest way and 
merely enforcing the payment of a rigorous taxa- 
tion on the people. When this empire decayed 
there was a general scramble for the pieces, and 
the East India Company and France were the 
keenest competitors. The Mohammedan invasion 
had placed on the thrones of many of the native 
states men who in race and religion were as 
much foreigners to the people they ruled as were 
the Europeans. Nothing resembling a whole- 
sale deposition of native rulers was attempted, 
and many of these Mohammedan governments 
were even bolstered up, while the British interven- 
tion saved the last remnants of the really ancient 
native states, whose hereditary institutions go 
back to a period of probably over a thousand 
years. It is not possible here to give any adeqiiate 
description of the means employed to weld this 
heterogeneous mass into an empire under one 
rule. In the process there have been mistakes 
innumerable, and even to-day there is much to be 
desired in the system which has been gradually 
evolved. It cannot, however, be too strongly 
insisted on that, whatever may have been her 
original motives, Britain has for a considerable 
period devoted her energies with a single eye to 
the betterment of the conditions of life in the vast 
territory under her control. Without the strong 
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hand with which she keeps in check the different 
races, anarchy and bloodshed would spread them- 
selves over the land. To quote a distinguished 
Mohammedan of northern India: "This thing" 
— the question as to who after the departure of 
the English would be conquerors — "would rest 
on the will of God. But until one nation had 
conquered another (the Hindoos and Mohamme- 
dans) and made it obedient, peace could not reign 
in the land." 

The subject with which we are at present con- 
cerned is, however, not the right or necessity 
which takes the Occidental into Oriental coun- 
tries, but the methods of dealing with the native 
population. We have seen that in India, as com- 
pared with the Philippines, administrators had a 
more complicated problem to solve because the 
methods and traditions of government varied 
more widely there than in the archipelago, as did 
also the character of the races, religions, and 
conditions of life. Any attempt to establish at 
once a uniform and settled mode of government 
would have involved not only an overwhelming 
force of military and officials to back it, but a 
great amount of injustice to the people. The 
general policy may be said to have been that of 
dealing with each state on its merits, and of 
interfering as little as possible. In some cases the 
desire to retain as far as practicable the outward 
forms of government to which the people were 
accustomed led, indeed, to the prolongation of a 

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system of tyranny and misrule which might have 
been avoided by more drastic measures. Up to 
the last few years there have been native rulers 
under British protection whose practices could 
not be permanently tolerated, and who, per- 
sisting in their evil ways, despite the advice 
of their Residents, have been deprived of their 
positions, thus affording the critics of Britain 
another opportunity to denounce her grasping, 
unscrupulous ambition. 

There is, of course, a difference in the position of 
the various protected native states which still 
enjoy a varying degree of independence, but all 
acknowledge the paramount power of Britain and 
her right to interfere in, for instance, a case of 
civil war or of injustice and tyranny. None can 
maintain a larger military establishment than is 
approved by the British government, nor enter 
into negotiations with another state or a foreign 
power. 

There is a large section of India — about four- 
sevenths of the whole area — not comprised in 
these native, semi-independent states, which was 
placed at first under military rule and then 
organized under the direct rule of the govern- 
ment. Part of British India, as it is called, was 
undoubtedly taken by force, from those who had, 
however, previously conquered it. In this territory 
the only way in which any native can obtain a 
position of authority is by entering the Civil Ser- 
vice and becoming a servant of the British crown. 

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The conditions under which he may do this have 
been altered and revised within recent years, and 
at the present moment a very wide range of op- 
portunities presents itself. 

The Civil Service is divided into two sections, 
for the management of the higher branches of the 
executive and judicial administration. The first 
is an Imperial service, a select body recruited by 
competition in England, but open to any British 
subject — European, colonial, or native. The high 
class of men attracted by this service, the reason 
for its popularity, and its general efficiency have 
been noted elsewhere. From this service the 
majority of the highest civil offices are filled, as 
well as a number of less important posts in which 
the younger men get their training. The second 
service is a provincial one, a huge body recruited 
in the chief Indian provinces, and consisting al- 
most entirely of natives. The detailed civil ad- 
ministration of the country is, therefore, carried 
on almost entirely by natives, under the super- 
vision of a small handful of white men — actually 
eight hundred in number, or one official to every 
three hundred thousand of native population and 
each one thousand two hundred square miles of 
territory. The general principle now followed in 
the employment of natives is that no post save 
the very highest shall be closed to natives of proved 
ability and probity; but in practice there is little 
chance that a native will rise to the chief executive 
and administrative posts. These are reserved for 

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men recruited in England; and without the train- 
ing of an Enghsh school or university — not a mere 
literary training, be it observed — it is not thought 
that the native can attain to the standard re- 
quired for such ofhces. Few are likely to pass this 
test successfully. In the judicial branch the na- 
tive has practically an open field, and makes an 
excellent use of the opportunities offered him. 
The standard of morality among the native of- 
ficials has improved surely, if slowly, and in 
some departments is very high. Three factors 
have contributed to this — better education, the 
example of Europeans, and the removal of tempta- 
tion by granting salaries on a very liberal scale. 
With regard to the latter point there is no country 
in Europe — save, perhaps, Britain — where of- 
ficials are so well paid as are those of the native 
Civil Service in India. They are infinitely better 
paid than American officials in the Philippines. 
Besides the civil, judicial, and executive services, 
there are other departments in India— the Public 
Works, Forestry, Telegraph, Police, and Education 
— all organized on much the same lines, by which 
the majority of posts are filled by men educated 
and recruited in India, and the minority by open 
competition in England. This competition is, in 
the education department, superseded by selection, 
and a certain degree of selection influences all the 
services. 

It may seem to an American unjust that any 
restriction should be placed on the careers of 

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natives who are able to pass the necessary educa- 
tional tests, but it must be remembered that in 
India, as in all countries, but more especially Ori- 
ental ones, the educational test is far from perfec- 
tion in bringing the best men to the fore. This 
is true in Britain, where the growing dislike of 
patronage has made the competitive examination 
almost the only door to a government career, and 
has, therefore, undoubtedly excluded a niimber 
of men who are excellently qualified in character 
for such careers. Still, no superior system can be 
devised, and the material available is of such good 
quality and the traditions of the service have be- 
come so strongly rooted that there is little chance 
of deterioration in the general standard. But in 
Oriental countries — and in some others which are 
not Oriental — circumstances have made politics 
and government more of a trade than a profession. 
This is aggravated in India by the caste system, 
and we find there that the men of strongest charac- 
ter, belonging to the purest races and representing 
the cream of native life, would not only be beaten 
in any competitive test by a quicker, brighter, but 
far less reliable race, but could hardly be persuad- 
ed to submit to such a test and enter upon a strug- 
gle which would involve a loss of their dignity and 
racial pride. 

It is the Bengali — the intellectual but shifty, 
restless, intriguing element, useless in time of war 
— who fills the government offices. Apart from 
his defects, it would be absolutely impossible to 

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GREATER AMERICA 

Open to him posts which would make him prac- 
tical ruler of races which are deeply antagonistic 
to him, and which in essentials of command are 
his superior. These submit to the Englishman, 
respecting, if they do not love him; but to an- 
other "native," of a race they despise and hate, 
they would give neither obedience nor respect. 

This problem, in a modified form, is one that 
meets the white man in the tropics wherever he 
goes. Before he gives any native power over 
others he must be sure of a good many things, 
about which it will be exceedingly difficult to get 
information. It may be argued, therefore, that 
the best way is to allow the natives to select their 
own rulers, and to this alternative we must re- 
turn later. Meanwhile, it may be useful to sum 
up the principal features in the employment of 
natives by Great Britain in India. 

First, the system has been gradually evolved, 
and every effort consistent with the preservation 
of British supremacy has been made to preserve 
to the aristocracy of the country their position 
and privileges. Religious customs have not only 
been tolerated but protected, except in such mat- 
ters as involve breaches of the laws of life and 
property. Racial prejudices have been respected. 
Secondly, a wide range of careers has been opened 
to natives, always as the paid servants of the 
government. Thirdly, both European and native 
officials receive salaries which should place them 
above the temptation to corruption. These sal- 

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GREATER AMERICA 

aries are calculated on the basis of the actual ex- 
penses of life in India, and are not regulated by 
European custom. Fourthly, it is recognized that 
Britons are, after all, foreigners in India, and that 
they rule alien races who would probably prefer 
to misrule themselves. It is also premised that 
British rule is unquestionably the best, and that 
the best and highest British education is necessary 
to manufacture British rulers, so that the most 
important posts must be filled by men with this 
important qualification. Fifthly, this corps d'elite 
must be spread over the country, thinly but 
evenly, to secure a thorough oversight of all its 
affairs. Finally, the government is centralized, 
but not over-centralized, and its supreme control 
lies in the hands of a British viceroy, who is 
answerable to the Parliament and the crown, 
through a Secretary of State (a member of the 
cabinet), directing a department known as the 
India Office, assisted by the advice of a body 
called the Indian Council, drawn from men of 
Indian experience. 

Municipal government in British India is largely 
carried on by natives, there being as many as 
seven hundred and fifty towns with a municipal 
organization, elected chiefly by the tax -payers 
and dealing with matters of local interest, such 
as water supply, sanitation, roads, and markets. 
It is very doubtful to what extent this municipal 
freedom has been a benefit to the people, and, 
despite optimistic official reports, there is a general 

328 



GREATER AMERICA 

Opinion that, even with the considerable influence 
brought to bear by British officials, a good deal of 
abuse has crept into the working of the system, 
especially in all matters connected with finance 
or patronage. Uninfluenced and uncontrolled, 
there can be little doubt what the result would be. 

There is, in fact, considerable discrepancy in 
the views expressed regarding the success general- 
ly of the British raj in India. Those who hold an 
unfavorable opinion must, however, be prepared 
to be asked by what standard they are judging — 
whether they have any clear conception of what 
India was like before the British took it in hand; 
what would be its condition were they to abandon 
control. It must be remembered that among the 
incontestable benefits bestowed on the many races 
of the countries known as India must be counted 
a law and order which it had never known before, 
the opening-up of communications, and the es- 
tablishment of native colleges, where education of 
a far wider range is given and infinitely wider op- 
portunities than any native possessed before. 

As regards the efficiency and high character of 
the Indian services, it is often forgotten in Brit- 
ain, and is little known in the United States, that 
the present condition was only achieved within 
recent years, and that a long process of evolution 
was necessary to organize the branches of a govern- 
ment so wide and varied in its operations. As an 
instance of the slowness of development which has 
been found essential owing to the complicated 

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GREATER AMERICA 

problems to be faced, it may be mentioned that 
the penal code, now allowed to be at once the 
simplest and most efficient ever devised, was 
draughted forty years before it passed into law, 
and was during that period constantly revised by 
the ablest jurists. 

This brief description of the British raj in India 
is, perhaps, rather in the nature of a digression 
in a book dealing with Greater America. It has 
been written, however, with a view to dispel a 
few illusions in the mind of the American reader, 
and as affording a valuable analogy to American 
expansion in the Pacific. 

At first sight, it is rather the points of contrast 
than those of similarity which strike us. Our own 
expansion has taken place openly and avowedly 
for purposes of trade. As a rule, we have post- 
poned the problem of providing a permanent 
government for our dependencies as long as 
possible. The Englishman has never been the 
apostle of a political theory. American expansion, 
on the contrary, has cloaked itself continually in 
the garb of a mission of liberty. In reality a 
hard-headed, practical people, not likely to go into 
any enterprise without a sound commercial basis 
— driven, moreover, in late years by industrial 
expansion — the United States of America has, 
nevertheless, constantly held up the idealistic 
point of view of their own actions. Readers of 
this book will know that the writer does not share 
this view. To him the expansion of America does 

330 



GREATER AMERICA 

not appear either capricious or altruistic. It has 
been the logical, determined progress of a strong 
people, who, if they lack, as Bryce declares, the 
" earth-hunger " which has inspired other nations, 
have certainly managed to disguise their true 
sentiments. 

In the Philippines, however, they were forced 
to take a step which has a very plausible semblance 
of disinterestedness. Regarded as an isolated act, 
their occupation of the archipelago has even a 
quixotic aspect. It is, therefore, excusable that 
this point of view should have been taken by 
many people, and certainly no Briton can afford 
to scoff at their attitude. 

When the perspective of time restores to their 
true places in history these recent happenings in 
the Pacific, it will, however, become plain that in 
following out the destiny she had marked out for 
herself, in breaking up the Spanish colonial empire, 
and in providing for the development of her 
Pacific coast, America went but little, if at all, out 
of her way when Dewey steamed into Manila Bay. 
Once there, she was equally bound to stay. No 
Power with her aspirations could have left the 
islands; to do so would have been a retrograde 
step not only in the eyes of the world, but in actual 
progress towards that goal which no American 
disclaims. 

Having found her India rather suddenly, how- 
ever, America is disposed to regard it as a white 
elephant. The British view of his Indian Empire 

331 



GREATER AMERICA 

is an eminently sane one, and does not really clash 
with any American ideals; but the American does 
not yet know quite what to think about the 
Philippines. India to the Briton does not now 
mean, as some Americans still imagine, a source 
of infinite wealth. We trade with our empire, 
but we have sunk a good deal of money in it, for 
which we are not getting an excessive return. 
Far from being an actual source of wealth, we still 
spend a good deal on the equipment of her civil 
service. She pays her own expenses, and is in- 
clined to grumble that we force on her a policy of 
defence which is very costly. This is the Imperial 
burden, which some of our colonies are inclined to 
shirk. India, however, is paying for immunity 
from invasion which can only be secured by strong 
defence. 

To the Briton India means the prestige of his 
country, a training-ground of character for his 
race, a field of wide and interesting work, both 
on his own account and in the interests of the 
native peoples. Incidentally, the Briton's view 
includes also the desire, born of his innate sense of 
justice, that the natives should be allowed every 
privilege consonant with their own welfare. He 
regards their welfare as of extreme importance, 
though not, perhaps, for any very altruistic mo- 
tives. To take a broad view, it is as a field for 
his energies that he chiefly regards the empire 
which tradition and the heroic exploits of his 
forefathers have also invested with a glow of 

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GREATER AMERICA 

sentiment. Enough has been said to show that 
his energies have by no means flowed in purely 
selfish channels. 

Why should not the American adopt a similar 
view of the Philippines? Partly because of rea- 
sons set forth in a previous chapter/ partly be- 
cause he feels bound to consider the natives as in- 
dividuals with rights; and also partly because, 
thanks to the demagogues, fanatics, and cranks of 
his own country, he is still wavering under the im- 
pression that he is wronging both the Filipino and 
himself by his action in retaining control of the 
archipelago. In any case, he feels bound to show 
by his actions that in occupying the Philippines 
he was actuated by the highest motives. These 
sentiments may have little relation to real facts; 
they may blind men to their own logical position 
and may create false hopes, but they are genuine 
in their way and have their origin in the funda- 
mental principles of life. The enlightened British 
view of dependencies is to make them prosperous 
and give them the best government possible. The 
American view is to give them the power of govern- 
ing themselves ; and that then all these things will 
be added unto them. This divergence of ideals 
would apparently make any approximation of the 
American to the British view impossible. It will 
lead the American who has read the foregoing 
pages, as a justification of our work in India, to 

• "Americans in the Tropics," 
333 



GREATER AMERICA 

reply : " Yes ; you may be doing your best, and your 
best may be very good after your lights; but we 
are bound to act up to ours, and they are very 
different lights, indeed." 

Taking this rational objection into considera- 
tion, and remembering the lofty ideal which, de- 
spite everything, has undoubtedly had its place in 
the American attempt to deal with the Filipinos, 
we are bound to be somewhat disappointed with 
the results so far as we can trace them. It must 
be noted that methods very similar to those of 
Britain have been adopted, most successfully, in 
Puerto Rico. Up to the point of evacuation there 
was more common-sense than idealism displayed 
in Cuba. In the Caribbean, therefore, the apostles 
of liberty have not sacrificed efficiency to theory. 
There has been no question of placing Puerto- 
Ricans among the "really free peoples"; they are 
even denied a position among free Americans. We 
need not enlarge here on the subject of Cuba. 

The Filipinos apparently presented themselves 
as better material — there are more of them, to be 
sure — and the idea of converting tribes to the 
number of seven million into a free, self-governing 
"nation" was a fascinating one, and by its very 
size appealed to the American mind. One of the 
first discoveries of the conquerors, however, was 
that their task was much more complicated than 
they thought. One of its most difficult features 
was that which has exercised Britons in India so 
greatly, and has only recently been placed on a 

334 



GREATER AMERICA 

fairly sound basis. The employment of natives 
in the government of their own country was 
complicated in the Philippines by a general igno- 
rance lit up with flashes of precocious ability. At 
first the governmental structure was piled together 
in an arbitrary and hap-hazard way, but the 
necessity for a more orderly system, and, above 
all, the desire of all honest men concerned to place 
the Philippine officials out of the influence of the 
Spoils System, precipitated matters, and in the 
autumn of 1900 the scheme was already fully 
developed and a Civil Service board began work. 
It is necessary to describe in some detail the work- 
ing of this board, since it presumably embodies the 
result of American studies of existing systems, 
modified by the enlightened principles of democ- 
racy. One may reasonably expect it, if far from 
perfect in detail, to be informed by the spirit of 
wide justice and foresight, full of provisions to 
insure, as the act says, "an honest and efficient 
Civil Service for the Philippines." 

The Civil Service board is the root of the whole 
matter. Upon it the whole structure, in fact, 
depends for its success. 

It is composed of three men appointed by the 
Philippine commission, and, although the com- 
position has varied, always includes one Filipino. 
The functions of this board are not comparable to 
that of any body in the British system. Primari- 
ly an examining board, it has also been intrusted 
with the preparation of reports on such subjects 

335 



GREATER AMERICA 

as salaries, and is also a sort of reference committee 
to which the heads of departments must report, 
and which has a voice in all matters relating to 
personnel "which do not affect the internal ad- 
ministration of departments." It is a little dif- 
ficult to imagine the exact nature of the latter 
circumstances. 

The method of procedure, so far as can be 
gathered from the not very lucid reports, is to 
hold examinations in every subject of which a 
knowledge is required in the various branches of 
government service. A certain amount of con- 
fusion was inevitable from the fact that many 
posts were already filled, but this has been partly 
obviated by examination of the acting employes. 
Every bureau or department, the provincial ser- 
vices, and the municipality of Manila are now 
closed to all save candidates who have passed 
the prescribed tests. Examinations are held in 
Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu, and also in the United 
States. The examinations are in Spanish and 
English, and while it is to be presumed that 
English is required of all candidates for the higher 
positions, it is not clear exactly where the line is 
drawn. The highest posts — the heads of bureaus, 
executive secretaries, and officials who require 
special technical or scientific knowledge — are ex- 
empted from this rule. Appointed originally by 
the civil commission for special aptitude, these 
officers will be succeeded by men drawn from a 
class formed of the chief assistants in their offices 



GREATER AMERICA 

and promoted on merit. The specialists are re- 
cruited from the hsts of the federal classified 
service, and are transferred for a time to the 
Philippines. Apparently this was the only way 
in which efficient officers could be secured. 

It is not easy to define the exact relations be- 
tween the Civil Service board and the heads of 
departments. The latter furnish the board with 
lists of vacancies in their offices, and are in return 
furnished with lists of " eligibles " from which they 
are allowed to " select. ' ' As their choice is limited, 
by the obligation to prefer a Filipino to an Amer- 
ican, and among Americans those who have served 
in the army or navy ; and as, we are told, the lists 
sometimes contain not more than two names for 
each post to be filled, it is obvious that the heads 
of departments are somewhat restricted as to this 
" selection." It is, in fact, the board which is the 
appointing authority, and only the strictest im- 
partiality on the part of its members can prevent 
the recurrence of abuses which it was particular- 
ly intended to avoid. The heads of departments 
may grant leave of absence on a fixed schedule, 
may vary the salary of the employes within certain 
Hmits, and have, of course, the power of reporting 
adversely on unsatisfactory work . They are , more- 
over, permitted to select, appoint, and discharge 
some of their subordinates who are merely laborers 
or unskilled workmen. 

All this would, perhaps, have been an ample 
provision to lay the foundations of a Civil Service 
« 337 



GREATER AMERICA 

and to secure the freedom of action of an executive 
head if the Phihppines were a normally constituted 
country with an ample supply of material. As it is, 
the operation of race jealousy, the lack of educated 
material, the inordinate ambition of the mestizo 
aristocracy make it difficult to work this elaborate 
Civil Service machine without mistakes and in- 
justice, and it must be remembered that the odium 
of these descends on the central government. It 
appears to the writer to be, once more, an over- 
elaboration of machinery to have created this 
maze of examinations, appointments, promotions, 
and reports. The first step should have been to 
secure an able and permanent body of officials of 
the higher grades, and to permit them to fill at 
their own discretion all clerical posts, at all events, 
holding them responsible for the efficient working 
of their respective departments. It is difficult to 
see what good purpose is served by the inclusion 
in the lists of such functionaries as pipe-fitters, 
letter-carriers, or homheros, and in practice these 
are controlled entirely by their departmental 
heads. They serve to swell the lists of candidates, 
however, and to increase the technical work of the 
board, which prides itself on the number of exami- 
nations it can hold in one year, and is apparently 
convinced that "eligible" means "efficient." 

Unfortunately, no fixed tenure of service could 
be settled for officials drafted in from home, and 
throughout there seems to run a presumption that 
three years will be the extreme length of service, 

2Z^ 



GREATER AMERICA 

" The matter of return to the United States after 
a certain lapse of time will always be considered 
by persons taking service in the Philippines." 
This is, of course, one of the most serious bars to 
efficiency. Honesty should be secured by the 
promotion on merit system, which, it is claimed, 
is thoroughly carried out in the present service. 
No provisions, however, can secure this unless 
both the Civil Service board itself and the chief 
officials of departments are above suspicion. 

As regards the former, it seems unfortunate 
that the most permanent factor in its composition 
(which has already suffered several changes) is 
a Filipino gentleman of extremely checkered 
political career. The first president was, fort- 
unately, a man of high capacity and integrity, 
the one Filipino against whom no one had ever 
alleged anything evil; but there are not many 
pubhc men in Manila who could even approach 
this standard. The salary paid to each member of 
the board (three thousand five hundred dollars) is 
not sufficient, under the circumstances of life in 
Manila,' to attract able men of the best character 
from the United States, and the enormous amount 
of clerical and routine work involved by placing 
so many posts under the board makes it impossible 
for that body to superintend every detail in the 
manner which is essential for accurate and honest 
examination work. After all, the examination in 

»The same criticism applies to every American appoint- 
ment in the Philippines. 

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fixed subjects of candidates is a very indifferent 
test of their fitness for all but clerical posts, es- 
pecially in a case like this, when character must 
be the determining factor in success. The board, 
indeed, expresses in its report a doubt as to the 
completeness of a literary test, and a certain 
number of posts are exempted from it. 

The chief difficulty is to obtain material at 
all suitable for the work. In the year ending 
October i, 1902, only three thousand nine hundred 
and twenty -nine candidates competed for two 
thousand posts, and of these only two thousand 
and forty-four became eligible — a very small mar- 
gin. The natural desire of the board to meet the 
demand for "eligibles" must make it difficult to 
maintain the standard when the supply is running 
short. There is a provision that temporary em- 
ployes may be engaged if no "eligibles" are to 
be had, and, until a steady supply of properly 
educated and qualified men could be insured, 
it would have been better to leave the lower 
grades of the service on a temporary basis. It 
is much easier not to engage a man than to em- 
ploy and then dismiss him with all the parapher- 
nalia of government procedure; and the Oriental 
who has once tasted office is a spoiled man for 
life, so far as more humble avocations are con- 
cerned. 

To sum up the principal defects in the Civil Ser- 
vice system of the Philippines. First, a lack of 
inducernents to the best class of Americans, who 

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GREATER AMERICA 

could only be attracted by a permanent service 
with good pay, regular furloughs, and either a 
pension or some other provision to compensate for 
life in the tropics. Secondly, the inclusion in 
the Civil Service lists of a number of petty posts, 
altogether unimportant, and practically controlled 
by the heads of departments, which leads to a 
multiplication of clerical work and detail until 
essentials are swamped. Thirdly, the confusion 
of functions in the Civil Service board, which 
ought not to combine the duties of examination 
with those of appointment, reference, and re- 
port. Lastly, it is to be regretted that a board 
which is intrusted with such important functions 
could not have been composed of a more per- 
manent staff of officials, men of weight and ex- 
perience, of unimpeachable integrity, and entirely 
removed from local political influence. 

When we compare the Civil Service of the 
Philippines, as it is now constituted, with the 
Indian Civil Service, we are not struck, as might 
have been expected, with the superiority of the 
former as a training-school for natives. There is 
an evident attempt to open to natives every rank 
of service for which they are qualified, but this 
is equally evident in India, the main difference 
being that Britain exacts a higher qualification. 
As a matter of fact, this difference is fundamen- 
tal. The British regard any phase of govern- 
mental work as requiring training, whereas it 
is the favorite theory of Americans that a good 

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GREATER AMERICA 

general education fits a man for any post in 
life. 

The most serious divergence in policy, and 
one which fills a Briton with misgivings, is the 
severance of the Philippine Civil Service from 
that of the mother-country. This may have been 
necessary to avoid the " Spoils System," but it at 
once diminishes the efficiency on which so much 
depends. It has been found necessary hitherto 
to fill certain posts from the classified lists of 
the United States in order to obtain the right 
stamp of man ; it might surely be possible, in the 
Civil Service reforms which are proposed, to pro- 
vide a branch of the service, specially recruited 
and trained for a fixed term to be spent in the 
Philippines, with compensating advantages and 
without the temporary and uncertain conditions 
which attach to the present method. Some such 
provision is necessary to recruit good officers. 

No stronger contrast can be found between the 
American and British methods than in their ac- 
tion as regards judicial reforms. It is true that 
in this respect the greatest difference existed be- 
tween the Philippines and any country conquered 
by Britain. Nowhere has it been our fate to 
take over, with a very imperfect civilization, a 
highly developed code and method of judicial 
procedure. To criticise Spanish law is to involve 
one's self at once in the most difficult problems. 
It was founded on one of the most enduring codes 
in history and has the sanction of high authority. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

It may be safely said, however, that, even if 
properly administered, it had every possibility 
of clashing with American ideas, and that in the 
Philippines it was administered extremely badly. 
Still, the groundwork was there, and there are 
many who think that it is better to administer 
justly the laws to which people are accustomed 
than to suddenly plunge them into a wholly dif- 
ferent system. No more difficult task can be 
imagined than this, to which the civil commission, 
numbering two distinguished lawyers, applied 
themselves. No criticism of what they accom- 
plished can be attempted in this book; it would 
be unfair without an enumeration of their dif- 
ficulties. What they did not accomplish, however, 
was to secure an upright, incorruptible judiciary. 
Accustomed to the partialities and venalities of 
his own State courts, this does not shock the 
sensitiveness of the American as it might, but he 
forgets that his own country is happily in a far 
more settled condition than the archipelago, and 
that the Filipino does not possess his own nice 
discrimination in these matters. The fault has 
been due to that cherished ideal of which we have 
spoken so often. Rough-and-ready but absolute- 
ly upright justice would have been worth more 
to the Filipinos than years of legislation or acres 
of bills, and, if any codification was necessary, it 
should have been too simple to afford any exercise 
for the wits of the clever Filipino lawyers. 

Criticisms and comparisons are, however, of 

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GREATER AMERICA 

very little use at the present stage of affairs. 
Americans are making their experiment on a 
grand scale. If it fails they will not be the first 
people who at the start have muddled the task of 
governing Orientals, and their natural adaptive- 
ness and ready resource will enable them in the 
long run to achieve success. 



CHAPTER XV 
PROBLEMS OF EXPANSION— ARMY AND NAVY 

After the campaign of 1812-15, with the 
exception of the Mexican war (1846-48) and 
the civil war, which lasted five years, the United 
States had no experience of war until the colli- 
sion with Spain in 1898. Americans then awoke 
to the fact that the old idea of isolation, of free- 
dom from embroilment with foreign powers, was 
no longer compatible with the new conditions. 
They rubbed their eyes and began to realize that 
they ought to have — what they did not possess — 
an army. Since the disbandment of the im- 
provised volunteer armies of the civil war, the 
vast majority of the nation had never seen a 
soldier, and even the great cities had ocular evi- 
dence of the existence of a national military force 
only through the occurrence of an occasional riot 
—such as those of Pittsburg, in 1877, and Chicago, 
in 1894 — or when some great national celebration 
afforded the people the spectacle of a military 

parade. 

After the civil war the army was reorganized 
on a very modest scale from the best of the recently 
disbanded volunteer regiments. The material was 

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GREATER AMERICA 

good. Both officers and men had been trained in 
war, had learned their profession in the stem 
school of experience. In many respects they were 
a striking contrast to the army of ante-bellum 
days, which, after a long period of peace, had 
fallen into sleepy ways, and, under the corrupt- 
ing influence of party patronage, had become 
thoroughly inefficient and out of date. From 
the time of reorganization until the Spanish war 
the American army consisted of some twenty- 
eight thousand men, mainly engaged in wars on 
the Indian frontiers or in policing the new districts 
settled up as the wave of westward migration 
surged forward. Scattered in small posts, at wide 
intervals, discipline was difficult to maintain, and 
any such thing as general or systematic organiza- 
tion was an impossibility. In the course of time, 
as the country in the West was gradually occupied 
and at the same time great cities arose, the number 
of small posts was decreased and the troops were 
concentrated on certain points, where they would 
be available in the event of riots or serious dis- 
turbances of the peace. 

The Spanish war found the United States quite 
unprepared. The curse of politics was over all. 
The abuses of patronage had sapped the en- 
thusiasm and spirit of the service. Rivalries 
between the adjutants - general and the civilian 
Secretaries of War had brought about utter con- 
fusion everywhere — no army, no officers, no staff, 
no plan — in a word, chaos. Equally unprepared 

346 



GREATER AMERICA 

and equally ready to meet the emergency heroi- 
cally, the United States set aside the experience 
of others, trusting to the genius and energy of the 
race and the illimitable resources of the country 
to pull her through. The failure to evolve order, 
and especially the difficulty experienced in moving 
a small force across to Cuba, was, perhaps, the 
most striking feature of the general debacle, and 
was in marked contrast with the powers of perfect 
organization displayed by the Japanese a few 
years earlier in the Chino- Japanese war. 

Notwithstanding the difficulties arising from this 
state of affairs, the campaigns both in Cuba and 
the Philippines were brought to a successful con- 
clusion, though with the inevitable waste of life 
and treasure involved by the absence of a trained 
and disciplined army under efficient officers. Both 
were subalterns' wars ; there was no plan of cam- 
paign; it was merely jungle-fighting, in scattered 
bodies, no concerted action being possible. The 
situation was saved by the pluck of the men, by 
the adaptability and initiative of the American, 
with a nucleus of West Point officers, trained 
men, reared in a school of iron discipline. 

The urgency of reform — drastic reform — was 
forced upon the American government. An army 
had to be created, and armies are not made in 
a day. A capable War Minister, courageous and 
self-reliant, appeared in the person of Mr. Root 
in 1899. He acted on the principle that the 
object of an army is "to provide for war," the 

347 



GREATER AMERICA 

very contrary of the theory upon which the entire 
treatment of the army had been based from the 
end of the civil war/ There had been no or- 
ganization, no training as a whole, and the service 
was permeated by the patronage system. This 
was due to the prevailing impression that war 
was impossible — at any rate, so remote as to be 
negligible. Able army officers who had clamored 
from time to time for reform could get no hearing. 
Systematic study, preparation of material for war, 
promotion of officers according to capacity, train- 
ing of men and officers in large bodies were evident- 
ly needed. Four important recommendations were 
made — the establishment of a war college; the 
attendance of every officer at this college for a 
period; officers from the line to serve on the staff 
for four or five years instead of until retirement; 
the modification of the seniority system. These 
reforms were far-reaching, involving as they did a 
complete change in the whole army organization. 
There remained, however, one reform which lies 
at the very root of the whole question — the 
elimination of politics from the army.^ A prac- 
tical step in this direction was taken by Mr. Root 
when, an increase of the army being imminent, 
he made public the names of the senior officers 
already appointed, nearly all regular officers. 

* The same discovery seems to have been recently made 
regarding the British system, judging from the War Office 
(reconstitution) committee. 

^ Atlantic Monthly, April, 1902. 

348 



GREATER AMERICA 

The fury of the politicians may be imagined, but 
they were powerless in the face of the accomplished 
fact, at a critical period, too, when the nation 
took a serious view of the matter. The President, 
as commander-in-chief of the army, followed this 
up by an attempt to establish the " merit system " 
in 190 1 . " No pressure, political, social, or personal, 
of any kind " was to be permitted, and the exercise 
of such pressure, if there were reason to believe 
it to be instigated by an officer, would militate 
against him. The army was thus assured the 
same footing as the classified Civil Service and the 
navy, by the simple fiat of the President, who has 
always held the strongest views on the subject of 
keeping the Civil Service, and the army especially, 
free from politics. Favoritism and patronage had 
eaten into the vitals of the army, and it required 
great courage to attack the system as the Presi- 
dent and his Secretary of War did ; but in justice 
it must be remembered that they had the op- 
portunity of acting during a critical time, which 
previous men had not. Many had been the 
recommendations, but no one had dared to cut 
the Gordian knot. It must be noted, however, 
that the promotions of Leonard Wood and Fun- 
ston over so many seniors certainly did not seem 
to the regular officers to be altogether in con- 
sonance with the spirit of the new reform. 

Among the reforms recently initiated are the 
creation of a war college, a general service and 
staff college, a reserve of regulars, and a general 

349 



GREATER AMERICA 

staff, on the pattern of the most efficient European 
armies, for which forty-two picked officers have 
been selected.^ The office of general commanding 
(commander-in-chief) has been abohshed and in 
his place there is now a chief of staff with a 

* The general staff consists of one chief of staff, who has 
the rank of lieutenant-general, the highest grade in the 
American army at the present time; two assistants to the 
chief of staff, not below the grade of brigadier-general; four 
colonels, six lieutenant-colonels, twelve majors, twenty cap- 
tains or first lieutenants, all of whom receive the regular pay 
and allowances of their rank, with the exception of the lieu- 
tenants, who when detailed on staff duty have the rank, pay, 
and allowances of captains mounted. All officers detailed 
to general staff duty serve for four years unless sooner re- 
lieved, and on being relieved they return to the branch of the 
army in which they hold their permanent commissions, and 
are not eligible for fxorther staff duty until they have served 
two years with their regiments or commands, except in case 
of emergency or time of war. The duties of the general 
staff, as prescribed in the act, "shall be to prepare plans for 
the national defence and for the mobilization of the military 
forces in time of war ; to investigate and report upon all ques- 
tions affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of prep- 
aration for military operations; to render professional aid 
and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers 
and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in 
informing and co-ordinating the action of all the different 
officers who are subject under the terms of this act to the 
supervision of the chief of staff; and to perform such other 
military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be 
from time to time prescribed by the President." The chief 
of staff under the direction of the President or the Secretary 
of War is given supervision of all troops of the line, "and of 
the adjutant-general's, inspector-general's, judge advocate's, 
quartermaster's, subsistence, medical, pay, and ordnance 
departments, the corps of engineers, and the signal corps, 
and shall perform such other military duties not otherwise as- 
signed by law as may be assigned to him by the President." 
The office of general commanding is abolished. 

350 



GREATER AMERICA 

general staff under him. The reform accom- 
pHshed is, in fact, the solution of the problem 
which the British government is attempting to 
solve without creating a general staff. The 
American Secretary of War is now strictly re- 
sponsible to the President for the details of 
military administration, and he operates through 
the chief of staff. Every effort has been made to 
minimize routine and red tape. An attempt is 
being made to evolve something like order out of 
the chaos of the national guard, militia, and 
volunteer forces, by defining the obligations and 
duties of each branch, by altering the militia law, 
which, according to the President, was "obsolete 
and worthless," and by an endeavor to make the 
organization and armament of the national guard 
identical with that of the regular forces. Some 
procedure for raising volunteer forces and selection 
of officers is to be prescribed by law in advance. 
Army reform is not a popular cry even in Brit- 
ain, where we have our little wars, and sometimes 
a big one, to emphasize the urgent necessity of 
keeping the army efficient; but in the United 
States it is even more difficult to sustain the 
interest of the public in such a movement or to 
obtain the necessary legislation and appropria- 
tions. Beyond this, there is the grave difficulty 
of reconciling the relative interests and powers of 
the federal and the State governments, all branches 
of the forces, except the regular army, being under 
the latter. The path of reorganization does not, 

351 



GREATER AMERICA 

therefore, promise to be an easy one, and it re- 
mains to be seen whether, once the object-lesson 
begins to fade from the memory, the Americans 
will be capable of the sustained effort necessary 
for placing their military forces upon a satis- 
factory footing. 

There is one aspect of the military question 
which seems to have received little attention as 
yet — namely, the organization of native troops, 
on which the successful handling of tropical de- 
pendencies like the Philippines must largely de- 
pend. Many examples are to be found in the 
British Indian and colonial empire. A small be- 
ginning has been made in the Philippines, where 
a native force of some five thousand men has been 
organized and is said to be working fairly well, 
though the force is gravely handicapped by the 
want of officers of the right stamp, due to the want 
of proper inducements and to the very limited 
field of supply. A good deal might be learned 
from a study of the British experience in countries 
like India, Egypt, Burma, and the Malay peninsula, 
and it is with this object that General Leonard 
Wood last year visited some of these countries on 
his way to the Philippines. Not merely there, 
but in the Caribbean and Central America, the 
Americans will require to utilize the services of 
the natives; and a few words regarding the em- 
ployment of natives as troops and police in India 
may not be inapplicable here. 

Without the co-operation of native auxiliaries 

352 



GREATER AMERICA 

the British raj in India would have been an im- 
possibiHty. Before the mutiny the natives were 
recruited in three armies, those of Bengal, Madras, 
and Bombay. There was, besides, a strong force 
of so-called "irregular cavalry" and infantry, 
raised chiefly from the warlike tribes of the Pun- 
jaub. The proportion of Europeans to natives 
was extremely low — one to every eight or nine 
—and about one-third of the infantry and all 
the European artillery were local troops raised 
by the East India Company for permanent 
service. Had the whole native armies revolted 
there would have been an end to British rule. 
Fortunately, however, when the army of Bengal 
and part of that of Bombay mutinied, the Madras 
army remained faithful, and the Punjaub frontier 
force rendered good service in subduing the mu- 
tiny. 

In the reorganization which followed, an entirely 
different system was adopted. Not only was the 
proportion of Europeans increased to that of one 
European to two natives, but greater care was 
exercised in recruiting the native regiments. The 
general principle adopted has been the mingling of 
men of different races and religions in the same 
regiments but in separate companies. All the 
European troops are part of the imperial army, 
and only serve part of their time in India ; officers 
may be transferred to native regiments, but the 
majority are recruited by the appointment of 
candidates from the Royal Military College at 
'^ 353 



GREATER AMERICA 

Sandhurst. These officers of the Indian army are 
also employed in a large number of civil posts and 
in the political or diplomatic department. These 
details are given to show how careful a reorganiza- 
tion of the military system has been accomplished 
since the mutiny. Other reforms were the pro- 
vision made for safeguarding the health of the 
European troops, especially the arrangements for 
sending each battalion serving in an unhealthy 
district to the hills for a part of each year. This 
and other sanitary precautions are valuable in 
preserving not only the health but the morale of 
the men. The most remarkable change strength- 
ening the military position has been, however, in 
the direction of improved communications. The 
conditions prevailing at the time of the mutiny 
have been radically altered by the creation of a 
great net-work of roads, railways, and telegraphic 
communication. Those who take a somewhat 
ghoulish delight in prophesying another mutiny, 
and who speak of the British in India as "living 
over a volcano," must overlook these circum- 
stances if they believe that anything comparable 
to the outbreak of 1857 is possible to-day. 

The police force in India consists entirely of 
natives, under an English chief, district superin- 
tendents and assistants. It is very seldom nec- 
essary—not more than once or twice a year, and 
generally in connection with some religious dis- 
pute—to call out even a small body of the military 
to maintain order, a fact which speaks well for the 

354 



GREATER AMERICA 

efficiency of the police. All Britons who have 
had experience of native troops or military police 
in India speak well of their loyalty and courage; 
and it is no exaggeration to say tha^ in some of 
the northern regiments the wild fighting tribes 
who have been organized into regiments have 
transferred their allegiance with a whole heart to 
their white officers, and would, like the majority 
of the Indian native army, follow the Sahib any- 
where he chose to lead them. 

The question of native armies is of peculiar 
importance in the Philippines, because the Filipino 
is of that essentially warlike stock — the Malay. 
Without possessing the qualities which distinguish 
the warrior tribes of India, he has still a pred- 
ilection for fighting; and in the special kind of 
warfare which the physical difficulties of his own 
islands necessitate he is well versed. The caste 
distinction which was so grave an obstacle to the 
Indian organization does not exist here, nor is 
there the religious difficulty to combat; but at 
the same time there is, perhaps, a greater degree 
of untrustworthiness, a lack of esprit de corps, sl 
vanity and instability which were not encountered 
in India after the great initial steps had been 
accomplished. The more civilized the Filipino the 
more care needs to be exercised in placing him in 
any responsible position, and this is peculiarly the 
case in military and police appointments. It is 
essential that American supervision should be of 
the closest kind, and that the American officers 

355 



GREATER AMERICA 

or instructors should be of the highest possible 
calibre, both as to efficiency and character. A 
similar lesson was learned in India through many 
failures and one terrible disaster. The Philippine 
police service was fortunate in being placed at 
first under an officer of the right stamp, and the 
work it has done is a justification of the policy. 
But there is a tendency to expect too much from 
any body in the archipelago which is in fair work- 
ing order, and the police have been, like every 
other branch of the service, overworked. They 
have had little time for internal organization or 
drill, and, it may be mentioned, incidentally, they 
are the worst-paid body in the service. 

A fresh problem in controlling a tropical region 
will arise in Panama. Without any question of 
military occupation, there will be needed a strong 
police force to maintain order. Negroes are the 
only possible material for such a force, since the 
country is very unhealthy for white men and the 
Colombians are unsuitable. There will certainly 
be a great drain on the negro population of the 
West Indies both for the work of construction on 
the canal and for police duties. It would be 
impossible to utilize the present black cavalry of 
the United States army, who, with excellent 
fighting qualities are not suited for civil duties. 
The negro police may be recruited from the South, 
but it is doubtful whether they would care for 
service on the isthmus, and there must be grave 
doubts as to their amenability to discipline. The 

356 



GREATER AMERICA 

West Indian negro is not only strong physically, 
but is docile, willing, and brave when disciplined 
and led. But he will require different treatment 
and handling to that usually meted out by Amer- 
icans to negroes. He understands neither the free- 
dom of manner nor the strong contempt with which 
his race is treated in America. It is again the ques- 
tion of a high class of officers. In every part of 
our own empire we have found this to be the case, 
and it has come to be idiomatic with us that it 
takes a gentleman to get on with " niggers." This 
subject has been treated of elsewhere, in the 
chapters on the Phihppines and Americans in the 
tropics. It narrows itself down again and again 
to this : America has now to provide inducements 
to the very best of her sons to serve abroad as 
police officers, military instructors, civil servants, 
and so forth. Only by the very best can Greater 
America be worthily served. 

To turn to the other branch of the militant 
service. There can be no question that naval ex- 
pansion is the dominant note in world policy to- 
day.^ Germany heads the list in the strenuous- 
ness of her efforts, and is bent on doubling her fleet 
in the next decade, and achieving the Herculean 
task of becoming second only to Great Britain in 
naval power. Her exertions have forced on Great 
Britain an unusual activity. We have adopted a 
policy known as the "two-power standard," by 

* See Appendix A. 
357 



GREATER AMERICA 

which we must maintain a fleet at least equal to 
those of any two combined powers. Any decrease 
in the proportion of our naval strength would be 
fatal to that supremacy on the sea which our scat- 
tered empire makes essential. The present rate of 
naval expansion is a heavy burden to us, so heavy 
that it becomes increasingly doubtful whether 
this country can continue, unaided, to support 
it. Russia, although essentially a land power, 
has adopted a naval policy which must sorely 
puzzle some of her ardent admirers. What can 
be her object in laying down vessels in all the yards 
of Europe and America until she is already third 
on the list in point of numerical strength. She 
has established herself on the Pacific and has 
ice-free ports on the China Sea; she still hopes 
for an outlet on the Persian Gulf, and is work- 
ing steadily towards the Baltic. With her am- 
bitions we have now little to do. They may, 
however, be briefly summed up as being chiefly 
inimical to the United States in that they are 
essentially monopolistic. Anglo - Saxondom — 
however it may work, and some of its methods 
have certainly been rather indirect — is desirous of 
opening the world for trade, of bringing freedom, 
civilization, and peace to every part of the globe. 
Russia, with her programme of territorial ex- 
pansion, military achievements, closed ports, auto- 
cratic government, and non - progressiveness, is 
a menace to the world. One of the signs of the 
times is an evident working compact between 

358 



GREATER AMERICA 

Russia and Germany, and an interesting side- 
light is cast on this by the clause included in the 
Russo-German agreement regarding China/ which 
provides that Russia shall oppose no obstacle to 
German ambitions in South America and shall 
give her a free hand in following out her interests 
and developing the material resources in that 
country.^ 

The naval question is, therefore, of even great- 
er importance to a country which, like America, 
has spread overseas, extended her seaboard, and 
occupied a number of positions of strategic value, 
if defended by a strong fleet. The actual ef- 
ficiency of the United States navy is liable to be 
over-estimated because of its success in the Spanish 
war. There was a tendency, not unnatural to 
people who tasted for the first time in their lives 
the fruits of victory, to exaggerate their own 
achievements. Since 1812 the United States had 
seen no naval warfare, and the present generation, 
remembering what was done then, and also the 
part played by their ships in blockading the 
confederate ports during the civil war, were apt to 
congratulate themselves on having kept alive the 
naval tradition. 

As a matter of fact, however, the present navy, 
such as it is, dates only from 1882, at which date 

^ Reinsch, World Politics, p. 284. 

' In the German Diet, in December, 1903, the president, 
by a significant slip of the tongue, referred to Russia as "an 
allied and friendly power." 

359 



GREATER AMERICA 

the ships were all antiquated wooden vessels. 
The reason for this is simple. Before the civil 
war America was fairly well provided with ocean 
shipping, naval and mercantile — the latter, in- 
deed, almost equalled that of Great Britain in 
tonnage. With the dislocation resulting from the 
war and the preoccupation of the reconstruction 
period came the restriction which forbade the 
purchasing of vessels in foreign countries. Co- 
inciden tally, the introduction of iron and steam 
vessels involved the entire remodelling of existing 
navies. America did not attempt to cope with 
this. She had entered on a period in which the 
urgent character of home problems and the ex- 
haustion of the nation after a fratricidal struggle 
made warlike preparations, for remote contingen- 
cies, extremely distasteful. It is to this period, 
and not to an earlier one, that she owes the growth 
of that desire for isolation, that vehement protest 
against any movement which would bring her in 
contact with European powers, which has been 
magnified by some people into a national policy 
or tradition. Taking a short view, shutting their 
eyes to the possibilities which their own develop- 
ment would involve, the Americans of the period 
echoed a parrot-cry which is heard now in another 
quarter of their continent. "We do not want a 
navy for defence," they said, "for Europe has 
neither excuse nor desire to attack us, and if she 
did it is on land that our defence would be made. 
We do not want one for offence, because we are 

360 



GREATER AMERICA 

self-contained in our own continent, and will not 
meddle with Europe." Then came the era of 
industrial expansion, and all America was too 
busy money-making to attend to either army or 
navy. 

In the early eighties, however, oversea expan- 
sion, especially in the Pacific, and the conse- 
quent broadening of the national outlook, aroused 
a certain interest in these matters. The mer- 
cantile marine had dwindled almost to vanish- 
ing-point ; the ships-of-war are described as having 
been almost as inefficient as those of Alcibiades 
and Hamilcar, certainly as the ships of Tromp and 
Blake. The first step was the appointment of an 
advisory board, and from this time the creation 
of a modem navy went on steadily, if slowly. Not 
only ships were needed but a trained personnel, 
and one of the steps which assisted in making the 
small navy really efficient was the practice of 
keeping the ships at sea and training the men to 
gunnery. To this fact was no doubt chiefly due 
the success in the Spanish war. After the war 
a complete reorganization of the personnel took 
place (in 1899), the executive and engineering 
branches being amalgamated. Of recent years, 
too, a grand effort has been made to regain the 
ground lost in the mercantile marine. The ship- 
ping subsidy bill of 1901, and the shipping Trust 
which followed, have been powerful instruments 
in assisting this, and the result is that last year 
the mercantile marine tonnage for the first time 

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GREATER AMERICA 

in American history was over six millions gross. 
Nevertheless, a very large proportion of American 
trade is still carried in foreign bottoms, and there 
is practically no carrying-trade with either the Far 
East or South America. 

The stimulus provided by subsidies and Trusts 
is, of course, more or less artificial, and is on that 
ground open to criticism, but in these days of 
forced competition it is impossible without some 
such measures to establish the necessary lines, 
which must be provided first and left to justify 
their existence afterwards. The policy of Ger- 
many in this respect has forced the pace on other 
nations, and it is the experience of Great Britain 
that even old and well-established lines, paying 
legitimate dividends, cannot stand against those 
assisted, as are German lines, by a high degree 
of organization and heavy subsidies from govern- 
ment. 

One of the great difficulties in the way of the 
American naval and mercantile marine is the 
costliness of building vessels. America possesses 
all the requisites, and has, besides, brought the 
mechanical side of the work to a high pitch of per- 
fection, but the cost of labor, and especially of the 
skilled labor, necessary for a great deal of such 
work is a heavy charge. This should not prove 
an obstacle to a people who seem to find some 
difficulty in disposing of a yearly surplus; but the 
American, however rich, desires full value for his 
money, and he is, perhaps, hardly yet convinced 

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GREATER AMERICA 

that the enormous cost of these vessels represents 
their actual value to him when built. 

An even greater difficulty is that of obtaining 
a suitable personnel. There is no pressure of 
population in America, and very little of that 
sentiment for the sea which is found in an island 
people. Living on a great continent, many thou- 
sands never even see the ocean. Still, there is a 
vast seaboard, which should furnish a supply of 
men for the sea, were it not for the fact that 
neither the Pacific seaboard nor even the southern 
part of the Atlantic is adequately furnished with 
harbors. Puget Sound is, perhaps, the finest har- 
bor in the world; but it stands alone. A fish- 
ing population is always a valuable recruiting- 
ground for the navy; but, except in the most 
northern latitudes— Maine and Oregon— there is 
but little of this element to be found. Germany 
has, indeed, proved that by a careful early train- 
ing a good sailor may be evolved from a peasant 
from the heart of the country; but it is doubtful 
whether it would be possible to transplant, even 
in a modified form, the German system to a coun- 
try so impatient of discipline as the United States. 
The mercantile marine of America enjoys, un- 
fortunately, an evil reputation among sailors, and 
much is needed to improve the status of men both 
in this and the naval branch of the service. Great 
Britain suffered in the past from desertion, mu- 
tiny, and other drawbacks, which have only been 
obviated by entire reform— first, in the position 

3^3 



GREATER AMERICA 

accorded to men on board ship as regards their 
rights, and, secondly, in the selection and pro- 
motion of officers. 

It is claimed for the American navy that it is 
entirely exempt from the baneful effects of patron- 
age; and it is certain that the officers trained at 
Annapolis have every opportunity of becoming 
efficient, while they are subjected to a discipline 
which is essential to men who may be called on 
in the future to take command and responsibility 
on a large scale. A navy general staff has recently 
been proposed in which all the different branches 
of the service — personnel, fleet, and war plans — 
should be thoroughly co - ordinated and placed 
under efficient officers.* A naval constioiction 



^ In his annual report made to the President, Mr. Moody, 
the Secretary of the Navy, said : "It is asserted by many, 
both within and without the naval service, that alterations 
in the organic law governing the administration of naval 
affairs would result in an increased efficiency and economy. 
The agitation for a change comes from so many and such 
respectable quarters that it cannot be denied consideration. 
It has been pointed out with truth that in the civil war, 
and, in a very much less degree, in the war with Spain, the 
organization proved inadequate. ... It is not my purpose to 
recommend specifically at this time any of these proposals, 
but only to bring them forward for the earnest discussion and 
consideration which their importance deserves. Mere change 
is not reform, and none should be attempted until it appears 
clearly that conditions would be bettered thereby. I venture, 
however, to express the hope that Congress may give to the 
whole subject of the organization of our naval establishment 
its best thought and attention. The cost of our naval es- 
tablishment as well as the importance of the efficiency of the 
navy would amply warrant all the study which can be 
given." 

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GREATER AMERICA 

programme, to cover a period of twenty years, 
with an average expenditure of about thirty mill- 
ion dollars per annum, is now proposed. There 
is, therefore, the nucleus of an efficient arm, 
which should be strengthened and equipped in 
every possible way, not, perhaps, with a view to 
actual conflict, but to render such conflict un- 
likely. The machinery has been provided, here 
as in the army ; what is now necessary is the 
stimulus afforded by national sentiment and in- 
telligent interest. The formation of Navy Leagues, 
which have proved, both in Germany and Great 
Britain, of the greatest service in insuring naval 
efficiency, is a measure which should be initiated 
in the United States. Under the present system 
of government such leagues would be extremely 
useful in influencing pubHc opinion, upon which 
so much depends. 

It will be seen, therefore, that a good deal has 
been accompHshed, and that still more is con- 
templated, towards placing the military and naval 
services upon a footing commensurate with the 
great and growing world interests which it is their 
duty to defend. 



CHAPTER XVI 

ASIA IN TRANSFORMATION 

At the risk of appearing to digress slightly from 
the actual subject-matter of this book, Greater 
America, it is necessary here to give a brief account 
of the changes which are taking place in Asia. 
That these must profoundly affect not only the 
great powers of Europe (whose fate, indeed, is to 
a certain extent bound up in them), but must in- 
fluence America in a high degree, and may have 
a determining voice in the future of Greater 
America, may not be obvious at first sight. But 
no one who seriously contemplates the extraor- 
dinary character of Asiatic developments and their 
immistakable trend can doubt that this is the 

case. 

The transformation of Asia is synonymous with 
the expansion of Russia. The Russification of a 
vast continent has proceeded at a pace so rapid 
that many of us can remember its infancy — the 
time when the expression " Mervousness " was 
laughingly applied to a few people who did not 
accept Russia's "assurances" regarding her am- 
bitions in Central Asia. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

Let us take briefly the most salient points in the 
situation. Asia contains about one -half of the 
world's population, and its races are unusually 
prolific. It has resources which are practically 
unlimited, including an area of food - producing 
land which is unequalled in any other continent. 
It is now, not only in the Near but in the Far 
East, the arena for the great powers of Europe, 
the European situation being reproduced in 
both these regions. Into the Oriental arena 
the United States has been drawn. As the 
owner of the Philippines she is practically an 
Asiatic power. But, apart from that, her in- 
evitable evolution as a world-power and her re- 
lations with other nations, which are bound to 
increase in intimacy, compel her to play a part 
in the international drama in the Far East. It 
would be hardly consonant with American am- 
bitions or pretensions if that part were a minor 
one. There is, indeed, no quarter of the globe 
where the United States has interests in which 
she can afford to put herself on a level, say, with 
Belgium. 

What are the principal changes in Asia which 
will bring that continent into touch with America ? 
First, we have the annihilation of distance. From 
east to west flow the lines of international com- 
munication. Already the traveller round the world 
can choose alternative routes without deviat- 
ing much from a direct path. Oceans no longer 
divide; they rather unite. The opening of com- 

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GREATER AMERICA 

mtinication through Suez brought Europe into 
close contact with the East; the opening of a 
trans-isthmian canal will do as much for the 
greater part of the United States. The Mississippi, 
the cradle of a great industrial future, in which 
is the centre of gravity of the United States, is 
peculiarly situated as regards the isthmus, and 
the opening of the new route to the East will 
give the vast Mississippi region, as well as the 
Atlantic States, a short and direct outlet to 
markets still unexploited — the Pacific and the Far 
East. 

Asia has been crossed by a continuous railway 
line, already throwing out branches, and the 
journey between Europe and the Far East has 
been reduced to some twenty days. This all- 
Russian line is only part of a scheme for linking 
up European Russia with her empire in the Far 
East of Asia. The centre of the continent is, for 
the most part, a vast table-land, rising, on the 
borders of northern India and Tibet, to lofty 
mountain ranges. Physical difficulties render this 
region the last stronghold of Oriental exclusive- 
ness; but even now the insistent European is 
knocking at the gates, and it is not yet certain 
that he will not find another semi-European warm- 
ing his hands at the fire when he does break in. 
Be that as it may, central Asia has already its 
trunk-line of railway, with feeders running down 
towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, to 
the borders of Afghanistan and northward to 

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connect with the Siberian Hne.' Then, through 
the territories of the Sick Man of the East, once 
prosperous and populated, still full of possibilities, 
a line is projected which would connect the Med- 
iterranean and the Persian Gulf and give yet an- 
other alternative route to the East. India is link- 
ed up by a railway system of some twenty-seven 
thousand miles, and Burma has her own railways, 
to be joined later to those of India. Northern 
and southern China are being linked by rail- 
way lines, foreign built and owned. France is 
building an extension of her Tonkinese railway 
through Yunnan to the upper Yangtse; Canton 
is being connected with the Yangtse at Han- 
kow by an American line, and from that point 
a Franco-Belgian railway, in active construction, 
will shortly run to Peking, thus connecting China 
from south to north. Peking again is joined to 
the Russian Manchurian railways via Tientsin and 
Newchwang, but a shorter cut is said to be pro- 
jected, if not actually begun, and still another 
by which the Chinese capital will be linked up 
directly with Lake Baikal and the Siberian rail- 
way through a line across the so-called "Gobi 

' The trans-Caspian line, some two thousand three hundred 
miles in length, starts from Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian, 
skirts northeast Persia, and runs by Merv, Bokhara, Samar- 
kand, Khokand, and Margilan to Andijan in Fergana. It has 
a branch north to Tashkend, and thence a line (one thousand 
two hundred miles) is being constructed to Orenburg, on the 
borders of European Russia. A branch south to Meshed, in 
Persia, is under construction, and another, from Merv to 
Kushk, on the borders of Afghanistan, has been completed. 
34 369 



GREATER AMERICA 

Desert." Other Russian lines south of Peking are 
proposed, while the Germans are busy with their 
Hnes in Shantung, pushing their way in various 
directions into the Hinterland. Only the British, 
with various concessions in hand, are supine, the 
trend of events not encouraging the investment of 
capital. From every quarter, therefore, the steel 
lines — pioneers of political aggression rather than 
civilization and progress — are closing round or 
thrusting themselves, feeler-like, towards the heart 
of Asia. That great, inert. Oriental continent is 
being galvanized into life. The second change in 
the condition of Asia, to which, of course, the an- 
nihilation of distance has largely conduced, is the 
reproduction, first in the Near and then in the 
Far East, of the European situation, with all its 
rivalries, intrigues, and combinations. The centre 
of gravity of world politics has, as the writer pre- 
dicted twenty years ago, shifted from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific, and in that region we find not only 
Europe but America. 

The principal factor in accomplishing this trans- 
formation is undoubtedly the great northern Co- 
lossus. Russia's marvellous advance, her aims 
and their significance to the Anglo-Saxon peo- 
ples, are spoken of elsewhere. Her position as the 
owner of more than half Asia and the neighbor 
of America is in itself sufficient reason to compel 
American interest in Asiatic affairs. A more 
intimate aspect of the situation appears, how- 
ever, in the question of the future of China, and 

37° 



GREATER AMERICA 

on this the many changes in Asia have all a more 
or less direct bearing. 

Great Britain can recall the time when she en- 
joyed an easy supremacy in the affairs of the Far 
East. Her interests there were purely commercial. 
Both she and the United States contemplated 
nothing less than the acquisition of territory in 
that region. Their energies were bent merely on 
the opening of obstinately closed doors to their 
trade. Japan's sudden transformation and the 
ambitions of certain European powers changed 
the aspect of affairs. First came the defeat of 
China by Japan, the eviction of Japan by Rus- 
sia, Germany, and France, and then the scram- 
ble for Chinese territory, in which Russia actually, 
though not officially, made the first move. The 
extent of the expansion of Russia in the last half- 
century can be gathered from a glance at the map, 
prepared for the purpose; but it is difficult to 
discern the exact process of growth of Russian 
power in the Far East. At certain dates we see 
her annex or acquire great slices of territory — the 
Amur province, then Primorsk, then Manchuria; 
we see the steady increase of concessions on the 
part of China to her friend Russia, and at a certain 
date, at all events, we know that the foremost 
Chinese statesman of the day practically became 
the agent of the Tsar. These are all epoch-making 
events. But of the slow, persistent, silent diplo- 
macy, the thousand intrigues which made these 
events possible and which found nothing too small 

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GREATER AMERICA 

or too insignificant to be included within their 
scope — of all this we know very little/ 

Mongolia is valuable to the power which desires 
to dominate China. Although the general con- 
ception of that region is that of a huge, sandy 
desert, it contains, in fact, the grazing-ground for 
vast herds of sheep and cattle required for the 
feeding of a densely packed country like north 
China. Moreover, it is the breeding-ground for 
a small and sturdy breed of horses, invaluable for 
various purposes. If Mongolia is already honey- 
combed with Russian influence, we know that the 
same insidious factor has penetrated to the heart 
of Tibet. In a recent work' Mr. Chirol explains 
how, through one of the heads of the religious 
hierarchy who lives at Urga and has come en- 
tirely under Russian domination, a hold has been 
obtained over Lhasa. This personage obtained 
the admission to the councils of the Dalai lama of 

^ An instance of these hardly perceptible methods, which 
came to the writer's personal knowledge recently, may be 
given as an illustration. Some years back inquiries were set 
on foot at the principal Mongol lamaseries at Peking for men 
to teach Russians the Mongol language. Some twenty-five 
or thirty of these men, well equipped with money and clothes, 
left for certain towns understood to be somewhere on the 
Russian frontier to teach the Russians there. Their duties, 
needless to say, were to prepare the way for Russian domina- 
tion. The Russian officials at the time were in the habit of 
constantly visiting the head lamas in the Great Lamasery 
(said to have about one thousand five hundred lamas, the 
chief lama, or Gensen, being usually a Tibetan), at Peking, 
well laden with gifts, and of receiving visits from them in 
return. 

^ The Middle-Eastern Question. 1903. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

a Siberian Buriat, and this envoy has been back- 
ward and forward several times between Lhasa 
and St. Petersburg. Russian scientific missions 
have been busy in Tibet for many years ; and in 
the recent work of Dr. Sven Hedin, recording 
his observations in the outlying parts of Tibet 
and his abortive attempt to reach Lhasa, it is 
significant to note that his two Cossack guards 
secured for him not only respect and consideration 
wherever he went, but that the very officials who 
prevented his progress to the Forbidden City 
assured him that under no circumstances would 
they use force, but that he must carry out his 
project over their dead bodies.' One of the 
professors at the St. Petersburg University, M. 
Zybikoff, a Buriat by birth, has not only visited 
but resided in Lhasa as a lama, and he asserts 
that Buriats, Kalmucks, and Mongols of the Rus- 
sian dominion receive their priests from Tibet and 
send their youths to be trained in Lhasa, thus 
keeping up a constant stream of communication 
with the city, which is, in fact, " forbidden " only 
to foreigners who are not Russian subjects. In- 
cidentally, a Japanese and a Hindoo traveller have 
visited Lhasa without revealing their nationality 
and have given accounts of the city. If a Europe- 
an Russian has not been openly received at Lhasa 
it is probably because it has been convenient to 
Russia to maintain Tibet in her exclusive attitude- 

* Central Asia and Tibet. 1903. 
373 



GREATER AMERICA 

for through her Buddhist subjects she can get all 
she requires of information and influence. 

The British movement into Tibet has its origin 
no doubt in a desire to force the hand of Russia. 
It is important to retain Tibet as a real buffer 
state in central Asia and to prevent Russia from 
coming into close contact with the protected states 
on the northern fringe of India. A close connec- 
tion, based on religion and trade, exists between 
some of these states and Tibet, and the true in- 
terests of the latter lie southward and not north. 
There is no trade with Russia, and Tibet is cut off 
by the sand wastes of Turkestan and the deserts 
of Mongolia on the north and west ; east of her lies 
China, and the main current of national life flows 
in that direction. Hence her primary importance 
to Russia. A glance at a map will show how 
Tibet commands the sources of the Yangtse, and, 
with France creeping up through Yunnan, it is 
plain that China might be cut off from the rest of 
the continent entirely, dominated north and west 
by Russia and on the south by France. 

It is interesting to remember that the seven- 
teenth century, which saw the founding of Boston 
and the colonies of Rhode Island, Maryland, Caro- 
lina, and Pennsylvania, and the first Dutch settle- 
ment at the Cape of Good Hope, saw also the foun- 
dation of the Russian Empire by Peter the Great, 
who took his half-savage, half -Oriental, loosely 
organized kingdom, centring in the ancient khanate 
at Moscow, and turned it into the nucleus of a 

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GREATER AMERICA 

modern empire. The settlers of the New World 
began with individual liberty, initiative, and a 
spirit of independence and fraternity. Russia was 
founded by a clever, unscrupulous despot, ruling 
by sheer force of will over a savage, disunited 
congeries of tribes. He brought from his sojourn 
in the West some of the features of civilization and 
introduced them at the point of the sword. The 
New- World colonists began their lives with all 
the equipment that the best civilization of the 
time could give them. It is a singular and in- 
teresting contrast, and one that might profitably 
be followed in the whole history of the two peoples ; 
but we are now concerned more with Russia's 
future than her past. Great as has been her 
material progress, she remains to this day a semi- 
civilized giant. For the handful of highly polish- 
ed, elegant, French-speaking Russian nobility one 
meets in the cities there is a vast, illiterate, half- 
civilized proletariat.^ Only of late years has there 
grown up a middle class, which combine the 
heritage of poverty and labor with a certain degree 
of education. Whatever the forces warring within 
her, however, Russia has the enormous advantage 
in brute force of a great, rapidly growing popula- 
tion, like a vast battering-ram, directed by the 
highly wrought engine of the governing class, whose 

* In All the Russias Mr. Henry Norman, no captious critic 
of Russian affairs, says: "Poverty and illiteracy naturally go 
hand-in-hand. In no other great country of the world is pov- 
erty — monotonous, resigned poverty — to so great an extent a 
national characteristic of the people." 

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GREATER AMERICA 

motive power is supplied from St. Petersburg. 
Russia is the apotheosis of centralization, and 
should that central brain be paralyzed it is im- 
possible to foresee what might happen to the vast, 
unwieldy limbs; but, failing such a catastrophe, 
the giant will continue on his path until he meets 
a strong organism on which to try his strength. 
Hitherto, be it observed, he has proceeded against 
the lower organisms of political life, the weak 
central Asian khanates, the unorganized Siberian 
and Buriat tribes, the temfied and unprogressive 
China. His ambitions towards Constantinople 
landed him in a war with great powers, since when 
he has cast covetous eyes but has done nothing but 
scheme and undermine in that direction. 

Side by side with these changes on the Asiatic 
continent, a process of transformation has been 
working in the Pacific Ocean. Although this ap- 
pears to the casual observer to be a modern 
movement, and although it is only of recent years 
that modern statesmen have come to understand 
the part that ocean is to play in world history, yet 
the early statesmen of America, with a remarkable 
foresight, had a true conception of the importance 
of that ocean and laid their plans accordingly. 
Jefferson, at a time when the mountains still 
seemed an almost impenetrable barrier, foresaw 
the development under the American asgis of the 
whole Pacific slope. Seward, at a later date, 
while the rest of his world was exhausted with a 
fratricidal struggle and cared for nothing save 

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GREATER AMERICA 

peace and reconstruction, could look ahead far 
enough to seize the opportunity of securing for 
his country Alaska and the Aleutian islands. 

During the period which preceded the civil war, 
America, indeed, had been playing a considerable 
part in Pacific affairs. The war of 1812 roused 
in her people that pride in and love of ships which 
was their heritage. American traders, fishers, and 
explorers were first in the Pacific. At this time 
England was engaged, through the East India 
Company, in a slow, stately, and not altogether 
remunerative trade with the ports of the Far East. 
Her ships had to go by the Cape of Good Hope, 
and a year was not an unreasonable time for the 
trading venture to occupy. Then America began 
to send across from her Pacific slope the light, 
swift vessels for which she was to become famous. 
The discovery of gold in California in 1847, ^^^ ^^ 
Australia in 185 1, gave a stimulus not only to the 
carrying- trade but to industries and manufactures. 
The Pacific began to be the arena of a number of 
ocean highways, and all this made an increase in 
the world's shipping an imperative necessity. A 
keen competition for the carrying - trade in the 
Far East between Britain and America ensued, 
and the evolution of the American clipper, which 
was the most beautiful, as well as the fastest ship 
of the day, gave the New World a supremacy in 
mercantile marine which she has never since 
attained. 

It is worth while to pause for a moment in our 

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GREATER AMERICA 

sketch of Pacific expansion to recall these halcyon 
days which must surely be forgotten by Americans 
when they speak of the "newness" of the policy 
which gives them interests in the Pacific and in 
eastern Asia. The late Alexander Michie, writing 
from actual memory of those days, draws the 
following picture: 

" The ocean was the true route to California for 
emigrants and material, but the voyage was long, 
and, impatience of intervening space being the 
ruling temper of gold-seekers, the shortening of 
the time of transit became a crying want for the 
living cargoes, and scarcely less for the perishable 
provisions which the new ships were designed to 
carry. Speed, comfort, and capacity had, there- 
fore, to be combined in a way which had never 
before been attempted. The result was the his- 
torical American clipper of the middle of the 
century, beautiful to look on with her cloud of 
white cotton canvas, covering every ocean high- 
way. These were vessels of large capacity, carry- 
ing one -half more dead -weight than their reg- 
istered tonnage, built and rigged like yachts, and 
attaining a speed never before reached on the 
high seas. . . . The Americans not only had the 
Cahfomian trade practically in their own hands, 
but were prompt to turn the advantage which 
that gave them to profitable account in the com- 
petition for the trade of China. The ships, when 
empty, sailed across the Pacific, loading at Canton 
or Shanghai tea and other produce for London or 

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GREATER AMERICA 

New York. . . . Larger and finer ships were con- 
stantly being added to the American fleet until they 
almost monopolized the trade not only between 
New York and San Francisco, but also between 
China and Great Britain. . . . Thus the China Sea 
became a principal battle-ground whereon the 
struggle for ascendency between the ships of Great 
Britain and the United States was most strenuous- 
ly fought out."' 

How the British roused themselves to meet their 
rivals, the heroic measures adopted, including the 
abrogation of the Navigation Acts, and the part 
played in the struggle by the discovery of gold 
in Australia, by the civil war in America, by the 
opening of the Suez Canal, and by the invention 
of iron and steam vessels, is a story which can- 
not be told here. Sufficient that the energies of 
Americans were turned for a time into other 
channels, their shipping declined, the day of the 
beautiful, white-winged argosies was over and the 
paths of the Pacific knew them no more. 

The second period of American activity in the 
Pacific has led her back to contend once more, on 
very different terms, for the markets of the Far 
East. No longer is Britain practically the only 
competitor; no longer is that vast region a terra 
incognita waiting only for Occidental enterprise 
and affording unlimited scope for the merchant ad- 
venturer. The transformation of Asia is nowhere 

* The Englishman in China. 
379 



GREATER AMERICA 

more evident than in the Far Eastern section of 
that continent, and the main features in that 
change are the advance of Russia, already de- 
scribed, and the renascence of Japan. 

These two factors — advancing Russia and pro- 
gressive Japan — are antipathetic. Sooner or later 
their interests were bound to clash. To Japan 
the vital question in the Far East is the pres- 
ervation of China as an Oriental state. She has 
been plainly shown that she is not to be per- 
mitted to exercise authority over her sister na- 
tion; indeed, the legitimate fruits of victory were 
denied her after the Chino-Japanese war. Since 
that time she has changed her tactics and has done 
everything in her power to win the confidence of 
China. She has succeeded well, if we remember 
the intense contempt with which the Chinese used 
to regard their Japanese neighbors. But the steady 
absorbing process to which Russia is subjecting 
the administrative centre, as well as the outlying 
provinces of China, are too insidious, and too far 
advanced to be combated by similar methods on 
the part of Japan, who, moreover, has not been 
allowed by the European powers (what each one 
claims for itself) an actual foothold in the Chinese 
Empire. It is, therefore, no question as to the in- 
dependence of Korea alone — vital as that is to the 
Japanese; Russia is not prepared to fight for that 
— nor is it a matter of trade interests in Man- 
churia, though these may be used as a lever. 
The crux of the situation is whether or no Russia 

380 



GREATER AMERICA 

will give definite assurances in a binding form 
as to her ambitions in eastern Asia — assurances 
with ample guarantees that she does not dispute 
the sovereignty of China. This would form a 
basis for future operations and would establish 
an element of permanency which would be un- 
doubtedly used by Japan to strengthen the posi- 
tion of China. That apparently moribund empire 
would certainly use her independence to make 
fresh engagements with Western powers as to 
trade; but in the influence and tutelage of Japan 
rests the only hope of permanent improvement in 
her condition. 

As for the attitude of Japan at this crisis, it 
is remarkable for its consistency and firmness, 
despite many attempts made to deflect the issue, 
to discredit her by apparent concessions which 
she could not accept, and by other devices to place 
her in an unfavorable light before the world. 
Japan keeps her aims steadily before her, and 
what those aims are may well be stated in the 
words of a man who has a life-long knowledge of 
his subject. Captain Brinkley, in his recent book 
says: "Japan has risen to the headship of the 
Far East. Is that the goal of her ambition ? One 
of her favorite sayings is, ' Better be the tail of an 
ox than the comb of a cock. ' She is now the comb 
of the Oriental cock — that is not enough ; she wants 
to be the tail of the Occidental ox. How is it to 
be done? Evidently by following the route that 
has already led her so far. She cannot turn back. 

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GREATER AMERICA 

Her destiny forces her on, and there is no mistaking 
the sign - post set up by her recent experience. 
She has been taught that fighting capacity is the 
only sure passport to European esteem " — (Captain 
Brinkley has already pointed out that until she 
beat China, Japan's internal progress had won her 
little recognition in Europe or America) — "and 
she has also been told again and again, is still 
perpetually told, that her victory over China 
proved nothing about her competence to stand in 
the lists of the West. She will complete the proof, 
or try to complete it."^ Incidentally it may be 
remarked that Japan's position as the "comb of 
the Oriental cock" would be immediately jeop- 
ardized by the break up of China, which would 
bring several European powers into prominence 
in the Far East and would certainly mean the 
ascendency of Russia. Japan is, therefore, pro- 
tecting what she has already won, as well as 
satisfying a legitimate ambition for future great- 
ness. 

One of the factors in the situation in China which 
is hardest to gauge is the rapprochement which 
has taken place between the thinking classes in 
Japan and China, despite the defeat suffered by 
a proud people at the hands of a nation they 
despised, despite the ever-growing web of Russian 
intrigue and influence. It seemed as though, in her 
extremity, China had turned to her once-despised 

^ Japan and China. 1903. 
382 



GREATER AMERICA 

rival for help against the Western barbarians, and 
the founding of the East Asiatic League, with an 
organ at Peking, the despatch of students to 
Tokio, and the demand for Japanese teachers in 
many forms of industry and in the army, are signs 
of good feeling hailed as a happy augury. 

The great difficulty in appraising the true value 
of such signs is to differentiate between the real 
China and the Manchu government, whose acts 
represent the Celestial Empire to the outer world. 
Progress and reform had quite a little vogue in 
court circles after the return from Singnan-fu. 
Missionaries were patted on the back by hands 
steeped in the blood of thousands of native Chris- 
tians ; ladies of legations were wept over, in regret 
for past misunderstandings, and went away loaded 
with sweet words and cheap presents; Imperial 
edicts decreed the reform of education, which, if 
carried out, would revolutionize the whole fabric 
of Chinese society ; and, simultaneously, a despatch 
urged the immediate capture and execution of 
reformers who had been suggesting less drastic 
measures without the imperial imprimatur. 

The extraordinary force vested in the Manchu 
government, and controlled by the Empress 
Dowager and her immediate relatives, has a 
peculiar relation to the Chinese people. It has 
been pointed out by native writers (from the 
secure vantage-point of a British settlement) that 
the head of the Manchu dynasty has by Chi- 
nese law incurred the punishment of decapitation 

383 



GREATER AMERICA 

by having surrendered territory to a foreigner. 
Moreover, the bulk of the Chinese neither respect 
nor love the wonderful old lady at Peking. The 
vilest stories are in common circulation about her, 
just as they were about her great supporter, Li- 
Hung Chang. At the same time, not only the 
Chinese people at large, but some of the best and 
most upright of Chinese statesmen, including the 
Yangtse viceroys, Liu-kun-yi and Chang-chih- 
tung, were personally loyal to her and saved the 
empire for the Manchu dynasty at the time when 
the secession of the Yangtse provinces was strong- 
ly urged from without. No adequate explanation 
can be given of this anomaly, which is the more 
confusing as one attempts to analyze it. No na- 
tion is so badly governed as the Chinese — none, 
perhaps, enjoys a more complete local autonomy. 
The paradoxes of China are proverbial. The only 
suggestion that can be offered as to the continued 
ascendency of the Manchus is the fact that were 
they to fall the vast net-work which emanates from 
Peking and centres there would be thrown out of 
gear. There is nothing that could be set up in 
its place; no rival dynasty. The nepotism of the 
Manchus has secured them a monopoly of all the 
best posts near the throne and has precluded the 
rise of a Chinese aristocracy. The actual organi- 
zation of society, indeed, precludes any real Chi- 
nese aristocracy or ruling class. The Manchus 
alone have the privileges attaching to an heredi- 
tary nobility, and though titles have been be- 



GREATER AMERICA 

stowed on distinguished Chinese, these are, in fact, 
for foreign consumption only. There is only one 
Chinese hereditary noble, who derives the dignity 
from his descent from Confucius. While this is 
the case, it is obviously difficult to evolve any 
class combination among the Chinese which could 
vie with that of the small but powerful Manchu 
aristocracy which are spread over the land, " eat- 
ing it," as the phrase goes. The people, in many 
ways wretched, from the Western point of view, 
being the victims of official corruption, heavy 
exactions, and incomplete justice, are far from 
contented, but yet have not that oneness of aim, 
that power of combination, which makes masses 
powerful in the state. Revolutions and rebellions, 
on small and large scales, are chronic, but no 
great leader has appeared who could point the 
way to victory. The Chinese has no aspirations 
at all after ethical perfection. He wants to be 
let alone and to have an opportunity for selling 
what he makes or raises. He has a rooted objec- 
tion to taxation, and would infinitely rather bribe 
a tax-gatherer to pass him over than give up his 
just demand. 

Whatever may be the future of this people, it is 
plain to the most enlightened of their own states- 
men that they are not ripe for the introduction, 
wholesale, of a European civilization. The same 
consideration probably weighs with many enlight- 
ened Chinese in their allegiance to the dynasty. 
That dynasty represents to the ignorant masses 
« 385 



GREATER AMERICA 

what no other power, no representative govern- 
ment, no new form of control can. They can 
hardly separate the Son of Heaven who rules them 
from the vague deity of whom there is an image 
in the breasts of the most ignorant of mankind. 
Russia was well advised when she began her at- 
tack on the Far East at the very heart of empire, 
and she has now established herself in the minds 
of the government at Peking as the friend and 
protector of the dynasty against those clamorous 
nations which have long been asking for refoiTQ 
— reform — reform! Reform would have to begin 
with the court itself, and that would not suit 
either the Empress Dowager or her favorites, so 
she has flung herself into the arms of the one 
power which not only does not ask for these in- 
convenient changes, but is also prepared to use 
force, if necessary, to back her opinions. The oft- 
repeated assurances of Great Britain have ceased 
to be regarded; she is no longer considered as 
China's friend, and it is thought easy to get the 
better of her with Russia's aid. An affront, too, 
was considered to have been put upon China by 
the British alliance with Japan, which may also 
have estranged somewhat the two Oriental coun- 
tries. It was believed by the Chinese to have 
been aimed against them. "Why did you not 
come to us, make an alliance with us?'' asked a 
Chinese statesman of his English friend. Not very 
reasonably, perhaps, from our point of view, but 
the Chinese point may well be different, and we 

386 



GREATER AMERICA 

are too little given to regard it. Under any cir- 
cumstances, however, it is to be feared that China 
will see in the present situation only a fresh proof 
of Russia's superiority of strength and purpose 
over the Anglo - Saxon powers. Her budding 
friendship for Japan may not stand such a test. 
She will comment on the futility of alliance with 
Europe, and should Japan fail in the attempt 
to secure her independence, will make the best 
terms she can with the conqueror, which will mean 
her own partition under the guise of protectorates. 
The worst thing that can happen to China, the 
dismemberment which began on the last occasion 
of conflict in the Far East, seems, therefore, once 
more possible, unless Japan is successful in put- 
ting a limit to Russian ambitions. 

Is China — rich in population and resources, in 
potentialities, awaiting the master-hand — rapidly 
degenerating into a Sick Man of the East? Or is 
there reserved for her another fate, even more 
inglorious? She is one of the last of Oriental 
empires. Siam is drifting towards her inevitable 
fate as a "protectorate" of France. Persia is 
independent only in name ; a fierce battle between 
Britain and Russia is being silently waged over 
her moribund body. Afghanistan, Tibet— buffer 
states — cannot long withstand the dynamic forces 
pressing upon them. Turkey is upheld merely 
by the balance of power in Europe— a slender reed. 
Is Russia to hold the key to China's future? Is 
the continent of Asia to be divided, giving Russia 

387 



GREATER AMERICA 

a solid, compact empire, leaving Great Britain 
the southern excrescences, with a slice or two for 
France and Germany in the East? This would 
obviously be a situation very difficult for Britain 
to maintain, and how much more so if the poten- 
tialities of China are to be developed on Slavonic 

lines. 

The actual position of the two Anglo-Saxon 
powers at this crisis in the history of the Far 
East, is a little difficult to define. That both 
have tangible interests which are threatened 
by Russia cannot be denied, and when we re- 
member the early history of Occidental inter- 
course with the Far East it seems remarkable 
that the earliest powers to open and develop that 
region should even contemplate an attitude of 
neutrality while so important a chapter in its 
history is being enacted. Both Britain and 
America have recently executed treaties with 
China which practically amount to an assertion 
of her sovereignty in Manchuria, and it is reported 
that Russia is willing to convey to those and to 
the other world powers an assurance that she has 
no intention to deprive China of that sovereignty. 
But, in the teeth of similar assurances, she has 
assumed in that region a position incompatible 
with China's sovereignty, and to Japan, as to the 
one power whose whole fate is bound up in this 
matter, has fallen the unpleasant task of requiring 
a more definite and binding promise. It is de- 
sirable that both Britain and America should keep 

388 



GREATER AMERICA 

this broad issue in mind, since it is the root of the 
situation, and certainly affects them both in more 
than one way. Japan is hardly likely to be mis- 
taken in her estimate of the situation as regards 
Russia and China, and if her estimate is right the 
great commercial nations, whose aims are coinci- 
dent with those of Japan, must view with grave 
misgivings any development which would cripple 
the one progressive Oriental nation, destroy the 
only hope of China for national regeneration, 
and throw the balance of power into Slavonic 
hands. Japan, as a naval power, holds that 
balance true in the Far East, and neither Great 
Britain, her ally, nor America, her friend, can 
afford to see the Japanese navy eliminated, or 
even reduced. There is another side of the 
question, which arises out of the possibility that 
Japan might be overcome by sheer weight in any 
struggle with the northern colossus. 

America has always desired to be considered 
as not only the home of liberty but the centre from 
which it should stream out into the world. She 
places more importance on the ethical significance 
of her own expansion than any other nation has 
yet done. She is practically pledged to the cause 
of freedom — even lays claim to quixotry in her 
dealings with oppressed peoples. Without sub- 
scribing to this view, without retracting the state- 
ment so frequently made in this book that Amer- 
ican expansion has been neither spasmodic nor 
altruistic, there remains the fact that the American 

389 



GREATER AMERICA 

people cannot, in the face of their actions else- 
where and their frequent protestations, view with- 
out deep concern the extinguishing of progress 
and liberty in Japan. Neither Britain nor the 
United States lifted up their voices against the 
brutal crushing of Finland — it was, perhaps, im- 
possible for them to do so save by an unpardonable 
breach of international etiquette; but in the case 
of Japan there are not only sentimental or moral 
grounds, but more solid ones, which could be made 
the basis of, at least, remonstrance. It is the con- 
duct of Russia in Manchuria which has brought 
affairs to a crisis, and Japan, remembering the 
language held by her Anglo - Saxon friends on 
this subject, was anxious that the collision which 
seemed inevitable should occur over a matter in 
which all the great powers were concerned. Even 
when disillusioned by a direct warning from Amer- 
ica and by an evident disinclination to interfere 
on the part of Great Britain, Japan has stood firm- 
ly in defence not only of her own interests but of 
those of the whole commercial world. 

What course can be suggested which would best 
serve the interests of Anglo - Saxondom ? The 
worst possible course is to permit Russia to dis- 
pose of the one active factor in the way of her 
domination of the Far East. It must be remem- 
bered that, whereas other nations have interests, 
or even territory, in the Far East, Japan alone, of 
the active powers, is at home there. All that she 
has of resources, interests, power, or prestige is 

390 



GREATER AMERICA 

contained in the north China Sea. Russia has 
reached that sea by contiguous expansion ; and by 
means of a Hne, recently derided as of " no stra- 
tegic use," she has placed this outlying part of 
her empire in direct and rapid touch with the 
brain-power at Petersburg. Were her expansion 
the legitimate expression of internal growth and 
progress, as has been that of the United States, it 
would be unreasonable to adopt a hostile atti- 
tude towards it. Even from the point of view of 
ethics the territory hitherto conquered or annexed 
by Russia is probably better off under her than 
under half-savage khans. But Russia's expansion 
is no longer legitimate. She has reached her ob- 
jective, the Pacific Ocean, and has not paused to 
develop or organize the vast territories she has 
occupied ; she has in no case laid the foundation of 
a future of freedom and prosperity for the con- 
quered peoples. She has simply imposed a cast- 
iron system and planted military colonies to keep 
things in order. She has no excuse save her own 
insatiable ambition and land-hunger. 

When she comes down to Korea she meets for 
the first time with a different state of affairs. A 
determined and civilized people now oppose her 
progress. She also crosses, not for the first time, 
the interests of her two great rivals for supremacy 
not only in the Far East but in world politics. 
She has the tacit encouragement of her friend 
Germany, who cannot afford to offend so near and 
great a neighbor. She can count on the neutrality, 

391 



GREATER AMERICA 

at all events, of France. At the same time it is 
notorious that her internal condition gives rise 
to serious misgivings among the most thoughtful 
and patriotic of her people. She is losing ground 
in Europe. She has serious problems in many 
parts of the empire which may become dangerous. 
It is the disloyal and disaffected among her sub- 
jects who are clamorous for the continuance of 
her aggressive policy, hoping that she may meet 
with disaster. Her friends wish that Russia 
might cease to be hag-ridden by destiny, which she 
believes, with Oriental fatalism, points her on 
to the subjection of Asia. They believe that a 
conflict in the Far East, if disastrous to Japan, 
may be equally harmful in the long run to the 
conqueror. The political subjugation of China 
may be followed by the economic conquest of 
Russian territory by the Chinese — as indeed 
is already occurring in eastern Siberia — and 
other results equally inimical to the ultimate 
welfare of the Russian people may follow a 
too successful territorial expansion in the Far 
East. 

The naval question is by no means the least 
pressing. Greater America and Greater Britain 
must both view with apprehension the possibility 
that the one naval power with whom they are 
entirely in accord as to policy, might be crippled 
or even destroyed by the fleets of Russia. The 
immediate result would be to place Russia in the 
front rank of naval powers. 

392 



GREATER AMERICA 

The practical question for the Anglo-Saxon 
nations is whether they can afford to look on while 
this important act in the drama of "Asia Trans- 
formed" is played without reference to their own 
interests or sentiments. 



CHAPTER XVII 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 

It has been constantly reiterated in this book 
that in her expansion America has followed a 
steady and even consistent policy. It therefore 
follows that, in the opinion of the writer, the 
Spanish war was not, as is sometimes asserted, 
the means of breaking down the barrier of isola- 
tion which the wisdom of the early Americans 
had enjoined.^ Apart from the view of the party 
politician, who may choose to present facts in a 
certain light, there is evidence that the isolation 
of the United States has been more of a condi- 
tion — and that a temporary one — than a policy. 
What Washington enjoined, and what has been 
the aim of every wise statesman in his country, 
was the avoidance of entangling alliances, or any 
alliances save temporary ones. "The great rule 
of conduct for us," he said, "in regard to foreign 
nations is, in extending our commercial relations, 
to have with them as little political connection as 
possible."^ It is notorious that to an alliance with 

' One phase of American foreign policy has been developed 
more fully in chapter vi. 

^ Washington added : ' ' We may safely trust to temporary 

394 



GREATER AMERICA 

France the infant republic owed much of its 
early success. In modem times it is partly owing 
to the countenance of Great Britain that she owes 
her unimpeded expansion in the Pacific — unim- 
peded, at all events, so far as the great European 
powers are concerned. 

An able American statesman* gives as two of 
the chief features, in an isolation which he re- 
gards as now impossible, the Monroe Doctrine 
and the protective tariffs. 

Apart from the fact that a protectionist policy 
has been adopted by nations who have no desire 
for isolation, it must be conceded that, if this 
be really the case, it is well for Americans that 
destiny has proved too strong for them ; and it may 
be hoped that a commercial policy which was only 
a temporary expedient, and is becoming adverse 
to the interests of large nimibers of the people, 
shall pass into the regions of limbo at the same 
time as that " isolation " of which it is supposed to 
be an expression. Neither of them had any real 
place in the true conception of the republic. 

The Monroe Doctrine is, of course, the main- 
sheet of all who believe that America is marked 
out by Fate for a different destiny to that of any 
other world-power. It secures to her — so far as 
she is ready to stand by it — a predominance in her 

alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Jefferson used the 
expression "entangling alliances" in his inaugural address 
in 1801. 

' Richard Olney, " Growth of Our Foreign Policy." Atlantic 
Monthly, March, 1900. 

395 



GREATER AMERICA 

own hemisphere, and prevents the re-creation of 
the European situation on American soil, as we now 
have it in eastern Asia. But, in order to justify 
this famous doctrine, America has been forced to 
expand, to annex, to stretch out overseas; she 
is cpmpelled to contemplate a complete revision 
of her naval and military scheme; she is obliged 
to enter herself among the nations prepared for 
war — and all this would be useless and sense- 
less but for the fact that the very spirit of the 
doctrine which kept Europe from the American 
sphere has taken America into the arena of world 
politics. Whichever way we turn it seems, in- 
deed, quite impossible to reconcile the " isolation " 
policy with the ambitions of a great and growing 
nation. How is it possible to put a ring-fence 
round the ambitions of a people like the Americans ? 
The policy of the great leaders of the early 
republic was a cautious one. It might not have 
occurred to a European statesman to utter the 
famous warning about entangling alliances, but 
Washington knew the self-confidence and inex- 
perience of his countrymen. At the same time, 
the first American diplomacy was engaged in 
attempting to disturb the balance of power in 
Europe in a manner favorable to the independence 
of the new republic. This was the first of a long 
series of interventions, some trifling, some impor- 
tant (like the crushing of the Barbary pirates), 
all dictated by self-interest. Nevertheless, it is 
rather the exception to find the United States 

396 



GREATER AMERICA 

taking part, as in the Mediterranean, in affairs 
which were not directly connected with her 
own hemisphere. That hemisphere, however, 
provided her with sufficient points of contact 
with European powers. That European pohtics 
were carefully followed and manipulated to her 
advantage will be evident to any one who studies 
America's acquisition of Louisiana, the Floridas, 
Oregon, and other of the older territories, not to 
mention the more recent annexations. The policy 
of isolation is now, in fact, a mere farce, unless 
Americans are prepared to accept its full signifi- 
cance. Europe may accept at present a Monroe 
Doctrine which cripples her energies in the New 
World, but the attitude of " Hands off, Europe!" 
is only possible if America herself is prepared to ab- 
stain scrupulously from any interference, interven- 
tion, or even expression of interest in cis- Atlan- 
tic affairs. This she has never yet done. Apart 
from the numerous cases of intervention abroad 
(of which the latest examples are China and Tur- 
key), while she has consistently resented and re- 
pelled any suggestion of European interference in 
America,^ she has been unable even to resist that 
tendency so strong in every proud and liberty- 

• In the New Orleans case the United States insisted that 
Italy should abide by the decision of the American courts, 
action that was in striking contrast with the line of conduct 
adopted towards Chili in 1890, when ex- parte evidence was 
taken in the United States and special ri.cjhts were set up. 
Only when a charge of gross injustice was fully established had 
the United States the right to claim a review of the case. 

397 



GREATER AMERICA 

loving people to express herself strongly in cases 
of misgovemment, to use her influence on behalf 
of oppressed peoples. "There is no reason," says 
Mr. Olney, "why the United States should not 
act for the relief of suffering humanity and for the 
advancement of civilization wherever and when- 
ever such action would be timely." He instances 
another case, in which a non-active policy would 
be almost impossible. At the time of the Na- 
poleonic wars, America, compelled by her weak- 
ness, maintained a neutrality which was humihat- 
ing and degrading in its results. Under similar 
circumstances — or, it may be presumed, any cir- 
cumstances in which Britain might be involved 
in a liffe-and-death struggle on the ocean — it would 
be practically impossible now for America to re- 
tain her neutrality. This is the view, not of a 
Briton, be it remembered, or of an irresponsible 
press writer, but of an American statesman of high 
standing. He does not profess satisfaction with 
this condition of affairs, nor does he, in the writer's 
opinion, give due weight to the mass of historical 
evidence which can be brought forward to prove 
that America has never been free from foreign 
entanglements of some kind. He is rather of the 
school of American thinkers who would prefer for 
their country that ideal expansion which would 
give her all she wants of trade, prestige, territory 
— what not? — without the corresponding obliga- 
tions and responsibilities. But his conclusions 
are so thoroughly in accord with the spirit in 

398 



GREATER AMERICA 

which this book is written that they may well 
be summarized here. America has expanded. 
Whatever her foreign relations in the past, 
she has now come into the European family, 
and while that does not imply that she must not 
study her own interests first, it does imply some 
of the obligations of family life. Finally, if the 
exigencies of the situation make alliance with one 
or other power inevitable, America, in choosing 
Britain, will select the one most formidable as a 
foe and most effective as a friend, "whose people 
make with our own but one family, whose internal 
differences should not prevent a united front as 
against the world outside, whose influence upon 
the material and spiritual conditions of the human 
race has, on the whole, been elevating and benefi- 
cent, and whose example and experience cannot 
help being of the utmost service in otir dealing 
with the difficult problems before us."^ 

If any American still cherishes the illusion that 
a study of European politics is not essential to 
the statesmen of the New World, he must sure- 
ly abandon it when he reflects on the nature of 
American relations with Germany. To ignore the 
significance of Germany's attitude, to be ignorant 
of its bearing on the politics of the rest of Europe, 
means failure to grasp salient features of Amer- 
ica's position as a world-power. To give the true 
proportions to this subject would involve more 

> Richard Olney , ' ' Growth of Our Foreign Policy. " A tlantic 
Monthly, March, 1900. 

399 



GREATER AMERICA 

Space than can be afforded in this book, and yet 
its bearing on Greater America is such that we 
must endeavor to take a bird's-eye view of it. 

The growth of Germany is one of the most 
striking features of modem Europe. Her popu- 
lation is bounding forward at a rate only equalled 
in Russia; she has been converted from an agri- 
cultural to an industrial and commercial power; 
she has acquired colonies and strategic points, has 
built up a fine mercantile marine, and, finally, has 
embarked on an ambitious naval policy. Ac- 
cording to the programme at present laid down, 
the year 1916 (probably an earlier date) will see 
Germany second instead of fifth among the nations 
in sea power. The policy is a very thorough one, 
and is not confined to the mere laying down of 
ships, but includes the increase and equipment of 
dock-yards and the training of a personnel. For 
the latter Germany has in her hardy coast popula- 
tion excellent material. 

Germany's position in Europe is a peculiar one. 
She lies between two great powers (one, at least, 
her traditional enemy) which have for some years 
past been in close alliance. On the south she has 
the great, unwieldy, disorganized Austria -Hun- 
garian Empire; on the north the little kingdoms 
of Denmark, Holland, and Belgium.' The avowed 

• By the treaty of London (i 831) the neutrality of Belgium 
was guaranteed by four powers — Austria, Russia, Great 
Britain, and Prussia; but it was only in 1839 that all the 
European powers recognized the kingdom of Belgium. 

400 



GREATER AMERICA 

aspirations of Pan-Germanism are to gather all 
these fragments into a federated German Empire. 
Vast as is the scheme, unlikely to be fully realized, 
it yet has about it an element of possibility and 
reasonableness. Many portions of Austria-Hun- 
gary, for instance, are already German-speaking. 
They will soon be involved in a counter- struggle 
against the rival force of Pan-Slavism. Denmark 
and Holland— especially the latter— are more or 
less economically dependent on Germany. She 
has recently completed a canal which, by giving 
access from her great manufacturing centres to a 
German port, would enable her, if she wished, to 
divert some of that traffic which is Holland's 
principal asset. Denmark is a harder nut to 
crack. Here, as in Holland, there must be a con- 
flict between loyalty to a national ideal and the 
desire to share that material prosperity in which 
small and isolated peoples can no longer hope to 
participate. It is suggested that Denmark should 
be neutralized, in her own interests and that of 
Europe, but it is difficult to see where the guaran- 
tee is to come from, in view of the position of Ger- 
many and her ambitions. 

These contingencies may seem remote, but it 
must not be forgotten that, by reason of their 
form of government, Germany and Russia are en- 
abled to take the long view in their foreign policy 
which is impossible to Britain or America, and, 
having set a goal before them, press forward 
steadily towards it. Even at the present stage 

90 401 



GREATER AMERICA 

we see that Germany was recently within an ace 
of securing a most important overland line of 
communication with the East, which might have 
provided an alternative or a rival route to Suez. 
Her ambitions in Asia Minor have been for the 
time checked, but she has already secured a posi- 
tion there which cannot fail to be valuable. It 
has, incidentally, forced Great Britain to move 
in a way she would not otherwise have done, 
and it has — temporarily, at all events — check- 
mated Russia's designs on the Holy Land and 
the Persian Gulf. 

It is, however, as a naval power that Germany 
looks to the future. Hitherto it has been believed 
that her main object was to cripple Great Britain. 
Her writers have been very outspoken on the sub- 
ject, and there is no doubt that to offset, if not 
to outvie, the supremacy of Britain on the ocean 
is in Germany's opinion a vital part of her own 
development. But, so far as European politics 
are concerned, she is no longer in a position to 
declare herself "with all the continent against 
England." The rapprochement which has recently 
taken place between France, Italy, and Britain, 
collectively and individually, is not without its 
significance. These are all naval powers and the 
near neighbors of Germany, whose continental 
ambitions would seriously upset the balance of 
power which it is to their interest to maintain. 
The South African war, too, occurring at a time 
when Germany had not completed her prepara- 

402 



GREATER AMERICA 

tions, has ended in a manner which seems to elim- 
inate her hopes in that quarter. Her present colo- 
nies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific are far from 
flourishing. She does not desire to extend them 
on similar lines, but, rather, to increase her hold- 
ing of strategic points, even in tropical countries. 
German ambitions are now taking a turn in which 
Britain ceases to be the principal obstacle. She 
desires an extension of power, not so much in ter- 
ritory as in the control, or joint control, of trade 
routes ; in a great central European federation un- 
der her own hegemony; in planting commercial 
colonies in South America and securing a prepon- 
derating influence in its affairs. She hopes to ob- 
tain a colonial empire without fighting for or buy- 
ing it. Holland's great East Indian possessions 
she feels secure of in the course of time. She must 
have a strong naval power to control so vast an 
island empire, and to maintain a position where 
she will be between the United States on the north 
and Australasia on the south as rivals in the Pa- 
cific. She is extremely anxious not to be debarred 
from another arena of international interests, the 
Caribbean. It is, perhaps, not very obvious how 
she can achieve this end in the teeth of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine and the fact that not a coral island 
now remains that is not pre-empted. Holland, 
however, has a group of islands (Cura9oa) which, 
although not on a direct trade route from Europe, 
occupy an important position midway between the 
Antilles and Panama. Holland, too, is a South 

403 



GREATER AMERICA 

American power, though the value of Dutch Guiana 
may be more theoretical than practical. Another 
European power, Denmark, also has West Indian 
possessions. St. Thomas has a potentially good 
harbor and commands the Anegada passage, which 
is the direct and main route from the isthmus to 
Europe. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
America has long been desirous of securing the 
Danish islands, which are economically decadent 
and strategically of no value to Denmark. That 
she has not been able hitherto to accomplish her 
object has been commonly attributed to Danish 
sentiment, but is, in reality, the direct result of 
pressure and influence brought to bear by Ger- 
many, as on a recent occasion, through the instru- 
mentality of a personage connected with the court 
at Copenhagen. 

A very interesting question arises in connection 
with this incident. The Monroe Doctrine may 
prevent Germany from purchasing, say, a coaling- 
station at Cartagena, though such an interpreta- 
tion is straining its terms. The United States, 
as has already been said, is probably prepared to 
go to this length and abide the consequence. By 
no conceivable interpretation, however, can the 
Monroe Doctrine prevent Danish or Dutch islands 
from gravitating into the German orbit through 
a process of federation by their sovereign states. 
And yet such an eventuality is by no means an 
impossibility and would be a direct challenge to 
the position taken up by America. 

404 



GREATER AMERICA 

Were Germany a great Pacific power the im- 
portance of these stations in the Caribbean, once 
the canal is opened, would, even from a commer- 
cial point of view, be at once apparent ; and, as a 
matter of fact, she is already in a minor degree 
established in the Pacific, owning already part of 
New Guinea and various groups of islands. She 
is confident, moreover, of her ultimate domination 
over the Dutch East Indies, which would bring 
her at another point — Borneo — into close touch 
with America in the Philippines. Then there is 
Samoa, where the two powers are already side by 
side. Altogether, the question of actual relations 
with Germany is one to be carefully studied in 
connection with Greater America. 

German ambitions in South and Central Amer- 
ica have taken the form of commercial settlements. 
The German makes a singularly good pioneer 
trader and settler in a foreign country. He has a 
curious likeness in this respect to the Chinaman. 
Both are frugal, industrious, painstaking, insinuat- 
ing, adaptive, contented with small profits; both 
retain their own national characteristics, language, 
ideas, and love of the fatherland, without, how- 
ever, being in the true sense of the word colonists. 
Both take little part in domestic politics, which, 
perhaps, is why they do not become political 
pioneers for their own countries. They simply 
accept the government they find and make the 
best of it. 

Some years ago there was a strong impression 

405 



GREATER AMERICA 

that Germany was steadily bent on colonial ex- 
pansion in South America. The niimber of Ger- 
man immigrants to southern Brazil, the Argen- 
tine, and Uruguay, and the fact that communities 
of Germans were gaining in strength and main- 
taining their purely Teutonic character, gave color 
to this idea. The extension of the Monroe Doc- 
trine to the southern continent puts a new com- 
plexion on all this. Any openly expressed designs 
would, for the present, be out of the question. 
The fact remains, however, that colonization com- 
panies and steamer lines, both highly subsidized, 
continue to send out German immigrants; and if 
this stream has declined of late years that is 
probably due to industrial expansion at home 
and to the fact that Germany is not yet ready to 
assert herself. The actual sentiment of German 
immigrants towards their fatherland is a difficult 
factor to gauge. The United States has successful- 
ly assimilated so large a stream of Teutonic immi- 
gration that Americans are naturally sceptical as 
to the strength of German tradition. It is notable, 
too, that this assimilation has proceeded in the 
teeth of a very real affection on the part of Ger- 
mans for their own language and literature and a 
pride in the intellectual achievement of the father- 
land. Attempts have been made to stimulate this 
sentiment in the United States in the interests of 
Pan-Germanism, but it has utterly failed to shake 
the position of Germans as loyal citizens, and 
it may be said of those who become naturalized 

406 



GREATER AMERICA 

that they are intensely American. It must be 
remembered that, whatever the German's love for 
his fatherland, he realizes, when he leaves it, the 
rigidity and tyranny of the government which the 
militarism and arrogance of the east Prussian 
element has imposed on a united Germany. The 
fatherland of to-day may be greater, stronger, more 
progressive than of old, but by just so much as she 
succeeds in her fight for commercial and material 
power she ceases to exercise that hold upon the 
affections of her people which was founded upon 
intellectual and aesthetic conquests and the rivalry 
between schools of thought rather than centres of 
commerce. The German colonists in Latin Amer- 
ica, therefore, may cherish their heritage of lan- 
guage and literature without wishing to be in- 
cluded in the modem German Empire and to 
come imder that rigid militarism on which it is 
founded. Germans notoriously avoid their own 
colonies, not altogether for the alleged reason of 
their unpromising aspect, but because they find 
themselves dragooned by officials in a manner 
which recalls unpleasantly their early experiences 
in the mother-country. It is, for all these reasons, 
more than possible that the German element in 
South America will remain neutral, if not hostile, 
to any scheme of national colonization; but it 
remains to a great extent homogeneous. There 
is always, of course, the possibility of an Uitland- 
er question arising similar to the one in South 
Africa, for the conditions of government are in 

407 



GREATER AMERICA 

many parts as bad as possible. What course 
Germany would take in such a case is largely de- 
pendent on two things — her own condition of pre- 
paredness and that of the United States. German 
influence would have long ago assumed far more 
serious proportions but for the undeniable fact 
that the German immigrant is willing to inter- 
marry with natives in all countries where a white 
stock is found. Throughout Central, and in some 
parts of South, America, for instance, communities 
of several hundred Germans — clerks, merchants, 
planters, and small traders — are found, very few 
of whom brought wives from the old country. 
They intermarry with the Spanish - Americans, 
and the result, if influenced chiefly by the stronger 
parental type, is nevertheless a variation on the 
old German stock, and more bound by ties to the 
country of birth than to that to which by name, 
and probably by speech, they belong. In southern 
Brazil the black element makes intermarriage, to 
a people Uke the Germans, far less possible. 

Reference has been made to the Venezuela ar- 
bitration, which has raised a question of the first 
importance in international relations — namely, 
whether the powers which declared the "pacific 
blockade" are entitled to preferential treatment 
or not. If the decision be in the affirmative, the 
tendency will be to appeal to such measures ; if not, 
the use of the " pacific blockade " will stand con- 
demned. In either case, the Monroe Doctrine will 

be affected. 

408 



GREATER AMERICA 

It seems probable, taking all these circum- 
stances as far as possible into consideration, that, 
although actual political colonization by Germany 
may not be in question, German influence in 
South America may yet become a serious one. 
In southern Brazil, for instance, no less than one 
himdred and fifty million dollars of the foreign cap- 
ital invested is German. The same process is at 
work in all parts of the southern hemisphere, Brit- 
ain being the only serious competitor. American 
capital, influence, and prestige, despite the Monroe 
Doctrine and the Pan-American scheme, are rather 
on the wane. North Americans are antipathetic 
to South Americans, and the gulf is widened by 
mutual suspicion and distrust; whereas Germans 
adapt themselves to the conditions of life and are 
regarded as useful and harmless by their hosts. 

If in all this there is no argument for a close 
study of German policy in its bearing on Greater 
America, this book will certainly have failed in its 
object. German ambitions clash at many points 
with those of Anglo- Saxondom, and the future 
may bring this home to the English-speaking 
peoples and may help to cement the bond of union 
between them. The attempt made by the Kaiser 
to win American confidence and to undermine 
the Anglo-American understanding has been a 
signal failure. The incidents of Venezuela, Manila 
Bay, and especially the German attitude at the 
beginning of the Spanish war, cannot be forgotten. 

If friendship between Germany and the United 

409 



GREATER AMERICA 

States is merely a diplomatic fafon de parler, it has 
in the past been a warm sentiment between the 
American Republic and Russia. This "tradi- 
tional friendship" rests on the most shadowy 
basis, but has nevertheless been used with effect 
on certain occasions.* Russia, in fact, was an 
American power at one time, and was engaged 
in extending her influence quietly but steadily 
along the Pacific coast, long before she had actually 
crossed Asia and established herself on the other 
side of the ocean. She had, besides the great 
territory known as Alaska, settlements as far 
south as California, and in the early part of 
the nineteenth century she threatened to make 
the Pacific, north of 51 degrees on the American 
and 45 degrees on the Asiatic coast, a mare 
clausnm. The Monroe Doctrine was, in fact, 
partly aimed at her, and induced her to withdraw 
some of her pretensions. The purchase of Alaska, 
in 1867, put an end to her American possessions, 
for by that time she was fully occupied with a 
more promising scheme of contiguous expansion. 
Russia still remains, however (with the exception 
of Britain, in Canada), the nearest European power 
to the American Republic. Although the proposal 
to unite the Asiatic and American continents by a 

* The Russian fleet visited the United States during the 
civil war, an act construed to be one of extreme friendliness 
at a time when Europe generally was in sympathy with the 
Confederacy. Dr. Wendell Holmes gave expression to this 
sentiment in the words, " Who was our friend when the world 
was our foe?" 

410 



GREATER AMERICA 

railway line and tunnel under Bering Strait is too 
chimerical to come into the range of practical con- 
siderations, there is no doubt that the develop- 
ment both of Alaska, the Aleutian isles, and the 
Pacific slope, on the one hand, and the Asiatic 
littoral, especially Manchuria, on the other, will 
make commercial relations between America and 
Russia an important factor. There is something 
unusually interesting and picturesque in this con- 
tact between the two powers which stand in the 
modem world for the extreme examples of oppos- 
ing systems. The Russian Empire is almost as 
young as the young American Republic; she has 
made a progress in her own way even more re- 
markable than that of the United States. In one 
respect she is the superior. She possesses, besides 
a vast number of subject races, a homogeneous 
population, which increases with a rapidity un- 
equalled elsewhere. It is estimated that one-six- 
teenth of the world's population lives under the 
Russian flag. De Tocqueville, in 1835, expressed 
the conviction that the Russian and American 
peoples would one day divide the world. We are 
not quite so certain now, when we see the stagnancy 
of the true American population, that the New 
World is as full of vitality as De Tocqueville 
beheved. Russia, too, despite her phenomenal 
expansion, has the elements of weakness at her 
very heart. Nevertheless, the shock between two 
systems so radically opposed cannot fail to have 
serious consequences, and if the latent forces 

411 



GREATER AMERICA 

of the two Titans are ever consciously arrayed 
against each other the struggle will probably be 
of a moral nature. Whatever the future may 
hold, it is certain that relations between Russia 
and America must become more intimate. The 
New World cannot afford any longer an attitude 
of indifference as regards happenings in the Old. 
The United States has come down into the arena 
of the Pacific, in which the future of Asia is to 
be largely determined. She is deeply concerned 
in that future, which will directly affect the in- 
terests not only of her seven or eight million 
Pacific subjects and of her Pacific coast, but in- 
directly the whole of Greater America. 

The actual relations of America with Oriental 
countries have been more intimate than is some- 
times supposed. America is proud of her claim 
to be the first to open Japan to the outer world. 
It was inevitable that this great power, with its 
thousands of miles of littoral along the Pacific, 
should stretch across the ocean to that other coast, 
where an ancient, rich, and picturesque civiliza- 
tion was to be found — a contrast to the bareness 
of life in the pioneer colonies at home. It would 
have been turning the back on American aspira- 
tion and achievement in the past, as well as shut- 
ting the eyes to the menace of the future, had the 
republic refused to play her part in the Oriental 
drama. She enjoys also the distinction of being 
the first power to make a treaty with Korea, and 
she has recently executed one with China, which 

412 



GREATER AMERICA 

at the present juncture must be regarded as an 
important factor in the situation, since it asserts 
not only American interests in Manchuria, but 
the sovereign rights of China in that region — the 
very point for which Japan is contending. 

France is a Pacific power, but she is Httle Ukely 
to be brought by reason of this into contact with 
America. Her departure from Mexico and relin- 
quishment of the Panama canal removed her from 
the American sphere, but she retains a foothold in 
the Caribbean, and also off the coast of Newfound- 
land, and it must not be forgotten that islands 
like these, of little intrinsic value to their possessors 
but ardently desired by other nations, may easily 
become pawns in the game of international politics. 
France is even a South American power, by reason 
of her portion of Guiana. She does not love a 
purely commercial form of colonization, nor is 
she successful in it. Her stationary population 
makes the replenishment of tropical colonies an 
impossibility, and she has, besides, in northern 
Africa, a far nearer and more congenial sphere for 
activity. There may, therefore, arise one day the 
question of some of these scattered remnants of her 
empire changing hands, and in this way her re- 
lations with America may become more cordial, or 
be strained, according to the circumstances of the 
moment. Obviously, American statesmen can- 
not afford to be oblivious of France when they 
take their survey of affairs which affect their 
country. The final elimination of Spain from 

413 



GREATER AMERICA 

the eastern hemisphere and from the Pacific re- 
moves her altogether from American affairs, save 
so far as her kinship with and influence over the 
Latin-Americans are concerned. The relations of 
the United States with these ancient outposts of 
the Spanish Empire have been dealt with else- 
where; Denmark as a Caribbean power has also 
been treated of ; Holland plays her part chiefly 
as the cat's-paw of Germany. Incidentally, it 
must be said that one of the sorest spots in Ger- 
man-American relations is the fact that it is cer- 
tain that Germany would intervene, in the event 
of the Dutch queen dying without issue, to pre- 
vent the establishment of a Netherlands republic. 
Minor questions in American foreign relations 
have been raised lately in establishing commercial 
intercourse with Abyssinia, for which purpose a 
mission was despatched; and the sending of a 
squadron to Beirout to protect American interests 
on a recent occasion is another indication of the 
activity and catholicity which the interests of 
Greater America enjoin in her foreign policy. 

Last of all, we come to the relations subsisting 
between the English-speaking peoples. Canada's 
position has been fully discussed elsewhere.' It 
is, of course, bound up with the relations of the 
mother-country and her quondam colonies. 

As far as national sentiment is concerned, there 
is no doubt that a great change is visible on either 

* Chapter x., "Canada and Pan-Americanism." 
414 



GREATER AMERICA 

side of the Atlantic. The soreness of spirit on the 
one hand and the arrogance and contempt on the 
other — an American might possibly reverse these 
terms ; he has invariably believed Great Britain to 
be very sore at the loss of her colonies, and at one 
period, at all events, he indulged in a national 
vanity which was quite beyond the noiTnal air of 
even a Briton's superiority — have given way to a 
genuine appreciation of each other's good qualities. 
The American remains, as he was in De Tocque- 
ville's day, more sensitive to criticism than his 
British cousin. He has not gone through the 
hardening process to which our continental critics 
have subjected us. He remains somewhat self- 
assertive in consequence, and is, therefore, liable 
to be misunderstood; but there is an interest and 
sympathy in British affairs among the better 
educated, and even an excess of Anglophilism in 
certain circles, to which we have responded with 
an almost hysterical outburst of admiration for 
everything American. A far surer foundation, 
however, for friendship is the growing sense of 
community of political interests, the intermingling 
of the two societies, facilitated by improved com- 
munications, and also the removal of many points 
of discussion, if not of dissension. The most 
serious questions, such as those of Venezuela, 
the Bering Sea, the trans - isthmian canal, and 
Alaska, have been amicably settled, and those 
still remaining, of which the fisheries is the 
most important, can be disposed of by means 

415 



GREATER AMERICA 

of direct diplomatic negotiation or by reference 
to The Hague tribunal.^ One result of Amer- 
ican expansion is to make the republic both 
more interesting and more intelligible to British 
people. It was the purely local character of 
the politics — their provincialism, narrow range, 
and unpicturesque monotony — which made them 
distasteful to a British observer. x\merica is 
past the stage of incubation; she has emerged 
as a full-fledged world - power. We watch with 
interest and follow with criticism her efforts in 
fields where we, too, have labored. She, on her 
part, is able to appreciate and understand far 
better the circumstances and problems of our 
national life. In some phases of her expansion 
she is following in our footsteps, and the dif- 
ficulties she encounters lead her to a more sym- 
pathetic judgment of our past failures and achieve- 
ments. She cannot hope to expand — nor even to 
retain — without crossing the paths of other pow- 
ers as ambitious and progressive as herself, and 
without shouldering responsibilities heavy to be 
borne. Whatever our own future may be it should 
not cross hers. We desire that freedom of poli- 
tical life, of trade, and communications which is 
her goal also. 

The practical question in Anglo-American re- 

* There seems to be no sufficient justification for a fresh 
arbitration treaty, which is opposed to the opinions and 
prejudices of a majority of the American people, and would 
be bitterly resented by the Senate as infringing their con- 
stitutional control of foreign affairs. 

416 



GREATER AMERICA 

lations is exactly what either people has to gain 
from alliance — not, perhaps, an actual paper treaty, 
but a strong and tangible yet unwritten bond, con- 
firmed by small concessions on either side and 
carried into the realms of diplomacy. Great 
Britain stands to gain a great deal that is vital 
to her at this stage of her development. What 
America stands to gain may be left to the readers 
of this book to decide. 
27 



APPENDIX 



The following comparative tabular statement indicates 
the numerical strength of the fleets of the powers named. 

BUILT 



Battle-ships (ist class) 

Battle-ships (2d class) 

Battle-ships (3d class) 

Coast-defence vessels , 

Cruisers, armored , 

Cruisers, protected (ist class) 
Cruisers, protected (2d class) . 
Cruisers, protected (3d class) . . 

Cruisers, unprotected 

Torpedo vessels 

Torpedo-boat destroyers 

Torpedo boats 

Submarine torpedo boats 









>k 








V 


a 


G 




•a u) 


0£ 


C 


1 






D <U 


42 


19 


13 


12 


12 


10 


4 


8 


4 


4 


— 


I 


2 


I 


I 


12 


5 


— 


2 


14 


13 


II 




15 


18 


9 


8 


2 


5 


2 


21 


7 


b 


I 


— 


3 


5^! 


16 


5 


8 


5 


II 


32t 


17 


— 


10 


II 


2 


10 


I 


3 


20 


— 


II 


34 


16 


9 


2 


14 


— 


112 


14 


48 


28 


II 


14 


«5 


247 


132 


93 


145 


27 


5 


15 


— 


— 


I 


3 



17 

67 



♦ Including three partially protected. 



t Including one partially protected. 



BUILDING 



0(g 



tSO! 



Battle-ships (ist class), 

Battle-ships (2d class) . . 
Coast-defence vessels. . . 

Cruisers, armored 

Cniisers, protected 
class) 

Cruisers, protected (2d 
class) 

Cruisers, protected (3d 
class) 

Scouts 



jl2 } 

i 3M 



3_ 



19 



(ist 



13 I 



Torpedo-boat destroyers 

Torpedo boats 

Submarine torpedo boats 



I 3*i 
1 15* 



\i'\ 



5 ) 

2*f 



19 



18* f 



\t*\ 



tS 



* To be laid down — 1903-1904. 



APPENDIX 



B 



-C M 



to 


ro 


c 


01 






u 






r) 


f) 


C 






3 




3 


. 


liX 




o 


3 


u 


ta 


C 


:^ 


01 


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o 


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u 




(U 


s 


H 


« 


< 


s 


1 


l^ 


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t/J 


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lU 










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r > 






o 


T) 


CQ 


Ih 




o-d 


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l-l 


C 

oi 


, 


,_( 


05 


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o! 


CQ 


n 






bo 




G 


i) 


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^ 


a 


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0) 




o 


MX 


r; 


<LI 






& 




o 


O 


M 


M 


fi 


rO 


ol 


00 


Ih 




w 


•1 



1 



#!»«. 



N 



wn i»y < r '';^' i7*i>^ • 







420 



INDEX 



"Absorption, not annexation," 
as applied to Mexico and 
Central America, 170. 
Abyssinia, America establishing 
commercial relations with, 414. 
Adams, John, President, re- 
ferred to, 263. 
Adams, John Quincy, President, 
his declaration in reference to 
Texas, 53; on the acquisition 
of Cuba, 126, 127. 
Afghanistan, a buffer state, 387. 
Africans, see Negroes. 
Aguinaldo, rebellion organized 

by, 86. 
Alaska, how governed, 265; its 

promising future, 268, 269. 
Amazon River, suggested as 
southern boundary of the 
United States, 170. 
America, see United States. 
" American hegemony," a will-o'- 
the-wisp, 221, 223, 225. 
American people, the composi- 
tion, characteristics, and ten- 
dencies of, 1-37. 298-301, 307, 
308, 313, 362; how affected by 
European immigration, 1-9, 
II, 16-19, 60; proud of their 
colonial ancestors, 4; their 
literary and artistic mediocrity, 
8; leisured class of, 9-1 1 ; effect 
of corrupt party tactics upon, 
11-13; of the West, 12-15, 18; 
colonial societies of, 16; modi- 
fication in national character 
of, 16-19; their relations with 
the Indians, 19-22, 60; how 
they are affected by the negro 
problem, 22-27, 60. 61; their 
interest in educational proj- 
ects, 27, 28; their education' 
too materialistic, 29, 30; the 



effect of industrial expansion 
upon, 30-37; relations of capi- 
tal and labor among, 30-35; 
how affected by millionair- 
ism and trusts, 31-33. 35. 3^; 
their high standard of living, 
34; how differentiated from 
the rest of the world, 36, 37; 
review of their successive 
colonizations, 38-61, 62-84, 
85-111, 112-131, i32-i46;how 
affected by religious persecu- 
tion at home and abroad, 42, 
43, 44; their triumph over 
physical difficulties, 45; their 
early expansionist tendencies, 
48, 53, 55, 56; their liberal in- 
terpretation of their Constitu- 
tion, 50, 51; their colonization 
of Texas, 52 and «.; their 
boundary disputes with neigh- 
boring nations, 53, 54; their 
filibustering activities, 54, 55; 
how their civil war checked 
the expansion of their country, 

56, 57, 129, 130; their at- 
titude as to the purchase of 
Alaska, 57; development of 
their trade with the Far East, 

57, 58; their long -continued 
struggle with Spain, 59; their 
love of phrases, 63, 66; over- 
fond of government reports, 
76-78; concerned more with 
the ethics of government than 
with its practical justice, 11 1; 
compared with Germans and 
Englishmen as colonizers, 158; 
their investments in Mexico, 
166 and n.\ as distinguished 
from the people of other 
American countries, vi., 199, 
200; whv their trade with 



421 



INDEX 



South America is declining, 
219, 220; how they are gov- 
erned, 253-283; their govern- 
ment inconsistent and illogical, 
277; their misconception of 
Oriental character, 288, 289, 
299, 300; how they regard 
their possession of the Philip- 
pines, 331-335; their maritime 
exploits, 377-379. SeeVnited 
States. 

American society, its hetero- 
geneous character, 16-19; its 
aloofness from political affairs, 
308. 

American sphere, the new, 147- 
170. 

"Americans," as applied to the 
people of the United States, 
vi., 199, 200. 

Americans in the tropics, 147- 
170. 

Anglo-American relations. 414- 

417- . . 

Anglo-Saxon race, characteristics 
of, 117, 151, 203, 358. 

Annexation, see Colonization; 
Expansion. 

Antilles, see West Indies. 

Araticanians, the, 206. 

Arbitration, a motive for Pan- 
American movement, 216, 218, 
222; a new Anglo-American 
arbitration treaty would be 
resented by the United States 
Senate, 416 w. 

Argentina, the people, resources, 
and government of, 207-209, 
214; its trade with the United 
States, 215 «., 216 n.; financial 
record of, 420. 

Arizona, seizure of, from Mexico, 
53; Territory of, 56; govern- 
ment of, 265. 

Arkansas, its admission to the 
Union, 52. 

Armenian immigration, 2. 

Army, United States, its condi- 
tion and efhciency, 345-357; 
organization of the general 
staff, 350 n. 

Asia, its partitionment, 286; 
transformation of, 366-393; 
its population and resources, 
367; its railways, 368-370; 
early competition for its mari- 



time trade, 378, 379; attitude 
of Russia and Japan in, 370- 
376, 380-383, 386-392; the 
Manchu dynasty and its con- 
trol of China, 383-386; inter- 
ests of Greater Britain and 
Greater America in, 388-393. 

Asia Minor, Germany's designs 
in, 402. 

Australia, discovery of gold in, 

377- 

Austria- Hungary, its relations 
with Germany, 400, 401. 

Aves Islands, decision of Con- 
gress regarding, and the prin- 
ciple involved, 55. 

Bahia Honda, American station 
in Cuba, 191. 

Balance of power, as a motive 
for colonizing, 43, 44; first 
American diplomacy engaged 
in disturbing, 396. 

Balance of trade, anti-expansion- 
ists fear to disturb, 48. 

Balmaceda, Jose Manuel, fate of, 
206. 

Belgium, its relations with Ger- 
many, 400, 401. 

Bengali, their services in British 
India, 326, 327. 

Bering Strait, proposed tunnel- 
ling of, 410, 411. 

Black Republic, the, its check- 
ered history, 176-178. 

Blaine, James G., his initiation 
and interpretation of Pan- 
Americanism, 199, 220, 222. 

Blanco, Guzman, Venezuela dic- 
tator, 202. 

Bolivar, Simon, and his con- 
ception of Pan- Americanism, 
199; his death , 2 o 2 ; his theories 
of government, 203 n. 

Bolivia, characteristics of, 205; 
its trade with the United 
States, 215 w., 216 n. 

Boundary disputes, with Mexico, 
Great Britain, and other na- 
tions, 53, 54- 

Brazil, people, resources, and 
government of, 210-213; her 
trade with the United States, 
215 n., 216 M.; German and 
American capital invested in, 
409. 



422 



INDEX 



Brinkley, Captain, quoted on the 
character of Japan, 381, 382. 

Britain, see Great Britain. 

British rule in India, 318-333. 

British West Indies, compared 
with the French West Indies, 
186-188; importance and de- 
sirabiUty of, 193, 194; favor 
American amalgamation, 195- 
197; complementary to Can- 
ada, 197. 

Britons, as colonizers, compared 
with Spaniards, 156. 

Buchanan, James, President, 
proposed a protectorate over 
portions of Mexico, 55. 

Bureau of American Republics, 
at Washington, 217, 279 n. 

Bureaucracy, in the Philippines 
and in the States, 75-79. 

Burmese, indolence of, 99. 

Calhoun, John C, referred to, 
263. 

California, effect of discovery of 
gold in, I, 377; applies for 
admission into the Union, 

53- 
Canada, boundary between Ore- 
gon and, 54; her import trade 
with the United States, 168 
n.; rapid growth of, 197; 
complementary to the British 
West Indies, 197; Blaine fa- 
vored annexation of, 199; and 
Pan - Americanism, 226-252; 
her commercial and political 
relations with the mother- 
country, 228-232, 234-246, 
251, 252; her trade relations 
with the United States, 228- 
230, 236-238, 244-248; how 
influenced by her French 
population, 230-233; her ob- 
jection to the Monroe Doc- 
trine, 239, 240; immigration 
to, 242, 243, 247, 248; is she 
being Americanized ? 242, 251; 
her resources, 242, 243; Amer- 
ican capital invested in, 245 n. ; 
her dependence upon the 
American press and news 
agencies, 246, 247; her rail- 
way development, 248, 249; 
her water communication, 250; 
her ports on the Pacific, 250; 



her provinces compared with 
States across the frontier, 
250. 

Canadian Northern Railway, 
249. 

Canadian Pacific Railway, 248. 

Canal, Panama, a consideration 
of the problem, 160-165; its 
bearing on American expan- 
sion, 190-198. 

Capital, foreign, discriminated 
against in the Philippines, 
105, 106; its introduction into 
the Philippines demanded, 107, 
108; a comparison of English 
and American, invested in 
South America, 220; American, 
invested in Canada, 245 «.; 
German and American, in 
South America, 409; financial 
record of Spanish - American 
republics, 420. 

Capital and labor, relations be- 
tween, 30-35 ; of United States 
and Japan compared, 30, 31, 
33. 34, 35; their approaching 
conflict, 32, 240; gap between, 
widened by trust develop- 
ment, 35, 36 ; in the Philippines, 
101-106; in Cuba, 133-136; in 
the West Indies, 196. 

Caribbean Sea, expansion in; 
Cubans and their American 
friends, 1 12-13 1 ; Cuba and the 
United States, 132-146; Amer- 
ican control of, 1 71-198; what 
man and nature have done for 
the islands of, 171-173; prob- 
able effect of the isthmian 
canal upon, 190-198. 

Carthage, the first great colonial 
power, 39. 

Castillo, Senor Canovas del, a 
typical Spaniard, 155. 

Catholic Church, the, in the 
Philippines, 91, 92; in Central 
America, 156, 157; in the 
French West Indies, 188; in 
the South American republics, 
2 1 1-2 13; a factor opposed to 
Pan - Americanism, 213; in 
Canada, 231, 232, 233. 

Central American republics, 
character and condition of, 
148-15 1 and «.; 155-158; their 
colonization considered, 158, 



423 



INDEX 



159; their import trade with 
the United States, 168 n.; 
financial record of, 420. 

Chili, the people, resources, and 
government of, 205-207; her 
trade with the United States, 
215 n., 216 ».; financial record 
of, 420. 

China, importance of com- 
mercial treaties with, to de- 
velop the Philippines, 107; 
how involved in the trans- 
formation of Asia, 366-393; 
railways of, 369, 370; her 
war with Japan, 371; her se- 
cret alliance with Russia, 371- 
374; attitude of government 
and people to Japan, 382- 
385; not ripe for European 
civilization, 385-388; United 
States makes treaty with, 41 2. 

Chinese, immigration of, dis- 
couraged, 18; secret societies 
of, 87, 98; a limited number 
admitted to the Philippines, 
1 01; their general exclusion 
from the Philippines prevents 
the development of the isl- 
ands, 108. 

Chino-Japan war, results of, 371, 
380. 

Chirol, Mr., exposes Russia's 
domination over Lhasa, 372. 

Church, Catholic, see Catholic 
Church. 

Cincinnati, Society of the, 16. 

Cities, American, growth of, 2. 

Civil Service, colonial, the United 
States needs an efficient, 289, 
290, 301, 309—314; that of the 
United States and other na- 
tions compared, 290-301; Phil- 
ippine, 278 n., 312, 314, 335- 
342; in British India, 324,325, 

341- 

Civil-service reform, need for, 
3'>'' -S09, 312. 

Civii yf-dv, the, checks expan- 
sion movement, 56, 129, 130; 
United States army before and 
after, 345; United States navy 
before and after. 359, 360. 

Clay, Henry, and the first ap- 
plication of the Monroe Doc- 
trine, 127; a Pan- Americanist, 
217 n. 



Coflfee and sugar, as a basis for 
reciprocity with Mexico, 168. 

Colombia, its rejection of canal 
treaty, 160; its imports from 
the United States, 168 n. ; char- 
acteristics of, 202; financial 
record of, 420. 

Colombians unfit for canal con- 
struction, 356. 

Colonial Dames, Society of, 16. 

Colonial societies, what they 
indicate, 16. 

Colonies, see Colonization; Ex- 
pansion. 

Colonization, by the American 
people, 38-61, ,62-84, 85-111; 
motives for, the same from 
age to age, 39-42 ; by Carthage, 
39; by Greece and Venice, 39; 
by Rome, 39, 40; by Portugal, 
40; by Spain, 40; by France, 
40; by Holland, 40; by Eng- 
land, 41, 42; religious per- 
secution a prime factor in 
American, 42, 43; interna- 
tional rivalry as a motive of, 
43, 44; the beginnings of 
American, and the opposition 
it has encountered, 47, 48; 
of Texas, 52 and n.; attempted 
by conquest and purchase, 54, 
55; principle involved in the 
occupation of the Aves Islands, 
55; inability of the United 
States to colonize Indians and 
negroes, 59, 60; what history 
of, shows, 6 1 ; Democrats op- 
pose, 143; of the West Indies 
by France and Great Britain, 
185-189; of South America, 
201, 202, 405-409, 413; op- 
posed to democracy, 277, 284; 
problems involved in, 240, 
263-283, 284-301, 302-316, 
317-344, 345-365. 388-393- 
See, also, Expansion. 

"Colony," how the meaning of 
the word is distorted by 
Canadians and Australasians, 
38, 39. 

Committee system of United 
States Congress, the. 260, 261. 

Congress, United States, its con- 
stitution and powers, 254, 255, 
258, 259-261, 264, 276, 277, 
279, 280. 



424 



INDEX 



Constitution, United States, how- 
interpreted to give power to 
the government to acquire 
territory by conquest or treaty, 
49, 50, 277, 284; should offer 
no hinderance to the country's 
expansion, 50. 

Consular service, American, 314, 

315- 

Cortes, Spanish, how composed, 
154- 

Costa Rica, financial recordof,42o. 

Cuba, attempts to purchase, 54, 
55, 128; war in, led to Amer- 
ican protectorate, 58, 112, 129, 
130; character of the people 
and conditions of life in, 113- 
131, 132-146; a coming negro 
problem in, 119; immigration 
into, 121 and n. ; defective edu- 
cational opportunities of, 122, 
123; scarcity of agricultural 
and skilled labor in, 124; 
how affected by British oc- 
cupation in 1762, 124, 125; 
proposed acquisition of, by 
young American republic, 125- 
130; claims representation in 
the Cortes, 127 ; its revolt from 
Spain, 127-131, 132; Lopez 
expedition to, 129; guerilla 
war in, 130; its freedom es- 
tablished, 131; its relations 
with the United States, 132- 
146, 179; its labor problem, 
133-136; improvement of its 
sanitation and public works, 
136, 137; educational reforms 
effected in, 137-140; condition 
of law in, 140, 141; a "pro- 
tected republic," 142; its pros- 
perity depends on reciprocity 
with the United States, 142, 
144; its annexation considered, 
143, 145, 146; its first presi- 
dent, 144, 145; controls the en- 
trance to the Gulf of Mexi- 
co, 190, 191; compared with 
Jamaica, 194; complementary 
to the United States, 197; 
government of, 267, 268; a 
protectorate of the United 
States, 274-276. 
Cubans, character of, and condi- 
tions of life in Cuba, 112-131, 
132-146; illiteracy of, 122; 



their lack of administrators 
and business - men, 123; and 
of agricultural and skilled 
labor, 124. See Cuba. 
Curajoa, importance of, 403. 

Danish and Dutch West Indies 
compared, 189. 

Democracy, opposed to trusts, 
31. 33' 35' 36; shibboleths of, 
never checked United States 
expansion, 48, 284; its power 
yet to be demonstrated, 61; 
its clash with Orientalism, 
82-84, 97, loi, 104; its com- 
promise with imperialism, 108, 
III, 302, 303; opposed to a 
system of patronage, 277; op- 
posed to any form of colonial 
government, 277, 302; grave 
fault of American, 308. 

Democratic party, its demand 
for the annexation of Oregon, 

53- 

Denmark, her treaty with the 
United States regarding the 
West Indies, 56, 57, and «.; 
her West Indian dependencies, 
189; her relations with her 
neighbors, 400-404. 

Dependencies, see Colonization; 
Expansion. 

De Tocqueville, his prediction of 
the annexation of Texas, 52 
n. ; on the loquacity of Amer- 
ican public officers, 77 «.; on 
the growth of Russia and the 
United States, 411. 

Diaz, Porfirio, President of 
Mexico, 165, 166, 169. 

Diike, Sir Charles, on the gov- 
ernment of the British West 
Indies, 186. 

Diplomatic service, American, 
315. 316. 

Dominica, see British West In- 
dies. 

Dominican Republic, a travesty, 
178, 179; its population, 269. 

Dutch and Danish West Indies 
compared, 189. 

East India Company, and Eng- 
land's trade with the Far 
East, 377. 

Ecuador, character of, 204; its 



425 



INDEX 



trade with the United States, 
215 «., 216 ».; financial record 
of, 420. 

Education, as a factor in the 
negro problem, 25; a solvent 
for all racial and political 
problems, 27-30; in England 
and the United States com- 
pared, 28, 29; too materialistic 
in the United States, 29, 30; of 
the Filipinos, 84, 91-97; defec- 
tive opportunities for, in Cuba, 
122, 123; how improved in 
Cuba under the protectorate, 
137-140. 

"Elastic clause," see Constitu- 
tion. 

Elections in the Philippines, 70- 

^ 73. 79. 80. 

Electors, and their election of 
President and Vice-President, 

255- 

Elgin, Lord, negotiates reci- 
procity treaty between Can- 
ada and the United States, 
228. 

Emigration, to the West, 46; to 
Oregon, 53. 

England, public life in, com- 
pared with that in the United 
States, 10, 11; education in, 
compared with that in the 
United States, 28, 29; House 
of Lords compared with Amer- 
ican Senate, 36; the main 
factor in her colonization, 41, 
42; in the war of 1812, 51. 
See Great Britain. 

English-speaking peoples, pro- 
posed federation of, 252. 

"Entangling alliances," true 
meaning of phrase, 394-396. 

Europe, South American trade 
with, 214, 215; South America 
complementary to, 219, 220; 
attitude of, to the Monroe 
Doctrine, 223-225, 397, 403, 
404, 406, 408; its future parti- 
tion, 286; international rela- 
tions of, 394-417. 

Examinations, non-competitive, 
for civil service, 305. 

Expansion, United States, tem- 
porarily checked by civil war 
and reconstruction, 56, 129, 
130; United States never hesi- 



tated on path of, 48, 284; 
legality of, 50; theory and 
practice of Pacific, 62-84, 85- 
1 1 1 ; of trade in the Philip- 
pines, 106-108; in the Carib- 
bean, 112-131, 132-146; spirit 
of, evolves a new phase of the 
Monroe Doctrine, 128, 170; 
bearing of the Panama canal 
upon, 190-198; marred by 
corrupt party government, 
240, 263-283, 302-312; de- 
mands a colonial civil service, 
284-301, 309-314; natives 
should be employed in the 
governmental processes of, 
317-342; needs a practical 
judicial system, 342, 343; an 
efficient army and navy es- 
sential to, 345-365; demands 
the employment of native 
troops, 352-357; British and 
American, in the Far East, 
388-393. See Colonization. 

Family compact, the, how it 
affected Cuba, 124, 125. 

Far East, the, development of 
trade with, 57 See Asia; 
Japan; Philippines. 

Favoritism in the army, abolish- 
ment of, 349. 

Federal government, its relations 
to the States, 253, 254, 255- 
258; its democratic character 
lost, 277; its control of oversea 
dependencies lacks perma- 
nency, 278. 

Federation, not annexation, the 
purpose of Pan- Americanism, 
226, 252; of English-speaking 
peoples, 252. 

Ferdinand of Aragon, on char- 
acter of Spaniards, 152. 

"Fifty-four-forty or fight," the 
party cry of, 54. 

Filibustering, government en- 
courages, 54, 55- 

"Filipino Nation," the non- 
existent, 67. 

Filipinos, character of, 63, 65- 
67, 71, 72, 79-83, 86-88, 
91-94, 97-104, 270-274, 288, 
289, 334, 335; social organi- 
zation of, 68, 69; views of 
prominent, 72, 89-91; their 

26 



INDEX 



resistance to American arms, 
86; their opposition to taxa- 
tion, 90; their attitude to 
religion, 91, 92, 271; their 
education, 92-97, 104; have 
no status in the world of 
labor, 97-105; their conflicting 
interests, 108; what they want 
ed and what they got, in; 
how they are governed, 266, 
267, 270, 274; anxious to be 
absorbed' by Greater America, 
273, 274, 278; compared with 
the people of British India, 
319, 320. See Philippines. 
Finland, the brutal crushing of, 

390. 
Florida, purchase of, from Spam, 
51; eventful history of, 51 «.; 
admitted to the Union, 52. 
Ford, I. N., quoted, 202. 
France, fails in true colonization, 
40; her sale of Louisiana, 49; 
her West Indian islands, 185- 
189- her protectorates, 276 
n.; in China, 371, 388; her 
international relations, 402, 
413; her navy compared with 
the navies of other nations, 
419. 
Franking, the abuse of, 306. 
Free-trade, British, its effect on 

Canada, 228. . 

Fremont, John C, his explonng 

expedition, 53. 
French Canadians, characteris- 
tics of, 230-233. 
French West Indies, government 
and people of. 185-189; com- 
pared with British West In- 
dies, 186-188; probable future 

of, 195- . , 

Friars, their expulsion from the 
PhiUppines, 89, 91. 

Froude, James Anthony, his pict- 
ure of the happy West Indian 
negro, 183, 184. 

Fuegians, the, 206. 

Funston, General, promotion ot, 
349. 

Fur trade, expansion due to, 53. 



Garrison, Llovd, favored the 

secession of Massachusetts, 53. 
German immigration, extent and 
cflect of, 3, 5; to Brazil, 52. 

4 



Germany, her protectorate sys- 
tem, 276 «.; her naval policy, 
357; her mercantile marine, 
362; in China, 371, 388; her 
international relations, 3.94- 
414; her growth and position, 
400, 401; her growing naval 
strength, 402; her attitude to 
the Monroe Doctrine, 403, 404, 
406; in Central and South 
America, 405-409". her navy 
compared with the navies of 
other powers, 419- 

Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, 

Great Britain, American claims 
to Oregon disputed by, 53, 54; 
effect of her occupation of 
Cuba in 1762, 124, 125; her 
dependencies in the West 
Indies compared with those 
of France, 186-188; impor- 
tance and desirability of her 
West Indian dependencies, 
193, 194; which favor Amer- 
ican amalgamation, 195-197 '- 
her interests in Chili, 207; m 
Brazil, 211; growth of im- 
perialism in, 226, 238, 239; her 
relations with Canada, 228- 
232, 234-246, 251, 252; her 
protectorates, 275 n.; her 
colonial civil service compared 
with the systems of other 
nations, 290-301, 318-344; her 
civil service, 306, 307 ; her rule 
in India. 318-333. 352-355J 
her "two -power standard 
naval policy, 357. 358; how 
involved in the transformation 
of Asia, 369-393; review of 
her international relations, 
394-417; her navy compared 
with the navies of other 
powers, 419- See, also, Eng- 
land. 

Greater America, what it means, 
[[{ -v.; how governed. 253-283. 

Guadeloupe, 'see French West 
Indies. 

Guam, island of, how governed, 
266. 

Guantanamo, American station 

in Cuba, 191- , 

Guatemala, financial record ot, 

420. 



27 



INDEX 



Hague tribunal, the, and the 
Monroe Doctrine, 224; sug- 
gested reference to, of Anglo- 
American disputes, 416. 

Half-breeds, lack of virility of, 
1 18-120. 

Havana, "the key of the New- 
World," 191. 

Hawaii, reciprocity treaty with, 
58; its acquisition, 58; Amer- 
icanized, 62; how governed, 
266, 269. 

Hay, John, Secretary of State, 
his management of the Pan- 
ama affair, 279. 

Hayti, the Black Republic, a 
warning, 176-178. 

Hedin, Dr. Sven, on Russian 
control of Tibet, 373. 

Hispaniola.in the French period, 
I 78; future of, 192. 

Holland, and her trading com- 
panies, 40; her relations with 
Germany, 400-405, 414. 

Holmes, Oliver Wendell, quoted, 
410 n. 

Honduras, Walker's attempt to 
conquer, 55; financial record 
of, 420. 

House of Representatives, the, 
255, 264, 276, 277, 279, 280; 
its committee system, 260, 
261, 280. 

Houston establishes the inde- 
pendence of Texas, 52, 56. 

Hungarian immigration, 2, 3, 22. 

Immigration, extent and effects 
of, 1-9, II, 16-19; Hungarian, 
2, 3, 22; Italian, 2, 3, 22; 
Armenian, 2, 3; Roumanian, 
2; Russian, 2, 3; Polish, 2, 
22; German, 3, 5; Irish, 3, 
5; restriction of, 6, 18; how 
directed to the West, 44; to 
Texas, 52 n.; will it change 
the character of the Cuban 
people? 143; to Argentina, 
208; of Americans to Canada, 
242, 243, 247; of British to 
Canada, 243, 248. 

Imperialism, and democracy, 
relations between, 108; com- 
mercial rather than political, 
197, 198, 226; not founded 
entirely on sentiment, 238, 239. 



India, British rule in, 318-333, 
352-355; compared to the 
Philippines, 319, 320, 352. 

Indian Bureau, the, 20; reserva- 
tion system, 2 i. 

Indians, their relations with 
the American people, 19, 22, 
60, 287; victims of the Spoils 
Systein, 20; effect of reserva- 
tion system upon, 20, 21, 60; 
foes of the Western frontiers- 
men, 46; their claims in 
Alabama and Georgia dis- 
regarded, 51; raids by the 
Seminoles in Florida, 51; their 
claims no bar to expansion, 
56; in Mexico, 167; in South 
America, 201, 202, 204 — 206, 
210; in Alaska, 265; govern- 
ment of their reservations, 265, 
266. 

Industrial depression predicted, 

33- . «. X 

Industrial expansion, efiect of, 

30-37- 

Insurrectos, Philippine, 87. 

Inter-Colonial Railway, 248. 

International rivalry in coloniza- 
tion, 43, 44. 

Intervention, European, by the 
United States, cases of, 397, 

399- , . . 

Iowa, its admission to the 

Union, 52. 
Irish immigration, extent and 

effects of, 3, 5. 
Italian immigration, 2, 3, 22. 
Italy, her international relations, 

402; her navy, 419. 

Jackson, Andrew, and his Spoils 
System, 12; his force of char- 
acter, 263. 

Jamaica, island of, its strategical 
situation, 193; compared with 
Cuba, 194. 

Japan, racial question in, 6; 
labor in, and in the United 
States compared, 30, 31, 33- 
35; intensely monarchical, 83; 
and Russia, Manila will be 
affected by result of war be- 
tween, 107; her attitude in 
Asia's transformation, 371, 
380-3S3, 388-391; her rela- 
tions with the United States, 



428 



INDEX 



412,413; comparative strength 
of her navy, 419. 

Japanese and Chinese immigra- 
tion discouraged, 18. 

Jefferson, Thomas, on the ac- 
quisition of Cuba, 126, 127, 
143; his force of character, 
263 ; on the development of 
the Pacific coast, 376. 

Jesuits, their work in ChiH, 212. 

Judicial system, elective, 240, 
241; need of a new, for the 
Philippines, 342, 343. 

Katipunan, the, 87. 

Key West, its strategic value, 
191. 

Kingston, harbor of, 194. 

"Know-nothing" party, 4. 

Korea, attitude of Russia tow- 
ards, 380, 381, 391; United 
States makes treaty with, 412. 

Labor and capital, relations be- 
tween, 30-35; of Japan and 
the United States compared, 
30. 31, 33-35; approaching 
conflict between, 32, 240; Trust 
development widens gap be- 
tween, 35, 36; in the Philip- 
pines, 101-106; in Cuba, 133- 
136; in the West Indies, 175. 

Labor unions, in Manila, 102, 
103. 

Ladrones, Philippme, 86-88, 92, 
102, 103. 

Latin- Americans, character of, 
150, 157, 158, 200-203, 216, 
270. 

Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, and reci- 
procity between the United 
States and Canada, 229, 230. 

Law, Cuba's system of, 140, 141; 
in the Philippines, 342, 343. 

Legarda, Senor B., his views on 
Philippine policy, 72, 90. 

Leisured class of America, the, 
9, 10; their distaste of public 
service, 10, 11. 

Leroy-Beaulieu, quoted on Eng- 
land's concessions to her colo- 
nies, 120; on the government 
of the French West Indies, 187. 

Lhasa, its underground connec- 
tion with St. Petersburg, 372, 
373- 



Lincoln, Abraham, President, the 
great exception, 263. 

Literature and art in the United 
States, 8. 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, on the effect 
of the American Revolution in 
Spanish America, 151 n. 

Lopez expedition, the abortive, 
129. 

Louisiana Purchase, the, 48-50; 
not provided for under the Con- 
stitution, 49; French spoken 
in, 61. 

Luzuriago, R. de, on the admis- 
sion of the Philippines into the 
Union, 72. 

Lynchings due to local condi- 
tions, 256. 

"Machine," the political, 259- 
261. 

Madison, James, on the annex- 
ation of Cuba, 126 and n.; his 
force of character, 263. 

Mahan, Captain, compares Cuba 
and Jamaica, 194. 

Makato, Tentearo, quoted on la- 
bor conditions in Japan and 
the United States, 30, 31. 

Malayans, characteristics of, 97, 
98, 355. 

Manchu dynasty, its control of 
China, 383-386. 

Manchuria, Russia's attitude to, 
380, 381, 390. 

Manila, capture of, 59; climate 
of, 98; trade unions in, 102, 
103; its possibilities depend- 
ing on result of Russo-Japan 
war, 107. 

Marshall, Chief- Justice, his au- 
thoritative reading of the 
"elastic clause" of the Con- 
stitution, 50. 

Martinique, see French West 
Indies. 

Massachusetts, its secession sug- 
gested, 53. 

Mercantile marine, American, 
361-363. 

Mestizos, Philippine, 68, 69, 79, 
82, 84, 86, 89, 92; Cuban, 
114, 118. 

Mexico, her loss of Texas, 52 
and «.; her war with the 
United States, 53, 345; ^^^ 



429 



INDEX 



cession of territory compris- 
ing California, New Mexico, 
Nevada, Utah, and portions 
of Colorado and Wyoming, 
53, 54; Buchanan proposes a 
protectorate over, 55; its ab- 
sorption considered, 147, 148, 
165-170; a republic only in 
name, 165; her government 
under Diaz, 165, 166; Amer- 
ican investments in, 166 and 
n.; her people illiterate, 166; 
her Indian and other problems, 
167, 168; her imports from 
the United States, 168 n.; an 
unsolved problem, 169, 170; 
financial record of, 420. 

Mexico, Gulf of, Cuba controls 
entrance to, 190, 191; devoid 
of harborage, 192. 

Michie, Alexander, quoted on 
America's maritime exploits, 

378. 379- 

Michigan, its admission into the 

Union, 52. 
Midway Island, naval station in 

the Pacific, 58. 
Militia law, changes in, 351. 
Millionairism, a modem disease, 

Miranda, Francisco Antonio Ga- 
briel, Venezuelan patriot, 202, 
203. 

Mississippi River, importance of, 
191, 368. 

Mona Passage, deficient in har- 
borage, 192. 

Mongolia, the centre of Russian 
influence in the East, 372-374. 

Monroe Doctrine, the, its ten- 
dency to preserve the balance 
of power, 44; its first ap- 
plication, 127; how it was 
applied to help Spain, 128; a 
later development of, 128; 
Pan- Americanism woven into, 
220-225; a matter of policy, 
not of international law, 220- 
222; designed in Europe, 220; 
attitude of South American 
states to, 223; Europe's atti- 
tude to, 223-225, 397, 403, 404, 
406, 408; objectionable to 
Canada, 239, 240; a feature of 
America's isolation, 395, 396; 
aimed at Russia, 410. 



Municipal government in British 
India, 328, 329. 

Napoleon I., his motive in dis- 
posing of Louisiana, 49. 

National character, American, 3, 
4, 15-18. 

National expansion, s^^ Coloniza- 
tion; Expansion. 

Navy, United States, its suppres- 
sion of piracy in the Medi- 
terranean, 51; in the War of 
181 2, 51; should keep pace 
with the country's expansion, 
195; condition and efficiency 
of, 357-365; compared with 
the navies of other powers, 

419- 

Negroes, the, nature and impor- 
tance of the problem they 
present, 22-27, ^°> 6i> 287; 
their steady increase, 22 ; what 
their leaders desire, 22; op- 
position to their citizenship 
in the Southern States, 23; 
how they can be dealt with 
justly, 24, 27; a subject race, 
24, 27; what education will do 
for them, 25 ; their segregation, 
6 1 ; will be a future problem 
for Cuba, 119, 142 ; in the West 
Indies, 173, 174, 181-185, 187, 
189, 196; in Brazil, 210; in 
Canada, 241; in Puerto Rico, 
269; in Trinidad and San 
Domingo, 269; are a retrogres- 
sive race, 273; their employ- 
ment by the government at 
Panama advocated, 356, 357. 

New England, disappearance of 
its yeomen, 15 n. 

New Mexico, seizure of, 53; 
government of, 265. 

New York City, nativity of its 
population, 3. 

News agencies, Canada depend- 
ent upon American, 246, 247. 

Nicaragua, filibustering attempts 
to conquer, 5 5 ; financial record 
of, 420. 

Non - competitive examinations 
for civil service, 305. 

Norman, Mr. Henry, quoted on 
the Russian people, 375 n. 

North, the, compared with the 
South at the time of the 



430 



INDEX 



adoption of the Constitution, 
47, 48; important develop- 
ment of, 53, 54. 

North Americans antipathetic 
to South Americans, 409. 

Nunez, Rafael, the Colombian 
dictator, 202. 

Oklahoma, government of, 265. 

Olney, Richard, quoted on the 
growth of America's foreign 
policy, 395 and n., 398, 399. 

Ordinaire, M. Maurice, on mod- 
em colonization, 187, 188. 

Oregon, annexation of, 53, 54. 

Ostend, conference at, 54; mani- 
festo, the, 129, 214. 

Pacific, the, development of 
American interests in, 57-60, 
62-111, 366-393. 

"Pacific blockade" of Vene- 
zuela, 223, 224. 

Palma, Senor, first President of 
the Cuban Republic, 144, 145. 

Panama Canal, a consideration 
of the question, 160-165; its 
bearing on American expan- 
sion, 190-198, 200, 367, 368; 
President Roosevelt's and Mr. 
Hay's admirable settlement of 
matters affecting, 279; em- 
ployment of natives in polic- 
ing and constructing, 356, 
357. 

Pan- Americanism, in the South- 
em Continent, 199-225; the 
orginators of the movement, 
199; the four Pan-American 
conferences, 213, 216-218; at- 
titude of the United States 
to the movement, 213-225; 
arbitration as a motive for, 
216; other objects aimed at, 
218; interwoven with the 
Monroe Doctrine, 220-225; in 
Canada, 226-252. 

Pan-Germanism, aspirations of, 
401, 406. 

Pango-Pango, Samoa, 58. 

Pan-Slavism versus Pan-German- 
ism, 401. 

Paraguay, its trade with the 
United States, 215 n., 216 «. ; 
financial record of, 420. 

Partido Federal, the, 89. 



Parties, political, see Politics. 

Patronage, the lever of the body 
politic, 258, 259, 262; the 
comer-stone of official and 
political life, 304, 305, 307; 
its effect on the army, 346, 
347, 349; navy exempt from, 
364- 

Pensacola, its strategic value, 
191. 

Persia, contest for, 387. 

Peru, characteristics of, 204, 
205; its trade with the United 
States, 215 «., 216 n. ; financial 
record of, 420. 

Peter the Great, and the found- 
ing of the Russian Empire, 

374, 375- , 

Philippines, the, their acquisi- 
tion, 59, 85, 331; problems to 
be solved in their coloniza- 
tion, 62 — 84, 287 — 312, 317- 
344, 352, 355- 356; elections 
in, 70-73, 79, 80; governor of, 
73, 74; bureaucracy in, 75-79, 
81; taxation in, 80; review 
of the United States' coloniz- 
ing efforts in, 85-11 1; secret 
societies of, 87; native con- 
stabulary of, 88, 89; expulsion 
of friars from, 89; the Church 
in, 91, 92; education in, 92-97, 
104; the labor question in, 
97-105; climate of, 98, 99; 
foreign capital and foreigners 
discriminated against in, 105, 
106; trade expansion in, 106— 
108; material progress in de- 
velopment of, 1 08-1 10; gov- 
ernment of, 266, 267, 271- 
274. 278, 331-335; Spoils Sys- 
tem in, 278 w., 335; compared 
with British India, 319. 320; 
judicial system in, 342, 343; 
employment of native troops 
in, 352, 355. 356. See Fili- 
pinos. 

Pines, Isle of, restored to Cuba, 
191. 

Plate River, its wonderful sys- 
tem of navigation, 209. 

Political corruption, its cause 
and effect, 11-13. 

Politicians, American, number 
of, 309. 

Politics, decHne of State, 257; 



431 



INDEX 



growth of party system, 258; 
patronage and vested interests 
control, 258, 259, 262, 304, 
305; obstacles to overcome in 
reforming, 283; civil-service 
reform, 305-309; elimination 
of, from the army, 346-349; 
European, a necessary study 
for the American statesman, 

399- 

Polk, James K., his attempt 
to purchase Cuba, 128; his 
enlargement of the Monroe 
Doctrine, 222. 

Population, increase of urban, 
2 n. ; of the United States 
and of various States com- 
pared, 13 «.; overflow of, 
the main factor in British 
colonization, 41, 42; of the 
original thirteen States, and 
how distributed, 47, 48. 

Portugal, her motives for coloni- 
zation, 40. 

President, the, election of, 241, 
254, 255; powers of, 261—264, 
267, 27S-282, 305, 310. 

Press, the American, its influ- 
ence in Canada, 246, 247. 

Protectorates, how distinguish- 
ed, 274-276; a list of existing, 
275 n., 276 n. 

Puerto Rico, occupation of, 58, 
147; a territory with no 
claims to statehood, and her 
inhabitants denied citizenship, 
179, 180 and n., 181; gov- 
ernment of, 266-269, 270; 
people of, 269. 

Puget Sound, 363. 

Railways, in Cuba, 137 ; in Peru, 
205; in Chili, 207; in Brazil, 
211; in Canada, 247-249; of 
Asia, 368-370. 

Reciprocity, its importance to 
Cuba, 142, 144; to Mexico, 
168; treaties with Brazil and 
Spain in Cuba, 215; with 
Canada, 228, 229, 230, 236, 
240-246. See Tariff. 

Reconstruction checks expan- 
sion, 56. 

Religious persecution, an im- 
portant factor in the colo- 
nization and development of 



America, 42, 43; Utah founded 

because of, 44. 
Republics, Spanish - American, 

characteristics of, 200-213; 

trade of, 214, 215 n., 216 «.; 

financial record of, 420. 
Rockhill, Mr., in charge of the 

Bureau of American Republics, 

279 n. 
Rome, the first state colonizer, 

39. 40. 
Roosevelt, President, quoted, 

4, 68, 223, 224, 288, 308, 351; 

his admirable administration, 

279, 281, 282; his army re- 
forms, 349-351- 
Root, Elihu, Secretary of War, 

his reforms in the army, 347- 

351- 

Roumanian immigration, 2. 

Russia, result of her war with 
Japan important to Manila, 
107; her aggression a menace 
to the trade interests of the 
Far East, 107 ; naval policy of, 
358; her ambitions inimical 
to the United States and a 
menace to the world, 358, 
359; her attitude in the Far 
East, 370-376, 380, 381, 387- 
389, 392; founding of the 
empire and character of the 
government, 374-376, 411; re- 
view of her foreign relations, 
394-417; her navy compared 
with the navies of other 
nations, 419. 

Russian immigration, 2, 3. 

Russo-German agreement, a side- 
light on, 358, 359 and n. 

St. John, island of, Seward's 

offer for, 57 n. 
St. Lawrence, the, and Canada's 

water communication, 250. 
St. Lucia, its importance, 194. 
St. Thomas, island of, seeks ad- 
mission into the Union, 56, 

57 and n., 192, 193. 
Salvador, its financial record, 

420. 
Samoa, its acquisition, 58, 62; 

how governed, 266. 
San Domingo seeks admission 

into the Union, 56, 57 and «. 

See Dominican Republic. 



432 



INDEX 



Sanitation in Cuba, 136, 137. 

Secret societies in the Philip- 
pines, 87. 

Selva, Carlos, on the instability 
of Latin - American govern- 
ment, 150, 151 n. 

Seminoles, see Indians. 

Senate, United States, voting 
strength of East and West in, 
13 «. ; Trusts will find their 
strongest support in, 36; com- 
pared with British House of 
Lords, 36; its constitution 
and powers, 254, 262, 264, 276, 
277, 279, 280, 304, 306; com- 
mittee system of, 260, 261. 

Seward, William H., his offer 
for St. Thomas and St. John, 
57 n.; his acquisition of Alaska 
and the Aleutian Islands, 376, 

377- 

Siam, a probable French pro- 
tectorate, 387. 

Silvela, Don Francisco, on lack 
of patriotism in Spain, 155 n. 

Slavery contest, how it affected 
the admission of new States 
into the Union, 52, 53, 129, 
130; no hinderance to ex- 
pansion, 55. 

Socialism, not yet a menace 
to capitalism, 32, t,;}; would 
aggravate the situation in 
Cuba, 135; in Spain, 154. 

Societies, colonial, what they 
indicate, 16; secret, of the 
Philippines, 87. See Cincin- 
nati; Colonial Dames; Sons 
and Daughters of the Revo- 
lution. 

Society, American, its hetero- 
geneous nature, 16-19. 

Sons and Daughters of the 
Revolution, 16. 

South, the, and the negro prob- 
lem, 22-27; compared with 
the North at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution, 
47, 48; admission to the Union 
of slave-holding States in, 
52; in competition with Cuba, 

132. ^33- 
South America, republics of, 
characteristics of their people 
and governments, 200—213 ; col- 
onization of, 201, 202; prod- 



ucts of, 214; its trade with 
the United States, 215 n., 216 
«.; its commercial interests 
paramount, 219, 220; its at- 
titude to the Monroe Doctrine, 
223; how affected by the 
Russo-German agreement, 358, 
359; German ambitions in, 
405-409; people of, anti- 
pathetic to North Americans, 
409; financial record of the 
various republics of, 420. 

Spain, motives for her coloniza- 
tion, 40; her sale of Florida, 
51; her claims to Oregon, 53; 
American government seeks 
to purchase Cuba from, 54, 
55, 128; her war with the 
United States, 58, 59, 112, 
345-347; America's struggle 
with, of long continuance, 
59; denies representation to 
Cubans, 127; Cuba revolts 
from, 1 27-131; failure of Os- 
tend manifesto to force a 
quarrel on, 129; development 
of her colonial system, 150; 
characteristics of her people, 
i5i'~^53. 154-156; her Cortes, 
how composed, 154; her gov- 
ernment, 154, 155; her elimina- 
tion from American affairs, 
413, 414. See Cuba. 

Spaniards, character of, 151-153, 
154-156, 176, 200-203, 207, 
218, 219. 

Spanish - American republics, 
financial record of, 420. See 
Central America; South Amer- 
ica. 

Spencer, Herbert, quoted on race 
fusion, 118 n., 119 n. 

Spoils System, the, baleful in- 
fluence of, 12, 20, 240, 301,305; 
the corner-stone of govern- 
mental power in the United 
States, 277; in the Philippines, 
278 n. 

States, their relation to the 
federal government, 253, 254, 
255-258. 

Subig Bay, selected as a naval 
station in the Philippines, 
109 n. 

Subsidies, in the development of 
the mercantile marine ,361,362. 



aS 



433 



INDEX 



Suez Canal compared with that 
proposed at Panama, 163, 
164, 367, 368. 

Sugar and tobacco, how affected 
by tariff in the Phihppines, 
107; in Cuba, 132, 133. 

Tariff, its effect in the Philip- 
pines, 107; in Cuba, 132; in 
Mexico, 167-169; in the French 
West Indies, 186; in Canada, 
22S— 230, 236—238, 244—248; a 
feature of America's isolation, 

395- , . . 

Tavera, Dr. Pardo de, his views 
on Philippine matters, 72, 89- 

Taxation, attitude of Filipinos 
towards, 90. 

Teachers, how they should have 
been prepared for the Fili- 
pinos, 94, 95; the poorest 
paid class in the Philip- 
pines , 95; how obtained for 
Cuba, 138, 139. 

Texas, annexation of, 52; De 
Tocqueville's prediction rela- 
tive to, 52 n.\ its admission 
into the Union, 52, 53. 

Tibet, the "forbidden," open 
to Russians, 372, 373; British 
movement into, 374; a buffer 
state, 387. 

Tobacco and sugar, how af- 
fected by tariff in the Philip- 
pines, 107; in Cuba, 132, 133. 

Tornado, her capture of the 
Virginius, 130 n. 

Trade, anti-expansionists fear 
to disturb balance of, 48 ; 
expansion of, in the Philip- 
pines, 106-108; of United 
States will be stimulated by 
Panama Canal, 162, 215; with 
Mexico, 166 ; with South Amer- 
ica, 214—216 «., 219, 220; with 
the Far East, 376-379. 

Trans-Canada Railway, 249. 

Trans-Caspian Railway, 369 n. 

Transformation of Asia, 366-393. 
See Asia. 

Treaty, with Denmark, 56, 57 «. ; 
with Hawaii, 58; with Japan, 
412; with China, 412, 413. 

Tropics, Americans in, 284-301. 

Trusts, the, opposed to democ- 



racy, 32, ^^, 35, 36; not yet 
menaced by socialism, 32; 
not altogether due to financial 
conditions, ^^•, their develop- 
ment widens gap between cap- 
ital and labor, 35; regulation 
of. 35. 36; will find their 
strongest support in the 
Senate, 36; discriminated 
against in the government of 
the Philippines, 108; feed the 
political machine, 108; in 
national affairs, 236; and sub- 
sidies develop the mercantile 
marine, 361, 362. 

Turkey, how upheld, 387. 

"Two-power standard,' Great 
Britain's, 357, 358. 

United States, the, immigra- 
tion to, 1-9, II, 16-19, 60; 
literature and art in, 8; 
national characteristics of her 
people, 9; her leisured class, 
9-1 1 ; public life in, compared 
with that in England, 10, 11; 
her political corruption, 11- 
13; her colonial societies, 16; 
a great world power, 19, 44, 
45, 59; her Indian problem, 
19-22, 60; her negro problem, 
22-27, 60, 61; education in, 
27-30; her industrial expan- 
sion, 30-37; her Senate com- 
pared with English House of 
Lords, 36; her expansion 
through colonization, 38-61, 
62-84, 85-111, 112-131; her 
oversea expansion due to 
international rivalry, 43, 44; 
tendency of her Monroe Doc- 
trine and its applications, 44, 
127, 128; weaknesses of the 
thirteen original States, 45; 
her acquisition and settlement 
of the Northwest Territory. 
45, 46; her purchase of Loui- 
siana, 48-50; discovery of the 
"elastic clause" of her Con- 
stitution, 50; her disregard of 
the highest judicial authority, 
50, 51; her great prosperity 
and rapid growth after the ac- 
quisition of Louisiana, 51; 
her purchase of Florida, 51; 
her annexation of Texas, 52 



434 



INDEX 



53; admits Florida, Arkansas, 
Michigan, Iowa, and Wis- 
consin, 52; her war with 
Mexico, 53, 345; her boundary 
disputes and acquisition of 
California, New Mexico, Ari- 
zona, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, 
Wyoming, and Oregon, 53, 
54; her unofficial encourage- 
ment of filibustering, 54, 55, 
129, 130; her semi-official 
efforts to acquire Cuba, 54, 
55, 125-130; her expansion 
checked by civil war, 56, 57, 
139; her acquisition of Alaska, 
57; her trade invasion of the 
Pacific, 57, 58; her first naval 
station in the Pacific, 58; 
her acquisition of Hawaii and 
of Samoa, 58; her protecto- 
rate of Cuba, war with Spain, 
and capture of Puerto Rico 
and Manila, 58, 59, 112, 130, 
131; her most pressing prob- 
lem, 60; her government of the 
Philippines, theoretical and 
practical, 62-84, 85-1 11; her 
department reports prolix and 
redundant, 76-78; her re- 
pudiation of the Ostend mani- 
festo, 129; her relations with 
Cuba, 132-146; her new sphere 
and its possibilities, 147-170; 
can she "Americanize" Cen- 
tral America and Mexico? 158, 
159; her isthmian canal prob- 
lem, 160-165; her exporta- 
tions to other American coun- 
tries, 168 n.; her control of 
the Caribbean, 171-198; her 
Puerto-Rican problem, 179- 
181; her acquisition of the 
British West Indies consid- 
ered, 193-197; her attitude to 
the Pan-American movement, 
199, 213-225; her trade with 
South America, 214, 215 n., 
216 «., 219, 220; her inter- 
pretation of the Monroe Doc- 
trine, 220, 222; her attitude 
to Canada, 226-252; and her 
dependencies, how governed, 
253-283; problems involved 
in her expansion, 284-288, 
302-316, 317-344; her need of 
an efficient colonial civil ser- 



vice, 289, 290, 301, 309-314; 
her colonial civil service com- 
pared with that of other na- 
tions, 290-301, 318-344; her 
consular and diplomatic ser- 
vice, 314-316; her miHtary 
system, 345-357; her naval 
system, 357-365; her mercan- 
tile marine, 361-363; how in- 
volved in the transformation 
of Asia, 366-393; her foreign 
relations, 394-417; cases of 
European intervention by, 
397-399; her navy compared 
with the navies of other 
nations, 419. See American 
people. 

Uruguay, character of, 210, 214; 
its trade with the United 
States, 215 n., 216 n. ; finan- 
cial record of, 420. 

Utah, founded by reason of 
religious persecution, 44. 

Venezuela, characteristics of, 
202-204; the "pacific block- 
ade" of, 223, 224, 408; its 
financial record, 420. 

Vested interests and patronage 
control the body politic, 258, 
259, 262. 

Vice-President, election of, 255. 

Virginius, capture of, and ex- 
ecution of her crew and 
passengers, 130 and n. 

Wake, island of, how governed, 
266. 

Walker, William, filibuster, 55, 
214. 

War, with England, 51; with 
Indians in Florida, 51; with 
Mexico, 53, 345; the civil 
war, 56; with Spain, 58, 59. 

War college, establishment of, 
348, 349- _ 

Washington, George, as an Amer- 
ican type, 15, 263; quoted on 
"entangling alliances," 394 
and «., 396. 

Webster, Daniel, 263. 

West, the, people and develop- 
ment of, 12-15, 46, 47; with 
a minority of electors has 
a majority of Senators, 13 
and n.; its pioneers sought 



435 



INDEX 



religious freedom, 42; how 
emigration was directed to, 
44; causes of emigration to, 
and its development towards 
statehood, 46, 47; first news- 
paper of, 46. 

West Indian problem, the, 184, 
185. 

"West Indies, the, treaty with 
Denmark regarding, 56, 57 
and n. ; their imports from the 
United States, 168 n.; Amer- 
ican control of, considered, 
1 71-198; inhabitants and con- 
ditions of, 173-189, 196; 
French and British, compared, 
185-188; Dutch and Danish, 
compared, 189; importance 
and desirability of British, 
193, 194; favor American I 



amalgamation, 195-197; ef- 
fect of Panama Canal upon, 
197, 198. 

Windward Passage, commanded 
by Cuba, 192. 

Wisconsin, its admission into the 
Union, 52. 

Wood, General Leonard, his so- 
lution of Cuba's educational 
problem, 137-139; his pro- 
posed promotion, 349; his 
visit to the East, 352. 

"Yankees" of the southern 
hemisphere, 207. 

Zybikoff, M., testifies to Rus- 
sia's domination over Tibet 
and Lhasa, 373. 



THE END 




EACH SQUARE REPRESENTS 
A POPULATION OF 25,000 
i CITIES OVER 100,000 POP. 



DIAGRAM SHOWING DENSITY OF POPULATION 
IN SOUTH AMERICA 



